Ex Parte Fillion et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 31, 2014

11828550 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 31, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/828,550 07/26/2007 Raymond Albert Fillion 214555-1 9514
62204 7590 07/31/2014
GE Licensing
ATTN: Brandon, K1-2A62A
1 Research Circle
Niskayuna, NY 12309
EXAMINER
AYCHILLHUM, ANDARGIE M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2847
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/31/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_______________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_______________

Ex parte RAYMOND ALBERT FILLION,
KEVIN MATTHEW DUROCHER, RICHARD JOSEPH SAIA
and CHARLES GERALD WOYCHIK
______________

Appeal 2012-006552
Application 11/828,550
Technology Center 2800
_______________

Before CHARLES F. WARREN, BEVERLY A. FRANKLIN and
GEORGE C. BEST, Administrative Patent Judges.

WARREN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Applicants appeal to the Board under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
decision of the Primary Examiner finally rejecting claims 1-22 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a): claim 1 over Sasaki (US 5,994,771) and Bhullar
(US 2004/0163953 A1); claims 2, 3, 5-12 and 16-22 over Sasaki, Bhullar
and Fillion (US 5,353,498); and claims 4, 5 and 13-15 over Sasaki, Bhullar,
Fillion and Brechignac (US 2004/0217454 A1). Br. 3; Ans. 4, 6, 11. We
have jurisdiction. 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm the decision of the Primary Examiner.
Claim 1, with reference to Specification Figures 1-3, illustrates
Appellants’ invention of an interconnect structure, and is representative of
the claims on appeal:
Appeal 2012-006552
Application 11/828,550
2
1. An interconnect structure, comprising:
a substantially flexible insulative web (38) having a first surface and a
second surface;
a logic device (40) having a first surface and a second surface, the
logic device (40) secured to the second surface of the insulative web (38) via
the first surface of the logic device (40);
a frame assembly (37) supporting the insulative web (38) and
comprising;
a frame base (12) having a first surface, a second surface, and
an inward facing surface (35) defining a frame aperture (36), the frame
aperture (36) extending through the fame base (12) from the frame base first
surface to the frame base second surface, wherein at least a portion of the
logic device (40) is disposed within the aperture (36); and
a first conductive layer (18) located adjacent the frame base
(12) first surface and only coupled indirectly to the logic device (40) through
the insulative web (38), wherein the first conductive layer is not in direct
contact with the logic device (40);
a device connector (34) operable to allow the logic device (40) to
communicate therethrough to the first conductive layer (18).
App. Br. 7 (App’x Of Claims On Appeal). Spec. ¶¶ 0019-0021, 0032.
Appellants argue each of the second and third grounds of rejection on
the claims as a group. Br. 4-5. Thus, we decide this appeal based on claims
1, 2 and 4. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
OPINION
We are of the opinion that Appellants’ arguments do not persuasively
establish reversible error on the part of the Examiner. In re Jung, 637 F.3d
1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that even if the examiner had failed
to make a prima facie case, the Board would not have erred in framing the
issue as one of reversible error because it has long been the Board’s practice
to require an appellant to identify the alleged error in the examiner’s
Appeal 2012-006552
Application 11/828,550
3
rejections) (citing Ex parte Frye, Appeal No. 2009-006013, at 9-10 [94
USPQ2d 1072, 1075] (BPAI Feb. 26, 2010) (precedential) (“The panel then
reviews the obviousness rejection for error based upon the issues identified
by appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon.”)); .cf., e.g., In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 392 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (“It is not the function of this court to examine the claims in
greater detail than argued by an appellant, looking for nonobvious
distinctions over the prior art.”).
With respect to claim 1, the Examiner submits that the combination of
Sasaki and Bhullar would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to use
Bhullar’s flexible insulative material forming the insulative web used as
bottom plate element 14, which is structured to form the base in the
disclosed biosensor, in place of the glass reinforced resin insulative material
used as Sasaki’s insulative core 10, thus providing insulative core 10 with
the flexibility to adjust to different conditions without breaking. Sasaki col.3
l.13 to col.4 l.47, Fig. 1; Bhullar ¶¶ 0026, 0027, Fig. 1. Ans. 4-6; Br. 4.
Appellants do not dispute the teachings of Sasaki and Bhullar. Br. 4.
Appellants contend that the combination of Sasaki and Bhullar would not
result in the claimed interconnect structure specified in claim 1 because
Bhullar’s bottom plate element 14 serves as a building base for the biosensor
in similar manner to frame base 12 serving as a building base for the claimed
interconnect structure, and thus is not the substantially flexible insulative
web 38 as claimed which “is an element of the buildup and not the actual
base of the buildup.” Br. 4.
On this record, we are of the view that Appellants’ position does not
establish that the Examiner erred in determining that one of ordinary skill in
Appeal 2012-006552
Application 11/828,550
4
the art would have substituted the flexible insulative material per se of
Bhullar’s bottom plate element 14 for the glass reinforced resin material of
Sasaki’s insulative core 10, thus arriving at substantially flexible insulative
web 38 of claim 1. Indeed, Appellants’ contention that the substitution of
Bhullar’s bottom plate element 14 (which is structured for use in building
the biosensor) for Sasaki’s insulative core 10 should be considered as a
building base in the same manner that frame base 12 serves as a building
base in the buildup of the interconnect structure, does not address the
Examiner’s position with respect to the obviousness of substituting Bhullar’s
flexible insulative web for Sasaki’s glass reinforced insulative material in
Ssaki’s insulative core 10. See, e.g., In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
1981) (“The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary
reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary
reference . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the
references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.”); cf. In
re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1985), and cases cited therein
(“even though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the
process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself”).
Turning now to claim 2, which limits claim 1 by specifying that
insulative web 38 is any manner of polymer film including one of the
materials specified by claim 3 which depends on claim 2, the Examiner
submits that the combination of Sasaki, Bhullar and Fillion would have led
one of ordinary skill in the art to use one of Fillion’s polymer film materials
disclosed for Fillion’s insulative web 12b, illustrated in Fillion’s Figure 4(e),
as insulative core 10 of Sasaki as modified by Bhullar, as applied to claim 1,
which would provide electrical insulation and thermal conductivity. Ans.
Appeal 2012-006552
Application 11/828,550
5
6-7. Appellants do not dispute the teachings of Fillion. Br. 4-5. We are of
the opinion that Appellants’ contention that Fillion’s disclosure with respect
to the structure formed by the method of fabricating an integrated circuit
module disclosed therein does not cure the “deficiencies” of Sasaki and
Bhullar advanced with respect to claim 1, fails to establish that the Examiner
erred in maintaining this ground of rejection for the reasons we stated above.
Indeed, Appellants reliance on Fillion’s fabrication method, which is not
relied upon by the Examiner, does not address the Examiner’s position based
on the insulative materials per se disclosed in Fillion.
In similar manner, we further find Appellants’ contention that
Brechignac “makes no mention of a substantially flexible insulative web,”
fails to establish that the Examiner erred in relying on Brechignac in
combination with Sasaki, Bhullar and Fillion to establish that the
combination of references would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to
use the metal that Brechignac discloses for support 2 as the material for
Fillion’s frame base 24, thus arriving at an interconnect structure
comprising, among other things, frame base 12 which can be metal as
specified in claim 4 in modifying claim 1. Ans. 11; Br. 5.
Accordingly, we affirm the grounds of rejection of claims 1-22 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) maintained on appeal by the Examiner.
The Primary Examiner’s decision is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED

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