Ex Parte Febonio et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 11, 201612486073 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 12/486,073 06/17/2009 37945 7590 08/15/2016 DUKEW, YEE YEE AND AS SOCIA TES, P.C. P.O. BOX 802333 DALLAS, TX 75380 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Barbara Febonio UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. FR920080055US 1 4423 EXAMINER NGUYEN, TIEN C ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3694 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/15/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): ptonotifs@yeeiplaw.com mgamez@yeeiplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte BARBARA FEBONIO and SANDRO PICCININI Appeal2014-002857 Application 12/486,073 Technology Center 3600 Before BIBHU R. MOHANTY, MICHAEL W. KIM, and CYNTHIA L. MURPHY, Administrative Patent Judges. MOHANTY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the final rejection of claims 1-19 which are all the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). SUMMARY OF THE DECISION We REVERSE. Appeal2014-002857 Application 12/486,073 THE INVENTION The Appellants' claimed invention is directed to a method and system for authorizing an electronic payment (Spec., para. 11 ). Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A method performed by a computer for authorizing an electronic payment request, the method comprising: [ 1] the computer requesting a first code from a user on receipt of a payment request made with a payment card configured with a one or more details of a one or more devices in the possession of a one or more owners of the payment card; [2] the computer refusing to make the payment in the event the first code does not substantially match a predefined second code; [3] responsive to the first code substantially matching the second code, the computer requesting a third code from the one or more devices with whose details the payment card is configured; [ 4] the computer comparing the third code with a predefined fourth code; [5] responsive to the third code not substantially matching the fourth code, the computer refusing to make the payment; and [ 6] responsive to the third code substantially matching the fourth code, the computer authorizing the payment. THE REJECTIONS The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence in support of the rejections: O'Connell Felger Dickson Maes Sheehan Skowronek Rados US 2002/0035539 Al US 2003/0195848 Al US 6,736,313 Bl US 7,003,497 B2 US 2007/0011099Al US 2009/0112765 Al US 7,600,676 Bl 2 Mar. 21, 2002 Oct. 16, 2003 May 18, 2004 Feb.21,2006 Jan. 11, 2007 Apr. 30, 2009 Oct. 13, 2009 Appeal2014-002857 Application 12/486,073 r-T""i1 ,.. 11 • • ' • 1 ,.. ,.. • l ne rouowmg reJecuons are oerore us ror review: 1. Claims 1-5 and 10-15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Maes, Dickson, and O'Connell. 2. Claims 6 and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Maes, Dickson, O'Connell, Sheehan, and Skowronek. 3. Claims 7 and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Maes, Dickson, O'Connell, and Sheehan. 4. Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Maes, Dickson, O'Connell, and Rados. 5. Claims 9, 18, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Maes, Dickson, O'Connell, and Pegler. FINDINGS OF FACT We have determined that the findings of fact in the Analysis section below are supported at least by a preponderance of the evidence. 1 ANALYSIS The Appellants argue that the rejection of claim 1 is improper because the cited prior art fails to disclose elements of claim limitation [1] (App. Br. 6-11; Reply Br. 2, 3). In contrast, the Examiner has determined that the cited rejection is proper and that the cited claim limitations are found in Maes at column 4, lines 55---67; column 5, lines 1-15; and column 8, lines 1---65 (Ans. 5-7). 1 See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the general evidentiary standard for proceedings before the Patent Office). 3 Appeal2014-002857 Application 12/486,073 We agree with the Appellants. The Appellants first argue that the cited prior art fails to disclose the claim limitation for "a payment card configured with a one or more details of a one or more devices in the possession of a one or more owners of the payment card" (App. Br. 6-13). The Examiner has first determined that the cited claim limitation is nonfunctional descriptive material, but we disagree with this contention. Here, the claim requires that the method be carried out with a request from a payment card configured in the manner recited in claim limitation [ 1] identified above. In the Answer at page 7, the rejection also cites to the portion of the argued claim limitation as being disclosed by Maes at column 4, lines 55----67; column 5, lines 1--45; and column 8, lines 1----65 under a broadest reasonable interpretation, but we disagree with this contention. Here, these citations to Maes fail to disclose the cited claim limitation for "a payment card configured with a one or more details of a one or more devices in the possession of a one or more owners of the payment card." Maes at column 4, lines 55-67 discloses features such as those directed to electronic transactions, but nothing of the cited limitation for a payment card specifically configured "with a one or more details of a one or more devices in the possession of a one or more owners of the payment card." Maes at col. 5: 1--45 also fails to disclose a card with such claimed details. For instance, at col. 5:16-22 it is disclosed that the location of the private mailbox 12 is not disclosed, but rather a separate e-Notary 11 is used. Maes at col. 8: 1----65 similarly fails to disclose a card with such claimed details. Maes at col. 8: 1-11 discloses that a consumer may make a purchase and receive a confirmation code for the transaction. There is no disclosure here, however, of the credit card being configured with "details of a one or more 4 Appeal2014-002857 Application 12/486,073 devices in the possession of a one or more owners of the payment card.'' Rather in contrast, in a second step, Maes at col. 8:9-40 discloses, again, that the separate e-Notary service is used, which then contacts the consumer. For these reasons, the rejection of claim 1 and its dependent claims is not sustained. Independent claims 10 and 11 contain similar limitations and the rejection of these claims is not sustained for the same reasons given above. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW We conclude that Appellants have shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims as listed in the Rejections section above. DECISION The Examiner's rejection of claims 1-19 is reversed. REVERSED 5 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation