Ex Parte Fear

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 22, 2019

14146634 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 22, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/146,634 01/02/2014
102469 7590 04/24/2019
PARKER JUSTISS, P.C./Nvidia
14241 DALLAS PARKWAY
SUITE 620
DALLAS, TX 75254
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Andrew Fear
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
AU-13-0218-USl 4658
EXAMINER
NGUYEN,VU
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2619
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/24/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@pj-iplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ANDREW FEAR
Appeal2018-005721
Application 14/146,634
Technology Center 2600
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, LARRY J. HUME, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.
COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1-3, 5, 7-16, 18, and 19, which are all the claims pending in this
application. 1 Claims 4, 6, 17, 20, and 21 are canceled. We have jurisdiction
over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm-in-part.
1 The real party in interest is Nvidia Corp. App. Br. 3.
Appeal2018-005721
Application 14/146,634
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant's claimed invention relates "to computer gaming and, more
specifically, to multitasking while playing a computer game." Spec. ,r 1.
Exemplary Claim
1. A graphical processing unit of a computing device,
compnsmg:
a video overlayer configured to create an operating area
in full screen video frames of a game generated by said
graphical processing unit employing a first operating system
and a game application; and
an overlay interface configured to receive a virtual space
input from a mobile computing device and provide said virtual
space input to said video overlayer to simultaneously operate a
virtual machine within said operating area, while operating said
game through said full screen video frames, employing an
operating system of said mobile computing device that is
different than said first operating system, wherein said mobile
computing device is a different device than said computing
device.
App. Br. 11, "Claims Appendix." (Emphasis added regarding contested
limitations).
Rejections
A. Claims 1-3, 5, 7-11, 13-15, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being obvious over the combined teachings and suggestions of
Raveendran et al. (US 2013/0033496 Al, published Feb. 7, 2013)
(hereinafter "Raveendran"), Janssen et al. (US 2012/0005269 Al, published
Jan. 5, 2012) (hereinafter "Janssen"), and Hamill et al. (US 2010/0001995
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Application 14/146,634
Al; published Jan. 7, 2010) (hereinafter "Hamill"). 2
B. Claims 12, 16, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
obvious over the combined teachings and suggestions of Raveendran,
Janssen, Hamill, and Subramaniam et al. (US 2015/0179143 Al, published
June 25, 2015) (hereinafter "Subramaniam").
ANALYSIS
We have considered all of Appellant's arguments and any evidence
presented. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive
arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
Regarding Rejection A, the Examiner finds the proffered combination
of Raveendran, Janssen, and Hamill teaches or suggests all limitations of
independent claims 1, 9, and 14, and dependent claims 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11,
13, 15, and 18. (Final Act. 4--10).
Based upon our review of the record, and for the reasons discussed
below, we find the contested claim 1 limitation "a video overlayer
configured to create an operating area in full screen video frames of a game
generated by said graphical processing unit" is dispositive to the appeal of
Rejection A of independent claim 1, and claims 2, 3, 5, 7, and 8 which
depend therefrom. ( emphasis added).
2 We note the Examiner omits the Hamill reference from the heading of
Rejection A. See Final Act. 4. However, the Examiner relies upon Hamill as
evidence in the detailed statement of rejection thereunder. See Final Act. 6.
We have made appropriate correction to the heading of Rejection A, supra.
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Application 14/146,634
Rejection A of Claims 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 8
under 35 U.S. C. § 103
Issue: Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, did the Examiner err by finding
Raveendran, Janssen, and Hamill collectively teach or suggest the contested
limitation:
a video overlayer configured to create an operating area infull
screen video frames of a game generated by said graphical
processing unit[,]
within the meaning of representative claim 1? 3 (Emphasis added).
The Examiner finds Janssen (i1i181, 83, 98) teaches full screen video
frames of a game. See Final Act. 6.
Regarding the disputed limitation of claim 1, Appellant contends:
The cited portion of Janssen, however, does not teach creating
an operating area in full screen video frames. As shown above,
the cited portion merely teaches stacking windows based on
their z-orders and is silent as to creating an operating area, e.g.,
stacking a window, on top of a full screen. Rave [sic] and
Janssen as applied therefore do not teach or suggest "a video
overlayer configured to create an operating area in full screen
video frames of a game generated by said graphical processing
unit" as recited in Claim 1.
App. Br. 7.
The Examiner disagrees with Appellant's arguments (Ans. 10-12).
The Examiner looks to the Specification, and finds: "For [the] broadest
reasonable interpretation purposes and without importing limitations from
3 We give the contested claim limitations the broadest reasonable
interpretation (BRI) consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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Application 14/146,634
the specification into the claim (MPEP §§ 2111 and 2111.01), the disclosure
fails to define the term 'full screen' or 'fullscreen. "' Ans. 11.
As an issue of claim construction, the Examiner further concludes:
"At the time of the claimed invention, 'full screen' in the field of graphical
user interfaces meant, among other things, 'a window occupying all the
available displayable surface of a screen."' Ans. 11-12 (underline omitted).
In the Reply Brief, Appellant further responds:
But the claimed limitation is not just 'full screen"' (see Id.) The
limitation in its entirety reads 'full screen video frames of a
game generated by said graphical processing unit." The
Examiner thus has not considered the entire limitation and has
improperly ignored the rest of the limitation (see In re Wilson,
424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970) stating 'All words in a
claim must be considered in judging the patentability of that
claim against the prior art'). As such, even if the asserted plain
meaning is correct, a fully-sized window of Janssen does not
teach or suggest the limitation 'full screen video frames of a
game generated by said graphical processing unit.'
Reply Br. 3 ( emphasis added).
Claim Construction
We begin our analysis with claim construction. 4 We tum to the
Specification for context. Applying a broad but reasonable interpretation to
4 Claim construction is an important step in a patentability determination. A
legal conclusion that a claim is obvious involves two analytical steps,
assuming the references have been properly combined under § 103. See
Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 353 F.3d 928, 933 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("Both
anticipation under § 102 and obviousness under § 103 are two-step inquiries.
The first step in both analyses is a proper construction of the claims .... The
second step in the analyses requires a comparison of the properly construed
claim to the prior art." (internal citations omitted)). Under the second step,
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Application 14/146,634
the language of claim 1, we construe "full screen video frames of a game
generated by said graphical processing unit" as video frame buffers,
consistent with the supporting description found in the Specification: as one
or more memory buffers dedicated to video frame data. See Spec. ,r,r 1 7, 28,
29; Fig. 1. 5
Given this construction (id.), we tum to the evidence relied upon by
the Examiner (Final Act. 6; Ans. 10-12). We find the cited paragraphs of
Janssen (i-fi-f 45, 46, 81, 83, 98, and Fig. 2) are silent regarding any mention
of video frames, as distinguished from windows, much less "full screen
video frames of a game generated by said graphical processing unit," as
recited in independent claim 1. ( emphasis added).
Further regarding the rejection of claim 1, we find the Examiner has
not shown that the additionally cited Raveendran and Hamill references
overcome the aforementioned deficiency of Janssen. Because the Examiner
has not established that the proffered combination of Raveendran, Janssen,
and Hamill teaches or suggests "full screen video frames of a game
the Board must compare the construed claim to one or more prior art
references and make factual findings regarding the limitations contested by
Appellants. See In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Because the PTO is entitled to give claims their broadest reasonable
interpretation, a court's review of the Board's claim construction is limited to
determining whether it was reasonable. See Morris, 127 F.3d at 1055.
5 See Spec. ,r 17 ("110. For example, the GPU 117 can render video frames
for the display device 110 from a game program stored in the system
memory 104."); ,r 28 ("As shown, the GPU local memory 120 includes a
frame buffer 126."); ,r 29 ("The input data signals to the display device 110
are typically generated by scanning out the contents of one or more video
frames of image data that is stored in the frame buffer 126."). See also
FRAME BUFFER 126, as depicted in Figure 1.
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generated by said graphical processing unit" ( claim 1 ), we are constrained
on this record to reverse the Examiner's Rejection A of independent claim 1,
and of claims 2, 3, 5, 7, and 8, which depend therefrom.
Rejection A of Independent Claims 9 and 14
and Dependent Claims 10, 11, 13, 15, and 18 under 35 U.S. C. § 103
We note remaining independent claims 9 and 14 are silent regarding
the argued limitation, "full screen video frames of a game generated by said
graphical processing unit," as recited in claim 1. ( emphasis added).
The Examiner has found the cited references teach or suggest all the
limitations of claims 9 and 14. See Final Act. 8-10. Although Appellant
contends the disputed limitation "a video overlayer configured to create an
operating area in full screen video frames of a game generated by said
graphical processing unit" is recited in each of the independent claims 1, 9
and 14 (App. Br. 6), this limitation (i.e., "full screen video frames") is only
recited in claim 1. ( emphasis added).
Thus, Appellant's arguments regarding the contested limitation are
not commensurate with the broader scope of independent claims 9 and 14.
Moreover, Appellant does not argue independent claims 9 and 14 separately
from claim 1. App. Br. 6-8. Arguments not made are waived. See 37
C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
Therefore, on this record, and based upon a preponderance of the
evidence, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred regarding Rejection A of
independent claims 9 and 14.
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Application 14/146,634
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's Rejection A of remaining
independent claims 9 and 14, and associated dependent claims 10, 11, 13,
15, and 18 (not argued separately). See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
Rejection B of Dependent Claims 12, 16, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
Appellant states that "Subramaniam is not cited to cure the above
noted deficiencies of the applied combination of Rave [sic], Janssen and
Hamill with respect to independent [c]laims 9 and 14." App. Br. 9.
Appellant thus asserts the Examiner does not provide a prima facie case of
obviousness for dependent claims 12, 16, and 19, by virtue of their
dependency from independent claim 9 or independent claim 14. Id.
However, for the reasons discussed above, we find no deficiencies
with the Examiner's Rejection A of independent claims 9 and 14.
Moreover, Appellant does not advance separate, substantive arguments for
Rejection B by contesting the Examiner's findings regarding specific
limitations recited in dependent claims 12, 16, and 19. App. Br. 9.
Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
Therefore, on this record, we sustain the Examiner's Rejection B of
dependent claims 12, 16, and 19.
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Application 14/146,634
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-3, 5, 7, and 8
under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 9-16, 18, and 19
under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(±).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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