Ex Parte Elwart et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 29, 2018

13897576 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 29, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/897,576 05/20/2013
28395 7590 10/31/2018
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FG1L
1000 TOWN CENTER
22NDFLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Shane Elwart
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
83348862 6508
EXAMINER
CAMPBELL, JOSHUA A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3747
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/31/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Exparte SHANE ELWART, SUDIPTO AICH, and
JAMEL SEAGRAVES
Appeal2018-001841
Application 13/897,576
Technology Center 3700
Before CHARLES N. GREENHUT, BRETT C. MARTIN, and
SEAN P. O'HANLON, Administrative Patent Judges.
GREENHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a rejection of claims 1,
3-7, 9, 11-14, and 16-19. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.
1 The Appeal Brief states "[t]he real party in interest is Ford Global
Technologies, LLC." App. Br. 1.
Appeal2018-001841
Application 13/897,576
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a stop/start control based on repeated
driving patterns. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1 A method for controlling an auto stop/start vehicle comprising:
selectively disabling auto stop/start functions in response
to a detected vehicle position relative to an automatically learned
vehicle route based on previous drive cycles, wherein the vehicle
route comprises a location where the vehicle has previously
crossed a detected stream of traffic, the selective disabling
comprising disabling the auto stop function in response to
approaching the location of the previously detected stream of
traffic.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1 and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I02(a)(l) as being
anticipated by Weslati (US 2011/0153127 Al, published June 23, 2011 ).
Claims 5, 11, and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Nagano (JP 2004-169664 A, published June 17, 2004) and
Seibertz (US 2003/0087724 Al, published May 8, 2003).
Claims 3 and 4 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Weslati and Aoki (US 6,401,012 Bl, issued June 4, 2002).
Claims 13 and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Nagano, Seibertz, and Aoki.
Claims 6, 7, and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Nagano, Seibertz, Schneider (US 2010/0175936 Al,
published July 15, 2010) and Ashihara (US 6,335,700 Bl, issued Jan. 1,
2002).
Claims 9 and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Nagano, Seibertz, and Weslati.
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Application 13/897,576
OPINION
The Examiner found claims 1 and 19 anticipated by W eslati.
Appellants reproduce paragraphs 23 and 24 of Weslati and contend, "[t]here
is clearly no disclosure of an automatically learned route comprising a
location where the vehicle has previously crossed a detected stream of traffic
and selectively disabling the auto stop feature in response to approaching the
location of the previously detected stream of traffic." App. Br. 3--4
( emphasis omitted).
Arguments must address the Examiner's action. 37 C.F.R.
§ 4I.37(c)(l)(iv) ("The arguments shall explain why the examiner erred as
to each ground of rejection contested by appellant"). Appellants' arguments
concerning claims 1 and 19 are incomplete in this regard because they do not
address the portions of W eslati relied upon by the Examiner purported to
disclose the subject matter Appellants allege is missing from Weslati. In the
Final Office Action the Examiner clearly cited paragraphs 4 and 5 of W eslati
concerning the previously crossed automatically learned traffic location.
Final Act. 3--4. Paragraph 5 of Weslati, for example, states, "the route-
learning powertrain control feature can recognize if a given route is through
a sustained period of stop-and-go traffic." This same paragraph continues on
to state, "the route-learning powertrain control could also modify start/stop
timing to emphasize internal combustion operation if the driver prefers a
more aggressive operating style, or more electric motor operation if the
driver prefers a more fuel efficient operating style." It seems clear that the
cited paragraphs of Weslati, considered in their entirety, are teaching that the
automatic stop/start timing can be modified, or "disabled," based on
traversing a previously learned traffic area and the user's preferred driving
style. We note that neither claim 1 nor claim 19 precludes the reliance on
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Appeal2018-001841
Application 13/897,576
additional variables such as preferred driving style for making the
determination to disable auto stop or auto start functions. Based on
Appellants' arguments, which do not address the most relevant portions of
Weslati cited by the Examiner, we are not apprised of any error in the
Examiner's finding that Weslati discloses, "disabling the auto stop function
in response to approaching the location of the previously detected stream of
traffic." Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 1 and 19 and that of
claims 3 and 4, the latter being argued based only on dependency from claim
1 (App. Br 6).
The Examiner's rejection of independent claims 5 and 11 is less clear.
In particular, it is not clear that the Examiner considered the correct claim
language and how the Examiner makes the leap from the cited portion of
Nagano's disclosure to the language of claims 5 and 11:
"[I]f the percentage of valid idling stops stored near the stop
location is greater than or equal to the prescribed value ( value
Th), the engine is stopped. As a result of the aforementioned
control, idling stop is performed when the automobile has
stopped for a prescribed period of time or longer at a specific
position." Thus, Nagano discloses disabling automatic stopping
[sic] of the engine when the vehicle is at a second vehicle stop
within a learned distance subsequent to a first vehicle stop.
Ans. 11 (quoting Nagano paragraphs 9, 18 and misquoting claims 5 and 11
which require "disabl[ing] an auto start" as opposed to an "auto stop.")
Although not necessarily limiting, an example in the Specification
embodying the processes of claims 5 and 11 is "when a driver pulls a vehicle
up to a garage, activates a garage door opener, and waits for the garage door
to open fully before proceeding to park the vehicle in the garage." Although
Nagano indicates other potential uses, Nagano is primarily concerned with
waiting for a traffic light, which may occur at slightly different positions
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Appeal2018-001841
Application 13/897,576
each time the light is encountered. Nagano, paras. 2-5. The processes
described in the portions of Nagano cited by the Examiner involve only
determinations as to whether or not to automatically stop the engine. The
Examiner does not explain why an automatic stop determination should be
equated to disabling an automatic start or stop function or, more particularly
disabling an auto start as required by each of claims 5 and 11. App. Br. 5---6.
None of the other references cited by the Examiner in the rejection of claims
5 and 11 or in the rejections of those claims depending therefrom are relied
on by the Examiner to cure this deficiency. Accordingly, we do not sustain
the rejections of claims 5-18.
DECISION
The Examiner's rejections of claims 1, 3, 4 and 19 are affirmed. The
Examiner's rejections of claims 5-7, 9, 11-14, and 16-18 are reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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