Ex Parte Elrod et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 18, 2019

13672611 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/672,611 11/08/2012
98995 7590 04/22/2019
Zilka-Ko tab, PC - AMDC
1155 N. 1st St.
Suite 105
San Jose, CA 95112
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Mark Elrod
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
AMDCP528 1628
EXAMINER
KHATTAR, RAJESH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/22/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
zk-uspto@zilkakotab.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MARK ELROD and GENE HOFFMAN, JR.
Appeal2018-002912
Application 13/672,611
Technology Center 3600
Before JEAN R. HOMERE, HUNG H. BUI,
and ADAM J. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOMERE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Non-Final Rejection of claims 1-5 and 11-27, which constitute all claims
pending in this application. 1 App. Br. 12-19, Claims App. Claims 6-10
have been canceled. Id. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
1 Appellants identify Vindicia, Inc., as the real party in interest. App. Br. 3.
Appeal2018-002912
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Introduction
According to Appellants, the claimed subject matter relates to a
method and system for allowing partial authorization of an electronic
payment request associated with a customer's prepaid card account, which
may not have sufficient funds to authorize the full requested amount to cover
a transaction at a merchant location. Spec. ,r,r 2, 6, 8, and Fig. 1. In
particular, upon receiving via a billing platform ( 406) a request for
electronic payment authorization from a merchant (113, 116, and 119) for an
online transaction initiated by a customer, a server (122) analyzes pertinent
account data obtained from a history database to determine whether the
requested transaction will successfully go through based on verification
information obtained from various financial institutions associated with the
account. Id. ,r,r 78-84.
Representative Claim
Claims 1, 11, and 18 are independent. Independent claim 1 is
representative, and reads as follows:
1. A method comprising:
providing a history database compnsmg online
transactions for a plurality of online merchants of online
subscription services and a plurality of payment cards
previously processed by a server, wherein payment card
numbers for the payment cards are not stored in the history
database but rather payment card identifiers that are associated
with but different from the payment card numbers;
at the server, receiving a first online transaction
comprising an electronic payment request from an online
merchant of subscription services for a payment using a
payment card, wherein the payment request comprises a
payment amount being charged;
from the server, sending an electronic authorization
request to a payment processor for the payment amount;
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at the server, rece1vmg from the payment processor a
response to the electronic authorization request for the first
online transaction comprising an indication that a partial
authorization flag is set;
when the partial authorization flag is set, receiving a
partial authorization for an authorized amount which is less
than the payment amount;
performing, by the server, an analysis to determine
whether to approve the first online transaction for which the
partial authorization was received, including:
identifying a partial authorization database comprising
partial authorization percentages for the plurality of merchants;
from the partial authorization database, determining for the first
merchant an X value as a partial authorization percentage;
using at least one electronic processor of the server to
determine if the authorized amount is greater than the X percent
of the payment amount;
when the authorized amount is greater than the X percent
of the payment amount, making a deposit request on behalf of
the merchant for the authorized amount, where X is less than
lOO;and
when the authorized amount is less than the X percent of
the payment amount, determining a probability of success of a
full deposit, wherein the full deposit comprises a deposit
request for the payment amount in full, comprising:
checking an identifier of the payment card against the
history database to search for online transactions previously
processed by the server;
checking the identifier of the payment card against a bad
BIN list;
checking the identifier of the payment card against a
chargeback list; and
based on the checking of the history database, bad BIN
list, and the chargeback list, assigning a probability of success
value of a full deposit;
when the probability of success value is greater than Z,
making a deposit request for the merchant for the payment
amount that is greater than the authorized amount against only
the payment card of the first transaction; and
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when the probability of success value is less than Z, not
making a deposit request for the merchant for the payment
amount that is greater than the authorized amount.
Rejection on Appeal
Claims 1-5 and 11-27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 as being
directed to patent ineligible material. Non-Final Act. 2-8.
ANALYSIS 2
Standard for Patent Eligibility
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a "new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas" are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int 'l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217-18 ( citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is "directed to." See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 ("On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
2 We refer to Appellants' arguments and the Examiner's findings and
conclusions set forth in the Non-Final Action (mailed March 31, 2017,
"Non-Final Act."), the Appeal Brief (filed August 29, 2017, "App. Br."), the
Answer (mailed November 24, 2017, "Ans."), and the Reply Brief (filed
January 24, 2018, "Reply Br.") for the respective details.
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risk."); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) ("Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners' application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.").
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219--20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594--95 (1978)); and
mental processes ( Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as "molding rubber products" (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981) ); "tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores" (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267---68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that "a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176, 191 ("We view
respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula."). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim "seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract ... is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, ... and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment." Id. ( citing Benson and Flook), and 187 ("It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
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to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.").
If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we tum to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where "we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive
concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. "A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include 'additional features' to ensure 'that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [ abstract idea]."' J d.
( quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). "[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer
implementation[] fail[ s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention." Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
section 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 50-57 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("2019 PEG"). Under the 2019 PEG, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
( 1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h)). 3
See 2019 PEG, 5 2, 5 5-56. Only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception!
and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, does the
office then look to whether the claim:
3 All references to the MPEP are to Rev. 08.2017 (Jan. 2018).
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
"well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 PEG at 56.
Examiner's Findings and Conclusions
In the first step of the Alice inquiry, the Examiner determines
independent claims 1, 11, and 18 are directed to the abstract idea of
"processing and approving a payment card transaction for a payment amount
even though partial authorization for an authorized amount, which is less
than the payment amount, has been received." Non-Final Act. 4. According
to the Examiner, "processing and approving a payment card transaction" is a
form of fund transfer between two parties or creating a contractual
relationship between two parties, which is considered as a method of
organizing human activity-a fundamental economic practice. Id. 4--5.
Additionally, the Examiner determines that the recited steps are simply
directed to collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results
as in Electric Power Group. Id. at 6; see also Ans. 4.
At Alice step 2, the Examiner determines the claims do not recite
additional elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the
abstract idea. Non-Final Act. 6-7. Instead, the Examiner avers the claims
merely implement the abstract idea on a generic database/server, which are
"simply performing their routine, well-understood, routine, and conventional
functions of storing online transactions for a plurality of merchants,
receiving a first online transaction, sending an electronic authorization
request to a payment processor, receiving a response to the electronic
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authorization request, and performing an analysis." Id. at 6. The Examiner
further notes the ordered combination does not improve the functionality of
the claimed database or server as they would function as any other
database/server would. Id. at 7; see also Ans. 4.
Appellants ' Contentions
Appellants argue the following:
The claims are not limited to generally processing and approving a
payment card transaction, as suggested by the Examiner, but instead
the claims relate to computer processes for determining a particular
transaction amount to authorize and initiating deposit of the same,
where the authorized amount may be different from the an initially
requested transaction amount ( e.g. may be full, partial, or zero), based
on an analysis of various criteria.
App. Br. 10.
Thus, applicant's claims are not merely directed towards the fund
transfer itself, or the well-known practices relating to financial
transactions which are limited to either fully authorizing or fully
denying an initially requested transaction amount. Instead applicant's
claims provide a computer system having specific logic and data
stored therein that enables the computer system to handle partial
authorizations of initially requested transaction amounts. Thus,
applicant does not believe that the claims are merely directed towards
old fundamental economic practices or fund transfers, as otherwise
suggested by the Examiner, but instead that the claims enable the
computer to provide functionality not previously provided for partial
authorization of transactions.
Id. at 11.
Our Review
Alice/Mayo-Step 1 (Abstract Idea)
Applying the guidance set forth in the 2019 PEG, we determine the
Examiner has not erred in rejecting the claims as being directed to patent
ineligible subject matter. The 2019 PEG instructs us first to determine
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whether any judicial exception to patent eligibility is recited in the claim.
The guidance identifies three judicially-excepted groupings: (1)
mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human activity
such as fundamental economic practices; and (3) mental processes. We
focus our attention on the second grouping, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as fundamental economic practices. Claim 1 recites,
inter alia, the following limitations:
(1) at the server, receiving a first online transaction comprising an
electronic payment request from an online merchant of
subscription services for a payment using a payment card, wherein
the payment request comprises a payment amount being charged;
(2) from the server, sending an electronic authorization request to a
payment processor for the payment amount;
(3) at the server, receiving from the payment processor a response to
the electronic authorization request for the first online transaction
comprising an indication that a partial authorization flag is set;
( 4) when the partial authorization flag is set, receiving a partial
authorization for an authorized amount which is less than the
payment amount;
( 5) performing, by the server, an analysis to determine whether to
approve the first online transaction for which the partial
authorization was received, including:
(a) identifying a partial authorization database comprising
partial authorization percentages for the plurality of
merchants;
(b) from the partial authorization database, determining
for the first merchant an X value as a partial
authorization percentage;
( c) using at least one electronic processor of the server to
determine if the authorized amount is greater than the X
percent of the payment amount;
As argued by Appellants, these limitations relate to "computer
processes for determining a particular transaction amount to authorize and
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initiating deposit of the same, where the authorized amount may be different
from [the] an initially requested transaction amount (e.g. may be full, partial,
or zero), based on an analysis of various criteria." App. Br. 10. In other
words, the claim as a whole merely involves the authorization of payment
for an online commercial transaction. Because these limitations recite the
types of operations that would ordinarily take place in authorizing payment
in an online transaction, these limitations recite the fundamental economic
practice of authorizing payment in an online transaction that falls within the
abstract ideas identified by the 2019 PEG. Although the claim recites the
comparison of a merchant's partial authorization percentage X with an
authorized amount, the notion of comparing a merchant's requested amount
with a charge card's authorized amount is a routinely performed operation in
the field of payment processing. Therefore, as correctly noted by the
Examiner, like the concepts of hedging in Bilski, and the concept of
mitigating settlement risk in Alice, the concept of authorizing payment in a
financial transaction is an fundamental economic practice long prevalent in
our system of commerce. Non-Final 4. 4 Accordingly, we agree with the
Examiner that independent claims 1, 11, and 18 recite a judicial exception of
4 See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (intermediated settlement); Bilski, 561
U.S. at 611-12 (risk hedging); Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs.,
859 F.3d 1044, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ("[P]rocessing an application for
financing a purchase" is a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in
our system of commerce.); LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 F.Appx.
991, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Like the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and
intermediated settlement in Alice, "the concept of applying for loans and
receiving offers is also long prevalent in our financial system."); Mortg.
Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (finding claims directed to the "anonymous 1oan shopping" to be
abstract).
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a fundamental economic practice, which is a certain method of organizing
human activity. Having determined that the claims recite a judicial
exception, our analysis under the 2019 PEG turns now to determining
whether there are "additional elements that integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application." See MPEP § 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h).
"Integration into a practical application" requires an additional element or a
combination of additional elements in the claim to apply, rely on, or use the
judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the exception. 84 Fed. Reg., 53.
Appellants' claims 1, 11, and 18 recite a computer-related limitation,
(e.g., a history database, a server (claim 1), a server (claim 11), a history
database and a server ( claim 18)). We do not find the computer-related
limitation is sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application. Besides indicating that the server may be implemented as part
of a network infrastructure, Appellants' Specification provides no
meaningful detail about the structure of the server or its configuration. Spec.
,r,r 3 6-41. The Specification also discusses problems arising in the context
of processing partial payment authorizations, partial deposits. Id. ,r,r 2---6.
Additionally, the Specification indicates that the server may be used to
perform steps 1-5 of claim 1 recited above. Id. ,r 78-84. However, the cited
portions of the Specification do not indicate that in performing the recited
steps, the functionality of the server is improved. Although we do not
dispute Appellants' argument that the computer has specific logic to handle
partial authorizations of initially requested transaction amounts, such a logic
is similar to logic used in a generic computer for comparing a requested
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transaction amount with an authorized amount. App. Br. 11. AppeUants do
not persuasively explain why the claims improve the functioning of a
cornputer or improve the financial transaction processing technology. See
MPEP § 2106.05(a). Rather, the claims merely adapt the abstract idea to an
execution of steps performed by a processor. 5'ee Credit Acceptance, 859
F.3d at 1055 ("Our prior cases have made clear that mere automation of
manual processes using generic computers does not constitute a patentable
improvement in computer technology."); see also Bancorp Services, L.L. C.
v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (US.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (A computer "employed only for its most basic function ... does not
impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims."). Further,
Appellants' identified improvements are improvements to the abstract idea,
not improvements to a technology or computer functionality. Thus, on the
record before us, the cited claim limitations do not improve the functionality
of the server by performing operations to authorize partial payment on a
charge card, nor do they achieve an improved technological result in
conventional industry practice. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am.,
Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Because claim steps 1-5, outlined above, do not (1) provide any
technical solution to a technical problem as required by DDR Holdings; 5 (2)
5 DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
The Federal Circuit found DDR 's claims are patent-eligible under§ 101
because DDR 's claims: (1) do not merely recite "the performance of some
business practice known from the pre-Internet world" previously disclosed
in Bilski and Alice; but instead (2) provide a technical solution to a technical
problem unique to the Internet, i.e., a "solution ... necessarily rooted in
computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in
the realm of computer networks." DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257.
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provide any particular practical application as required by BASCOM; 6 or (3)
entail an unconventional technological solution to a technological problem
as required by Amdocs, 7 we agree with the Examiner's determination that
Appellant's claims 1-5, and 11-27 are directed to an abstract idea that is not
integrated into a practical application.
Alice/ Mayo-Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
Turning to step 2 of the Alice/1v1ayo framework, we look to whether
the claim: (a) recites a specific limitation or combination oflimitations that
are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field; or (b)
simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. 2019 PEG, 56. We discern no additional element or combination
of elements recited in Appellants' independent claims 1, 11, and 18 that
contains any "inventive concept" or adds anything "significantly more" to
transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 573
U.S. at 221. Appellants do not direct our attention to any portion of the
Specification indicating that the claimed processor perfonns anyihing other
than well-understood, routine, and conventional functions, such as receiving
and processing. See Elec. Power Group, 830 F.3d at 1355 ("Nothing in the
claims, understood in light of the specification, requires anything other than
off-the-shelf~ conventional computer, network, and display technology for
gathering, sending, and presenting the desired information."); buyS~iFE', Inc.
v. Google. Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("That a computer
6 BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
7 Amdocs Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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receives and sends information over a network----whh no further
specification----is not even arguably inventive."); and Alice, 573 U.S. at 224----
26 (receiving, storing, sending information over networks insufficient to add
an inventive concept). Instead, Appellants' claimed subject matter simply
uses generic computer components ( e.g., a server, processor, transceiver) to
perform the abstract idea of processing partial authorization of payment for a
transaction. As noted above, the use of a generic computer ( e.g., server,
database) does not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-
eligible subject matter. As our reviewing court has observed, "after Alice,
there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does
not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible." DDR, 773 F.3d at
1256 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 223).
Because the discussed claim elements only recite generic computer
functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional, the claim is
devoid of an inventive concept. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. Appellants are
reminded that "the 'inventive concept' [under step two of the Mayo/Alice
test] cannot be the abstract idea itself' and "Berkheimer ... leave[ s]
untouched the numerous cases from this court which have held claims
ineligible because the only alleged 'inventive concept' is the abstract idea."
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J.,
concurring). "It has been clear since Alice that a claimed invention's use of
the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive
concept that renders the invention 'significantly more' than that ineligible
concept." BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed.
Cir. 2018). We, therefore, agree with the Examiner that the computer
functions recited in the claims were, in fact, generic, and are met by
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numerous case law establishing that using a generic computer to expedite
and automate processes traditionally performed manually, or that are
otherwise abstract, is a well-understood, routine, and conventional use of
such computers. Non-Final Act. 7; see also, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I
LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (utilizing an
intermediary computer to forward information); Bancorp Services,
L.L.C., 687 F.3d at 1278 ("The computer required by some ofBancorp's
claims is employed only for its most basic function, the performance of
repetitive calculations, and as such does not impose meaningful limits on the
scope of those claims.").
To the extent Appellants argue the claims necessarily contain an
"inventive concept" based on their alleged novelty or non-obviousness over
the cited references, Appellants misapprehend the controlling precedent.
Although the second step in the Alice/ Mayo framework is termed a search
for an "inventive concept," the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or
non-obviousness, but, rather, a search for "an element or combination of
elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."' Alice,
573 U.S. at 217-218 (alteration in original). A novel and nonobvious claim
directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90.
Appellants are further reminded that "relying on a computer to
perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to
render a claim patent eligible." OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788
F.3d 1359, 1363 ( citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 224 ("[U]se of a computer to
create electronic records, track multiple transactions, and issue simultaneous
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instructions" is not an inventive concept.)); see also, e.g., Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 ("[M]erely
adding computer functionality to increase the speed or efficiency of the
process does not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise abstract idea.").
Therefore, the functions recited in independent claims 1, 11, and 18 do not
add any meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the abstract idea to
the particular technological environment. Id.
Because Appellants' claims 1, 11, and 18 are directed to a patent-
ineligible abstract concept and do not recite something "significantly more"
under the second prong of the Alice analysis, we sustain the Examiner's
rejection of claims 1, 11 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Appellants do not present additional arguments for dependent clairns
2-5, 12-17, and 19-27. Accordingly, for the same reasons as set forth for
independent claims 1, 11, and 18, we sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 rejection of dependent claims 2----5, 12----17, and 19----27.
DECISION
For the above reasons, we affirm the Examiner's patent ineligibility
rejection of claims 1-5, and 11-27.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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