Ex Parte Duro-Emanuel et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 7, 201310645060 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 7, 2013) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 10/645,060 08/21/2003 Olaseni B. Duro-Emanuel 101612-5026-US 6554 28977 7590 11/08/2013 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP (PH) 1701 MARKET STREET PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103-2921 EXAMINER RANKINS, WILLIAM E ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3694 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/08/2013 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte OLASENI B. DURO-EMANUEL, DIANE M. RINNOVATORE, KENT PEER-NOUS, MICHELLE SUZANNE WERNLI, and KONSTANTIN BRAUN ____________________ Appeal 2011-011420 Application 10/645,060 Technology Center 3600 ____________________ Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and THOMAS F. SMEGAL, Administrative Patent Judges. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2011-011420 Application 10/645,060 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 35-42, 51-66, and 70-75. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). STATEMENT OF THE DECISION We REVERSE and enter a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).1 BACKGROUND Appellants’ invention relates to financial securities, and more particularly, to an arrangement in which a collection of principal for a first financial instrument is allocated to a second financial instrument (Spec. 1, ll. 7-9). Claim 35, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal: 35 A system comprising: memory operable to store at least one program; and at least one processor communicatively coupled to the memory, in which the at least one program, when executed by the at least one processor, causes the at least one processor to perform a method comprising: providing liquidity to a financial transaction in which a term note and a money market note are issued by, upon receiving a payment for principal of the term note, crediting the payment to principal of the money market note if the principal of the money market note is not fully credited, and crediting the payment to principal of the term note 1 Our decision will refer to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed April 11, 2011) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed June 22, 2011) and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed April 28, 2011). Appeal 2011-011420 Application 10/645,060 3 if the principal of the money market note is fully credited, wherein the term note and the money market note have a same credit risk rating. THE REJECTION The following rejection is before us for review: Claims 35-42, 51-66, and 70-75 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. ANALYSIS We are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 35-42, 51-66, and 70-75, which are all of the pending claims, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement (App. Br. 7-11 and Reply Br. 2-5). The Examiner maintains that the rejection is proper because “the specification does not disclose a system comprising memory operable to store at least one program and at least one processor coupled to the memory which when executed by the processor causes the processor to perform the method of the applicable claims” and “also does not disclose a computer readable medium having stored thereon computer executable instructions that configure the computer to perform the method of the applicable claims” (Ans. 6). However, as the Examiner acknowledges, the subject matter of a claim need not be described literally (i.e., using the same terms or in haec verba) in order for the disclosure to satisfy the written description requirement. Instead, the fundamental factual inquiry is whether the Specification conveys with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, Appellants were in possession of the invention, Appeal 2011-011420 Application 10/645,060 4 as now claimed. See, e.g., Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Here, we agree with Appellants that although the Specification does not use the terms “computer,” “memory,” “processor,” “computer readable storage medium,” or “computer executable instructions,” the description in the Specification of how the method of providing liquidity is performed, and the descriptions that the collecting and crediting steps can be performed electronically (see, e.g., Spec. 4, ll. 15-25) and that the money market note and the term note may be embodied in an electronic form (see, e.g., Spec. 5, ll. 12-17), convey with reasonable clarity that Appellants were in possession of the claimed invention at the time the application was filed. Therefore, we will not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 35-42, 51-66, and 70-75 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. New Ground of Rejection We enter the following new ground of rejection pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Non-Statutory Subject Matter Each of independent claims 70-72 recites a “computer readable storage medium having stored thereon computer executable instructions that, when executed on a computer, configure the computer to perform a method comprising” a number of recited steps. The phrase “computer readable storage medium,” when given its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the Specification, includes transitory signals, which are non-statutory subject matter. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (transitory embodiments are not directed to statutory subject matter); see also Ex parte Mewherter, 2013 WL Appeal 2011-011420 Application 10/645,060 5 3291360 at *6-7 (PTAB May 8, 2013) (precedential) (finding a machine readable storage medium non-statutory under § 101). Therefore, we will enter a new ground of rejection of claims 70-72 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 35-42, 51-66, and 70-75 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is reversed. A NEW GROUND OF REJECTION has been entered for claims 70-72 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides that “[a] new ground of rejection . . . shall not be considered final for judicial review.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that the Appellants, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the Examiner. (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). Appeal 2011-011420 Application 10/645,060 6 REVERSED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) mls Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation