Ex Parte Ducey et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 27, 2014

11826192 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 27, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte RICHARD V. DUCEY, EDWARD G. CZARNECKI,
and MARK O’BRIEN
________________

Appeal 2011-012624
Application 11/826,192
Technology Center 2400
________________

Before: EDWARD A. BROWN, MICHAEL L. HOELTER, and
LYNNE H. BROWNE, Administrative Patent Judges.

HOELTER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2011-012624
Application 11/826,192

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a decision on appeal, under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), from a final
rejection of claims 1-15, 17-23, 32-39, and 41-451. App. Br. 12. Claims 16,
24-31, and 40 have been canceled. App. Br. 1. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The disclosed subject matter relates to a “method and system for
managing event and emergency notification over a network.” Spec. para.
[0001]. Independent claim 1 is illustrative of the claims on appeal and is
reproduced below:
1. A method for managing event and emergency
notification over a combined network having at least one first
device and plural second devices, wherein each second device
has an associated output format, the method comprising:
generating, at the first device, a message targeted to the
plural second devices, wherein the message includes data for

1 Appellants filed an Amendment After Final on October 13, 2010 cancelling
rejected claim 40. In the Advisory Action mailed November 5, 2010, the
Examiner appears to have accepted the cancellation of claim 40 by
excluding claim 40 as a claim that is subject to appeal. Adv. Act. para. 7.
From the record, both Appellants and the Examiner deem claim 40 to be
cancelled. See App. Br. 1 and the Examiner’s reliance thereon at Ans. 3,
para. 3; note also the absence of claim 40 in Appellants’ Claims Appendix
and also the Examiner’s election to not repeat the rejection of claim 40 (as
stated at Final Rej. 2, 13 mailed May 13, 2010) in the Answer. We
understand claim 40 to be cancelled.
2 Appellants incorrectly identify the claims on appeal as including claim 16
but not claim 15. App. Br. 1. Claim 16 has previously been canceled while
claim 15 has been rejected by the Examiner and is argued by Appellants.
Ans. 5; App. Br. 7. We treat Appellants’ recitation in their Appeal Brief of
claim 16 but not claim 15 as inadvertent.
Appeal 2011-012624
Application 11/826,192

3
outputting an emergency notification in plural formats that
include FSK alert tones, email, digital television, and electronic
message services;
formatting, at a server, the message into plural Internet
Protocol (IP) data packets;
injecting the IP packets into at least one transmission
signal, the at least one transmission signal being associated with
respective communication formats of the targeted second
devices;
transmitting the at least one injected transmission signal
over the combined network to each-second device; and
automatically triggering, at each targeted second device,
an emergency notification in a supported output format based
on the data included in the message.

REFERENCES RELIED ON BY THE EXAMINER
Bryan US 2002/0129354 A1 Sep. 12, 2002
Rahman US 2005/0086685 A1 Apr. 21, 2005
Medford US 2007/0004377 A1 Jan. 4, 2007
Hasek US 2007/0136743 A1 Jun. 14, 2007
Vella US 7,617,287 B2 Nov. 10, 2009

THE REJECTIONS ON APPEAL
1. Claims 1, 4-7, 9-15, 32-38, 41, and 42 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Medford and Vella. Ans. 5.
2. Claims 17-20, 22, and 23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Medford, Vella, and Rahman. Ans. 18.
3. Claims 39 and 43-45 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Medford, Vella, and Hasek. Ans. 23.
4. Claims 2, 3, 8, and 21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Medford, Vella, and Bryan. Ans. 25.

Appeal 2011-012624
Application 11/826,192

4
ANALYSIS
The rejection of claims 1, 4-7, 9-15, 32-38, 41, and 42
as being unpatentable over Medford and Vella
Appellants argue independent claims 1, 32, 41, and 42 together. App.
Br. 5-6. We select claim 1 for review with claims 32, 41, and 42 standing or
falling with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011). Appellants
also generally argue claims 4-7, 9-15, 33-38, 403, and 42 together with more
specific arguments directed to claims 12, 13, 14, 34, 35, and 36. App. Br. 7.
We address claims 12, 13, 14, 34, 35, and 36 infra with claims 4-7, 9-11, 15,
33, 37, 38, and 42 standing or falling therewith.
Claim 1
The Examiner relies on Medford for teaching all the limitations of
claim 1 with the exception that Medford “fails to explicitly teach outputting
an emergency notification in email and electronic message services
formats.” Ans. 5-7. The Examiner relies on Vella for this teaching. Ans. 7-
8. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to modify
Medford by outputting an emergency notification in email and electronic
message services formats “in order to speed the delivery of the alert message
to the recipients.” Ans. 8 citing Vella 7:53-65 and 8:13-15.
Appellants address the limitation of “generating, at a first device, a
message targeted to plural second devices.” App. Br. 5. Appellants do not
dispute the Examiner’s findings regarding Medford’s corresponding first and
second devices (Ans. 5), but instead contend that “[Appellants'] claims
embody the features of message origination” which is allegedly missing in
the teachings of Medford. App. Br. 6 (italics added). Appellants contend

3Appellants list claim 40 but present no arguments specific to this claim.
App. Br. 7. This listing of claim 40 appears to be inadvertent.
Appeal 2011-012624
Application 11/826,192

5
that Medford “explains in detail the necessary processing that occurs
downstream of message origination.” App. Br. 6 (italics added). Appellants
appear to be equating the claim term “generating” with “message
origination” in that Medford “discloses that the broadcast message is not
targeted or addressed to plural devices until the message is processed” and
that Medford “does not disclose or suggest the manner in which an
emergency message is originated at a local authority.” App. Br. 6 (italics
added).
We note that claim 1 recites a limitation directed to “generating” a
message that is targeted for receipt at the second devices. Appellants do not
indicate where the claim term “generating” is expressly defined in the claims
or Specification such that this term precludes the receipt of a signal and its
subsequent modification and further transmission along a communication
path. In other words, claim 1 is silent regarding “message origination” and
Appellants do not explain that a signal (original or otherwise), after entering
a communication path, cannot be further generated therealong for receipt by
other devices.
Medford paragraph [0026] teaches the receipt of an emergency signal
via an antenna and the subsequent processing of that received signal. See
also Medford Fig. 2. Paragraph [0044] discusses a server in Medford’s
system that “may generate a broadcast signal 289” while Paragraph [0045]
teaches that this broadcast signal 289, when it is generated, may include
“customer premise[s] equipment identifiers” so that when downstream
devices (i.e., set top boxes, computers, telephones) detect these identifiers,
the “device will receive the signal and cause the included EAS [Emergency
Alert System] message to be displayed.” In view of these disclosures,
Appeal 2011-012624
Application 11/826,192

6
Appellants do not explain how Medford’s disclosure of receipt,
modification, and further transmission of an emergency message is
precluded by the claim limitation “generating, at the first device, a message
targeted to the plural second devices” as claimed.
Appellants further contend that claim 1 recites “the use of a combined
network” and that “[Appellants] have defined a combined network
architecture as including satellite DTV datacast, and Internet ICP/IP
transmission capabilities.” App. Br. 6. Appellants do not indicate where
this claim term is so defined nor does Appellants’ Specification proffer such
an explicit definition. Further, Appellants’ contention and here-proposed
definition does not differentiate over Medford Figure 2, which illustrates a
network involving a broadcast signal 289 sent via IP Network 212 to set top
boxes 250 for televisions 260. Appellants do not indicate how Medford’s
teaching of IP Network 212 fails to also include the use of satellite
transmissions to set top boxes 250. Further, Medford specifically teaches
that EAS signals may be incorporated “into one or more IP delivery
platforms” such that signal 289 is “capable of being transmitted over one or
more IP networks” for delivery to a plurality of end devices that “will
receive the signal and cause the included EAS message to be displayed”
thereon. Medford paras. [0026], [0044], and [0045]. In view of the above,
Appellants fail to persuasively explain why Medford does not teach the use
of a combined network as argued and as claimed.
Appellants further contend that Vella “does not remedy the
deficiencies of Medford” (App. Br. 6) but, as discussed above, we are not
persuaded that Appellants have identified any deficiencies in Medford that
need to be remedied. Appellants also contend “that there is no disclosure,
Appeal 2011-012624
Application 11/826,192

7
teaching, or suggestion in Vella that would guide one of ordinary skill in the
art to modify Medford” in the manner stated by the Examiner. Reply Br. 2.
As indicated supra, the Examiner’s reason to combine Medford with Vella is
“in order to speed the delivery of the alert message to the recipients.” Ans.
8. This stated reason coincides with the referenced language in Vella which
teaches a way to “increase efficiency” in a manner that “would speed the
delivery of the alert message to the targeted recipients.” Vella 8:6-15.
Accordingly, while there is no requirement that Vella provide an explicit
disclosure, teaching, or suggestion, Appellants’ contention that there is no
disclosure in Vella “that would guide one of ordinary skill in the art” is also
not persuasive in view of Vella’s express teaching.
In view of the record presented, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 1, 32, 41, and 42.
Claims 12, 13, 14, 34, 35, and 36
Appellants contend that claims 4-7, 9-15, 33-38, and 42 are
“distinguishable over the applied art of record not only because of their
dependency from either of claims 1, 32, and 41 but also because of the
additional features recited therein.” App. Br. 7. As an example of these
“additional features recited therein,” Appellants repeat the “originator”
contention discussed supra which was not found persuasive. App. Br. 7.
Appellants also specifically address claims 12, 13, 14, 34, 35, and 36
contending that “Medford does not disclose or suggest attaching a video to
the message, creating a distribution list at the first device, which is the
message originator, and transmitting the message as a web feed or datacast.”
App. Br. 7. The Examiner finds the limitations of these claims disclosed in
Medford as indicated at Answer pages 10-11 and 14-15. For example,
Appeal 2011-012624
Application 11/826,192

8
regarding Appellants’ assertion of “attaching a video to the message” (claim
12), the Examiner references Medford paragraph [0054] discussing various
video devices associated with a computer for a video display thereon. Ans.
10; see also Medford Fig. 10 and particularly item 610. Regarding
Appellants’ assertion of “creating a distribution list” (claim 13), the
Examiner references Medford’s group list 484 discussed in Paragraph
[0040]. Ans. 10. And finally, regarding Appellants’ assertion of
transmitting the message as a web feed or datacast” (claim 14), the Examiner
references Medford’s Paragraph [0026] discussing the incorporation of the
message “into one or more IP delivery platforms.” Ans. 10-11.
Accordingly, Appellants’ contentions are not persuasive of Examiner error
or, the lack of articulated reasoning with rational underpinning required to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness. We sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 4-7, 9-15, 33-38, and 42.

The rejection of claims 17-20, 22, and 23
as being unpatentable over Medford, Vella, and Rahman
Appellants only present arguments with respect to independent claim
17 (App. Br. 7-8) and as such, we only address this claim with the remaining
claims standing or falling with claim 17. Appellants do not dispute the
Examiners’ additional reliance on Rahman for the rejection of claim 17, but
instead reiterate arguments discussed above concerning the teachings of
Medford. App. Br. 7-8. Appellants also contend that “Rahman fails to
remedy the deficiencies of Medford and Vella as it relates to” these previous
arguments. App. Br. 8. Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive of
Examiner error. We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 17-20, 22,
and 23.
Appeal 2011-012624
Application 11/826,192

9
The rejection of claims 39 and 43-45
as being unpatentable over Medford, Vella, and Hasek
Claims 39 and 43-45 depend from one of independent claims 1, 17,
and 32. Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s additional reliance on
Hasek but instead contend that “Hasek fails to remedy the deficiencies of
Medford and Vella with respect to independent claims 1, 17, and 32.” App.
Br. 8. Appellants’ contention is not persuasive of Examiner error and
accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 39 and 43-45.

The rejection of claims 2, 3, 8, and 21
as being unpatentable over Medford, Vella, and Bryan
Claims 2, 3, 8, and 21 depend from one of independent claims 1 and
17. Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s additional reliance on Bryan
but instead contend that “[Bryan] fails to remedy the deficiencies of Medford
and Vella with respect to independent claims [1 and 17].” App. Br. 8.
Appellants’ contention is not persuasive of Examiner error and accordingly,
we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 3, 8, and 21.

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1-15, 17-23, 32-39, and 41-45 are
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

hh