Ex Parte Duarte et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 19, 2017

12200782 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 19, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/200,782 08/28/2008 Matias Duarte QCP142213 8266
7590
Paradice and Li LLP/Qualcomm
1999 S. Bascom Ave.
Suite 300
Campbell, CA 95008
EXAMINER
WONG, WILLIAM
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2141
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/21/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ocpat_uspto@qualcomm.com
uspto@paradiceli.com
william @paradiceli. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MATIAS DUARTE, DANIEL SHIPLACOFF, JEREMY LYON,
PAUL MERCER, and RICHARD R. DELLINGER
Appeal 2017-001441
Application 12/200,782
Technology Center 2100
Before ERIC B. CHEN, JEREMY J. CURCURI, and
DAVID J. CUTITTAII, Administrative Patent Judges.
CHEN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2017-001441
Application 12/200,782
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of
claims 34—54. Claims 1—33 have been cancelled. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention relates to event notifications in the form of
alerts. (Abstract.)
Claim 34 is exemplary, with disputed limitations in italics:
34. A method for notifying a user of an event on a mobile
computing device, the method being performed by one or more
processors of the mobile computing device and comprising:
detecting the event on the mobile computing device, the
detected event comprising reception of a text message or an email;
in response to detecting the event, presenting a pop-up
notification on a touch-sensitive display of the mobile computing
device, the pop-up notification including a portion of the received text
message or email;
in response to detecting the user swiping the pop-up
notification off the touch-sensitive display, dismissing the pop-up
notification from the touch-sensitive display without displaying a
remaining portion of the received text message or email; and
in response to detecting the user tapping on the pop-up
notification, invoking an application corresponding to the detected
event.
Claims 34—38, 41—45, and 48—52 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as anticipated by Christie (US 2009/0177981 Al; July 9, 2009) or
in the alternative, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Christie
and either Rosenberg (US 2007/0146347 Al; June 28, 2007) or Stappers
(US 2002/0030271 Al; Mar. 14, 2002).
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Claims 39, 46, and 53 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Christie, or alternatively, over Christie, and either
Rosenberg or Stappers, and Vetelainen (US 2007/0010292 Al; Jan. 11,
2007).
Claims 40, 47, and 54 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Christie, or alternatively, over Christie, and either
Rosenberg or Stappers, and Orimoto (US 2005/0044500 Al; Feb. 24, 2005).
The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of claims 34—54 under 35
U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. (Ans. 9—10.)
ANALYSIS
§103 Rejection—Christie and Rosenberg
We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 18—20; see
also Reply Br. 8—9) that the combination of Christie and Rosenberg would
not have rendered obvious independent claim 34, which includes the
limitation “in response to detecting the user swiping the pop-up notification
off the touch-sensitive display, dismissing the pop-up notification from the
touch-sensitive display without displaying a remaining portion of the
received text message or email.”
The Examiner found that the message pop-up of Christie, which
displays an incoming message on a portable multifunction device, as
illustrated in Figure 231, corresponds to the limitation “the pop-up
notification including a portion of the received text message or email” (Final
Act. 5) and that the close icon of Christie, which closes the message pop-up,
corresponds to the limitation “dismissing the pop-up notification from the
touch-sensitive display without displaying a remaining portion of the
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received text message or email” (id. at 6). The Examiner further found that
the flick gesture of Rosenberg, for flicking an icon off a touch screen,
corresponds to the limitation “in response to detecting the user swiping . . .
off the touch-sensitive display.” (Final Act. 6—7.) The Examiner concluded
that “[i]t would have been obvious ... to modify the gestures [to interact
with the pop-up notification] of Christie to include the teachings of
Rosenberg for the purpose of quickly and easily removing and/or
transferring an item(s).” (Final Act. 7; see also Ans. 14.) Alternatively, the
Examiner concluded that “one of ordinary skill in the art at the time would
have further recognized that this would merely amount to a simple
substitution of known methods that would have yielded predictable results.”
(Ans. 14.) We agree with the Examiner.
Christie relates to “portable devices for performing instant
messaging.” (| 3.) Figure 2 of Christie illustrates portable multifunction
device 100 having touch screen 112 that displays graphics within user
interface (UI) 200. (| 150.) Christie explains that “inadvertent contact with
a graphic may not select the graphic” and provides an example of “a swipe
gesture that sweeps over an application icon [which] may not select the
corresponding application when the gesture corresponding to selection is a
tap.” (Id.) Figure 231 of Christie illustrates portable multifunction devices
100, having interface 23001 for displaying “an incoming message that is
longer than a predefined length according to some embodiments,” such that
“[t]he user can also select the Close icon 2228 to close the displayed
message.” (1496.) Figure 231 of Christie also illustrates a portion of
incoming message 2225, for example, “I will send you another SMS before
take-off. . . .” (1 521.) Christie also explains that such incoming messages
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Application 12/200,782
can also being characterized as a “message pop-up.” (1 502.) Because
Christie explains that interface 23001 displays an incoming message,
Christie teaches the limitation “the pop-up notification including a portion of
the received text message or email.” Furthermore, because Christie explains
that the user can select close icon 2228 to close the portion of incoming
message 2225, Christie teaches the limitation “dismissing the pop-up
notification from the touch-sensitive display without displaying a remaining
portion of the received text message or email.”
Rosenberg relates to “gesture recognition functions [for] portable
computing devices.” (12.) Figure 1 of Rosenberg illustrates handheld
computing device 100 (120), which includes touch screen 101 with
graphical user interface (GUI) 102, such that “a user . . . provide[s] input. . .
by manually touching the surface of the screen as a means of targeting and
selecting displayed graphical elements” (121). In particular, Rosenberg
explains that
a flick gesture is enabled in which a user touches a finger to the
touch screen 101 of handheld computing device 100 at a
location that is over or upon a graphical element that is
relationally associated with a particular data file, and then flicks
his or her finger, with continuous contact upon the touch screen
101, towards and off the edge of the side of touch screen 101
that is closest to pointing portion 105 of handheld computing
device 100.
(124.) As a result, Rosenberg explains that “the [graphical] element is
generally moved upon the display screen by GUI drivers such that it quickly
slides across the screen and then disappears when it reaches the edge of the
screen.” {Id.) Because Rosenberg explains that such flick gesture enables
the user to quickly slide the graphical element to the edge of the screen,
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Rosenberg teaches the limitation “in response to detecting the user swiping
. . . off the touch-sensitive display.”
A person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that
incorporating the flick gestures of Rosenberg for touch screens, with the
portable multifunction device of Christie would provide the ability to
quickly slide graphical elements to the edge of the portable multifunction
device of Christie. SeeKSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417
(2007). Similarly, combining Christie with Rosenberg is no more than the
simple substitution of the flick gestures of Rosenberg for the close icon of
Christie, which dismisses a pop-up notification to an email or text, with no
unexpected results. See id. Thus, we agree with the Examiner (Final Act. 5;
see also Ans. 14) that modifying Christie to incorporate the flick gestures of
Rosenberg for touch screens would have been obvious.
First, Appellants argue that “Christie fails to disclose ‘in response to
detecting the user swiping the pop-up notification off the touch-sensitive
display, dismissing the pop-up notification from the touch-sensitive display
without displaying a remaining portion of the received text message or
email,’ as recited in claim 34.” (App. Br. 19; see also Reply Br. 8—9.)
However, the Examiner cited to Christie for teaching the limitation
“dismissing the pop-up notification from the touch-sensitive display without
displaying a remaining portion of the received text message or email” (Final
Act. 6) and cited to Rosenberg for teaching the limitation “in response to
detecting the user swiping . . . off the touch-sensitive display” {id. at 6—7).
Second, Appellants argue that “the Examiner has failed to provide any
reasoned explanation as to why or how it would have been obvious at the
time of Applicant’s invention to modify Christie to include the teachings of
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Rosenberg.” (App. Br. 19 (emphasis omitted).) In particular, Appellants
argue “the Examiner fails to explain how Rosenberg’s ‘at least one data file’
can be reasonably interpreted as ‘the pop-up notification’ recited in claim
34” and “the Examiner fails to explain how ‘transferring at least one data file
... to an electronic device’ (as taught by Rosenberg) can be reasonably
interpreted as ‘dismissing the pop-up notification from the touch-sensitive
display ....’” (Id. at 20 (emphases omitted).) Contrary to Appellants’
arguments, the combination of Christie and Rosenberg is based on the
improvement of a similar device in the same way as in the prior art, or in the
alternative, by combining known elements to achieve predictable results.
(Final Act. 6—7; see also Ans. 14.) In particular, one of ordinary skill in the
art would have modified Christie such that the flicking gesture of Rosenberg
is used to close the message pop-up of Christie, rather than pressing the
close icon. (Id.)
Last, Appellants argue that “Christie teaches away from this exact
feature [of ‘in response to detecting the user swiping the pop-up notification
off the touch-sensitive display’], disclosing ‘inadvertent contact with a
graphic may not select the graphic ... a swipe gesture that sweeps over an
application icon may not select the corresponding application ....’” (Reply
Br. 9 (emphases omitted).) However, Christie explains that “a swipe gesture
that sweeps over an application icon may not select the corresponding
application when the gesture corresponding to selection is a tap.” (1150.)
In other words, Christie explains that if the icon of Christie is responsive
only to a tap, then such icon would be unresponsive to a swipe, rather than
“teaching away” from all swiping motions. Accordingly, Appellants have
not provided persuasive arguments as to how Christie criticizes, discredits,
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or otherwise discourages the claimed “in response to detecting the user
swiping the pop-up notification off the touch-sensitive display’.” See In re
Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Christie
and Rosenberg would have rendered obvious independent claim 34, which
includes the limitation “in response to detecting the user swiping the pop-up
notification off the touch-sensitive display, dismissing the pop-up
notification from the touch-sensitive display without displaying a remaining
portion of the received text message or email.”
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 34 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 35—38 depend from claim 34, and Appellants
have not presented any additional substantive arguments with respect to
these claims. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 35—38 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a), for the same reasons discussed with respect to
independent claim 34.
Independent claims 41 and 48 recite limitations similar to those
discussed with respect to independent claim 34, and Appellants have not
presented any additional substantive arguments with respect to these claims.
We sustain the rejection of claims 41 and 48, as well as dependent
claims 42-45 and 49—52, for the same reasons discussed with respect to
claim 34.
§103 Rejections—Christie, Rosenberg, and Vetelainen or Orimoto
Although Appellants nominally argue the rejections of dependent
claims 39, 40, 46, 47, 53, and 54 separately (App. Br. 22—23), the arguments
presented do not point out with particularity or explain why the limitations
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Application 12/200,782
of these dependent claims are separately patentable. Instead, Appellants
argue that claims 39 and 40 “distinguish over the cited references for at least
the same reasons as claim 34,” claims 46 and 47 “distinguish over the cited
references for at least the same reasons as claim 41” {id. at 22), and claims
53 and 54 “distinguish over the cited references for at least the same reasons
as claim 48” {id. at 23). We are not persuaded by these arguments for the
reasons discussed with respect to claims 34, 41, and 48, from which claims
39, 40, 46, 47, 53, and 54 depend. Accordingly, we sustain these rejections.
Other §§ 102 and 103 Rejections
We do not reach the rejection of claims 34—38, 41—45, and 48—52
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Christie and the rejections of 34—
54 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over various combinations of
Christie, Rosenberg, Stappers, Vetelainen, and Orimoto. Affirmance of the
rejections discussed previously renders it unnecessary to reach the remaining
rejections, as all of pending claims have been addressed and found
unpatentable. Cf. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (not
reaching additional obviousness rejections).
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 34—54 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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