Ex Parte Doumuki

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 11, 2016

11834158 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
111834,158 08/06/2007 Tohru Doumuki
36738 7590 08/15/2016
ROGITZ & AS SOCIA TES
750B STREET
SUITE 3120
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
50W8829.0l 9251
EXAMINER
KASSIM, KHALED M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2468
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/15/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
Noelle@rogitz.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Exparte TOHRUDOUMUKI 1
Appeal2015-000799
Application 11/834, 15 8
Technology Center 2400
Before BRUCE R. WINSOR, KEVIN C. TROCK, and AMBER L. HAGY,
Administrative Patent Judges.
HAGY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Final Rejection of claims 1, 3-7, and 9-18, which are all of the pending
claims. We have jurisdiction over these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We reverse.
1 Appellant identifies the real parties in interest as Sony Corporation and
Sony Electronics, Inc. (App. Br. 2.)
Appeal2015-000799
Application 11/834, 15 8
Introduction
According to Appellant, "[ t ]he present invention relates generally to
systems and methods for the network set-up of wireless devices from the
wireless network itself or an external user computer." (Spec. 1.)
Exemplary Claim
Claim 1, reproduced below, is exemplary of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method for configuring a network device for a network,
compnsmg:
at a user computer or user telecommunication device
having communication access through a wireless access point,
receiving from a human end user a device identification (ID)
unique to the network device;
receiving at the user computer or user telecommunication
device from a human user input representing registration
information related to the network device including user account
name and password;
using the user computer or telecommunication device,
providing the device ID and registration information to an
Internet server;
sending at least the device ID from the server to a network
component in the network;
using the device ID as a temporary network ID to establish
communication between the component and the device;
sending a main network ID from the component to the
device; and
subsequently using the main network ID in
communication between the device and the network wherein the
main network ID is for a main channel and initially is sent to the
device on a subchannel using the temporary network ID.
2
Appeal2015-000799
Application 11/834, 15 8
REFERENCE
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Barriga et al. US 2005/0154913 Al July 14, 2005
REJECTION
Claims 1, 3-7, and 9-18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
being anticipated by Barriga. (Final Act. 2---6.)
ISSUE
Whether the Examiner erred in finding Barriga teaches "using the
main network ID in communication between the device and the network
wherein the main network ID is for a main channel and initially is sent to the
device on a subchannel using the temporary network ID," as recited in
independent claim 1, and commensurately recited in independent claims 7
and 13.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues the Examiner's finding of anticipation is in error
because, inter alia, 2 Barriga does not teach "anything about sending a main
network ID initially to the device on a subchannel using the temporary
network ID. Barriga nowhere discusses sub channels, much less as claimed."
(App. Br. 7.) The Examiner responds:
Barriga's customized manner for granting access to the user
shows multiple channels (routes of communication for access),
2 Because the issue addressed herein is dispositive of the Examiner's
rejection, we do not reach the additional arguments raised by Appellant.
3
Appeal2015-000799
Application 11/834, 15 8
wherein the set of authentication actions in Paragraphs [0051-
57] are performed once (one channel), and then subsequent
access upon user presentation of a token is performed in a
different manner (different channel, and the use of the different
channel and not using the first channel again shows a
deactivation of the first channel).
(Ans. 3.)
Appellant's argument persuades us of error in the Examiner's finding
that Barriga teaches a "main channel" and "subchannel," as claimed.
Although Barriga does not expressly mention any "channels," we agree
some sort of channel is necessary for the communication between a user and
a Service Provider that Barriga describes. (E.g., Barriga i-fi-151-58.) The
Examiner does not, however, point to any teaching in Barriga that discloses
multiple channels of communication that could fall within the reasonable
scope of a "main channel" and a "subchannel," as recited. Although the
Examiner first states that a "channel" is a "route[] of communication for
access" (Ans. 3); the Examiner then purports to read a "channel" on a
"manner" of access. (Id.) From that premise, the Examiner finds Barriga
teaches multiple channels because Barriga supposedly teaches multiple
"manner[s]" of access. (Ans. 3.) The Examiner's basis for this finding is
unclear, but it appears the Examiner finds Barriga teaches different manners
of access by disclosing a first manner as the set of authentication actions,
which are performed once when the users registers with a Service Provider,
and then a second manner as "subsequent access upon user presentation of a
token." (Ans. 3 (citing Barriga i-fi-151-57.) Stated more succinctly, the
different manners of access found by the Examiner to be taught by Barriga
appear to be the initial set up between the user and a Service Provider and
then subsequent access by the user. (See id.)
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Appeal2015-000799
Application 11/834, 15 8
We disagree that the Examiner's findings regarding Barriga's teaching
of "different manner[ s ]" of "access" are within the broadest reasonable
interpretation of claim 1 in light of Appellant's Specification, which
consistently describes the "main channel" and "subchannel" as distinct
physical channels:
In non-limiting embodiments the W AP 102 has a capability to
communicate at least with the WND 104 over two wireless
channels (main and subchannel), each of which is specified by a
respective SSID and WEP key. In one implementation the SSID
of the main channel may be designated "Na", and the WEP key
can be calculated by a specific function F(x), which is commonly
implemented in the WND 104 as well.
(Spec. 5 (emphasis added); see also Spec. 7-10 and Figs. 2 and 3.)
Accordingly, we concur with Appellant's contention the Examiner has
erred in finding Barriga teaches "using the main network ID in
communication between the device and the network wherein the main
network ID is for a main channel and initially is sent to the device on a
subchannel using the temporary network ID," as recited in independent
claim 1 and commensurately recited in independent claim 7.
With regard to independent claim 13, we note that, although claim 13
does not recite the "main channel" and "subchannel" terminology, both the
Examiner and Appellant argue claim 13 as of commensurate scope with
claim 1. (Final Act. 5; App. Br. 9.) We agree claim 13 includes the
"subchannel" and "main channel" structure within the recitations of the
"means for communicating a main network ID to the device over the home
network using the device ID as a temporary network ID" and the "means for
subsequently using the main network ID to establish communication
between the device and at least one component on the network,"
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Appeal2015-000799
Application 11/834, 15 8
respectively. (App. Br. 14 (Claims App'x).) By statute, these "means"
limitations "shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof." 35
U.S.C. § 112(f). As Appellant states (App. Br. 4), these means limitations
correspond to the following structure disclosed in Appellant's Specification:
With the subchannel communication established, at step (7) the
WAP 102 sends the SSID Na of the main channel to the WND
104 via the subchannel. Now having the main channel SSID, at
step (8) the WND 104 changes its SSID to be the main channel
SSID Na and also sets its WEP key to be a function of the main
channel SSID Na, establishing communication with the WAP 102
through the main channel. In this way, security of the main
channel SSID and WEP keys of the home network is preserved.
(Spec. 7.)
For the foregoing reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection
of claims 1, 7, and 13, or the rejections of dependent claims 3---6, 9-12, or
14--18.
CONDUCT OF APPELLANT'S COUNSEL
A concerning pattern of conduct by Appellant's counsel bears
separate mention. In this Appeal, as in several other unrelated matters
before the Board, 3 Appellant's counsel has engaged in inappropriate ad
hominem attacks on the Examiner and other USPTO officials. In particular,
in the present Appeal, Appellant's counsel ostensibly accuses the Examiner
of impropriety by alleging the Examiner is "making things up" in
3 See, e.g., Ex parte Locker, App. No. 2012-004052, 2014 WL 4803201 n.5
(Sept. 16, 2014); Ex parte Chen, App. No. 2013-000232, 2015 WL 1481083
n.2 (Mar. 31, 2015); Exparte Dawson, App. No. 2013-007037, 2015 WL
8984458 n.2 (Dec. 4, 2015); Ex parte Flores, App. No. 2014-007707, 2016
WL 3546710 n.7 (June 20, 2016).
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Appeal2015-000799
Application 11/834, 15 8
characterizing the Barriga reference (App. Br. 7), and questions the
Examiner's competence by characterizing the Examiner's findings as based
on "her remarkably incorrect understanding" (App. Br. 8) and an "expedient
ploy of simply putting words to the contrary into Barriga's mouth while
gesturing generally to paragraphs .... "(Reply Br. 7.) We do not find such
attacks to be appropriate, persuasive, or helpful in advancing Appellant's
arguments for reversal.
We further note Appellant's counsel has been admonished by the
Board on multiple occasions to refrain from similar lack of civility, with at
least one such opinion released by the Board be/ ore briefing in this matter
was filed. See Ex parte Locker, App. No. 2012-004052, 2014 WL 4803201
n.5 (Sept. 16, 2014). This panel admonishes Appellant's counsel, again, of
the duty to conduct all business with the Office with decorum and courtesy
and to submit complaints, if appropriate, through proper channels:
"Applicants and their attorneys or agents are required to conduct their
business with the United States Patent and Trademark Office with decorum
and courtesy .... Complaints against examiners and other employees must
be made in correspondence separate from other papers." 37 C.F.R. § 1.3.
DECISION
For the above reasons, the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) rejection of
claims 1, 3-7, and 9-18 is reversed.
REVERSED
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