Ex Parte DI CENSO et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 21, 2017

14498525 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 21, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/498,525 09/26/2014 Davide DI CENSO P13373US HRMN/0086 1586
98031 7590 09/25/2017
Arte.ois T aw firm in T T P - Harman
EXAMINER
7710 Cherry Park Drive Suite T #104
Houston, TX 77095
SWARTHOUT, BRENT
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/25/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
kcruz @ artegislaw.com
algdocketing @ artegislaw. com
rsmith @ artegislaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte HARMAN INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES, INC.1
Appeal 2017-003255
Application 14/498,525
Technology Center 2600
Before JASON V. MORGAN, JON M. JURGOVAN, and
ADAM J. PYONIN Administrative Patent Judges.
MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Introduction
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final
Rejection of claims 1—19. The Examiner objects to claims 20 and 21, but
indicates they “would be allowable if rewritten in independent form
including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening
claims.” Ans. 3. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.
1 Davide DI CENSO and Stefan MARTI are the inventors.
Appeal 2017-003255
Application 14/498,525
Invention
Appellant discloses a “pedestrian information system that can provide
alerts to a distracted pedestrian related to hazards in the pedestrian’s path”
wherein if “the system determines that the pedestrian is not aware of. . .
identified hazards, then the system can output audio, visual, and/or haptic
alerts to the pedestrian.” Abstract.
Exemplary Claims
Claims 1 and 14, reproduced below with key limitations emphasized,
1. A system for providing warnings of hazards to a user,
comprising:
a first sensor that detects at least one of a region and an object
in an environment of the user;
a second sensor that detects an activity of the user, wherein the
first sensor and the second sensor are configured to be worn by
the user,
at least one acoustic transducer configured to be worn
proximate to an ear of the user;
a memory storing instructions; and
a processor coupled to the memory, wherein, when executed by
the processor, the instructions configure the processor to:
identify a hazard based on at least one of the region and
the object detected by the first sensor;
determine whether the activity of the user detected by the
second sensor indicates awareness by the user of the
hazard', and
upon determining that the activity of the user does not
indicate awareness of the hazard, output to the at least
one acoustic transducer an audio warning for the hazard.
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Application 14/498,525
14. A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing
instructions that, when executed by a processor, configure the
processor to provide a warning of a hazard to a user by
performing the steps of:
analyzing a digital image of an environment to identify a hazard
based on at least one of an object and a region in the
environment;
analyzing an activity of the user to determine whether the
activity of the user indicates awareness of the hazard; and
upon determining that the activity does not indicate awareness
of the hazard, outputting, to an acoustic transducer configured
to be positioned proximate to an ear of the user, a warning for
the hazard.
Rejections
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 3—7, and 13—15 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Grimm et al. (US 8,253,589 B2; issued
Aug. 28, 2012) and Newman et al. (US 2004/0150514 Al; published Aug. 5,
2004). Final Act. 2—3.
The Examiner rejects claims 2, 8—12, and 16—19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Grimm, Newman, and Strickland et al.
(US 2015/0035685 Al; published Feb. 5, 2015). Final Act. 3^1.
ANAFYSIS
Claims 1—6
The Examiner relies on Grimm’s pedestrian-based device to render
obvious most of the recitations of claim 1. Final Act. 2 (citing, e.g., Grimm
col. 5,11. 25—31, 50-58, Figs. 1, 3). The Examiner acknowledges Grimm
does not specifically state that the “determination of whether [a] hazard alert
should be given is based on whether a second sensor detects [the] hazard in
[the wearer’s] line of sight” (i.e., based on whether the activity of the user
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Application 14/498,525
detected by the second sensor indicates awareness by the user of the
hazard). Final Act. 2. Instead, the Examiner relies on Newman’s use of
driver eye gaze in a hazard warnings system to render obvious modifying
Grimm’s device to incorporate the second sensor that indicates awareness
by the user of the hazard as recited. Final Act. 2 (citing Newman 130); see
also Ans. 5.
Appellant contends the Examiner erred because Newman’s “eye gaze
detector is mounted in the dashboard of a passenger compartment of a
vehicle and is directed back at the front of the driver so as to see the driver’s
eyes.” App. Br. 10 (citing Newman 124); see also Newman Fig. 5.
Appellant argues that “Newman is entirely silent regarding any type of
sensor that is configured to be worn by a user and is capable of detecting
whether the user is aware of a hazard within the surrounding environment.”
App. Br. 11. Appellant further argues that neither Grimm nor Newman
teaches or suggests “that the eye gaze detector of Newman is capable of
being worn by a user” or otherwise renders obvious “how such a
configuration could be accomplished.” Id.
As Appellant correctly submits, Newman discloses an example eye
gaze detector 50 that uses cameras mounted in the front of a passenger
compartment of a vehicle. Newman 124, Fig. 5. Importantly, cameras
mounted in the front of a passenger compartment of a vehicle do not
represent sensors worn by a user (i.e., the operator of the vehicle). The
Examiner’s findings do not show that Newman, even in combination with
Grimm, renders obvious the use of alternative sensors that would be worn by
a user.
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Application 14/498,525
The Examiner concludes that use of the “concept of sensing operator
activity indicating awareness of hazard[s] to reduce nuisance alerts” would
have been obvious to an artisan of ordinary skill. Ans. 5. However, the
Examiner does not support this conclusion with sufficient findings or
analysis addressing the differences between Newman’s vehicle-mounted
cameras and the claimed wearable second sensor. The Examiner also does
not show that Grimm cures the noted deficiency of Newman. Therefore, we
agree with Appellant that the Examiner’s findings do not show that the
combination of Grimm and Newman renders obvious “a second sensor that
detects an activity of the user, wherein ... the second sensor [is] configured
to be worn by the user” and “determin[ing] whether the activity of the user
detected by the second sensor indicates awareness by the user of the hazard,”
as recited in claim 1.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
rejection of claim 1, and claims 3—6, which depend therefrom and
incorporate the disputed recitation. The Examiner does not show that
Strickland cures the noted deficiency of Grimm and Newman; therefore, we
also do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 2.
Claims 7—13
Appellant persuasively argues similarly rejected claim 7 includes
substantially similar recitations to those discussed with respect to claim 1.
We agree because claim 7 is directed to headphones comprising a housing,
“a second sensor configured to detect an activity of the user, wherein . . .
second sensor [is] arranged relative to the housing” (i.e., is configured to be
worn by the user as part of the headphones), and a processor that
“determine [s] whether the activity of the user detected by the second sensor
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Application 14/498,525
indicates awareness by the user of the hazard.” For the reasons discussed
above, the Examiner’s findings do not show that the combination of Grimm
and Newman renders obvious the claimed arrangement of a second sensor
on the headphones of claim 7, where the second sensor detects an activity of
the user such that a determination can be made regarding awareness by the
user of a hazard.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
rejection of claim 7, and claim 13, which depends therefrom. The Examiner
does not show that Strickland cures the noted deficiency of Grimm and
Newman; therefore, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) rejection of claims 8—12.
Claims 14—19
Appellant argues that claim 14 also recites “limitations that are
substantially similar to those discussed . . . with respect to . . . independent
claim 1.” App. Br. 12; see also Reply Br. 6. However, Appellant’s
arguments with respect to the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 are not
commensurate with the scope of claim 14.
Claim 14 recites instructions that, when executed, perform steps
directed to analyzing an activity of the user to determine whether the activity
of the user indicates awareness of the hazard and determining that the
activity does not indicate awareness of the hazard. However, claim 14 fails
to limit the source of data regarding the activity of the user to a sensor that is
worn by the user. Rather, the activity of the user could be analyzed based on
data from cameras mounted in the front of a passenger compartment of a
vehicle, such as those found in Newman. Newman 124, Fig. 5. As such,
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Appellant’s arguments with respect to claim 1 are inapplicable to the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 14.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection
of claim 14, and claims 15—19, which Appellant does not argue separately.
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—13.
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 14—19.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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