Ex Parte Denton

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 25, 2014

11252945 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 25, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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Ex parte GUY SIMON DENTON
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Appeal 2011-012212
Application 11/252,945
Technology Center 2400
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Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, THU A. DANG,
and LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

INVENTION
The claims are directed to:
a system and method for controlling security of remote
unattended devices in a computing network environment and, in
particular, the invention relates to a system and method for
controlling security of a remote network power supply device
that powers up a remote unattended network device, more
particularly, a system and method for controlling security of a
wireless power supply device that powers up a remote
unattended network device.
(Spec. 1).
Independent claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the
subject matter on appeal (emphasis added):
1. A system for controlling security of a remote network
power supply device, the system comprising:
a remote network power supply device having a secure standard
implemented thereon and having a power-supply-identity;
a remote unattended network device powered from said remote
network power supply device, wherein the remote unattended network
device is located remotely from the remote network power supply
device, and wherein power is supplied from the remote network power
supply device to the remote unattended network device via a wired
power line;
a portal having a secure connection for controlling said remote
network power supply device; and
a power addressable protocol based on said secure standard and
running on said portal for receiving and sending one or more secure
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communications over said secure connection in response to a directive
issued by an authorized client for controlling said remote network
power supply device powering said remote unattended network
device. (Contested limitations emphasized).

REJECTIONS
A. Claims 1-8 and 15-19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Ewing (U.S. Patent 7,099,934 B1;
Aug. 29, 2006) and First (U.S. Pub. No. 2005/0138377 A1;
June 23, 2005).
B. Claims 9-14 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Ewing and First, and further in view of
Martin (U.S. Patent 7,239,892 B2; July 3, 2007).

GROUPING OF CLAIMS
Based on Appellant’s arguments, we decide the appeal of § 103
rejection A of claims 1-8 and 15-19 on the basis of claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2004).1
We address rejection B of contested dependent claim 11 separately,
infra.

1 Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on January 21, 2011. The date of filing
the Notice of Appeal determines which set of rules applies to an ex parte
appeal. If a Notice of Appeal is filed prior to January 23, 2012, then the
2004 version of the Board Rules last published in the 2011 edition of Title
37 of the Code of Federal Regulations (37 C.F.R. § 41.1 et seq.) applies to
the appeal. See also MPEP (rev. 8, July 2010).
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ANALYSIS
Issue: Under § 103, did the Examiner err in finding the cited
combination of Ewing and First would have taught or suggested the
contested limitations of :
a remote unattended network device powered from said
remote network power supply device, wherein the remote
unattended network device is located remotely from the remote
network power supply device, and wherein power is supplied
from the remote network power supply device to the remote
unattended network device via a wired power line,
within the meaning of representative claim 1 (emphasis added)?
Regarding claim 1, Appellant contends:
As depicted in Figure 2, the power distribution strip 214
of Ewing is a component of the local equipment rack 206.
There is no teaching or suggestion of an unattended network
device that is located remotely from the remote network power
supply device. Rather, the power distribution strip 214 of
Ewing is local, not remote, to the cards in the rack 206. The
attached definition of the 1999 edition of “Webster’s New
World College Dictionary” makes it clear that “remote” means
“distance in space; far off; far away”, which distribution strip
214 clearly is not. Thus, the feature of remotely controlling
power supplies, which themselves are remote from the devices
to which they provide power, (“a remote unattended network
device powered from said remote network power supply device,
wherein the remote unattended network device is located
remotely from the remote network power supply device, and
wherein power is supplied from the remote network power
supply device to the remote unattended network device via a
wired power line”) is not taught by any combination of the cited
art, particularly in the passages cited by the final Office Action.
(App. Br. 8-9 (emphases omitted)).

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The Examiner disagrees, referring to Ewing’s Figure 2:
In light of the original specification, the broadest reasonable
interpretation of a remote device and remote power supply
device located remotely from each other and connected via a
wired power line is that the remote device and remote power
supply device are separate and distinct, but located such that a
wired power cable may extend between them. Clearly, Ewing
teaches that the remote network devices, which are the network-
equipment units, are distinct and separate from the remote
power supply device, located such that a wired power cable
may extend between them.
Appellant further argues that Ewing does not teach a
remote network device that is remote from a remote power
supply device and points to the original specification on page 8,
line 21 to page 9, line 5. However, Examiner notes this portion
of the specification only provides a definition of a remote
network device (refer to any computing device, such as, a
computer or a server that is located at a distance and not easily
monitored) and a remote power supply device (refer to a power
supply device that is either wireless or wired and is located
remotely from a user or client), but does not state the remote
power supply device is remotely located from the remote
network device. In light of the original specification, the
broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim language is that
the remote power supply device is distinct and separate from
the remote network device as discussed above. As discussed
above, Ewing clearly teaches these limitations.
(Ans. 19-20 (emphases added)).

This appeal turns upon whether the Examiner’s claim interpretation of
“located remotely” is overly broad or unreasonable, within the meaning of
representative claim 1.
At the outset, we note Appellant has not defined “located remotely”
(claim 1) in terms of a specific distance range using any particular units of
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measure, e.g., inches, feet, yards, meters, or miles. However, Appellant’s
arguments focus on the distance between the network equipment unit 208
(remote unattended network device) in Ewing’s Figure 2 as being too close
in distance to be reasonably considered “remotely located” from power
distribution strip 214 (remote network power supply device). (App. Br. 8-9).
Thus, the Examiner is relying on a narrower range of distance between the
claimed devices compared to Appellant’s interpretation of “located
remotely” as being implicitly limited to a more distant (but undefined)
range. (Claim 1).
To the extent that the greater “remotely located” range of distance as
interpreted by Appellant (but undefined in terms of specific claimed units)
may overlap the shorter range of distance relied on by the Examiner (Ewing,
Fig. 2), our reviewing court held in Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc.,
463 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2006), “[w]here a claimed range overlaps with
a range disclosed in the prior art, there is a presumption of obviousness.”
The overlap need not be substantial to trigger the presumption. In re Geisler,
116 F.3d 1465, 1469 (Fed.Cir.1997).
Our reviewing court further guides: “[A]lthough the specification
often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have
repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.
[C]laims may embrace ‘different subject matter than is illustrated in the
specific embodiments in the specification.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations omitted). Moreover,
because “applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad
construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or
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patentee.” In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Given this guidance, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in
concluding:
In light of the original specification, the broadest reasonable
interpretation of a remote device and remote power supply
device located remotely from each other and connected via a
wired power line is that the remote device and remote power
supply device are separate and distinct, but located such that a
wired power cable may extend between them.
(Ans. 19 (emphases added)). Under this broader construction, we agree with
the Examiner that the aforementioned contested limitations are taught or
suggested by the cited combination of Ewing and First.
Regarding the Webster’s dictionary definition newly introduced into
the record (App. Br. 8), Appellant has not complied with our rules, which
require “a statement setting forth where in the record that evidence was
entered in the record by the examiner. Reference to unentered evidence is
not permitted in the brief.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.67(c)(1)(ix).2
Regarding the contested “wherein” clause limitation, “wherein power
is supplied from the remote network power supply device to the remote

2 37 C.F.R. § 41.67(c)(1)(ix) (“Evidence appendix. An appendix containing
copies of any evidence submitted pursuant to §§ 1.130, 1.131, or 1.132 of
this title or of any other evidence entered by the examiner and relied upon by
appellant in the appeal, along with a statement setting forth where in the
record that evidence was entered in the record by the examiner. Reference
to unentered evidence is not permitted in the brief. See § 41.63 for treatment
of evidence submitted after appeal. This appendix may also include copies
of the evidence relied upon by the examiner in any ground of rejection to be
reviewed on appeal.” (emphasis added)). See also supra note 1.
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unattended network device via a wired power line” (claim 1), we agree with
the Examiner that the
portion of the specification [pointed to by Appellant] only
provides a definition of a remote network device (refer to any
computing device, such as, a computer or a server that is
located at a distance and not easily monitored) and a remote
power supply device (refer to a power supply device that is
either wireless or wired and is located remotely from a user or
client), but does not state the remote power supply device is
remotely located from the remote network device. In light of
the original specification, the broadest reasonable interpretation
of the claim language is that the remote power supply device is
distinct and separate from the remote network device as
discussed above.
(Ans. 19-20 (emphasis added)).
Given the Examiner’s broader claim interpretation, we see no error
regarding the Examiner’s specific findings as set forth in the statement of
rejection, which points to Ewing, at column 7, lines 35-40, and Figure 2:
Vertical space in the rack 206 is typically at a premium, so all
the possible vertical rack space is reserved to the network-
equipment units 208 212 and not to any power supplies or
controllers. Therefore, a power-distribution strip 214 is
implemented as one or two long skinny plug strips mounted
vertically in the back inside corner spaces. It includes a
software-controlled relay-switch for each corresponding power
cord set from the network-equipment units 208 212.
(Ans. 6).
For these reasons, on this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner
erred. Accordingly, we sustain the § 103 rejection of representative
independent claim 1 over the combined teachings and suggestions of Ewing
and First. Claims 2-8 and 15-19 (not argued separately) fall therewith. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2004).
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Dependent Claim 11
Claim 11 recites: “The method according to claim 10, further
comprising the step of: assigning multiple remote unattended network
devices to a role-group, wherein the role-group defines a functional area of
an enterprise; and assigning a specific wireless power supply device to the
multiple remote unattended network devices in the role-group” (emphasis
added).
Regarding dependent claim 11, Appellant acknowledges “Ewing
teaches that a particular user (“a user logged in with a general username”)
may be allowed to control power to a set of intelligent power modules
(IPMs),” pointing to Ewing at column 11, lines 15-17. (App. Br. 10).
However, Appellant contends, “there is no teaching or suggestion of
assigning a specific wireless power supply device to a role-group of devices,
particularly where the role-group defines a functional area of an enterprise.”
(Id. (emphases omitted)).
We note claim 11 defines a “role-group” as “a functional area of an
enterprise.” However, we find no limiting definition described in
Appellant’s Specification that would preclude the Examiner’s broader
interpretation of “a functional area of an enterprise.” Therefore, on this
record, we are not persuaded of error regarding the Examiner’s findings:
Ewing explicitly teaches that individual IPMs or intelligent
power modules and the corresponding network equipment units
that are plugged into each IPM can be grouped together and a
general username can be defined and given access to power on
and off the group (Ewing, col. 11, lines 15-17, col. 11, lines 26-
40, see also various references to group throughout col. 12.).
While Ewing does not explicitly teach that the group defines a
functional area of an enterprise, the grouping of devices to an
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individual IPM as taught in Ewing is equivalent to a functional
area.
(Ans. 20).
Therefore, we sustain the § 103 rejection B of dependent claim 11.
Appellant advances no separate arguments regarding rejection B of
claims 9, 10, 12-14, and 20, which stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over the combined teachings and suggestions of
Ewing, First, and Martin. Arguments not made are considered waived. See
Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“When the
appellant fails to contest a ground of rejection to the Board, section
1.192(c)(7) [(now section 41.37(c)(1)(vii))] imposes no burden on the Board
to consider the merits of that ground of rejection . . . . the Board may treat
any argument with respect to that ground of rejection as waived.”).
Therefore, we also sustain the § 103 rejection B of claims 9, 10,
12-14, and 20.

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-20 under § 103.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED

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