Ex Parte Dejean et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 11, 2014

11517092 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 11, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/517,092 09/07/2006 Herve Dejean 20060147USNP-XER1383US01 1580
62095 7590 07/14/2014
FAY SHARPE / XEROX - ROCHESTER
1228 EUCLID AVENUE, 5TH FLOOR
THE HALLE BUILDING
CLEVELAND, OH 44115
EXAMINER
HU, JENSEN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2169
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/14/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte HERVE DEJEAN and JEAN-LUC MEUNIER
____________________

Appeal 2012-003174
Application 11/517,092
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before JOHNNY A. KUMAR, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and
PATRICK M. BOUCHER, Administrative Patent Judges.

BOUCHER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims
1–15 and 21–23. Claims 16–20 have been canceled. App. Br. 3. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

Illustrative Claim
The claimed subject matter relates to document conversion to a
common structured format (Spec. ¶ 1).
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Claim 1 is illustrative and is reproduced below:
1. A method for processing one or more organizational tables
of a document, each organizational table including a
substantially contiguous sub-set of text fragments of the
document identified as entries of the organizational table, each
entry having an associated linked fragment, the method
comprising:
assigning a score to each of the one or more
organizational tables respective to at least one object type based
on a scoring criterion for that object type; and
assigning a table type label to each of the one or more
organizational tables based on the scores.

References
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Zhou
Ferguson
US 5,892,843
US 6,336,094 B1
Apr. 6, 1999
Jan. 1, 2002
Huang
Lin
US 2001/0032217 A1
US 2003/0208502 A1
Oct. 18, 2001
Nov. 6, 2003

Rejections
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 1, 4–6, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Lin and Ferguson (Ans. 4–10).
Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Lin, Ferguson, and Huang (Ans. 10).
Claims 2, 3, 8–13, 15, 22, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Lin, Ferguson, and Zhou (Ans. 10–17).
Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Lin, Ferguson, Zhou, and Huang (Ans. 17).
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ANALYSIS
We have reviewed Appellants’ arguments in the Appeal Brief and
Reply Brief, and have reviewed the Examiner’s response to Appellants’
arguments. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for
emphasis.

Claims 1, 4–6, and 21
In addressing the rejection of claim 1, Appellants advance contentions
that draw a distinction between an “organizational table” and a “substantive
table,” noting that the specification specifically differentiates between such
table types. App. Br. 12. The specification identifies the term “substantive
table” as “a table containing content of the document as opposed to an
organizational table that provides organization to the document” and asserts
that “[t]he term ‘organizational table’ is intended to encompass both tables
of contents and tables of objects, but not substantive tables that contain
content of the document.” Spec. ¶ 22.
As Appellants state, “Lin discloses a method for extracting a table of
contents for a book or journal including numerous articles or chapters . . .
and for organizing the document based on the extracted table of contents.”
App. Br. 8 (citing Lin ¶¶ 30–90). Appellants acknowledge that the extracted
table of contents taught by Lin is an organizational table, but contend that
Lin does not disclose any other type of organizational table. Id.
The Examiner relies on Lin as disclosing all limitations of claim 1,
except that “Lin does not expressly disclose assigning a score to each of the
one or more organizational tables respective to at least one object type based
on a scoring criterion for that object type.” Ans. 5. For that limitation, the
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Examiner relies on Ferguson, which teaches a system for identifying tables
in a file by scanning the entire file for word strings that may represent titles
of a particular table type and assigning values according to how closely the
word strings resemble possible table titles. Ferguson, col. 4, ll. 24–48.
First, Appellants contend that the tables disclosed by Ferguson are
substantive tables, not organizational tables. App. Br. 11. Citing paragraph
45 of the specification, the Examiner responds that “substantive tables are
intended to be included in the definition of organizational tables since the
instant application deals with identifying and assigning such tables.” Ans.
19–20. Although we agree with Appellants that the Examiner’s reliance on
this portion of the specification is misplaced, Reply Br. 5–7, we are not
persuaded by Appellants’ overall argument. The teaching value of Ferguson
is found in its assignment of scores to a table, and we determine that one of
skill in the art would reasonably apply that teaching to the organizational
table disclosed by Lin.1

1 We additionally note that the distinction drawn by Appellants between
organizational tables and substantive tables relies on the informational
content of the respective tables. As such, Appellants’ contention relies on
nonfunctional descriptive material to identify a distinction with the prior art.
Such a distinction is not entitled to weight in the patentability analysis. See
Ex parte Curry, 84 USPQ2d 1272, 1274 (BPAI 2005) (informative), aff’d,
No. 06-1003 (Fed. Cir. June 12, 2006) (Rule 36) (“wellness-related” data in
databases and communicated on distributed network did not functionally
change either the data storage system or the communication system used in
the claimed method). “[N]onfunctional descriptive material cannot lend
patentability to an invention that would have otherwise been [invalidated] by
the prior art.” Ex parte Mathias, 84 USPQ2d 1276, 1279 (BPAI 2005)
(informative), aff’d, 191 Fed. Appx. 959 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing In re Ngai,
367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). See also Ex parte Nehls, 88
USPQ2d 1883, 1887–90 (BPAI 2008) (precedential) (discussing
nonfunctional descriptive material).
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Second, Appellants contend that “[c]laim 1 is founded upon the
recognition that the document may contain at least two different types of
organizational tables,” and that “[i]n the absence of this, it makes no sense to
assign a table type label to an organizational table, and so there is no
motivation to reach claim 1” because neither Lin nor Ferguson discloses two
different types of organizational tables. App. Br. 11. This contention is not
persuasive.
The Examiner correctly observes that claim 1 “does not specifically
require at least two different types of organization[al] tables.” Ans. 18.
Applying the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification,
Lin’s step of “mark[ing]” a candidate table-of-contents page as a real table-
of-contents page when the score for the candidate page exceeds a threshold
score teaches or suggests “assigning a table type label.” See Lin ¶ 78.
In addition, we disagree with Appellants’ argument that “every
organizational table scored using the approach of the proposed Lin/Ferguson
combination is a table of contents.” See Reply Br. 3. Appellants’ argument
improperly discounts Ferguson’s teaching of assigning values to identify and
label multiple table types. See Ferguson, col. 4, ll. 24–48. The combination
of this teaching with Lin reasonably suggests extending the labeling of a
single organizational table as taught by Lin to “assigning a table type label to
each of the one or more organizational tables based on the scores,” as recited
in claim 1. That Ferguson provides its teaching in the context of substantive
tables does not diminish, much less extinguish, the relevance of that teaching
for the reasons we address supra.
Third, Appellants contend that the references “do not disclose or fairly
suggest any object types to which an organizational table may be directed”
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so that the combination of references does not teach or suggest “assigning a
score to each of the one or more organizational tables respective to at least
one object type based on a scoring criterion for that object type,” as recited
in claim 1. App. Br. 12–13. This contention is not persuasive. The
Examiner finds that the features upon which Lin bases its score assignment
for tables of contents “represent at least one object type.” Ans. 5.
Appellants’ specification provides examples of object types (see, e.g., Spec.
¶ 22), and Appellants specifically direct our attention to paragraph 57 of the
specification, which states that “[t]he linked text fragments of a table of
contents will generally not be closely associated with objects of any object
type” (emphasis added). See App. Br. 12. Such permissive and exemplary
terms inform but do not limit construction of the term “object types,” which
we find encompasses the features identified by the Examiner as disclosed by
Lin.
Fourth, Appellants contend that “[t]he proposed modification of Lin
would require converting the table of contents extractor of Lin into an
organizational table labeler operating on already-extracted organizational
tables.” App. Br. 14. This contention is unpersuasive because, as we
explain supra, Lin already acts as a labeler when it marks a candidate table-
of-contents page as a real table-of-contents page.
Appellants do not argue separate patentability of claims 4 and 5. With
respect to claim 21, which recites a plurality of organizational tables, we are
not persuaded by Appellants’ contention that Ferguson fails to disclose such
a plurality of organizational tables for the reasons we provide supra. With
respect to claim 6, which recites assignment of a default table-of-contents
type, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that “all tables under
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consideration in . . . Lin are ‘candidate [table of contents]’ pages.” App.
Br. 15. It is axiomatic that if all tables under consideration are assigned as
candidate tables that those that do not meet the selection criterion are
assigned as candidate tables.

Claim 7
Appellants contend that “the mere disclosure in Huang of document
structuring using a DTD does not fairly suggest a document organizer that
organizes the document in accordance with a document type definition
(DTD) or schema that incorporates the at least one object type” (App. Br.
16). This contention “merely points out what a claim recites” and is
accordingly not “considered an argument for separate patentability of the
claim.” 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(1)(vii). See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (sustaining requirement that Appellants articulate more
substantive arguments if they wish for individual claims to be treated
separately).

Claims 2, 3, 8–13, 15, 22, and 23
Independent claim 8 recites that each organizational table is scored
“respective to at least one object type based on proximity of the associated
linked text fragments of the organizational table to objects of the at least one
object.” In addition to applying the teachings of Lin and Ferguson in a
manner similar to their application to claim 1, the Examiner cites Zhou for
this element of claim 8. Ans. 13. Zhou discloses extraction of title text from
scanned documents, including the identification of elements based on
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nearest-neighbor proximity of text elements. Zhou, col. 1, ll. 8–11; col. 7, l.
55 – col. 9, l. 27. The Examiner reasons that it would have been obvious to
one of ordinary skill in the art to apply such proximity identification to the
extraction of tables of contents disclosed by Lin. Ans. 11.
Appellants argue that the combination described by the Examiner is
not obvious “because Zhou does not relate to tables of any sort whatsoever,
much less to organizational tables.” App. Br. 17. Appellants further
contend that Zhou’s disclosure of classifying text does not disclose the
limitation because Zhou discloses “no differentiable ‘element’ or ‘object.’”
App. Br. 18. We disagree because Appellants’ contention attacks Zhou
individually when the Examiner has relied on its combination with Lin and
Ferguson. The test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the
prior art would have suggested to the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in
the art. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). As we note supra,
Appellants have not provided sufficient basis for a narrow construction of
the term “objects.” The teaching value of Zhou resides in its disclosure of
proximity analysis in extraction of information from documents. In light of
this teaching, one of skill in the art would reasonably include proximity
analysis in the scoring methodology of Lin so that the further combination
with Ferguson suggests “scoring each organizational table respective to at
least one object type based on proximity of the associated linked text
fragments of the organizational table to objects of the at least one object
type,” as recited in claim 8.
Appellants do not argue separate patentability of claims 2, 3, 9–13,
15, 22, or 23. Although Appellants address claim 2 separately, they merely
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refer to the arguments directed at claim 8, which are unpersuasive for the
reasons we set forth supra.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–15 and 21–23 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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