Ex Parte de Vries et alDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 8, 201914492597 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 8, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/492,597 09/22/2014 127350 7590 07/10/2019 Steptoe & Johnson LLP 1330 Connecticut Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Glen de Vries UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 20622.0050 (IDF-50) 3537 EXAMINER PAULSON, SHEETAL R. ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3626 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/10/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): hfox@steptoe.com rgreenfeld@steptoe.com ipdocketing@steptoe.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte GLEN DE VRIES, MLADEN LAUDANOVIC, and ANGEL JANEVSKI Appeal2017-003229 Application 14/492,597 1 Technology Center 3600 Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, BRUCE T. WIEDER, and MATTHEWS. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING Appellants filed a Request for Rehearing ("Request" or "Req.") under 37 C.F.R. § 41.52 for reconsideration of our Decision ("Decision" or "Dec.") on Appeal mailed March 6, 2019. The Decision affirmed the Examiner's rejection of claims 6 and 8-14 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter. An oral hearing was held on February 14, 2019. We have jurisdiction over the Request under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Medidata Solutions, Inc. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal2017-003229 Application 14/492,597 ANALYSIS A Request for Rehearing "must state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked by the Board." 37 C.F.R. § 4I.52(a)(l). A Request for Rehearing is not an opportunity to rehash arguments raised in the Briefs. Neither is it an opportunity to merely express disagreement with a decision without setting forth points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked. Arguments not raised in the briefs before the Board and evidence not previously relied on in the briefs also are not permitted except in the limited circumstances set forth in § 4I.52(a)(2) though (a)(4). Id. Appellants assert that the Board overlooked Appellants' argument regarding whether the present invention includes limitations which are not well-understood, routine, and conventional given that "the Examiner had deemed the claims 'allowable subject matter' over the prior art" (see Req. 2 (citing Final Act. 2-3)). More particularly, Appellants argue that the Board made a general reference to the "well-understood, routine, and conventional" test and its relation to Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018), Decision at 17-18, without addressing this issue - whether an invention that is novel and non-obvious can be found to be "well-understood, routine, and conventional." Req. 2-3. We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the Board overlooked Appellants' argument regarding whether the invention includes limitations which are not well-understood, routine, and conventional. Initially, we note that the question in step two of the Alice framework is not whether an additional feature is novel, but whether the implementation of the abstract idea involves "more than performance of 'well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry."' 2 Appeal2017-003229 Application 14/492,597 Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat 'l Ass 'n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347--48 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'!, 573 U.S. 208,225 (2014)). In this regard, we note that the Decision stated that "independent claim 6 recites a generic processor that performs the functions of the abstract idea, i.e., collecting, converting, calculating, and transmitting data, without particularity" (Dec. 14). 2 More particularly, the Decision determined that there is no indication here that the operations, recited in independent claim 6, require any specialized computer or inventive computer components - the Specification indicates just the opposite (see, e.g., Spec. ,r,r 14, 26-34). Here, the only claim element in independent claim 6 beyond the abstract idea is the claimed "processor," i.e., a generic component, operating in its routine and ordinary capacity to collect, convert, calculate, and transmit data. (Dec. 18). The Decision further articulated data can be collected manually (see Spec. ,r,r 27, 56), the collected data can be converted into aggregated data and subsequently converted into a first and second progress curves, either mentally or manually (see Spec ,r,r 26, 28, 51-52), and then the first and second progress curves can be transmitted to a user orally or through a written communication (see Spec. ,r,r 29-30). (Dec. 9). The Decision further stated: the Specification discloses that "[ t ]here are several ways to calculate the progress curves," e.g., "calculate and store in real- time all datapage status rollups and changes at any datapoint state change," "compute datapage states periodically at regular time intervals (e.g.[,] daily) and then calculate and store the resulting progress curves," and by "reconstructing datapage statistics 2 The Decision further noted that "independent claim 11 does not even recite that the method steps are performed by a processor or a computer" (Dec. 9, fn. 3). 3 Appeal2017-003229 Application 14/492,597 historically from a historical trail of datapoint state changes (e.g., audit trails)" (Spec. ,r 25). (Dec. 12). Appellants' Request fails to address any of these portions of the Decision or provide evidence of what particular limitation are meaningful beyond the face of the claim. In light of the above, we are not persuaded by Appellants' assertion that the Decision overlooked Appellants' argument regarding whether the present invention includes limitations which are not well-understood, routine, and conventional evidenced only by the Examiner's lack of any prior art rejection. And, to the extent Appellants maintain that the claimed invention is patent-eligible, i.e., that the present claims amount to "significantly more" than an abstract idea, simply because "the Examiner had determined that Appellants' claimed invention is novel and non-obvious" (Req. 3), Appellants misapprehend the controlling precedent. Neither a finding of novelty nor a non-obviousness determination automatically leads to the conclusion that the claimed subject matter is patent-eligible. Although the second step in the Mayo/Alice framework is termed a search for an "inventive concept," the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or non-obviousness, but rather, a search for "an element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."' Alice, 573 U.S. at217-18 (citation omitted). "Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the§ 101 inquiry." Ass 'nfor Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013). A novel and non-obvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89 4 Appeal2017-003229 Application 14/492,597 ( 1981) ("The 'novelty' of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter."). Thus, Appellants have not persuasively established that the claims are directed to something significantly more than the abstract idea. For the forgoing reasons, we conclude that Appellants have failed to show that the Board misapprehended or overlooked points raised in the appeal or that the Decision to affirm the Examiner was erroneous. DECISION We deny the request to reverse the Examiner's rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as to claims 6 and 8-14. DENIED 5 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation