Ex Parte Davidson

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 19, 2018

13435592 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
13/435,592 03/30/2012 Mark J. Davidson
143177 7590 12/21/2018
Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.
(United Parcel Service, Inc.)
2555 Grand Blvd.
Kansas City, MO 64108-2613
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
056182/398628 4350
EXAMINER
GUILIANO, CHARLES A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3623
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/21/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
IPDOCKET@SHB.COM
IPRCDKT@SHB.COM
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MARK J. DAVIDSON
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592 1
Technology Center 3600
Before JOHN A. EV ANS, HUNG H. BUI, and AARON W. MOORE,
Administrative Patent Judges.
BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-9, 11-13, and 27, which are all the
claims pending in the application. Claims 10 and 14--26 are cancelled.
Claims App'x. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM. 2
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is United Parcel Service
of America, Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellant's Appeal Brief ("Appeal Br.") filed June
16, 2017; Reply Brief ("Reply Br.") filed November 9, 2017; Examiner's
Answer ("Ans.") mailed September 13, 2017; Non-Final Office Action
("Non-Final Act.") mailed March 23, 2017; and original Specification
("Spec.") filed March 30, 2012.
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant's invention
Appellant's invention relates to "systems and methods for capturing
and evaluating operational data in order to improve operational efficiencies
in a variety of business contexts." Spec. 2: 12-13. According to Appellant,
"a fleet management computer system [is provided, shown in Figure 2] for
assessing operational delay." Spec. 2:15-16.
Appellant's Figure 2 is reproduced below with additional markings
for illustration.
0
. .. 100
D 102
TELE.lvlATlCS DEVlCE
0
tr---
110 ....
HANDHE1D DEVJCE
CONflCURED TO RECE.lV.E
''SERVKE.DATA''
130
_ __..., NETWORK
5
/
I'/
Figure 2 shows a fleet management system 5 for capturing and storing
operational data for a fleet of vehicles, and for evaluating various
operational efficiencies based on operational data including (1) "telematics
data" received from telematics device 102 and (2) "service data" received
from handheld device 110.
As shown in Figure 2, one or more processors included in central
server 120 are configured to perform: "[ 1] receiving service data [ and
2
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
contextual data], the service data being indicative of one or more service
dynamics for at least one vehicle operator during one or more time periods;
[2] identifying delay code segments based on the service data, each of the
delay code segments representing an occurrence indicated by the vehicle
operator as delaying a delivery-related activity during a certain period of
time; and [3] generating a graphical display indicating the identified delay
code segments." Spec. 3 :9--14. According to Appellant, in addition to
receiving telematics data from telematics device 102, handheld device (i.e.,
portable data acquisition device) 110 may also be configured to collect and
transmit telematics data on its own as well as service data (e.g., service data
input by a driver) including its contextual data, and location information
from a Global Positioning System (GPS) device. Spec. 25: 13-16, 26: 1-26,
27:8-17, 34: 17-20.
Illustrative Claims
Claims 1 and 27 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter, as reproduced below with disputed limitations in
italics:
1. A fleet management computer system for assessing
operational delay code segments attributable to one or more
delivery segments, said fleet management computer system
compnsmg:
one or more memory storage areas; and
one or more processors in communication with said one or
more memory storage areas;
wherein said one or more processors are, collectively,
configured to:
receive service data and corresponding contextual data,
said service data being indicative of one or more service
dynamics for at least one vehicle operator during one or more
3
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
time periods, wherein said service data comprises computer-
readable data generated by [ 1] a handheld device and indicative
of user input received by the handheld device, and said
contextual data comprises computer-readable data generated by
the handheld device concurrently with the service data and
indicative of a time the service data was generated;
identify, based at least in part on said user input received
by the handheld device and said contextual data generated by the
handheld device, service data indicative of one or more delivery
segment starts and service data indicative of one or more delivery
segment ends;
[2] link service data indicative of a delivery segment
start with service data indicative of a chronologically adjacent
delivery segment end to identify one or more delivery segments
each comprising service data captured between linked delivery
segment start data and delivery segment end data, with each of
the one or more delivery segments representing a delivery-
related activity performed by said vehicle operator;
identify, based at least in part on said user input received
by the handheld device and said contextual data generated by the
handheld device, service data indicative of one or more delay
code segment starts and service data indicative of one or more
delay code segment ends;
[3] link service data indicative of a delay code segment
start with service data indicative of a chronologically adjacent
delay code segment end to identify one or more delay code
segments each comprising service data captured between linked
delay code segment start data and delay code segment end data,
with each of the one or more delay code segments representing
an occurrence indicated by said vehicle operator as delaying a
delivery-related activity during a certain period of time;
associate one or more respective delay code segments with
a subsequent delivery segment delayed by the occurrence of the
one or more respective delay code segments by identifying the
one or more respective delay code segments as having
corresponding contextual data indicating the one or more
respective delay code segments occurred between a delivery
4
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
segment end corresponding to a prior delivery segment and a
delivery segment start corresponding to the subsequent delivery
segment; and
generate a graphical display indicating said respective
delay code segments as delaying the delivery-related activity of
the subsequent delivery segment associated with the one or more
respective delay code segments, wherein said graphical display
is provided for display via a graphical user interface comprising
an interactive geographical map and said geographical map
comprises a visible indication of a location of one or more of said
identified delay code segments.
Appeal Br. 34 (Claims App'x) (bracketing added).
EXAMINER'S REJECTIONS and REFERENCES
(1) Claims 1-19, 11-13, and 27 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a patent-
ineligible "abstract idea" without significantly more. Non-Final Act. 17-19.
(2) Claims 1-9, 12, 13, and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Appellant's earlier work product,
Davidson et al. (WO 2010/030341 Al; published Mar. 18, 2010)
("Davidson"), Jones (US 2003/0195696 Al; published Oct. 16, 2003), and
Sheha et al. (US 2005/0073443 Al; published April 7, 2005) ("Sheha").
Final Act. 20-32.
(3) Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
unpatentable over Davidson, Jones, Sheha, and Hitchner (US 6,128,543;
issued Oct. 3, 2000). Final Act. 32-33.
5
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
DISCUSSION
35 USC§ 101: Claims 1-9, 11-13, and 27
To determine whether subject matter is patent-eligible under§ 101,
the Supreme Court has set forth a two part test "for distinguishing patents
that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those
that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Alice Corp. Pty. v.
CLS Bankint'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). The first step in the analysis
is to "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those
patent-ineligible concepts," such as an abstract idea. Id. For computer-
related technologies, "the first step in the Alice inquiry ... asks whether the
focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer
capabilities" (which would be eligible subject matter) or instead "on a
process that qualifies as an 'abstract idea' for which computers are invoked
merely as a tool" (which would be ineligible subject matter). Enfzsh, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis
added). If the claims are directed to eligible subject matter, the inquiry
ends. Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the second
step in the analysis is to consider the elements of the claims "individually
and 'as an ordered combination"' to determine whether there are additional
elements that "'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible
application." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78).
In other words, the second step is to "search for an 'inventive concept'-i.e.,
an element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
6
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
[ineligible concept] itself."' Id. ( quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73).
"'[W]ell-understood, routine, [and] conventional activit[ies]' previously
known to the industry" are insufficient to transform an abstract idea into
patent-eligible subject matter. Id. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73).
In rejecting claims 1-9, 11-13, and 27 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the
Examiner determines these claims are directed to an abstract idea of
"collecting service data and context data regarding service dynamics of an
operator during a delivery activity, analyzing the collected data by
identifying, linking, and associating the start and end times of delivery and
delay segments, and displaying delay segments that delay delivery segments
based on the analysis of the collected data" that are considered as "an
ineligible method of organizing human activity" and that are akin or
analogous to claims directed to "collecting information, analyzing it, and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis," which were held to
be an "abstract idea" by the Federal Circuit in Electric Power Group. Final
Act. 8, 17-18 (quoting Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350, 1353-1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Examiner also determines steps
recited in these claims can be implemented mentally or performed manually
by a human with pen and paper. Non-Final Act. 7; see also CyberSource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
For instance the service data can be recorded by a human
recording the time of the day and the description of all activities
of the operator using a pen and pad of paper; [then] [ t ]he human
can then use their mind to analyze the recorded data to identify
and link time segments with start and end times that indicate both
the delays and the delivery activity; [ and] [ fJinally, the human
can record each delivery and delay with the start and end time on
a paper map.
7
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
Non-Final Act. 7.
The Examiner further determines the claims fail to amount to
"significantly more than the judicial exception" because the elements
recited, whether taken individually or in an ordered combination "amount to
no more than mere instructions to implement the idea on a computer and a
recitation of generic computer structure that serves to perform generic
computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities previously known to the industry." Non-Final Act. 18.
Alice/Mayo-Step 1 (Abstract Idea)
Turning to the first step of the Alice inquiry, Appellant argues the
claims are not directed to an abstract idea because:
(1) "the Examiner does not properly interpret the currently
pending claims" and "does not address the recited source
of the service data and the corresponding contextual data,
which drivers the later functionality of the claim
limitations" i.e., "[t]hese data types are generated by a
handheld device carried by a delivery vehicle operator"
(Appeal Br. 12-14; Reply Br. 3);
(2) "[t]he Examiner analysis entirely ignores the most obvious
distinction between the currently pending claims and those
reviewed in Electric Power Group, namely, that the
currently pending claims recite configurations operable in
entirely different field of use than those of Electric Power
Group, and the configurations of the currently pending
claims provide vastly different outputs as compared to the
claims of Electric Power Group. Whereas the claims of
Electric Power Group merely provide outputs of
otherwise already generated data, the currently pending
claims provide configurations that formulate entirely new
graphical display formats based on previously non-
existent links between various data types" (Appeal Br. 16);
8
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
(3) Appellants' claims, like the claims in McRO, Inc. v.
Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed.
Cir. 2016), recite "features enabling a distinct process that
was previously unknown to humans to be automated via a
computer system" (Appeal Br. 18) and "focus on an
improvement in technology [] specifically operating the
realm of computerized tracking of fleet vehicles" (Reply
Br. 8); and
(4) "[t]he combination of features recited in the claims
provide inherently computer-specific configurations that
address shortcomings of previously existing computer
systems at least in part via the use of service data and
corresponding contextual data generated by a handheld
device carried by a vehicle operator" and "[ t ]he recited
configurations are specifically tailored for use in a
computer environment to enable computing systems to
automatically identify the delivery segments and the delay
code segments without user intervention based on the
generated service data and corresponding contextual data
. . . do not simply recite some previously performed
manual task that may be selectably performed either
manually or via a computer (Appeal Br. 21-22).
Appeal Br. 12-18, 21-22; Reply Br. 2-12.
Appellant's arguments are not persuasive. First, the Examiner is
required to review all claims at some level of generalization and characterize
whether those claims are directed to an abstract idea under Alice step 1.
However, there is no single definition of "abstract idea." As the Federal
Circuit succinctly put it:
The problem with articulating a single, universal definition of
"abstract idea" is that it is difficult to fashion a workable
definition to be applied to as-yet-unknown cases with as-yet-
unknown inventions.
Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). Because there is no single definition of an abstract idea, the
9
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
Federal Circuit instructs us "to examine earlier cases in which a similar or
parallel descriptive nature can be seen-what prior cases were about, and
which way they were decided." Id. at 1294 (citing Elec. Power Grp., 830
F.3d at 1353-54; accordUSPTO Memorandum, July 2015 Update: Subject
Matter Eligibility (2015), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/ieg-july-2015-update.pdf ("US PTO Memorandum") (instructing
Examiners that "a claimed concept is not identified as an abstract idea unless
it is similar to at least one concept that the courts have identified as an
abstract idea"). In this case, the Examiner did just what she was required to
do under the USPTO Memorandum, has characterized the claims as required
pursuant to Alice, and has identified analogous claims as discussed in
Electric Power Group.
Second, Appellant's argument against Electric Power Group is
unpersuasive. The source of service data and corresponding contextual data,
i.e., "generated by a handheld device carried by a vehicle operator" is not
dispositive as to whether Appellant's claims are directed to an abstract idea
under Alice step 1. As correctly recognized by the Examiner, the abstract
concept recited in Appellant's claims (i.e. collecting service data and context
data regarding service dynamics of an operator during a delivery activity,
analyzing the collected data by identifying, linking, and associating the start
and end times of delivery and delay segments, and displaying delay
segments that delay delivery segments based on the analysis of the collected
data) is similar to "collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying
certain results of the collection and analysis," which was held to be abstract
by the Federal Circuit in Electric Power Group. Ans. 5. Contrary to
Appellant's argument, the steps recited in Appellant's claims 1 and 27 are
10
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
nothing more than receiving, processing, comparing, and identifying data of
a specific content, e.g., service data and corresponding contextual data.
Information, as such, is intangible, and data analysis and comparisons,
without more, are abstract ideas. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp.,
550 U.S. 437,451 fn.12 (2007); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355; Gottschalkv.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972). "[C]ollecting information, including
when limited to particular content ( which does not change its character as
information)," is "within the realm of abstract ideas." Elec. Power Grp., 830
F.3d at 1353-54; see also Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790
F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs.for
Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014); CyberSource, 654 F.3d
at 1370.
Third, Appellant's reliance on McRO is misplaced. For example, the
McRO '576 patent (U.S. Patent No. 6,307,576) describes a computer
software for matching audio to a 3D animated mouth movement to provide
lip-synced animation. McRO 's claims contain (i) specific limitations
regarding a set of rules that "define [] a morph weight set stream as a
function of phoneme sequence and time of said phoneme sequence" to
enable computers to produce "accurate and realistic lip synchronization and
facial expressions in animated characters" (McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313) and,
when viewed as a whole, are directed to (ii) a "technological improvement
over the existing, manual 3-D animation techniques" that uses "limited rules
in a process specifically designed to achieve an improved technological
result in conventional industry practice," McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316.
In contrast to McRO, Appellant's claims and Specification are
directed to "systems and methods for capturing and evaluating operational
11
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
data in order to improve operational efficiencies in a variety of business
contexts." Spec. 2: 12-13. According to Appellant, "a fleet management
computer system [is provided] for assessing operational delay." Spec. 2:15-
16. One or more processors included in central server 120 are configured to
perform: "[1] receiving service data [and contextual data], the service data
being indicative of one or more service dynamics for at least one vehicle
operator during one or more time periods; [2] identifying delay code
segments based on the service data, each of the delay code segments
representing an occurrence indicated by the vehicle operator as delaying a
delivery-related activity during a certain period of time; and [3] generating a
graphical display indicating the identified delay code segments." Spec. 3:9-
14.
Based on Appellant's claims and Specification, we determine that the
claims are directed to an abstract idea of "assessing operational efficiency"
based on input [ service and contextual] data, which is considered as a
"fundamental economic practice" as well as certain "methods for organizing
human activity." Such activities are squarely within the realm of abstract
ideas. Assessing operational efficiency based on input [ service and
contextual] data is a fundamental business practice prevalent in our system
of commerce, like (1) the risk hedging in Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593
(2010); (2) the intermediated settlement in Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356-57;
(3) verifying credit card transactions in CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011); (4) guaranteeing
transactions in buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2014); (5) distributing products over the Internet in Ultramercial, Inc. v.
Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014); (6) determining a price of a
12
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
product offered to a purchasing organization in Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v.
SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015); and (7) pricing a product for
sale in OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2015). Assessing operational efficiency based on input [ service and
contextual] data is also a building block of a market economy and, like risk
hedging and intermediated settlement, is an "abstract idea" beyond the scope
of§ 101. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356.
In addition, we note Appellant's claims 1 and 7 do not improve the
performance of a computer or solve a problem specific to computers or
computer networks. Appellant's Specification and arguments do not
demonstrate the claims "improve the way a computer stores and retrieves
data in memory," as the claims in Enfzsh did via a "self-referential table for a
computer database." See Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1336, 1339. Neither the steps
recited in Appellants' claims 1 and 17, nor the rest of Appellants'
Specification supply any description or explanation as to how these data
processing or analysis steps are intended to provide "a specific improvement
to the way computers operate," as explained in Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1336; or
an "unconventional technological solution ... to a technological problem"
that "improve[s] the performance of the system itself," as explained in
Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300, 1302.
As further recognized by the Examiner (Final Act. 3), the steps recited
in Appellant's claims 1 and 27, such as: [1] "receiving service data and
corresponding contextual data"; [2] "identifying ... service data indicative
of one or more delivery segment starts and service data indicative of one or
more delivery segment ends"; [3] "linking service data indicative of a
delivery segment start with service data indicative of a chronologically
13
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
adjacent delivery segment end"; [ 4] "identifying ... service data indicative
of one or more delay code segment starts and service data indicative of one
or more delay code segment ends"; [5] "associating one or more respective
delay code segments with a subsequent delivery segment delayed by the
occurrence of the one or more respective delay code segments"; and [ 6]
"generating a graphical display indicating said respective delay code
segments" (see claim 27) are also mental steps that could be performed in
the human mind or by a human using a pen and paper. See CyberSource,
654 F.3d at 1372-73 ("[A] method that can be performed by human thought
alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under
[section] 101."); see also In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
("[M]ental processes----or processes of human thinking-standing alone are
not patentable even if they have practical application."); Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) ("Phenomena of nature,[] mental processes,
and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic
tools of scientific and technological work.") (emphasis added).
Additionally, mental processes remain unpatentable even when automated to
reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen
and paper. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 ("That purely mental processes
can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the
holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalkv. Benson.").
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claims 1 and 27 are
directed to an abstract idea. Final Act. 17; Ans. 4.
14
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
Alice/Mayo-Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
In the second step of the Alice inquiry, Appellant argues the claims
recite elements that amount to "significantly more" [i.e., inventive concept]
than the alleged abstract idea" because:
( 1) Appellants' claims, like the claims in Amdocs (Israel) Ltd.
v. Openet Telecom, Inc. 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016),
"recite features for providing generated data links between
identified delivery segments and identified delay code
segments existing within service data generated by a
handheld computing device. This enhancement of data
stored within databases provides a novel and unique
methodology for parsing generated service data received
from handheld computing devices to provide
enhancements via the generated links between data.
Through the recited limitations of the independent claims,
the claims provide significantly more detail regarding how
enhancements to the data are utilized to solve a computer-
specific problem in an unconventional technological way
than those claims deemed patentable in Amdocs"; and
(2) Appellants' claims, like the claims in DDR Holdings, are
"necessarily rooted in the realm of computer networks"
and "provide specific recitations of features that are
configured to address and overcome limitations in the
methodology that computing systems receive and analyze
data to identify delivery segments and delay code
segments, and to link delay code segments with
corresponding delivery segments to provide an indication
of activities that may have delayed delivery related
activities occurring during the identified delivery
segments."
Appeal Br. 18-24; Reply Br. 15.
Appellant's arguments are not persuasive. Under current Federal
Circuit precedent, an "inventive concept" under Alice step 2 can be
established by showing, for example, that the patent claims:
15
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
(1) provide a technical solution to a technical problem unique
to the Internet, e.g., a "solution ... necessarily rooted in
computer technology in order to overcome a problem
specifically arising in the realm of computer networks"
(see DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257);
(2) transform the abstract idea into "a particular, practical
application of that abstract idea," e.g., "installation of a
filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end-
users, with customizable filtering features specific to each
end user" (see BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1352, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2016)); or
(3) "entail[] an unconventional technological solution ([ e.g.,]
enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological
problem ([e.g.,] massive record flows [that] previously
required massive databases)" and "improve the
performance of the system itself' (see Amdocs, 841 F.3d
at 1300, 1302).
In this case, however, we find no element or combination of elements
recited in Appellant's claims 1 and 27 that contains any "inventive concept"
or adds anything "significantly more" to transform the abstract concept into
a patent-eligible application. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2357. For example,
Appellant's abstract idea of "assessing operational efficiency" based on
input [service and contextual] data is not rooted in computer technology; nor
does it (1) provide any technical solution to a technical problem unique to
the Internet as required by DDR Holdings; (2) provide any particular
practical application as required by Bascom; or (3) entail an unconventional
technological solution to a technological problem as required by Amdocs.
Instead, Appellant's invention simply uses a generic computing device and
network, shown, for example, in Figures 1-23, to perform the abstract idea
16
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
of "assessing operational efficiency" based on input [ service and contextual]
data. Spec. 2: 14--22; Abstract.
As recognized by the Examiner, the use of generic computer elements
( e.g., computer system, memory storage, and processors) do not alone
transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.
Non-Final Act. 19; Ans. 16-17. As our reviewing court has observed, "after
Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations
does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible." DDR, 773
F.3d at 1256 (citing Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2358).
Additional Argument
Appellant argues that the claims "do not preempt the use of any
abstract ideas recited." Appeal Br. 23. However, this argument is not
persuasive because, although "preemption may signal patent ineligible
subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate
patent eligibility." Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d
1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). "Where a patent's claims are deemed only to
disclose patent ineligible subject matter" under the Alice/Mayo framework,
"preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot." Id.
Because Appellant's claims 1 and 27 are directed to a patent-ineligible
abstract concept and do not recite something "significantly more" under the
second prong of the Alice analysis, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of
claims 1-9, 11-13, and 27 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
35 USC§ 103: Claims 1-9, 11-13, and 27
In support of the§ 103 rejection of independent claim 1, the Examiner
finds Appellant's earlier work product, Davidson, teaches Appellant's
17
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
claimed "fleet management computer system for assessing operational delay
code segments" shown in Figure 1, including most claim limitations, except
for an express disclosure that (1) "one or more delay code segments
representing an occurrence indicated by said vehicle operator as delaying a
delivery-related activity" and (2) "[a] graphical display[] comprises a
visible indication of a location of one or more of said identified delay code
segments." Non-Final Act. 20-24 (Davidson 1:1-28, 4:8-34, 8:27-9:7,
11:11-13, 13:31-14:9, 16:17-17:6, 17:17-27, 18:29-34, 22:11-32, 23:3-16,
Fig. 10).
The Examiner then relies on Jones for teaching ( 1) "one or more delay
code segments representing an occurrence indicated by said vehicle operator
as delaying a delivery-related activity" and Sheha for teaching (2) "[a]
graphical display [] comprises a visible indication of a location of one or
more of said identified delay code segments." Non-Final Act. 24--25 ( citing
Jones ,r,r 70, 147, Fig. 1; Sheha ,r 138, Fig. 14).
Appellant does not dispute the Examiner's factual findings regarding
Jones and Sheha, or the Examiner's reason to combine. Instead, Appellant
disputes the Examiner's factual findings regarding Davidson. In particular,
Appellant argues Davidson does not teach:
"receiv[ing] service data and corresponding contextual data, said
service data being indicative of one or more service dynamics for
at least one vehicle operator during one or more time periods,
wherein said service data comprises computer-readable data
generated by [ 1] a handheld device and indicative of user input
received by the handheld device, and said contextual data
comprises computer-readable data generated by the handheld
device concurrently with the service data and indicative of a time
the service data was generated."
18
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
Appeal Br. 25-29 ( emphasis added). In other words, Appellant
acknowledges Davidson teaches the use of "vehicle telematics data"
received from vehicle sensors 220, via telematics device (RFID tag) 120,
shown in Figure 1, but argues Davidson does not teach or suggest any
"service data and corresponding textual data ... generated by a handheld
device" as recited in claims 1 and 27. Appellant further argues Davidson's
"vehicle telematics data" is not the same as "service data" and the Examiner
has improperly conflated "the concepts of telematics data and service data
by indicating that Davidson's discussion regarding telematics data is
somehow analogous to the recited features of receiving and utilizing service
data of independent claim 1." Appeal Br. 28.
Appellant also contends that because Davidson does not teach any
"service data," Davidson also does not teach or suggest any "linking service
data indicative of a delivery segment start with service data indicative of a
chronologically adjacent delivery segment end'' or "linking service data
indicative of a delay code segment start with service data indicative of a
chronologically adjacent delay code segment end'' as recited in Appellant's
claims 1 and 27. Appeal Br. 30-31.
Appellant's arguments are not persuasive. Instead, we find the
Examiner has provided a comprehensive response to Appellant's arguments
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Ans. 18-19. As such, we
adopt the Examiner's findings and explanations provided therein. Id. For
example, as correctly recognized by the Examiner, "the distinction between
service data and telematics data" is not recited in the claims. Ans. 18.
Likewise, Davidson's telematics device can also be a handheld device used
19
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
to capture telematics data and service data from sensors. Ans. 19 ( citing
Davidson 177-23, 27:23-34).
For example, Davidson's Figure 1 is identical to Appellant's Figure 2,
as reproduced below.
5
102
FIG. 1
Davidson's Figure 1 shows fleet management computer system for
evaluating various operational efficiencies based on operational data
including (1) "telematics data" received from telematics device 102 and (2)
"service data" received from handheld device 110.
As shown in Figure 1, Davidson teaches (1) the use of telematics
device 102 to receive telematics data from a plurality of vehicle sensors
located on vehicle 100 (Davidson 3 :24--25, 4: 1-7, Abstract) and (2) the use
ofhandheld device 110 to receive input service data (Davidson 8:12-24).
Davidson also teaches that, in addition to receiving telematics data from
telematics device 102, handheld device (i.e., portable data acquisition
20
Appeal2018-001050
Application 13/435,592
device) 110 may also be configured to collect and transmit telematics data
on its own as well as service data including location information from a
Global Positioning System (GPS) device. Davidson 8:1-11.
For these reasons, we are not persuaded of Examiner error.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection of claims 1
and 27 and dependent claims 2-9 and 11-13, which Appellant does not
argue separately.
CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude Appellant has not demonstrated
the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-9, 11-13, and 27 under 35 U.S.C. §
101 and§ 103.
DECISION
As such, we AFFIRM the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-9, 11-13,
and 27 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and§ 103.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
21