Ex Parte Dahiwadkar

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 22, 2018

14331834 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 22, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
14/331,834 07/15/2014 Sanjeevkumar V. Dahiwadkar
61494 7590 03/22/2018
Baker Donelson Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC
100 Light Street
BALTIMORE, MD 21202
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
029411.098476 2820
EXAMINER
SHARVIN, DAVID P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3692
MAILDATE DELIVERY MODE
03/22/2018 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SANJEEVKUMAR V. DAHIW ADKAR
Appeal2017-002482
Application 14/331,834 1
Technology Center 3600
Before PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, KENNETH G. SCHOPPER, and
ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
decision rejecting claim 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
1 The Appellant identifies Sanjeevkumar V. Dahiwadkar and IndiSoft LLC
as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal2017-002482
Application 14/331,834
ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
1. A business practice management system, comprising:
a hub-and-spoke web-based client/server architecture
including a plurality of remote client terminals, one client
terminal for each primary participant in a default mortgage
case, and a web server in direct communication with all of said
client terminals through an Internet backbone;
a URL web portal assigned to each of said participants,
said web portal including links to a plurality of index-tabbed
webpages each including content for guiding the respective
participants through all of the default loan resolution steps of
collection, loss mitigation, foreclosure, eviction, bankruptcy,
claims, REO acquisition and maintenance, and REO
disposition;
a modular array of web-based software resident on a
computer readable storage medium at said web server for data
exchange with the various participants and the various third
party applications used by those participants that facilitates
dialogue, guides and educates the participants, tracks activity,
and provides information necessary for a resolution, said
modular array including a workflow management module
comprising executable instructions stored on said computer
readable storage medium at said web server for defining a
plurality of data objects each comprising a chronological
sequence of pre-defined tasks, task-schedules and task-
assignments to one or more of said participants, said workflow
management module further comprising executable instructions
stored on said computer readable storage medium at said web
server for generating a graphical user interface for selecting any
user, loan, document, or group of the foregoing and attaching
any one or more of said plurality of data objects to said selected
user, loan, document, or group of the foregoing.
REJECTION
Claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as ineligible subject matter.
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Application 14/331,834
ANALYSIS
Applying the first step of the methodology delineated in Alice Corp.
Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014), the
rejection states that the claims at issue are directed to the abstract idea of a
business practice of guiding participants through default loan resolution
steps of collection, which is characterized as a fundamental economic
practice, a method of organizing human activity, and "organizing or
manipulating data or information." Final Action 2, 6, 8, and 12. Under the
second Alice step, the Examiner determines that the claimed features do not
involve significantly more than the abstract idea, because the claimed
elements amount to no more than instructions to implement the abstract idea
with a generic computing network. Final Action 2-3, 11.
Asserting error in the rejection, the Appellant contends that claim 1 is
not an abstract idea, because it relies on both a hardware foundation (hub-
and-spoke web-based client/server architecture) and distributed software.
Appeal Br. 5. The Appellant argues that the Specification describes a
particular, non-generic computer with a distributed architecture and a web
server specially programmed with particular modules that communicate in a
particular way with remote client terminals. Id. at 5-7. This argument is not
persuasive of error. The Supreme Court explained that, in regard to a
subject-matter eligibility determination, "[t]he fact that a computer
'necessarily exist[ s] in the physical, rather than purely conceptual, realm,'
... is beside the point." Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359. Indeed, under the first
step of the Alice analysis, "the claims are considered in their entirety to
ascertain whether their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject
matter." Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343,
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Application 14/331,834
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, the particular hardware/software items
addressed and relied upon by the Appellant are identified with reference to
the Specification (see Appeal Br. 5---6), but are not set forth with specificity
in the claim.
The Appellant also asserts that "[ n ]othing about claim 1 can be
performed by human thought alone, or by a human using pen and paper,"
such that "claim 1 is not an abstract idea." Id. at 7. Regardless of the
applicability of such tests of abstractness, however, the rejection identifies
the abstract idea as a fundamental economic practice and a method of
organizing human activities. Final Action 2, 6, 8; see also Answer 2-3.
Further, the Appellant also argues that the rejection is erroneous,
because it "conflates" the two Alice steps, by "factoring out prior art or non-
novel claim elements" in the step-one analysis. Appeal Br. 8. To the
contrary, as discussed above - and as the Examiner points out (see
Answer 5) - the rejection addresses each of the two Alice inquiries
separately and does not "factor[] out prior art or non-novel claim elements"
(Appeal Br. 8) in the first step. See Final Action 2-3.
In addition, the Appellant asserts that the Examiner's abstract-idea
determination lacks evidentiary support. Appeal Br. 9. Yet, the Examiner's
determination of abstractness (see Final Action 7-8; see also Answer 2, 4)
aligns with the approach of looking to court decisions regarding fundamental
economic practices and methods of organizing human activity. See Amdocs
(Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (A "decisional mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier
cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen - what
prior cases were about, and which way they were decided.") Fundamental
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Application 14/331,834
economic practices and methods of organizing human activity - such as the
identified abstract idea in this case - are categories of basic tools of
technological work, which courts regard as abstract ideas ineligible for
patenting. See Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2356-57; buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,
765 F.3d 1350, 1353-55 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Additionally, the Appellant
asserts that additional evidence is needed, but without providing any
supporting reasoning, or any evidence, that might contradict the Examiner's
determination.
Although the Appellant (see Reply Br. 2-3) disputes the propriety of
the Examiner's reliance upon buySAFE for the determination that claim 1 is
directed to a fundamental economic practice and a method of organizing
human activity (see Answer 2), we regard the comparison as apt. Like
claim 1, here, the claims at issue in buySAFE describe a method for guiding
a user through a well-known financial transaction- a transaction
performance guaranty in the claims of buySAFE, and a default loan
resolution in claim 1 of this Appeal. See buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355.
The Appellant also argues that the claim is not an abstract idea, by
relying on the machine-or-transformation test. Appeal Br. 7-8. Although
regarded as an "important and useful clue" to patent eligibility, the machine-
or-transformation test is not definitive. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 89 (2012). The machine-or-
transformation test does not displace the analysis required under Alice.
Turning to Alice's second step, the Appellant argues that claim 1
amounts to significantly more than the identified abstract idea, because the
claim is inextricably rooted in computer technology- based upon the
recitation of a sequential data object comprising a "chronological sequence
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of pre-defined tasks, task-schedules, and task-assignments," as well as the
recitation of the "attach[ ment ]" of such sequential data objects to other
objects (e.g., a "user, loan, document, or group of the foregoing"). Appeal
Br. 12. To contrary, as the Examiner explains (Answer 5), the computer
technology of claim 1 implements a commercial practice in a computer
environment - as opposed to addressing a problem arising specifically from
the circumstances of the computer environment. See In re TL! Commc 'ns
LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613-14 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Indeed, claim 1
does not actually recite any "particular sequential data object," as the
Appellant contends (Appeal Br. 12), but simply refers to "a plurality of data
objects each comprising a chronological sequence of pre-defined tasks, task-
schedules and task-assignments to one or more of said participants," without
providing any details about the sequence itself. The recitation of "attaching
... data objects" (Appeal Br. 12) is similarly generic. Performing processes
according to a sequence and attaching data objects are generic aspects of
computer functionality.
Finally, the Appellant's remark that "data mirroring" was "by no
means 'conventional' in practice" (Appeal Br. 12) is inapposite, because
claim 1 does not recite "data mirroring."
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellant's arguments are
unpersuasive, such that we sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.
DECISION
We AFFIRM the Examiner's decision rejecting claim 1 under 35
U.S.C. § 101.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED
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