Ex Parte Cutler et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 22, 2016

13035406 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 22, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/035,406 02/25/2011
76614 7590
Terry W. Kramer, Esq.
Kramer & Amado, P.C.
330 John Carlyle Street
3rd Floor
Alexandria, VA 22314
08/24/2016
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Kevin Cutler
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
ALC 3694 2726
EXAMINER
ABEDIN, NORMIN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2449
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/24/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
mail@krameramado.com
ipsnarocp@alcatel-lucent.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KEVIN CUTLER, HAIQING MA,
and HAMDY FARID
Appeal2015-000588
Application 13/035,406
Technology Center 2400
Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., JON M. JURGOV AN, and
KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judges.
JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final
rejection of claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.2
1 Appellants identify Alcatel Lucent as the real party in interest. (App. Br.
1.)
2 Our Decision refers to the Specification filed Feb. 25, 2011 ("Spec."), the
Final Office Action mailed Oct. 9, 2013 ("Final Act."), the Appeal Brief
filed May 8, 2014 ("App. Br."), the Examiner's Answer mailed Sept. 11,
2014 ("Ans."), and the Reply Brief filed Oct. 2, 2014 ("Reply Br.").
Appeal2015-000588
Application 13/035,406
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to reauthorizing a session on a subscriber
network by temporarily modifying an object associated with an event.
(Spec. i-fi-15-7 - Summary.) The object's attribute is changed to an adjusted
value that is different from its authorized value. (Id.) This feature may be
used, for example, to temporarily degrade quality of service (QoS) for a
service flow in response to an event, such as the depletion of a prepaid
account, until the subscriber purchases additional credit. (Spec. i138.)
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method for handling an event in a subscriber network
performed by a session management node, the method
compnsmg:
receiving, at the session management node, an event
notification;
retrieving an object associated with the event, wherein the
object includes an authorized value for an attribute;
determining, based on the event notification, that the
object should be temporarily modified;
determining, based on the event notification, an adjusted
value for the attribute, wherein the adjusted value is separate
from the authorized value;
storing the adjusted value for the attribute into the object
without modifying the authorized value for the attribute, wherein
the object stores both the adjusted value and the authorized value;
and
reauthorizing at least one session based on the object.
(App. Br. 11 - Claims App'x.)
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Appeal2015-000588
Application 13/035,406
REJECTION
Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on
Raleigh (US 2010/0191846 Al, publ. July 29, 2010) and Heinz (US
2008/0052387 Al, publ. Feb. 28, 2008). (Final Act. 2.)
ANALYSIS
After reviewing the record in this case, Appellants' arguments do not
persuade us the Examiner errs in the obviousness rejection. Instead, we
adopt as our own the Examiner's findings and conclusion of obviousness
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for claims 1-20 based on Raleigh and Heinz. (See
Final Act. 2-14 and Ans. 3-8.)
Independent Claims 1, 8, and 14
Appellants argue the Examiner fails to establish a prima facie case of
obviousness for several reasons. (App. Br. 5-8.) We address each of
Appellants' arguments in the following sections.
A. Event Notification
Appellants argue Raleigh does not disclose "receiving, at the session
management node, an event notification." (App. Br. 6.) However, the
Examiner indicates Raleigh discloses this feature in multiple places. (Ans.
4--5.) For example, Raleigh states:
If server usage exceeds a threshold, or if using a service
usage prediction algorithm results in predicted service usage that
will exceed a threshold, then the user can be notified of which
applications are causing the service usage overrun or potential
service usage overrun, via the user service interface agent.
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Application 13/035,406
(Id. citing Raleigh if 341.) We agree with the Examiner that Raleigh's
notification to a user of service usage overrun is equivalent to an event
notification as broadly claimed.
Similarly, Raleigh teaches when it is discovered service usage is out
of policy or profile limits or allowances, then the user is notified of the
overage condition. (Id. citing Raleigh if 109.) Thus, Raleigh notifies the
user when service usage exceeds certain limits, which is also equivalent to
receiving the claimed event notification. Accordingly, we are not persuaded
of Examiner error.
B. Temporary Modification
Appellants argue Raleigh fails to disclose "determining, based on the
event notification, that the object should be temporarily modified." (App.
Br. 6.) However, the Examiner notes Raleigh discloses adjustment of
service policy (object) based on time of day (event), which at least suggests
the claimed limitation. (Ans. 5---6 citing Raleigh if 205.)
The Examiner also notes Raleigh teaches that "the traffic shaping
algorithm can simply reduce traffic speed for all applications and traffic
types successively until the service usage projections are within service
usage limits for the present service billing period." (Ans. 5---6 citing Raleigh
if 204.) The Examiner establishes that Raleigh's service policy (object) can
be such as to reduce traffic speed until within service usage limits (event).
The event triggering modification of the service policy in this disclosure thus
may be viewed, for example, as the occurrence of traffic speeds above
service usage limits for the billing period. Accordingly, Raleigh discloses
the claimed limitation, and we are not persuaded the Examiner errs.
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Application 13/035,406
C. Storing Adjusted Value Without Modifying Authorized Value
Appellants argue Raleigh fails to disclose storing an adjusted value
without modifying an authorized value. (App. Br. 7; Reply Br. 1-2.) To the
contrary, the Examiner finds that Raleigh teaches or suggests traffic shaping
is used to adjust service usage or reduce traffic speed until the service usage
projections are within service use limits for the present service billing
period. (Ans. 7 citing Raleigh i-fi-1204, 248.)
We agree with the Examiner that a person of ordinary skill would
have understood that Raleigh's system must store both the adjusted and
authorized service usage values to perform the described operation.
Specifically, Raleigh's system must store the adjusted value so that it can
determine to what level to control service usage. Raleigh must also store the
authorized value in order to determine when the user has exceeded it, as well
as to determine when usage adjustments have brought service usage back
down to the authorized value. Although Raleigh does not explicitly disclose
storing these values, in an obviousness rejection "a reference must be
considered not only for what it expressly teaches, but also for what it fairly
suggests." In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785(Fed. Cir. 1993) quoting In re
Burckel, 592 F.2d 1175, 1179 (CCPA 1979). Accordingly, we agree with
the Examiner that Raleigh discloses the claimed feature.
D. Adjusted Value Separate from Authorized Value
Appellants argue the cited references do not disclose the limitation of
claim 1 reciting "determining, based on the event notification, an adjusted
value for the attribute, wherein the adjusted value is separate from the
authorized value." (App. Br. 7; Reply Br. 2.) For the reasons explained, we
agree with the Examiner that a person of ordinary skill would have
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Application 13/035,406
understood that the authorized and adjusted values must be stored separately
in Raleigh. The Examiner also notes this limitation is met by Raleigh's
teaching of service profile or plan adjustment from video and chat services
to only voice services to avoid cost over-runs. (App. Br. 6-7 citing Raleigh
i-fi-1205, 342.) A person of ordinary skill would have understood that a
computer system represents information such as service profiles or plans and
their adjustments as values stored in its memory. Thus, considering the
disclosures previously discussed in light of the general knowledge of the
person of ordinary skill, Raleigh discloses separate adjusted and authorized
values in multiple places in its disclosure.
E. Teaching Away
Appellants argue Heinz teaches away from the claim language of
storing an adjusted value without modifYing an authorized value. (App. Br.
7-8; Reply Br. 2-3.) Specifically, Appellants argue Heinz's switching to the
lowest available CODEC when a customer exceeds the limit of a usage plan
is a modification of the authorized value, which contradicts the claimed
limitation. (Id.)
We disagree with Appellants' argument. There is no indication in
Heinz that the CODEC (or the attributes or parameters thereof) used before
exceeding the usage plan are modified in any way when the customer
exceeds the usage plan and the lowest available CODEC is then selected for
use to allow the customer to continue using the network. See Heinz i1 248.
A person of ordinary skill would assume based on Heinz' teachings that the
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CODEC first used remains unchanged when switching to the lowest
available CODEC. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by this argument.
Remaining Claims
No separate arguments are presented for the remaining dependent
claims. Thus, for the reasons stated with respect to independent claims 1, 8,
and 14, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of the dependent claims for
obviousness. In re King, 801F.2d1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re
Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
CONCLUSION
An obviousness rejection under§ 103(a) requires that "there must be
some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the
legal conclusion of obviousness." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(internal quotations omitted)). On this record, we find the Examiner's
reasoning and underpinning adequate to support the conclusion of
obviousness.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-20 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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