Ex Parte Crombez et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 26, 2017

13655805 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 26, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/655,805 10/19/2012 Dale Scott Crombez 83330063 1885
28395 7590 07/28/2017
RROOKS KTTSHMAN P C /FfTET EXAMINER
1000 TOWN CENTER SMITH, JELANI A
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3662
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/28/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DALE SCOTT CROMBEZ, WILLIAM DAVID TREHARNE,
PAUL STEPHEN BRYAN, and THOMAS CHROSTOWSKI
Appeal 2017-001716
Application 13/655,805
Technology Center 3600
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, and
DAVID J. CUTITTAII, Administrative Patent Judges.
MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2017-001716
Application 13/655,805
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1, 3—8, 10—15, and 20—26. App. Br. 1. Claims 2, 9, and 16—19 have
been cancelled. See pages 2-4 of the May 27, 2015 Amendments to the
Claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Representative Claims
Representative claims 1, 4—6, 21, and 22 under appeal read as follows
(emphasis, formatting, and brackets added):
1. A method for controlling a vehicle comprising:
[A) ] in response to a user command to delay electric-
only operation of the vehicle,
[i)j selectively operating an electric machine and
an engine to propel the vehicle such that a state of charge
(SOC) of a traction battery electrically connected with
the electric machine is generally maintained as a constant
at a target value defined by the present SOC if the SOC is
within a predefined range of states of charge when the
user command is received; and
[B) j in response to capturing sufficient regeneration
energy such that the SOC rises above the target value while
operating under the user command,
[i) j resetting the target value to the SOC after
regenerative braking and
[ii) j selectively operating the engine and the
electric machine to maintain the SOC as a constant at the
reset target value.
4. The method of claim 1 further comprising selectively
operating the electric machine and engine to propel the vehicle
such that the SOC increases to a first predefined value within
the predefined range if the SOC is below the predefined range
when the user command is received and setting the target value
as the first predefined value.
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5. The method of claim 4 further comprising selectively
operating the electric machine and engine to propel the vehicle
such that the SOC decreases to a second predefined value
within the predefined range if the SOC is above the predefined
range when the user command is received and setting the target
value as the second predefined value.
6. The method of claim 1 wherein the predefined range is
based on vehicle speed information.
21. The vehicle of claim 10 wherein the upper threshold and
the lower threshold are set as outer limits for operating in the
charge sustain mode.
22. The vehicle of claim 10 wherein the upper threshold is set
as a maximum state of charge for operating the powertrain in
the charge sustain mode; and
wherein the lower threshold is set as a minimum state of
charge for operating the powertrain without charging the
traction battery to increase the state of charge.
Rejections on Appeal
1. The Examiner rejected claims 1, 4—6, 10-14, 20—24, and 26
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Conlon et al (US
2008/0300743 Al, pub. Dec. 4, 2008) (“Conlon”).1
1 Because we affirm the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejections of all the claims,
we decline to reach the merits of the § 102(b) rejection over the prior art.
See, e.g., In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (not reaching
rejections based on obviousness when claims already rejected as
anticipated). The Examiner’s § 102(b) rejection of these claims is not
discussed further herein.
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Application 13/655,805
2. The Examiner rejected claims 1, 4—6, 10-14, 20—24, and 26
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Conlon.2
3. The Examiner rejected claims 3 and 25 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Conlon and Druenert
et al. (US 2011/0264317 Al, pub. Oct. 27, 2011) (“Druenert”).3
4. The Examiner rejected claims 7 and 15 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Conlon and Yee et
al. (US 2011/0246013 Al, pub. Oct. 6, 2011) (“Yee”).4
5. The Examiner rejected claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Conlon, Yee, and Yoshimi (US
2011/0307134 Al, pub. Dec. 15, 2011).
Issues on Appeal
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1, 3—8, 21, and 22 as being
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because the prior art does not render
obvious the claim limitations argued by Appellants?
2 Claims 1, 4—6, 21, and 22 are argued separately. Separate patentability is
not argued for claims 10-14, 20, 23, 24, and 26. Except for our ultimate
decision, this § 103(a) rejection of claims 10-14, 20, 23, 24, and 26 is not
discussed further herein.
3 Separate patentability is not argued for claim 25. Except for our ultimate
decision, the Examiner’s rejection of this claim is not discussed further
herein.
4 Separate patentability is not argued for claim 15. Except for our ultimate
decision, the Examiner’s rejection of this claim is not discussed further
herein.
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Appeal 2017-001716
Application 13/655,805
ANALYSIS
Claim 1
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
Appellant submits that Conlon does not teach comparing
the SOC to a range after receiving a user command to delay
electric-only operation and operating the engine and electric
machine is a specified manner when the SOC lies within this
range.
App. Br. 7 (emphasis added).
In Paragraph 0038, Conlon is describing operation in the
sustaining operation strategy, and “measurement error” and
“hysteresis” are merely provided as margins of error to prevent
hysteresis and overly frequent cycling of the engine, and this is
not a range that a state of charge must lie within when the user
command is received to cause the vehicle to be operated as
required by claims 1,10 and 26. In Conlon, to prevent hysteresis,
the range would be set based on the state of charge itself, and not
compare the state of charge to a range before beginning a
operational mode of the vehicle as required by claims 1,10, and
26. Appellant notes that in paragraph 0031, Conlon is describing
operation in a different vehicle mode, the EV range
maximization strategy, and does not describe a range with
respect to the sustaining operation strategy equated to the user
command to delay electric-only operation in the Office Action.
The sustaining operation strategy as shown in block 222 of
Figure 3 is a separate control pathway to the EV range
maximization strategy as shown in block 228.
App. Br. 7 (emphasis added).
Conlon teaches only that the user can select an electric only mode
(or charge deplete mode) of operation, and does not teach user
selection to delay electric-only mode (or delay a charge deplete
mode) as required by the claims. (See Conlon, Paragraphs 18 and
31). Appellant submits that the sustaining operation strategy of
Conlon is the default operation strategy implemented by the
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Application 13/655,805
controller, as is shown in Figure 3. The sustaining operation
strategy is reached in Conlon based on any of the other modes of
operation not being selected or required by a vehicle state.
App. Br. 8 (emphasis added).
The control strategy of a hybrid powertrain is complex, and is
becoming increasingly automated to increase fuel economy and
to allow the user or driver to focus more attention to driving,
traffic, and the surrounding environment. Appellant submits that
it would not be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to add
a user commend [sic] to delay electric-only operation of the
vehicle to Conlon as stated by the Office Action, thereby
increasing the needs placed on the driver during operation of the
vehicle.
App. Br. 8—9 (emphasis added).
We disagree. First, at pages 15—16 of the Answer at items 2, 4, and 6,
the Examiner provides additional new obviousness analysis relying on
paragraph 32 of Conlon to explain the rejection of claim l.5
Alternately, the vehicle operator may select the EV range
maximization strategy via input to the operator interface device
18 indicating a preference for operating in the EV operating state,
causing the control system 15 to activate the EV range
maximization strategy prior to operating in the EV operating
state.
Conlon 132. Appellants do not dispute this new analysis. We agree with
the Examiner that in light of paragraph 32, it is known for an operator to
select to “delay” prior to operating the vehicle in the electric-only state.
Second, we agree with the Examiner (Final Act. 15—16) that
paragraphs 3 8 and 31 of Conlon render obvious a conditional operating
requirement of being “within a predefined range of states of charge when the
5 In the Final Rejection at page 20, Conlon’s paragraph 32 was relied upon
to reject dependent claim 13.
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user command is received.” Paragraph 38 shows that an operating range is
known to prevent hysteresis. Additionally, paragraph 31 shows that an
allowable state of charge range is known as to the EV maximization state.
We agree with the Examiner that it would have been obvious to apply an
allowable range to the charge sustaining state of paragraph 38 in light of the
description of a desired target value and that the target value may vary
during operation.
Claim 4
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 4 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
Appellant submits that Conlon does not teach, suggest, or
provide any reason to control the electric machine and engine to
increase the SOC to within the range when the SOC is below
the range when the user request to delay electric-only operation
is received as described in claims 4 and 11 and then maintain the
SOC as a constant at the target value, and therefore claims 4 and
11 are patentable.
App. Br. 9 (emphasis added).
As to Appellants’ above contention directed to claim 4, we disagree.
As discussed above, contrary to Appellants’ argument, we agree with the
Examiner that use of an allowable range would have been obvious over
Conlon. Further, we agree with the Examiner that it would have been
obvious to increase to a first predefined value within the range if the SOC is
below the predefined range given the Examiner cited “threshold” teachings
of Conlon. Final Act. 16—17.
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Claim 5
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 5 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
Conlon states that in the EV range maximization strategy, to
“compel engine operation to charge the ESD 60 at a maximum
charge rate such that the state of charge of the ESD 60 exceeds a
predetermined minimum state of charge”, so Conlon does not
describe operating the vehicle to decrease the SOC when the
user command is received. (Paragraph 0031). The Office Action
additionally relies on Paragraph 0033 and another operating
mode in the “charge depletion operating strategy” for another
threshold.
App. Br. 10 (emphasis added).
As to Appellants’ above contention directed to claim 5, we disagree.
As discussed above, contrary to Appellants’ argument, we agree with the
Examiner that use of an allowable range would have been obvious over
Conlon. Further, we agree with the Examiner that it would have been
obvious to decrease to a first predefined value within the range if the SOC is
above the predefined range given the Examiner cited “threshold” teachings
of Conlon. Final Act. 17.
Claim 6
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 6 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
The Office Action states that Conlon teaches “p.30, The
preset threshold for the state of charge of the ESD 60 may be
determined based upon vehicle speed.” Appellant submits that a
“preset threshold” as described by Conlon is not a “range” as
required by claims 1 and 6, or as interpreted by the Examiner in
Conlon with respect to the parent claims. Since Conlon does not
teach, suggest, or provide any reason to include all of the
limitations of claim 6[], claim[] 6 [is] patentable.
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App. Br. 11.
As to Appellants’ above contention directed to claim 6, we disagree.
At page 18 of the Answer at item 12, the Examiner provides additional new
obviousness analysis finding that “[a] preset threshold is in fact an example
of a range.” Appellants do not dispute this new analysis.
Claims 21 and 22
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 21 and 22
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
Appellant submits that the threshold as described in Paragraph
0030 is a low battery SOC threshold that compels engine
operation to prevent the battery from a deep discharge. The
“measurement error” and “hysteresis” in Paragraph 0038 relate
to preventing engine cycling during the sustaining charge
strategy, and is not an upper threshold for operating the vehicle
in a charge sustain mode as required by the claim. Appellant
submits that Coition does not teach operation of the vehicle
based on a user command with the SOC compared to a range
with an upper and a lower threshold as required by claim 21, and
therefore claim 21 is patentable.
App. Br. 11 (emphasis added).
Appellant submits that Conlon does not teach an upper threshold
for a range as required by claims 22 and 23, and therefore claims
22 and 23 are patentable.
App. Br. 12.
As to Appellants’ above contention directed to claims 21 and 22, we
disagree for the reasons set forth above as to claim 1.
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Claims 3, 7, and 8
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 3 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
Druenert does not teach the required user command, or
operating the engine and the electric machine as required by
claims 1 and 10.
App. Br. 12 (emphasis added).
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 7 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
Yee does not teach the required user command, or operating the
engine and the electric machine as required by claims 1 and 10.
App. Br. 13 (emphasis added).
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 8 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
Yee does not teach the required user command, or operating the
engine and the electric machine as required by claim 1.
App. Br. 13—14 (emphasis added).
Yoshimi does not teach the required user command, or
operating the engine and the electric machine as required by
claim 1.
App. Br. 14 (emphasis added).
As to Appellants’ above contentions directed to claims 3,7, and 8, we
disagree. The premise of each argument is that Druenert, Yee, or Yoshimi
does not overcome Appellants’ argued deficiency in Conlon as to claim 1.
As discussed above, we conclude the Conlon reference is not deficient,
Appellants’ arguments fail to persuade us that the Examiner has erred.
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CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1, 3—8, 10-15, and
20-26 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
(2) Claims 1, 3—8, 10-15, and 20-26 are not patentable.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 3—8, 10-15, and 20-26 as
being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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