Ex Parte Creamer et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 29, 2016

11382288 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
111382,288 0510912006
46322 7590 03/31/2016
CRGOLAW
STEVEN M. GREENBERG
7900 Glades Road
SUITE 520
BOCA RATON, FL 33487
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Thomas E. Creamer
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
BOC920060020US1 (074) 5838
EXAMINER
NANO, SARGON N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2457
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/31/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docketing@crgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte THOMAS E. CREAMER
and CURTIS E. HRISCHUK
Appeal2014-006275
Application 11/382,288
Technology Center 2400
Before JOHN A. EVANS, CATHERINE SHIANG, and
MONICA S. ULLAGADDI, Administrative Patent Judges.
ULLAGADDI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
AppeUants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a final rejection of
claims 1-1 7.
We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claim 1, reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. An optimized synchronization protocol enabled data
processing system comprising:
a synchronization client executing in a client computing
platform, the synchronization client being configured for
communicative coupling to a synchronization server for a
common application over a communications medium;
Appeal2014-006275
Application 11/3 82,288
a client data store of data for the common application;
and, a data store agent coupled to each of the
synchronization client and the client data store, the agent
comprising program code enabled to process updates to the client
data store for the common application on behalf of the
synchronization client as received from the synchronization
server in parallel with the synchronization client sending a
request for additional server updates from the synchronization
server as part of a synchronization conversation.
REJECTION ON APPEAL
Claims 1-17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Brown (US 7,035,847 B2; iss. Apr. 25, 2006) and Levy
(US 2007/0073873 Al; pub. Mar. 29, 2007). Final Act. 2---6.
ANALYSIS
The Examiner finds Brown teaches synchronizing metadata and
selected files between clients and a server using a synchronization
application. Final Act. 2-3. The Examiner finds "Levy teaches a client that
sends requests to a server for additional components before the client has
finished downloading a main page." Id. at 3. Based on those findings, the
Examiner concludes "[i]t would have been obvious to one on the ordinary
skill in the art at the time of the invention to incorporate the teachings of
Levy in Browns' [sic] invention to optimize the system by reducing the time
needed for updating network files." Id. We agree with and adopt as our
own these findings and conclusion, as set forth by the Examiner, which we
highlight below.
First, Appellants argue Brown does not teach or suggest "a client data
store of data for a common application." App. Br. 5---6.
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Application 11/3 82,288
The Examiner finds Brown teaches "during the synchronization
process[,] the client pulls down (download) changes from the server and
store[s] the changes in a local directory (data store)" and that "[t]hese
changes include selected files." Id. at 7 citing Brown, col. 9, 11. 4--28
(emphasis added). Appellants do not provide any construction for "client
data store" or "common application" that would exclude the cited teachings
of Brown, nor do Appellants explain how the Examiner's interpretation is
overly broad, unreasonable, or inconsistent with the Specification. As the
Specification includes only exemplary, non-limiting usages of these terms,
we find Appellants' first argument unpersuasive.
Second, Appellants argue "Levy is not teaching that a synchronization
server in parallel with a synchronization client sends a request for additional
server updates" because "Levy teaches that a request is sent after the client
receives the server's initial acknowledgment, not in parallel" and "describes
how a client needs to wait until the server receives and processes requests
for additional components of a web page that the client has requested." Id.
at 7.
Third, with regard to claims 6 and 12, Appellants argue Levy does not
show "applying each server update to a client data store in parallel to
sending a request for additional server updates" for the same reasons set
forth with respect to Appellants' second argument supra. Id. at 10.
Contrary to Appellants' second and third arguments, Levy also
describes sending requests in parallel with downloading and parsing a main
page. See Ans. 7-9; Levy i-f 250. In particular, Levy describes how
the client may send requests for additional components
before the client has finished downloading the main page.
When the client starts parsing the main page, the client may
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Appeal2014-006275
Application 11/3 82,288
find a reference to an additional component of the web page,
and upon recognizing the reference, the client may send a
request for that component, before the client has finished
downloading the entire main page.
Levy i-f 250 (emphasis added); see also id. at i-f 358.
Fourth, Appellants attempt to distinguish the cited teachings of Levy
in paragraph 250 by arguing "downloading responses to requests regarding
an HTML page is not equivalent to applying each server update from a
synchronization server to a client data store." App. Br. 10-11.
However, the Examiner applies Brown to teach "the synchronization
of client and server" and applies Levy to teach "parallel processing." Ans.
7-8. Appellants' fourth argument constitutes an individual attack on Levy,
which is not persuasive to show nonobviousness. In re Merck, 800 F .2d
1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
None of Appellants' first, second, third, or fourth arguments addresses
what the combined teachings of Brown and Levy would have suggested to
the ordinarily skilled artisan. See Ans. 7 citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d413
(CCPA 1981). Nor have Appellants persuaded us the Examiner's proffered
combination would have been "uniquely challenging or difficult for one of
ordinary skill in the art." See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.,
485F.3d1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citingKSRint'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)).
Appellants do not advance any argument against the Examiner's
findings about the remaining claim limitations of claim 1. Because we have
only considered the arguments that Appellants raised in the Briefs, the
arguments Appellants did not make are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv). For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded the
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Application 11/3 82,288
Examiner erred in finding the combination of Brown and Levy teaches or
suggests the disputed limitations recited in claim 1 and the limitations of
claims 2-5, which are not separately argued. Nor are we persuaded the
Examiner erred in finding the combination of Brown and Levy teaches or
suggests the limitations recited in claims 6 and 12 commensurate to the
disputed limitations of claim 1 and the limitations of claims 7-11 and 13-17,
which are not separately argued. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of
claims 1-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Brown and
Levy.
DECISION
The Examiner's rejection of claims 1-17 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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