Ex Parte Cotton

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 20, 2018

14500890 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 20, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/500,890 09/29/2014
20995 7590 12/25/2018
KNOBBE MARTENS OLSON & BEAR LLP
2040 MAIN STREET
FOURTEENTH FLOOR
IRVINE, CA 92614
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Jeffrey S. Cotton
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
AUTLT.001C9 3314
EXAMINER
MADAMBA, CLIFFORD B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3692
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/25/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
j ayna.cartee@knobbe.com
efiling@knobbe.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JEFFREY S. COTTON
Appeal2017-007359
Application 14/500,890
Technology Center 3600
Before ERIC S. FRAHM, JOHN A. EV ANS, and CARLL. SILVERMAN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
EV ANS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner's final rejection of claims 2---6. App. Br. 1. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
WeAFFIRM. 2
1 Appellant states the real party in interest is AutoAlert, LLC. App. Br. 4.
2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of the Appellant and the Examiner, we
refer to the Appeal Brief (filed August 26, 2016, "App. Br."), the Reply
Brief (filed April 7, 2017, "Reply Br."), the Examiner's Answer (mailed
February 9, 2017, "Ans."), the Final Action (mailed February 1, 2016, "Final
Act."), and the Specification (filed September 29, 2014, "Spec.") for their
Appeal2017-007359
Application 14/500,890
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims relate to methods for generating customer-specific vehicle
proposals based on ongoing vehicle finance pay-off information. See
Abstract.
INVENTION
An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of
Claim 2, the sole independent claim, reproduced below with some
formatting added:
2. A method of automatically generating leads for
automotive sales and leases by data mining from large pre-
existing computer databases, the method comprising:
using a computer to automatically retrieve, from one or
more electronic sources consisting of large pre-existing
databases of sales and financing records, each of the
following:
information relating to a large group of potential
customers;
information relating to large number of current
vehicles of the potential customers in the large group of
potential customers; and
information relating to a large set of current
financial terms for the large
number of current vehicles;
automatically determining a customized deal for each potential
customer by performing the following steps for each potential
customer in the large group:
respective details.
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identifying a current vehicle of the potential customer
from within the large number of current vehicles;
determining a trade-in value for the current vehicle;
identifying current financial terms for the current vehicle
from within the large set of current financial terms;
automatically determining a payoff amount for the
current vehicle from the current financial terms;
using stored associations between vehicle types to limit
required calculations by, without receiving a request from the
potential customer, automatically selecting a potential
replacement vehicle that is predicted to be of interest to the
potential customer, the automatic selection based on an
association between vehicle types stored in the computer and
the current vehicle of the potential customer;
retrieving potential financial terms available for the
potential replacement vehicle; and
calculating a potential payment amount for the potential
replacement vehicle, based on the potential financial terms, the
trade-in value, and the payoff amount;
for each of the potential customers, automatically
evaluating the customized deal to predict whether the deal is
likely to be desirable, without receiving a request from the
potential customer, by:
retrieving a current payment amount for the current
vehicle from the current financial terms;
automatically subtracting the current payment amount for
the current vehicle from the potential payment amount for the
potential replacement vehicle to determine a difference in
payments; and
predicting, if the difference in payments is less than or
equal to a preset threshold, that the deal will be desirable to the
potential customer; and
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automatically generating one or more electronic
messages alerting the dealer to each potential customer for
whom there is a deal that is predicted to be desirable.
App. Br. 57-8 (Claims Appx.).
The Prior Art Supporting the Rejection on Appeal3
As evidence ofunpatentability, the Examiner relies on the following
prior art:
Ahuja, et al., (Ahuja '711) US 2002/0013711 Al Jan. 31, 2002
Brown, et al., (Brown '691) US 2004/0039690 Al Filed Aug. 25, 2003
Cotton'099 US 7,827,099 Bl Nov. 2, 2010
Cotton'752 US 8,005,752 Bl Aug. 23, 2011
Cotton'46I US 8,095,461 B2 Jan. 10,2012
Cotton'79I US 8,396,791 B2 Mar. 12, 2013
The Re} ections on Appeal4
1. Claims 2---6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
non-statutory subject matter. Final Act. 4--8.
New Grounds of Rejection.
In the Answer, the Examiner applies the following new grounds of
rejection:
1. Claims 2---6 stand rejected under the judicial doctrine of
obviousness-type double patenting over Cotton '791 (Claims 1--4, 6,
3 The present application and the various patents to Cotton each claim the
priority of U.S. Application 60/525,233, filed November 25, 2003.
4 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of Claims 2---6 under the judicial
doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting over Cotton '791 (Claims 1-
11), Cotton '461 (Claims 1-20), Cotton '752 (Claims 1-24), and Cotton
'099 (Claims 1-3, 5-8, 11-15, and 22-30). Ans. 3; Reply Br. 4.
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Application 14/500,890
and 7), Sheinson (US 7,050,982 B2 issued May 26, 2006), and
Chandran (US 7,555,443 B2 issued Jun. 30, 2009). Ans. 14--23.
2. Claims 2---6 stand rejected under the judicial doctrine of
obviousness-type double patenting over Cotton '461 (Claims 1-5, 9-
13, and 17-21), Sheinson, and Chandran. Ans. 23-32.
3. Claims 2---6 stand rejected under the judicial doctrine of
obviousness-type double patenting over Cotton '752 (Claims 1-5, 9-
13, and 17-21), Sheinson, and Chandran. Ans. 32--42.
4. Claims 2---6 stand rejected under the judicial doctrine of
obviousness-type double patenting over Cotton '099 (Claims 1-3, 5-
8, 12-15, and 22-30), Sheinson, and Chandran. Ans. 42-55.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections of claims 2---6 in light of Appellant's
arguments that the Examiner erred. We have considered in this Decision
only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Brief. Any other
arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the
Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). We are
not persuaded that Appellant's identify reversible error.
Upon consideration of the arguments presented in the Appeal Brief
and the Reply Brief, we agree with the Examiner that all the pending claims
are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We adopt as our own the findings
and reasons set forth in the rejections from which this appeal is taken and in
the Examiner's Answer, to the extent consistent with our analysis below.
We provide the following explanation to highlight and address specific
arguments and findings primarily for emphasis.
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We consider Appellant's arguments seriatim, as they are presented in
the Appeal Brief, pages 11-55.
NEW GROUND OF REJECTION, CLAIMS 2-6: JUDICIAL OBVIOUSNESS-TYPE
DOUBLE PATENTING OVER COTTON '791, SHEINSON, AND CHANDRAN.
In view of these "new grounds," we consider the double patenting
rejections entered in the final rejection as having been withdrawn.
The Examiner finds Sheinson fails to teach: "automatically
determining a payoff amount for the current vehicle from the current
financial terms." As recited in independent Claim 2. Ans. 21; Reply Br. 5.
To supply this limitation, the Examiner finds Chandran teaches where a
customer purchases an automobile from a retail dealer, e.g., a Mazda
dealership, the customer makes monthly payments. Ans. 21. The Examiner
further finds Chandran discloses an "equity point" which is the point in the
repayment term where the amount owed is substantially equal to the value of
the vehicle. Id. The Examiner then concludes:
Id.
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at
the time of the invention to modify the invention of '791 to
include the teaching( s) of Sheinson for the motivation of
providing an incentive for an entity to accept an offer in
association with the purchase/lease of a vehicle through the
offer of more attractive and/or affordable financing terms which
may be facilitated by the settling of any outstanding loan
balance which can be performed readily and easily by any
person of ordinary skill in the art, with neither undue
experimentation, nor risk of unexpected results.
Appellant contends that the "equity point" disclosure fails to teach the
claimed "automatically determining a payoff amount for the current vehicle
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from the current financial terms." Reply Br. 6. Appellant argues rather,
Chandran teaches a standard financing model where a consumer has the
option to purchase at the "equity point" of the lease. Id. We disagree.
Appellant admits Chandran teaches an equity point, i.e., the point
during the financing of the car wherein the value of the car is equal to the
remaining balance on the loan which is the payoff amount automatically
determined from the current financial terms. We note there is a second such
point, i.e., the point at which the remaining balance is zero, i.e., when the
loan is paid off. Appellant's arguments seem to imply that the payoff
amount must be automatically determined at each point during repayment of
the loan. However, the claims do not impose such a limitation. We are not
persuaded the Examiner errs.
NEW GROUND OF REJECTION, CLAIMS 2-6: JUDICIAL OBVIOUSNESS-TYPE
DOUBLE PATENTING OVER COTTON '752, SHEINSON, AND CHANDRAN.
Essentially as for the rejection based on Cotton '791, The Examiner
finds Sheinson fails to teach: "automatically determining a payoff amount
for the current vehicle from the current financial terms." As recited in
independent Claim 2. Ans. 40. Similarly, the Examiner cites Chandran's
disclosure of an "equity point" to teach the disputed limitation.
For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded the Examiner
errs.
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NEW GROUND OF REJECTION, CLAIMS 2-6: JUDICIAL OBVIOUSNESS-TYPE
DOUBLE PA TENTING OVER COTTON '461, OR AL TERNA TIVEL Y OVER COTTON
'099, IN VIEW OF SHEINSON, AND CHANDRAN.
In the Answer, the Examiner newly-rejects Claims 2-6 over either
Cotton '461 (Claims 1-5, 9-13, and 17-21), or Cotton '099 (Claims 1-3, 5-
8, 12-15, and 22-30), in view of Sheinson, and Chandran.
Appellant contends the Examiner's findings are defective at least
because Cotton '461 does not comprise a claim 21 and because Cotton '099
does not comprise a claim 30. Reply Br. 4. We agree. The disputed claims
are not found in the cited patents. We do not sustain these rejections.
INDEPENDENT CLAIM 2: NON-STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER5.
Appellant contends Claims 2-6 recite eligible subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101 as interpreted by Alice Corp. v. CLS Banklnt'l, 134 S. Ct.
2347 (2014). See App. Br. 11-51. The Examiner extensively responds to
Appellant's contentions. See Ans. 4--8.
Appellant's Reply Brief "maintains [Appellant's] position regarding
the [rejection of Claims 2-6 under Section§ 101 as being allegedly directed
to nonstatutory subject matter] as set forth in Appellant's Appeal Brief dated
August 26, 2016. See Reply Br. 3--4. However, the Reply Brief presents no
5 The bulk of the Examiner's findings under§ 101 relate to Claim 1. Final
Act. 5. However, the Examiner notes that Appellant's prior "cancellation of
claim 1 renders its rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 moot," and quotes Claim
2 in the body of the rejection. Id., 2, 5---6; see App. Br. 12, n. 2. Thus, we
find the Examiner's remarks to pertain to Claim 2 and hold such reference to
Claim 1 to be harmless error.
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arguments that specifically address any findings presented in the Examiner's
Answer.
Primafacie case.
Appellant contends the Examiner failed to establish a prima facie case
of patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because "the Office
Action makes a number of baseless allegations that it does not attempt to
support with further explanation or evidence." App. Br. 17. We disagree.
The Federal Circuit has explained repeatedly that "the prima facie
case is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the
burden of production." Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). The
Examiner carries the burden of establishing a prima facie case when its
rejection satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 132 by setting forth a rejection in a
sufficiently articulate and informative manner. In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011). If the Examiner "adequately explain[s] the
shortcomings ... the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut the prima facie
case with evidence and/or argument." Hyatt, 492 F.3d at 1370. The Final
Office Action adequately explains the§ 101 rejection. See Final Act. 4--8.
The Examiner's statements satisfy§ 132(a) because they apply the
Mayo/Alice analytical framework and apprise Appellant of the reasons for
the § 101 rejection under that framework. Appellant has not responded by
alleging a failure to understand the rejection. To the contrary, Appellant
clearly identifies an abstract idea as found by the Examiner: "facilitating
customer identification thru data mining." App. Br. 22. For these reasons,
we are not persuaded the Examiner failed to make a prima facie case of
patent ineligibility under § 101.
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Preemption.
Appellant contends Claim 2 does "not seek to tie up any judicial
exception such that others cannot practice it." App. Br. 36.
While preemption may denote patent ineligibility, its absence does not
demonstrate patent eligibility. See Fair Warning, IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc.,
839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For claims covering a patent-
ineligible concept, preemption concerns "are fully addressed and made
moot" by an analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ariosa Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We conduct
such an analysis below.
Improper Examination.
Throughout the Appeal Brief, Appellant argues the Examiner has
improperly applied various USPTO examination guidance documents. See
e.g., App. Br. 14--15.
The Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, not
the Board, supervises examination and examiners. 6 If an examiner has
procedurally erred, the remedy lies exclusively in petitioning the Director for
supervisory review. 7 The Director has not delegated this supervisory
authority to the Board. 8
6 35 U.S.C. 3(a)(2)(A) and 132(a).
7 37 C.F.R. § 1.181; cf 35 U.S.C. 6(b) (giving substantive review powers
directly to the board).
8 Cf 37 C.F.R. § 41.3 (delegating some petition authority to the Chief
Administrative Patent Judge, not the board) and § 41.50(b) ( delegating to the
board the discretion to enter a new ground, propose a curative amendment or
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35 u.s.c. § 101.
Section 101 provides that a patent may be obtained for "any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has
long recognized, however, that § 101 implicitly excludes "laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" from the realm of patent-eligible
subject matter, as monopolization of these "basic tools of scientific and
technological work" would stifle the very innovation that the patent system
aims to promote. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bankint'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354
(2014) (quotingAss'nfor Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294-97 (2012); Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
Mayo-Alice Step 1.
The Supreme Court has instructed us to use a two-step framework to
"distinguish[] patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those
concepts." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. At the first step, we determine whether
the claims at issue are "directed to" a patent-ineligible concept. Id.
The Examiner finds that Claim 1 [sic "Claim 2"] recites a method of
automatically generating leads for automotive sales through a data-mining
technique comprising various computers and databases. Final Act. 5. The
Examiner finds the claims describe steps for facilitating customer
order additional briefing).
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identification thru data mining. Id. The Examiner finds the claimed scheme
is similar to other concepts that have been identified by the courts as
abstract, such a fundamental economic practice (e.g., concepts relating to the
economy and commerce; performance of financial transactions), as well as
certain methods of organizing human activity ( e.g., mental processes or steps
that a person should follow). Id. The Examiner finds the claimed scheme is
one that can be performed in the human mind, or manually and is a process
of collecting and comparing known information, similar to Classen 9, or of
obtaining and comparing intangible data, similar to Cybersource, 10 or of
using categories to organize, store and transmit information, similar to
Cyberfone or Content Extraction. Id. The Examiner finds the claims
generate a financial analysis output, similar to Freddie Mac 11 . Id. The
Examiner's Answer re-iterates these findings and more closely relates them
to the recitations of the claims. See Ans. 58---68.
Appellant contends Claim 2 does not describe any economic practice,
much less a fundamental one. App. Br. 15. Appellant argues that
automatically generating leads for automotive sales, as found by the
Examiner, is not a concept that is found in the July 2015 Quick Reference
Sheet. Id.
Appellant's Reply Brief does not respond to the Examiner's findings
respecting the rejections under § 101. See Reply Br. 4---6.
9 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (2011).
1° CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (2011).
11 Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., AKA Freddie Mac v. GrajJ!Ross
Holdings LLP (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Appellant characterizes the claims by quoting from Claim 2 the claims
"automatically determin[es] a customized deal for each potential customer
by performing the following steps for each potential customer in the large
group." App. Br. 24. But such "customization" or "tailoring" of a
presentation to a customer is a long prevalent economic practice. See e.g.,
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363,
1369-71 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (invalidating claims calling for tailoring web-page
content based on user information and navigation histories; observing that
newspaper inserts had long been tailored to customers' locations and
television commercials had long been tailored to the time of day, and
holding that "merely adding computer functionality to increase the speed or
efficiency of the process d[id] not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise
abstract idea"). We find, under Step 1, the claims are "directed to" an
abstract idea.
Mayo/Alice Step 2.
Where, as here, the claims are found to be "directed to" a patent-
ineligible concept, we then "consider the elements of each claim both
individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the
additional elements 'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible
application." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298).
This analysis has been characterized as the search for an "inventive
concept"- something sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to
"significantly more" than the abstract idea itself. Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S.
Ct. at 1294).
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Appellant contends the claims, similar to those of DDR Holdings, are
rooted in computer technology. App. Br. 29. As characterized by
Appellant, the claimed system retrieves information from a plurality of
sources, performs a unique set of operations, and determines whether a
particular customized deal is likely to be desirable to a particular potential
customer. App. Br. 29-30. The system then "automatically generat[ es] one
or more electronic messages alerting the dealer to each potential customer
for whom there is a deal that is predicted to be desirable." Id., 30.
Appellant contends the claimed system attempts "to overcome problems
specifically arising in the realm of automotive computer databases, such as
mining various records and data available and then extracting and analyzing
that information to determine specific potential transactions." Id. Appellant
further contends the claims "bear substantial similarities to the claims at
issue in Enfzsh12 " which were deemed eligible because they describe an
improvement in computer technology, i.e., a particular logical model for a
computer database. Id.
We disagree with Appellant because we find the claims to be closer to
those of TL! Communications. 13 In contrast to the claims in Enfzsh, the
Federal Circuit explained that the claims at issue in TL! Communications are
not directed to a specific improvement to computer functionality, and
therefore, they are not patent eligible. The patent at issue in TL!
Communications is related to an apparatus and method for storing and
organizing digital images using classification data, such as a date or a
12 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (2016).
13 In re TL! Communications LLC Patent Litigation, 823 F.3d 607 (2016).
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timestamp. While the Federal Circuit performed the same analysis it did in
Enfish, it found instead that "the claims are directed to an abstract idea of
classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner." TL!
Communications, at 611. The Federal Circuit explained that the claims are
not directed to "a specific improvement to computer functionality" because
the specification (1) does not describe any new apparatus, (2) fails to provide
any technical details, (3) and generally describes the system and methods in
"purely functional terms" performing "generic computer functions such as
storing, receiving, and extracting data." Id., at 612.
Appellant fails to direct our attention to any disclosure of a new
apparatus or technical detail, nor, other than by conclusory allegation, has
Appellant describes the claimed system and methods in other than "purely
functional terms" and other than as performing "generic computer functions
such as storing, receiving, and extracting data."
Appellant's remaining arguments.
We have considered all of the Appellant's remaining arguments and
have found them unpersuasive. Accordingly, because independent Claim 2,
and Claims 3---6 which stand or fall therewith, are directed to an abstract idea
and do not present an "inventive concept," we sustain the Examiner's
determination that they are directed to ineligible subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101. Cf LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 Fed. Appx. 991,
997 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("We have considered all of LendingTree's remaining
arguments and have found them unpersuasive. Accordingly, because the
asserted claims of the patents in suit are directed to an abstract idea and do
not present an "inventive concept," we hold that they are directed to
ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101."); see also, e.g., OIP
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Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2015) ("We have considered all of OIP' s arguments and find them
unpersuasive. Because the '713 patent claims the abstract idea of offer-
based price optimization and lacks an "inventive concept" sufficient to
"transform" the claimed subject matter into a patent-eligible application of
that idea, we affirm.") and Fair Warning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839
F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("We have considered FairWaming's
remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. For the forgoing reasons,
we affirm the district court's determination that the claims of the '500 patent
recite patent-ineligible subject matter under§ 101 and its dismissal of
FairWaming's infringement suit").
INDEPENDENT CLAIMS 3-6: NON-STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER.
Appellant contends the arguments made above in respect of Claim 2
apply equally to, and are incorporated by reference in support of, the
dependent claims. See App. Br. 45-51.
We find the dependent claims describe various [information gathering
and/or processing] schemes which do not patentably transform the abstract
idea found for independent Claim 2. Cf. Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 2016
WL 6958650, *10 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("These claims depend from independent
claims which were found to be directed to unpatentable subject matter, as
discussed above. Merely appending this preexisting practice to those
independent claims does not make them patentable. It is an insignificant
post-solution activity"). Also, where all claims are directed to the same
abstract idea, "addressing each claim of the asserted patents ... [is]
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unnecessary." Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo
Bank, Nat'! Ass 'n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
DECISION
The rejection of Claims 2---6 under the judicial ground of obviousness-
type double patenting is AFFIRMED.
The rejection of Claims 2---6 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is AFFIRMED.
Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection with respect to
each claim on appeal, the Examiner's decision rejecting Claims 1--4 and 6-
36 is affirmed. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.50(a)(l).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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