Ex Parte Costecalde et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 20, 2018

13909236 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 20, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/909,236 06/04/2013
75532 7590 07/24/2018
LEE LAW, PLLC
IBM SVLIP
P.O. BOX 189
PITTSBORO, NC 27312
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Jean-Marc Costecalde
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
SVL920130030US 1 7534
EXAMINER
JAMI,HARES
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2162
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/24/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@leelawpllc.com
docketing_archive@leelawpllc.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JEAN-MARC COSTECALDE and KEVIN N. TRINH
Appeal2017-010372
Application 13/909,236 1
Technology Center 2100
Before JON M. JURGOV AN, NABEEL U. KHAN, and
AARON W. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges.
KHAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Final Rejection
of claims 1-18. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 Appellants identify International Business Machines Corporation as the
real party in interest. App. Br. 3.
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BACKGROUND
THE INVENTION
According to Appellants, the invention relates "generally to records
management software programs, and more particularly to a record
management software program having program code for managing a life
cycle for metadata, wherein the life cycle for the metadata is separate from a
life cycle for an object to which the metadata is associated." Spec. ,r 1.
Exemplary independent claim 1 is reproduced below.
1. A computer-implemented method comprising:
assigning a first life cycle to a metadata object and a
second life cycle to a system object, where the metadata object
comprises metadata information associated with the system
object; and
programmatically managing retention of the metadata
object within computer readable storage memory according to
the first life cycle independently of managing retention of the
system object within the computer readable storage memory
according to the second life cycle.
REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS
1. Claims 1-18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
non-statutory subject matter. Final Act. 16-18.
2. Claims 1, 2, 4--8, 10-14, and 16-18 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Kilday (US 7,818,300 Bl, Oct. 19,
2010) and Gauba2 (US 2008/0178198 Al, July 24, 2008. Final Act. 19.
2 We note that at places in the record Gauba is misidentified as US
2009/017721 Al. See, e.g., Final Act. 19, 22. We further note that
references to "Mimatsu" appear in the record, however no specific passages
ofMimatsu (US 2009/017721 Al; July 9, 2009) cited. See, e.g., Final Act.
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3. Claims 3, 9, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Kilday, Gauba, Al, and Brooks et al., (US 2006/0259468
Al, Nov. 16, 2006). Final Act. 22-23.
DISCUSSION
REJECTIONUNDER35 U.S.C. § 101
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for "any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof." The Supreme Court has "'long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int 'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Ass 'nfor
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
The Supreme Court in Alice reiterated the two-step framework previously
set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,
566 U.S. 66 (2012), "for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first step in
that analysis is to "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one
of those patent-ineligible concepts," such as an abstract idea. The Court
acknowledged in Mayo that "all inventions at some level embody, use,
reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract
21 ( discussing claim 6). As recognized by Appellants (see App. Br. 46),
these apparent errors ae typographical or clerical in nature, and do not
appear to have impeded Appellants' ability to respond fully and
meaningfully to the Examiner's grounds for rejection. See 35 U.S.C.
§ I32(a).
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ideas." Mayo, 5 66 U.S. at 71. We, therefore, look to whether the claims
focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology
or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and
merely invoke generic processes and machinery. See Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2016). If the claims are
not directed to an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry
proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are considered
"individually and 'as an ordered combination,' to determine whether the
additional elements 'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible
application." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78-79).
Step One of Alice/Mayo Framework
Under the first step of the Alice/Mayo framework, the Examiner finds
"The claims are directed to the abstract idea of responsive to assigning a first
lifecycle to an object and assigning a second lifecycle to its associated
metadata object, which can be done in human mind." Final Act. 17. The
Examiner also finds "[ t ]he claimed invention is related to organizing and
retaining data ( e.g. system object and metadata) through lifecycle policies in
which mathematical correlations are being used to determine a
corresponding assigned lifecycle phase (e.g. review, export, or destroy
phase)." Ans. 13.
Appellants argue "This claimed subject matter represents a completely
new architectural approach to computer data organization and processing.
Appellant's claimed subject matter represents a fundamental change to data
organization and processing within computing platforms." App. Br. 13.
Appellants also argue the claims are:
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directed to a technological innovation for and improvement of
records management software applications (processes
performed), and is technologically rooted in computing platform
technologies and improvements to those technologies.
Appellant's claimed subject matter resulted and is necessarily
rooted in computer technology to overcome a problem
specifically arising in the realm of these specific types of
computer platforms.
App. Br. 13-14; see also App. Br. 14, 16 (arguing the claims are directed to
improving technological processing of computers that provide data
management services), 22 ( arguing the claims are directed to "a new concept
inextricably tied to computer technology and distinct from the types of
concepts found by the courts to be abstract)." Similarly, under Enfish,
Appellants argue the claims are not directed to an abstract idea because they
"affect an improvement of the functioning of the computer itself' by
allowing a "reduction of memory/storage and increased speed of in-system
processing." App. Br. 19. According to Appellants, the independent
management of the life cycles of metadata objects and associated system
objects allows for the deletion of the system object while preserving the
metadata information about the system object, thus "reducing storage
requirements for system objects that may be deleted and for which the
metadata object has separate utility." App. Br. 20. For the same reasons, the
"claimed subject matter further allows increased processing speed of
remaining system objects because system objects that are no longer needed
may be removed (and not processed, e.g., for directory listings, etc.)." App.
Br. 20.
Appellants further argue the claims are not directed to a method of
organizing human activity because the claims are not in any way related to
or similar to interpersonal and intrapersonal activities. App. Br. 18.
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Appellants also argue the claims cannot be performed by a human because
"[a] human cannot perform a 'computer-implemented method.' Further, a
human cannot perform 'program instructions."' App. Br. 21.
We are unpersuaded by Appellants' arguments. The claims are
directed to assigning a life cycle to a system object and to a metadata object
and to managing retention of the metadata object independently of managing
retention of the system object. We agree with the Examiner that the claims
are directed to organizing and retaining data and that such a process could be
performed in the human mind. Indeed, Appellants also characterize their
claims as directed to "computer data organization and processing." App. Br.
13. Claims directed to organizing data have been found to be directed to
abstract ideas by our reviewing court. Digitech Image Tech. v. Electronics
for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Appellants' arguments that the claims are directed to improvements in
computer technology and rooted in computer technology are unpersuasive.
Claim 1, for example, merely indicates the method is "computer-
implemented" and that management of the retention of metadata and system
objects occurs "programmatically" within a "computer readable storage
memory." These references to computer technology are insufficient to
support an argument that the claims are rooted in computer technology. See
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (recitation of generic computer elements does not make a claim
directed to an abstract idea patent-eligible). The central aspect of the claims,
which is to manage the life cycle of two objects independently, is something
that can be done through mental steps. Appellants' reliance on recitations of
"a computer-implemented method" and "program instructions" as
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precluding the method from being performed by a human are, for the same
reasons, unpersuasive.
Further, Appellants' argument that the claims improve the functioning
of the computer because of a reduction in storage requirements and an
increase in processing speeds is incommensurate with the scope of the
claims. These benefits, according to Appellants, stem from allowing the
system objects to be deleted while maintaining their metadata objects. See
App. Br. 19--20. However, the claims are not limited to instances where the
system object is deleted without deletion of its associated metadata object.
The claims only require independent management of the lifecycles of these
two types of objects regardless of whether one of those objects is
subsequently deleted or not. Thus, the improvements to the functioning of
the computer cited by Appellants do not necessarily follow from the claimed
subject matter.
Step Two of Alice/Mayo Framework
Under step two of the Alice/Mayo framework, the Examiner finds
"adding the subject matter of 'programmatically', 'computer readable
storage memory', and/or processors and managing the first and second
lifecycles independently to the claim 1-18 are not enough to qualify as
"significantly more."' Ans. 13. The Examiner finds
Viewed as a whole, these additional claim element(s) do not
provide meaningful limitation( s) to transform the abstract idea
into a patent eligible application of the abstract idea such that the
claim( s) amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea
itself ( e.g. a mental process that can be performed in the human
mind).
Final Act. 17-18.
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Appellants argue the claims amount to an inventive concept for
resolving a data management problem. App. Br. 22. According to
Appellants
the claims address a technological problem of independent
control/management of life cycles of two distinct types of in-
system objects (metadata objects and system objects) that have
historically been tightly coupled with dependencies. This
complex processing is not believed possible without Appellant's
claimed novel and non-obvious technological innovation. As
such, the claimed subject matter also amounts to significantly
more than simply performing 'responsive to assigning a first
lifecycle to an object and assigning a second lifecycle to its
associated metadata object.' Therefore, when taken as a whole,
the claimed subject matter also has additional limitations that
amount to significantly more than any form of abstract idea that
has been treated as an exception to patentability. As such, under
this additional reasoning, the claim also recites patent eligible
subject matter (Step 2B: YES).
App. Br. 22-23.
Appellants further argue:
there is no risk of inhibiting future innovation premised on the
alleged abstraction. Appellant's claimed subject matter is a
narrow technical application of a new technique of programmatic
retention of metadata independently of retention of system
objects, and is significantly more than merely assigning life
cycles, as alleged. Appellant's claimed subject matter produces
a concrete result (is not abstract), and does not foreclose future
innovation/invention in field of data management.
App. Br. 21.
Appellants argue the claimed subject matter is not generic or well-
known because the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection is clear error.
App. Br. 19.
We find these arguments to be unpersuasive. Appellants' argument
that the claims contain an inventive concept that is not well-known because
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the Examiner's obviousness rejection is in error is unpersuasive because, as
we explain below, we agree with the Examiner that the claims are obvious
over the prior art. Further while "novelty in implementation of the idea is a
factor to be considered ... in the second step of the Alice analysis"
(Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
( emphasis added)), "the addition of merely novel or non-routine components
to the claimed idea [ does not] necessarily tum[] an abstraction into
something concrete" (id.).
Appellants' argument that the claims are not preemptive and do not
inhibit future innovation is also unpersuasive. "While preemption may
signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption
does not demonstrate patent eligibility." Ariosa Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover,
"[ w ]here a patent's claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible
subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case,
preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot." OIP Techs.,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362---63 (Fed. Cir.), cert, denied,
136 S.Ct. 701 (2015).
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, we agree with the Examiner that
claims 1-18 are directed to an abstract idea. We also agree with the
Examiner that the claim elements, when considered individually or as an
ordered whole, do not amount to something significantly more than the
alleged abstract idea. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of
claims 1-18 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS
Claim 1
Appellants argue "Kilday And Gauba Do Not Disclose Assigning
Different Life Cycles to a Metadata Object and an Associated System
Object, and Do Not Disclose Managing Retention of the Metadata Object
Independently of Managing Retention of the System Object According to
the Respective Assigned Life Cycles." App. Br. 28 (emphasis omitted).
Specifically, Appellants argue that the Examiner's rejection is based upon
speculation because the Examiner "alleges that the retention policy of the
Kilday reference 'could be managed separately from another object."' App.
Br. 30.
Appellants further argue that "the Kilday reference discloses a very
tight coupling between the life cycle/retention of various metadata objects
and the system objects ( content items)" and prevents the deletion of the
content item and its content object until all links between the two are
deleted. App. Br. 31. According to Appellants
Any attempt to change the arrangement of the Kilday reference
to manage a life cycle/retention of metadata independently from
the content item/retention would render the Kilday reference
unsatisfactory for its intended purpose of forming detailed
relationships (the 'link count') between the retention of the
content item and the content object.
App. Br. 32.
In fact, according to Appellants, Kilday teaches away from the
claimed invention "by the disclosure of a tight coupling of retention of all
related objects by use of the retention policy." App. Br. 31.
We are unpersuaded by Appellants' arguments. First, we note the
Examiner has explained that in Kilday the retainer object may enforce a
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retention policy on both the content item and its associated metadata object,
or it may not, implying that the content item and its metadata object may be
managed independently. Ans. 20 (citing Kilday 5:33-39). Second,
Appellants' argument that the content item and content object are prevented
from being deleted until all links between them have been deleted is not
commensurate with the scope of the claim. The claim does not require the
system object and its metadata object to be deleted simultaneously. It only
requires that their life cycles be managed independently. Here, the
Examiner has explained that the retainer object may be used to manage the
life cycle of the content item (i.e. the claimed "system object") and its
associated content object (i.e. the claimed "metadata object") independently,
even if Kilday does not explicitly disclose that one may be deleted without
the other being deleted. Ans. 20-21 (citing Kilday 5:33-39).
We do not agree that Kilday teaches away from managing the system
object and metadata object independently. Kilday notes that
In many cases, an enterprise or other content owner may be
required and/or may desire to enforce with respect to such
metadata the same retention policy or policies and/or other
requirements applicable to the underlying content item with
which the metadata is associated. Therefore there is a need for a
way to ensure that items of content and their associated metadata
are retained and disposed of in parallel.
Kilday 1:25-30.
In other words, in some cases the two would not be subject to the
same retention policy. Indeed, this portion of Kilday implies that a system
object and its metadata object being managed independently is the default
situation in the absence of positively structured software that links the two
together.
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Appellants argue that Gauba also does not teach independent
management of the lifecycles of metadata objects and their associated
system objects. App. Br. 32-33. Appellants highlight Gauba's teaching that
"[t]he DDMM adaptor 304 may remove the metadata object 201 once the
pointed or referenced content is no longer available" as evidence that
Gauba's metadata object cannot be removed until the pointed content is no
longer available. App. Br. 33. Thus, according to Appellants, Gauba also
"enforces a tight coupling between the retention of pointed to objects and the
retention of the metadata object." As with Kilday, Appellants contend that
modifying Gauba to provide independent management of the lifecycle of
metadata objects and their associated system objects would "render the
Gauba reference unsatisfactory for its intended purpose of forming detailed
dependency relationships between the content item and the metadata object."
App. Br. 34. Appellants further argue that although Gauba utilizes the term
"life cycles" it does not "factually disclose any active assignment
('assigning') of a life cycle to the disclosed metadata object." App. Br. 35.
We are unpersuaded by Appellants' arguments. As we explained
above, the claim does not preclude the metadata object being deleted with its
system object. It only requires independent management of life cycles of the
two. The Examiner relies on the combination of Kilday and Gauba as
teaching this independent management of life cycles. Thus, Appellants'
argument against Gauda alone does not address the Examiner's rejection.
We also do not agree that modifying Gauda would render it unsatisfactory
for its intended purpose. Gauda's intended purpose is "discovery,
management, access and control of digital content distributed over a
plurality of heterogeneous digital services." Gauda ,r 1. The fact that in
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Gauda the metadata object and the associated digital content are linked is a
feature of Gauda, not its intended purpose, and would not render Gauda
unsatisfactory for discovery or management of digital content.
We also do not find Appellants' argument that Gauda does not teach
"life cycles" persuasive. The Specification describes a life cycle as "the
lifespan of the record that starts from a phase for creating the record (i.e.,
creation phase) followed by one or more phases for maintaining the record
(e.g., review phase, export phase, and destroy phase)." Spec. ,r 29.
Referring to Figure 3, Gauba explains that an identifier is used to "track
metadata objects across multiple life cycles of a metadata object." Figure 3
of Gauba depicts a flow of management of metadata objects, including the
creation of a new metadata object, updating the metadata object, and
removal of the metadata object. These events parallel the description in
Appellants' own Specification of what a life cycle refers to. Thus, we do not
agree that Gauba does not teach life cycles of metadata objects.
Claim 2
Claim 2 depends from claim 1 and recites "assigning the first life
cycle to the metadata object comprises assigning a metadata record that
comprises the first life cycle to the metadata object; and assigning the
second life cycle to the system object comprises assigning a system record
that comprises the second life cycle to the system object." Appellants argue
"The rejection again alleges speculatively with respect to the Kilday
reference that if 'a retainer object is assigned to file system comprising
retention policy, a second retainer could be assigned to the metadata object.
(Id., emphasis added)." Appellants also once again argue that Gauba merely
utilizes the term "life cycle" but does not support the Examiner's findings.
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App. Br. 40. Appellants also argue that Kilday does not teach the limitations
of claim 2 because it discloses "a very tight coupling between the retention
of the various metadata objects and the system objects (content items)."
App. Br. 40.
We find these arguments to be unpersuasive. The Examiner finds
Gauba teaches lifecycle objects as records with respect to metadata objects
and Kilday teaches retention objects as records with respect to system
objects. Ans. 23 (citing Gauba Fig. 2A, 3, ,r 80; Kilday 5:23--48). We agree
with the Examiner's findings and therefore disagree the Examiner's findings
are based on speculation. As to Appellants' remaining arguments, these are
essentially the same as those addressed above with respect to claim 1 and are
unpersuasive for the same reasons.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 2 and of
claims 8 and 14 which were argued together with claim 2. See App. Br. 38-
41.
Claim 4
Claim 4 depends from claim 1 and recites
where the first life cycle of the metadata object is different from
the second life cycle of the system object with which the
metadata information of the metadata object is associated, and
the metadata information comprises at least one of a name, a
creation date, a size, a unique location within a computer file
system hierarchy, and a custom property of the system object.
Appellants argue the rejection fails to provide any factual disclosure
of a first life cycle for metadata being different than a second life cycle for a
system object. App. Br. 42. In particular Appellants once again argue that
Gauba does not disclose life cycles, even though it utilizes the term. App.
Br. 42. Appellants also point to Kilday's disclosure of content items and
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associated content objects and retention objects, as not disclosing the
claimed limitations. App. Br. 42. Finally, Appellants argue "The rejection
has further failed to provide any distinguishing factual citation with respect
to Appellant's claimed metadata information that comprises at least one of a
name, a creation date, a size, a unique location within a computer file system
hierarchy, and a custom property of the system object." App. Br. 42.
Appellants' arguments are unpersuasive. As to arguments made
previously with respect to claim 1, these arguments are unpersuasive for the
same reasons as explained above. Appellants' argument that the references
do not disclose the claimed metadata comprising a name, creation date, size,
location or custom property is also unpersuasive. The Examiner finds
Kilday teaches that the document object contains descriptive material and
other metadata which corresponds to the claimed "custom property" of the
system object. The Examiner also finds Kilday discloses recording the
creation date of content objects. Ans. 24 (citing Kilday 6:6-11). We agree
with the Examiner that these portions of Kilday teach that the metadata
includes at least a creation date.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 4 and of
claims 10 and 16, which Appellants argued together with claim 4. See App.
Br. 41--43.
Claim 5
Claim 5 depends from claim 1 and recites "deleting the system object
without deleting the metadata object." Appellants argue that Kilday actually
suggests that each of the content item and the metadata will be
deleted together because the "link count on the document object
is used to ensure the document object and associated any
associated content item( s) and associated metadata are not
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deleted until required and/ or permitted by a last remammg
retainer." This union of retaining the set of objects (repeated
"and") enforces the coupling of the retention of these objects to
ensure that they are not deleted until permitted by a last
remaining retainer object (as a set).
App. Br. 44.
We are unpersuaded of Examiner error. Initially, we note that
Kilday's link count is associated with a content object, which corresponds
with the claimed metadata object. This link count prevents the content
object from being deleted until requirements to keep the associated content
item no longer exist. See Kilday 6:22-28. Thus, the links prevent deletion
of the metadata at least until the system object can be deleted but they do not
require deletion of the metadata object once the link count is decremented to
zero. Thus, Kilday's reference to the link count alone is not sufficient to
show that Kilday does not teach deleting system objects without deleting the
associated metadata object.
The Examiner finds that Figure 5C of Kilday depicts a situation where
a metadata object, depicted as document object 550, will not be deleted
when one of its associated system objects, depicted as content items 542 to
544 is deleted. Ans. 26 (citing Kilday Fig. 5C, 6: 1-21, 57 et seq.). Figure
5C of Kilday illustrates a situation where multiple content items 542 to 544
share a single document object. See Kilday Fig. 5C. The document object is
part of the metadata of the content items. Thus, according to Kilday's link
counts, the document object will not be deleted until at least all associated
content items are deleted. In other words, Kilday indicates that one of the
content items 542 to 544 may be deleted, without its associated document
object 550 being deleted because that document object's link count has not
yet reached zero ( due to other associated content items still existing).
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Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 5 and of
claims 11 and 17 which were argued together with claim 5. See App. Br.
43--45.
Claim 6
Claim 6 depends from claim 1 and recites "blocking access to the
metadata object if the first life cycle of the metadata object is not in a
destroy phase at deletion of the system object."
Appellants argue:
As such, what the Kilday reference factually discloses is
hold logic that may generally prevent content and/or associated
metadata (again together) from being accessed, viewed, moved,
deleted and/ or changed.
However, there is no factual disclosure of the metadata of
the Kilday reference as cited having its own - a separate - set of
phases of life cycles that are distinct from life cycles of the
content. As a result, there is no factual disclosure of the metadata
of the Kilday reference as cited having a "destroy phase," as
required by the plain meaning of Appellant's claim language
There further is no factual disclosure within the Kilday
reference as cited of deleting the content without deleting the
metadata. As a result, there is no factual disclosure within the
Kilday reference as cited of the disclosed metadata object being
retained at deletion of the system object. As a further
consequence, there is no factual disclosure within the Kilday
reference as cited of Appellant's claimed determination of
whether ("if) the first life cycle of the metadata object is not in a
destroy phase at deletion of the system object.
As another logical consequence, there is no factual
disclosure within the Kilday reference as cited of Appellant's
claimed blocking access to the metadata object if the first life
cycle of the metadata object is not in a destroy phase at deletion
of the system object.
App. Br. 46--47.
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We are unpersuaded of Examiner error. Appellants' arguments are
not commensurate with the scope of claim 6 which does not require a set of
life cycle phases for the content item or for the metadata object. Claim 6
merely requires "blocking access to the metadata object if the first life cycle
of the metadata object is not in a destroy phase at deletion of the system
object." The Examiner finds Kilday teaches "hold logic" which prevents
metadata that is under a "hold status" to be accessed, viewed, moved,
deleted, and/or changed. Ans. 27 (citing Kilday 4:45---64). The Examiner
thus finds it would have been obvious to block access to a metatdata object
if it is in a hold status, and therefore not in a destroy phase. Ans. 27.
Appellants' argument that Kilday does not disclose retaining metadata
at deletion of the system object is unpersuasive in light of the Examiner's
findings with respect to claim 5 explaining that if a metadata object, such as
Kilday's document object, is associated with multiple system objects (i.e.
multiple content items) then the metadata object will not be deleted when
one of the content items is deleted. See Ans. 26 (citing Kilday Fig. 5C, 6:1-
21, 57 et seq.).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 6 and of
claims 12 and 18 which were argued together with claim 6. See App. Br.
45--47.
Claim 3
Claim 3 depends from claim 1 and recites:
where the first life cycle of the metadata object is configurable,
via a metadata record assigned to the metadata object and based
upon at least one configurable predefined rule, to comprise at
least a review phase that allows an end-user to review the
metadata object, an export phase that allows at least extraction
and transfer of the metadata object from a database, and a destroy
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Application 13/909,236
phase that allows deletion of the metadata object independently
of deletion of the system object.
Appellants argue
However, there is no factual disclosure within the Brooks
reference as cited of a life cycle of a metadata object being
configurable in any way because the cited disclosure merely
discloses document retention processing. Further, there is no
factual disclosure within the Brooks reference as cited of a
metadata record assigned to the metadata object being based
upon at least one configurable predefined rule.
Additionally, there is no factual disclosure within the
Brooks reference as cited of a life cycle of a metadata object
comprising three (3) specific and distinct phases of life cycle for
metadata, specifically at least (i) a review phase that allows an
end-user to review the metadata object, (ii) an export phase that
allows at least extraction and transfer of the metadata object from
a database, and (iii) a destroy phase that allows deletion of the
metadata object independently of deletion of the system object.
App. Br. 49--50.
The Examiner relies on Brooks for teaching the claimed phases of the
metadata object's life cycle. Ans. 28 (citing Brooks ,r 73). Brooks discloses
an electronic record management system ("ERMS") that "provide[s] an
improved records retention mechanism for managing the lifecycle of
electronic records." Brooks ,r 73. The ERMS "manages electronic records
according to rules ... for ensuring records retention and disposal." Brooks
,r 73. "The ERMS may support a full range of disposal options through the
retention mechanism such as export to an external archive, deletion,
retention and review at a later date, and/or any other suitable options."
Brooks ,r 73. Because Brooks teaches rules for managing records that allow
for exporting the record, deleting the record, and reviewing the record, we
agree with the Examiner that Brooks, in combination with Kilday and
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Application 13/909,236
Gauba, teaches or suggests configurable predefined rules that comprise a
review phase, an export phase, and a destroy phase as claimed.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 3 and of
claims 9 and 15 that were argued together with claim 3.
DECISION
The Examiner's rejection of claims 1-18 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
affirmed.
The Examiner's rejections of claims 1-18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(±).
AFFIRMED
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