Ex Parte Cooper

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 28, 2017

12020437 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 28, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/020,437 01/25/2008 J. Carl Cooper COOP-00301 1945
57131 7590
J. CARL COOPER
2730 Tobiano Drive
Reno, NV 89521
EXAMINER
LE, RONG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2421
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/30/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
VIDEOENGR@ SBCGLOBAL.NET
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte J. CARL COOPER
Appeal 2017-007744
Application 12/020,437
Technology Center 2400
Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, BETH Z. SHAW, and
NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
SHAW, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims and 6-27. Claim 5 is objected to
being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if
rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base
1 According to Appellant, “[t]he real party in interest is J. Carl Cooper, the
inventor.” Br. 3. Appellant did not number the pages of the Appeal Brief.
We treat the title page as page 1, with subsequent pages numbered
consecutively.
Appeal 2017-007744
Application 12/020,437
claim and any intervening claims. Final Act. 2. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).2
We AFFIRM.
INVENTION
The invention relates to artificially generated unobtrusive audio and
video synchronization events, which are essentially undetectable by normal
human viewers, to send audio and video synchronization information by
encoding audio and video events in normal program audio and video
datastreams. Abstract.
Claim 1, which is illustrative, reads as follows:
1. An electronic system for unobtrusively and
repeatedly sending audio and video time
synchronization information over separate audio and
video transmission or storage devices used to transmit
or store audio and video information in compressed or
uncompressed form comprising:
a device to create unobtrusive audio events;
a device to create unobtrusive video events;
a device, operating with the above devices, to provide
temporal sequences of temporally synchronized unobtrusive
audio events and unobtrusive video events pertaining to the
relative timing of the audio and video information;
wherein the synchronized unobtrusive audio events and
synchronized unobtrusive video events are incorporated into
program audio and uncompressed program video information
that is then transmitted or stored; and
wherein an automated reader device reads the program
audio and the program video information which has been
2 This appeal is related to, at least, prior Appeal No. 2012-001632, and prior
Appeal No. 2013-001584, as well as Appeal No. 2017-010918 (U.S.
Application No. 12/020,411). Br. 4.
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Application 12/020,437
transmitted or stored, repeatedly determines the timing of the
unobtrusive audio events and unobtrusive video events, and in
response thereto outputs information pertaining to the relative
timing of the program audio and program video information.
REJECTIONS AT ISSUE
The Examiner has rejected claims 1, 4, 9-11, 15-17, 19, and 22-27
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Davis (US
2004/0037449 Al, pub. Feb. 26, 2004) and Rhoads (US 6,411,725 Bl,
issued June 25, 2002). Final Act. 6-16.
The Examiner has rejected claims 2, 3, and 18 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Davis, Rhoads, and Okada (US
2006/0140280 Al, pub. June 29, 2006). Final Act. 16-17.
The Examiner has rejected claims 6, 8, and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Davis, Rhoads, and Braudaway (US
2002/0090110 Al, pub. July 11, 2002). Final Act. 18-19.
The Examiner has rejected claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Davis, Rhoads, Braudaway, and Fekkes (US
2006/0139490 Al, pub. June 29, 2006). Final Act. 19-20.
The Examiner has rejected claims 12-14 and 21 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Davis, Rhoads, and Brill (US
2002/0027612 Al, pub. Mar. 7, 2002). Final Act. 20-21.3
3 We do not reach the merits of the Examiner’s obviousness-type double
patenting rejection of the claims (Final Act. 3) because this issue is not ripe
for decision by the Board. Panels have the flexibility to reach or not reach
provisional double-patenting rejections. See Ex parte Moncla, 95 USPQ2d
1884 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
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Application 12/020,437
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed Appellant’s arguments in the Brief, the Examiner’s
rejection, and the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments. We adopt
as our own the findings and reasons set forth in the rejection from which
appeal is taken and in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s
Appeal Brief. See Ans. 2-21; Final Act. 2-21. We highlight and address
specific arguments and findings for emphasis as follows.
As a preliminary matter, we note that several arguments by Appellant
are not commensurate with the scope of the claims. For example, Appellant
presents arguments regarding how Davis allegedly
says nothing which recognizes that the audio and video
synchronization can be upset, nothing about how to recognize
that it is upset, nothing about what to do if it is upset, and no
suggestion whatsoever to determine the timing difference or to
respond to the timing difference to correct or restore the
synchronization once it is upset.
Br. 39. Moreover, Appellant argues that Davis does not describe how its
watermarks are created. Id. at 34. However, “limitations are not to be read
into the claims from the specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181,
1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing In reZletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir.
1989)). Here, Appellant’s argument is not commensurate with the
limitations of representative claim 1, which does not recite recognizing
“upset” synchronization, correcting a “timing difference,” or how to create
watermarks. In other words, Appellant argues limitations not recited in the
claims. We decline to read the argued limitations into the claims.
Appellant also argues Davis is not analogous art. Br. 39. We are not
persuaded by this argument. “Whether a reference in the prior art is
‘analogous’ is a fact question.” In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir.
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Application 12/020,437
1992) (citing Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1568 n.9
(Fed. Cir. 1987)). Two criteria have evolved for answering the question:
“(1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the
problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the
inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the
particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Id. at 658-59
(citing In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Wood, 599
F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA 1979)). “A reference is reasonably pertinent if,
even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s
endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals,
logically would have commended itself to an inventor's attention in
considering his problem.” Id. at 659.
We find that Davis, titled “Integrating Digital Watermarks in
Multimedia Content,” is from the same field of endeavor as the invention,
i.e., audio video synchronization. Davis describes a method for decoding
auxiliary data from media signals in multimedia content that decodes
watermarks from different media signals and uses the watermarks to control
processing of the multimedia content. Davis, Abstract. Appellant argues
Davis’s formatting of signals is “entirely different” from the invention and is
therefore non-analogous art. Br. 39. The claimed signals, according to
Appellant, would be understood by one skilled in the art “to be real time
sequential signals adhering to completely different standards in a completely
different industry e.g. such as broadcast television and related fields of art
such as broadcast television program production and distribution.” Id. We
are not persuaded that Davis’s description of audio video and use in
“multimedia” is concerned with “entirely different” signals from the claimed
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Application 12/020,437
invention. Rather, Davis describes “multimedia” as “any data that has a
collection of two or more different media types.” Davis ^ 27. One example
is a movie, which has an audio and video track. Id.
Appellant also argues various teachings of the references and
combinations of the references are in error. Br. 46-75. However, we find
the Examiner has thoroughly explained how the teachings of the applied
prior art render the claim limitations obvious. Ans. 2-22. For example,
Appellant argues Davis fails to teach the functionality of providing temporal
sequences of temporally synchronized unobtrustive audio events and
unobtrusive video events. The Examiner explains how Davis teaches those
limitations. See Ans. 3-5. The Examiner’s findings and explanations are
reasonable, based on the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims,
and Appellant has not demonstrated error in the Examiner’s findings. Id.
Appellant also argues Davis fails to disclose a “timer device” as recited in
claim 17. However, we agree with the Examiner that, given the broadest
reasonable interpretation of the claim language, a timer device can be part of
the same device that creates unobstrusive audio or video events. Ans. 8.
Davis describes placing audio watermarks within a specified temporal range
of the video watermarks (Davis ^ 60), and therefore necessarily includes the
timer device as claimed. We conclude, therefore, the Examiner’s findings
are reasonable, based on the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims.
For these reasons and for the additional reasons stated in the Final
Rejection and Answer, we sustain the rejection of claims 1—4 and 6-27.
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DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims and 6-27 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv) (2011).
AFFIRMED
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