Ex Parte Cohen

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 18, 2017

12471557 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 18, 2017)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/471,557 05/26/2009 Uri Cohen SEED011USD1 6098
7590 10/18/2017
URI COHEN
4147 Dake Avenue
Palo Alto, CA 94306
EXAMINER
SMITH, BRADLEY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2817
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/18/2017 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte URI COHEN
____________

Appeal 2015-000667
Application 12/471,5571
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before TERRY J. OWENS, BEVERLY A. FRANKLIN, and
CHRISTOPHER M. KAISER, Administrative Patent Judges.

KAISER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the decision2 of the
Primary Examiner rejecting claims 1–17 and 31–37. Final Act. 7–21. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm in part.

1 Appellant identifies the real party-in-interest as Uri Cohen, the named
inventor. Appeal Br. 1.
2 Final Office Action, mailed January 10, 2014 (“Final Act.”).
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OPINION
Appellant’s invention “pertains to the field of electroplating metals or
alloys for filling high aspect ratio openings, such as trenches and vias, for
semiconductor metallization interconnects, thin film heads, or
micromachined Microelectromechanical Systems (MEMS) devices.” Spec.
1, ll. 11–14. “In particular, embodiments of the present invention provide
improved seed layers for electroplating copper or silver interconnects in
semiconductor devices, and methods and apparatus for fabricating such
improved seed layers.” Id. at 1, ll. 14–16.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the appealed subject
matter:
1. A method for depositing two or more [PVD] seed
layers for electroplating metallic interconnects over a substrate,
the substrate having a patterned insulating layer which includes
at least one opening and a field surrounding the at least one
opening, the at least one opening having top corners, sidewalls,
and a bottom, the field and the at least one opening being ready
for depositing one or more seed layers, and the method
comprising:
Depositing by a CVD technique a continuous first seed
layer over the sidewalls and bottom of the at least one opening
using a first set of deposition parameters; and
depositing a second seed layer over the first seed layer
using a second set of deposition parameters; wherein:
(i) the second set of deposition parameters includes at
least one deposition parameter which is different from any of
the deposition parameters in the first set of deposition
parameters, or whose value is different in the first and second
sets of deposition parameters,
(ii) the thickness of the first seed layer is from about 50Å
to not more than 400Å over the field,
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(iii) the first and second seed layers are sufficiently thick
over the field to enable uniform electroplating across the
substrate, and
(iv) after depositing the seed layers, there is sufficient
room for electroplating inside the at least one opening.
Appeal Br., Claims App’x A1.
The Examiner rejected claims 1–17 and 31–37 under the first
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 for lack of enablement. Final Act. 7–9. In
addition, the Examiner rejected the following claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over the following combinations of prior art:
Claims Prior-Art References
1–3, 6–10, and 31–37 Brown,3 Shacham-Diamand,4 and AAPA5
4 and 5 Brown, Shacham-Diamand, AAPA,
and Liu6

11, 12, and 15 Brown, Shacham-Diamand, AAPA, and
Gandikota7

13, 16, and 17 Brown, Shacham-Diamand, AAPA, and
Hoinkis8

14 Brown, Shacham-Diamand, AAPA,
Hoinkis, and Gandikota

3 Brown et al., U.S. Patent No. 6,187,670 B1, issued Feb. 13, 2001.
4 Shacham-Diamand et al., U.S. Patent No. 6,065,424, issued May 23, 2000.
5 Applicant-Admitted Prior Art, Spec. 18, ll. 17–24 (cited as identical
language in U.S. Patent No. 6,610,151, col. 12, ll. 20–29); Spec. 19, ll. 16–
19 (cited as identical language in U.S. Patent No. 6,610,151, col. 12, ll. 61–
65); Spec. 20, ll. 1–14 (cited as identical language in U.S. Patent No.
6,610,151, col. 13, ll. 15–35).
6 Liu et al., U.S. Patent No. 6,037,258, issued Mar. 14, 2000.
7 Gandikota et al., U.S. Patent No. 6,627,542 B1, issued Sept. 30, 2003.
8 Hoinkis, U.S. Patent No. 6,146,517, issued Nov. 14, 2000.
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Final Act. 8–15.
Appellant, proceeding pro se, separately argues each rejection.
Appeal Br. 6–83. Accompanying Appellant’s Appeal Brief is an Evidence
Appendix comprising five pieces of evidence totaling 167 pages of
documents. Appeal Br., Evidence App’x. We consider each of the
Examiner’s rejections below.

Lack of Enablement: Claims 1–17 and 31–37

The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that “[t]he
specification . . . enable any person skilled in the art to which [the claimed
invention] pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and
use the [claimed invention].” The Examiner concluded that this requirement
was not met with respect to claims 1–17 and 31–37.
First, Appellant argues that it was error for the Examiner to rely on
evidence of record that determining “the minimum thickness of a continuous
CVD Cu layer is a critical variable, and involves more than routine skill.”
Final Act. 7 (quoting Second Cheung Declaration (July 18, 2011) ¶ 12).
Based on this evidence, the Examiner concluded that, without sufficient
disclosure in the Specification, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not
have known how to make a continuous CVD layer with a field thickness of
50–250 angstroms. Id. at 7–8. The Examiner then noted that the
Specification failed to provide “the specific conditions,” such as “pressure,
substrate bias, sputtering gas pressure, sputtering gas flow rate, cathodic
power, and plasma power density” that could produce the claimed CVD seed
layer. Id. Given this lack of disclosure and the “large number [of]
variables,” the Examiner determined that making the claimed layer would
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require undue experimentation, meaning that the enablement requirement of
35 U.S.C. § 112 was not met. Id. Appellant argues that the Examiner
committed reversible error by relying on this declaration for evidence of lack
of enablement when it was intended merely to provide evidence of lack of
obviousness. Appeal Br. 7–10. To this end, Appellant argues that
obviousness must be proven without using an applicant’s own disclosure,
while enablement examines that disclosure to determine whether it is
sufficient, making evidence suitable to one determination irrelevant to the
other. Id. We do not find this argument persuasive. The purpose of the
Second Cheung Declaration is irrelevant; it is evidence for all that it says.
And what the declaration says is that the prior art itself fails to teach the
person of ordinary skill in the art how to make and use the claimed
invention. That statement is highly relevant to the enablement
determination, because, without any teaching in the prior art of how to make
and use the invention, any such disclosure must come from the
Specification.
We are not persuaded, however, that the Examiner was correct in
determining that the disclosure in the Specification was insufficient.
Appellant argues that a separate declaration of Cheung provides evidence
that proves that the disclosure in the Specification is sufficient to enable a
person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the claimed invention.
Appeal Br. 6–9 (citing Fifth Cheung Declaration (Sept. 23, 2013) ¶ 8). In
relevant part, that declaration says that, when combined with prior-art
knowledge, “the specification of the Cohen Application provides sufficient
guidance and direction to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . to
deposit a CVD seed layer that is continuous on the sidewalls and bottom of
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openings, and has a thickness between 50–400Å over the field, without
undue experimentation.” Fifth Cheung Declaration (Sept. 23, 2013) ¶ 8.
This is opinion testimony about an ultimate legal conclusion, namely
enablement. Accordingly, it is entitled to no weight. In re Chilowsky, 306
F.2d 908, 916 (CCPA 1962) (expert opinions that application met the
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 were “incompetent expressions” not
entitled to any weight).
The facts underlying the opinion expressed in the Cheung declaration,
however, are entitled to some weight. Id. The Examiner found that, without
some disclosure of the values to be given to the deposition variables, such as
“pressure, substrate bias, sputtering gas pressure, sputtering gas flow rate,
cathodic power, and plasma power density,” undue experimentation would
be required in order to make and use the claimed invention. Final Act. 7–8.
But Appellant argues that, on reading the Specification, a person of ordinary
skill in the art “would understand that, by using inorganic precursors which
do not contain carbon or oxygen atoms, the deleterious oxide or carbide
intermediate layer can be avoided, and a continuous CVD seed layer having
a thickness between 50-400Å (or between 50-250Å) over the field can be
obtained.” Appeal Br. 12. Appellant directs us to some evidence of record
supporting this argument. Fifth Cheung Declaration (Sept. 23, 2013) ¶ 8
(“The specification . . . teaches the POSITA that inorganic precursors (which
do not include oxygen or carbon atoms) enable the deposition of a
continuous CVD seed layer that has a thickness between 50-400Å over the
field, or even between 50-100Å.”); see Spec. 16, ll. 5–28 (describing using
“high purity, inorganic Cu compounds . . . which do not contain oxygen or
carbon atoms” in place of metallo-organic compounds in order to achieve a
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“clean metal-to-metal interface between a barrier layer containing a
refractory metal and the depositing copper” and thereby to obtain “good
adhesion, morphology, uniformity, and low electrical resistivity”). Further,
Appellant explains that this use of inorganic precursors is an improvement
on existing CVD seed layer techniques that result on their own in continuous
and conformal CVD layers as thin as 300 angstroms. Spec. 5, ll. 22–26, 6,
ll. 2–4. In light of this evidence, we are persuaded that the Examiner’s mere
statement that no details about the CVD deposition process itself were
provided was not sufficient to satisfy the burden on the Examiner in making
a case of lack of enablement. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1562 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (the Examiner must provide a reasonable explanation as to why the
scope of protection provided by a claim is not adequately enabled by the
disclosure); In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 224 (CCPA 1971) (“[I]t is
incumbent upon the Patent Office . . . to explain why it doubts the truth or
accuracy of any statement in a supporting . . . presumptively accurate
disclosure.”).
Accordingly, we reverse the rejection of claims 1–17 and 31–37 for
lack of enablement.

Obviousness: Claims 1–3, 6–10, and 31–37

The Examiner rejected claims 1–3, 6–10, and 31–37 as obvious over
the combination of Brown, Shacham-Diamand, and applicant-admitted prior
art. Final Act. 11–13, 15–18. The Examiner found that Brown taught or
suggested each limitation of these claims except for the first seed layer being
deposited by CVD, the recited thickness of the first seed layer, and the first
and second seed layers being deposited with different sets of deposition
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parameters. Id. According to the Examiner, a person of ordinary skill in the
art would have replaced Brown’s first PVD seed layer with the CVD seed
layer of Shacham-Diamand because doing so would be more likely to result
in a conformal seed layer. Id. at 13. Moreover, according to the Examiner,
it would have involved only routine skill in the art to “discover[] the
optimum or working ranges” of seed layer thickness. Id. at 12 (citing In re
Aller, 220 F.2d 454 (CCPA 1955)). Finally, according to the Examiner, it
was known in the art to vary deposition parameters, “such as duration of
deposition.” Id. (citing disclosure at Spec. 18, ll. 17–24; Spec. 19, ll. 16–19;
Spec. 20, ll. 1–14).
Appellant raises several arguments against these findings. First,
Appellant argues that combining the teachings of Brown and Shacham-
Diamand “would change the principle of operation of Brown . . . and would
render it unsatisfactory for its intended purpose . . . because it would
eliminate the unique improved flow and surface mobility of the PVD seed
layer material.” Appeal Br. 21. Appellant does not direct us to any evidence
of record to support this undeveloped argument. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded by this argument. In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA
1974) (“argument in a brief cannot take the place of evidence”).
Second, Appellant argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would not have replaced Brown’s first PVD seed layer with the CVD seed
layer of Shacham-Diamand because doing so would impose disadvantages,
including “poor adhesion to the barrier layer.” Appeal Br. 21–22, 29–30.
Appellant does direct us to evidence that CVD layers do not adhere as well
to barrier layers as do PVD layers. Id. at 29–30 (quoting Fifth Cheung
Declaration (Sept. 23, 2013) ¶ 16(b)). Of course, this evidence is
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contradicted by Appellant’s argument, discussed above, that the mere
disclosure of Appellant’s barrier layer is sufficient to enable a person of
ordinary skill in the art to make and use the claimed continuous CVD seed
layer. Moreover, the evidence to which Appellant directs us provides a
solution to the problem of poor CVD layer adhesion. According to
Appellant’s evidence, PVD “can readily deposit copper on the barrier layer
10 with relatively good adhesion,” and a “preliminary PVD step is found to
aid the nucleating of the later CVD copper film.” Fifth Cheung Declaration
(Sept. 23, 2013) ¶ 16(b) (emphasis removed). Thus, it was known in the art
to deposit a PVD layer before a CVD layer to improve adhesion. Although
Appellant’s claims do not recite a limitation requiring the PVD step before
the deposition of the CVD seed layer, they also do not exclude performing
this preliminary step. Appeal Br. A1–A4. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded by this argument that the Examiner committed reversible error in
finding that it would have been obvious to combine the teachings of Brown
and Shacham-Diamand by changing Brown’s first PVD layer to Shacham-
Diamand’s CVD layer.
Third, Appellant argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
not have used layers as thin as those claimed in the claims reciting thickness
limitations, because Brown discloses that no continuous layer can be less
than 1000 angstroms thick. Appeal Br. 22–23 (citing Brown, col. 4, ll. 29–
34). But Brown does not make such a statement. Brown says that obtaining
a thickness of at least 50 angstroms inside the opening (not obtaining a
continuous layer) “tends” to lead to (not requires) a thickness of 1000 to
2000 angstroms in wide-open areas. Brown, col. 4, ll. 29–34. This does not
constitute the “teaching away” that Appellant argues it does, because it
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“does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” the use of thinner
layers. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Instead, Brown
merely teaches a disadvantage of using a thinner layer. Accordingly, we are
not persuaded that Brown makes it so clear that thin layers were known to be
discontinuous that the Examiner’s finding that the layer thickness was
subject to optimization was erroneous.
Fourth, Appellant argues that Shacham-Diamand is not analogous art
to the claimed invention. Appeal Br. 30–32. “The analogous-art test
requires that the Board show that a reference is either in the field of the
applicant’s endeavor or is reasonably pertinent to the problem with which
the inventor was concerned in order to rely on that reference as a basis for
rejection.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986–87 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing In re
Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Appellant argues that
Shacham-Diamand is in the field of “electroless copper plating” rather than
the invention’s field of “copper electroplating.” Appeal Br. 32 (emphasis
removed). But a reference is analogous art, even if it is outside the field of
the invention, if it “is reasonably pertinent to the problem with which the
inventor was concerned.” Kahn, 441 F.3d at 987. Here, the problem with
which the inventor was concerned was “produc[ing] a continuous seed layer
on the sidewalls and bottom of . . . openings, while maintaining sufficient
thickness on the field to facilitate void-free copper electrochemical filling of
very narrow openings.” Spec. 6, ll. 7–10. We are persuaded that Schacham-
Diamand, which relates to “form[ing] metal films as thin as 100 Å” with
“low resistivity values approaching bulk values, low surface roughness,
[and] excellent electrical and thickness uniformity,” is reasonably pertinent
to that problem. Shacham-Diamand, Abstract.
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Fifth, Appellant argues that the person of ordinary skill in the art
would have had no reason to replace the PVD layer of Brown with the CVD
layer of Shacham-Diamand to improve seed layer conformality, because
Brown taught a process that, without any modification, already produced
“good conformality.” Appeal Br. 32–34. As evidence, Appellant directs us
to statements in Brown that assert that Brown’s process produces “improved
step coverage and conformality” and that “the conformality . . . will have
increased.” Id. (quoting Brown, col. 3, ll. 14–16, col. 4, ll. 64–65 (emphasis
removed)). We do not find this argument persuasive. Brown’s statements
merely assert that Brown improves on what was known in the art at the time
of Brown, not that no further improvement on Brown’s process is possible.
In addition, even if Brown did disclose that its process was somehow better
than the process claimed by Appellant, this would not necessarily negate the
suggestion to modify it by replacing it with the known more conformal CVD
layer of Shacham-Diamand. Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1200–01 (reason to
combine need not be supported by prior art suggestion that applicant’s
solution is the preferred or most desirable alternative).
Finally, Appellant also argues that neither Brown nor Shacham-
Diamand teaches a thin but continuous CVD layer. Appeal Br. 23. This
ignores the Examiner’s findings that (1) the applicant-admitted prior art
discloses that continuous CVD layers as thin as 300 angstroms were
common in the prior art and (2) optimization of the thickness within the
range of the prior art was a matter of routine skill in the art. Final Act. 7, 12;
see also Spec. 5, ll. 23–26 (it was “common” in the prior art to use CVD to
deposit layers with a “typical thickness of about 300Å to about 1,000Å”);
Spec. 6, ll. 2–4 (the prior-art CVD deposition techniques “provid[ed]
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continuous and complete step coverage of the seed layer”). Given these
findings, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in concluding that it
was within the routine skill in the art to achieve a continuous CVD seed
layer with a thickness of 300 angstroms or higher. There are thus three types
of claims: (1) those with no thickness limitations, (2) those with thickness
limitations that overlap the prior-art range of 300 angstroms or higher, and
(3) those with thickness limitations that do not overlap the prior-art range.
For those claims in the first two categories, which are claims 1–3, 6, 7, 10,
and 31–37, the fact that neither Brown nor Shacham-Diamand teaches a thin
but continuous CVD layer is immaterial, because Appellant has not
persuaded us that the Examiner erred by finding that a person of ordinary
skill in the art would have been able to optimize the CVD seed layer
thickness within the range that Appellant discloses was known in the prior
art. For those claims in the third category, however, we are persuaded that
the fact that neither Brown nor Shacham-Diamand teaches or suggests a
thickness within the claimed range is important, because the Examiner has
not provided sufficient evidence to support the finding that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would have “optimized” the layer thickness in a way
that resulted in layers thinner than those that Appellant has disclosed were
well known. These claims include claims 8 and 9. Accordingly, we affirm
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 1–3, 6, 7, 10, and 31–37, and
we reverse the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 8 and 9.

Obviousness: Claims 4 and 5

The Examiner rejected claims 4 and 5 as obvious over the
combination of Brown, Shacham-Diamand, Liu, and applicant-admitted
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prior art. Final Act. 14–15. With respect to claim 4, in addition to the
findings discussed above, the Examiner found that Liu teaches or suggests
“the first and second seed layers have no substantial overhangs sealing or
pinching off at the top corners of the at least one opening.” Id. at 14 (citing
Liu, col. 5, ll. 1–2). Appellant argues that it was improper for the Examiner
to rely on the figures of Liu, Appeal Br. 42, but the Examiner did not rely on
Liu’s figures, so we do not find this argument persuasive. In addition,
Appellant argues that Liu cannot teach or suggest a lack of overhangs
because “Liu . . . does not even mention overhangs.” Id. But Liu does
disclose depositing “[a] thick copper layer,” “completely filling [the] dual
damascene opening.” Liu, col. 4, l. 66–col. 5, l. 2. This “complete[] filling”
could not be accomplished if there were overhangs pinching off the top of
the opening, so Liu at least suggests avoiding the presence of such
overhangs. Thus, we are not persuaded by this argument that the Examiner
erred by rejecting claim 4 as obvious over the combination of Brown,
Shacham-Diamand, Liu, and applicant-admitted prior art.
Appellant also argues that an additional piece of evidence, Chen,9
teaches that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known that seed
layers of the thickness disclosed in Liu would have exhibited “substantial
overhangs on relatively narrow openings.” Appeal Br. 42. But Appellant’s
claim 4 is not limited to narrow openings, so it does not exclude wide
openings that would be free of the problem Appellant says is described in
Chen. Id. at A2. Thus, we are not persuaded by this argument that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 4.

9 Chen, U.S. Patent No. 6,197,181 B1, issued Mar. 6, 2001.
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With respect to claim 5, Appellant argues that no reference teaches or
suggests the recited thickness limitation requiring the first seed layer to be
between 50 and 100 angstroms thick. Id. at 48–49. As discussed above, we
are persuaded that it was error for the Examiner to find that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would have optimized the layer thickness beyond the
limits of the thicknesses known in the prior art. Accordingly, we affirm the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 4 and reverse the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of claim 5.

Obviousness: Claims 11, 12, and 15

The Examiner rejected claims 11, 12, and 15 as obvious over the
combination of Brown, Shacham-Diamand, Gandikota, and applicant-
admitted prior art. Final Act. 18–19, 21. Appellant argues that Gandikota is
not valid prior art, because Appellant has antedated Gandikota. Appeal Br.
63–64. Appellant’s only argument for this contention is a bare reference,
without pinpoint citations, to an affidavit of the inventor, which is 22
paragraphs long and covers 76 pages. Id. Our rules require that an Appeal
Brief include “arguments” that “shall explain why the examiner erred.”
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). “[M]ere statements of disagreement . . . do not
amount to a developed argument.” SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex
Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Accordingly, Appellant’s bare
reference to a voluminous declaration is not an argument under our rules,
and, therefore, it does not persuade us of any reversible error by the
Examiner in failing to find that Appellant antedated Gandikota.10

10 The same is true of Appellant’s argument for antedating Hoinkis, Appeal
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Appellant also argues that Gandikota “teaches away from” the subject
matter of claims 11, 12, and 15. Appeal Br. 64–65, 80–81. We are not
persuaded by this argument. Gandikota’s teaching that a CVD layer should
have a PVD layer underneath it at most disparages placing a CVD layer
directly on a barrier layer.11 But claims 11, 12, and 15 do not require a CVD
seed layer placed directly on a barrier layer; instead they require a CVD
layer with at least two more layers placed on top of the CVD layer. Id. at
A3. The claims do not exclude the presence of an additional PVD layer. Id.
Accordingly, Gandikota does not teach away from claims 11, 12, and 15.
Finally, Appellant argues that no reference teaches or suggests the
limitation of claims 11, 12, and 15 that requires the presence of a third seed
layer on top of the first two seed layers. Id. at 67. The Examiner relied on
Gandikota to teach or suggest a third layer. Final Act. 19 (citing Gandikota,
col. 7). But Gandikota teaches a seed layer, an adhesion layer, and a barrier
layer. Gandikota, col. 6, ll. 63–64, col. 7, ll. 31–35, Fig. 4. Although both
the seed layer and the adhesion layer arguably could be considered seed
layers, the Examiner does not explain why the barrier layer is also a seed
layer. Final Act. 19. Accordingly, we reverse the rejection of claims 11, 12,
and 15.

Br. 69, which relies on the same evidence in the same way.
11 This assumes that Gandikota actually disparages anything. It is not clear
that Gandikota actually does so. The portions of Gandikota to which
Appellant directs us simply teach a disadvantage of CVD copper layers and
express a preference for PVD layers. Gandikota, col. 2, ll. 53–57 (“CVD
copper has less than desirable adhesion to the barrier layers and has a
tendency to delaminate from the sidewalls”), col. 3, ll. 10–19 (“Preferably,
the adhesion layer comprises copper . . . deposited by physical vapor
deposition.”).
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Obviousness: Claims 13, 16, and 17

The Examiner rejected claims 13, 16, and 17 as obvious over the
combination of Brown, Shacham-Diamand, Hoinkis, and applicant-admitted
prior art. Final Act. 19–20. We reverse the rejection of claim 13 for the
same reasons we reverse the rejections of claims 11, 12, and 15, discussed
above, because claim 13 also requires a third seed layer. Appeal Br. A3.
Claim 16 requires the presence of a first seed layer having a thickness
between 50 and 200 angstroms. Id. We reverse the rejection of claim 16 for
the same reasons we reverse the rejections of claims 5, 8, and 9, all of which
require a thickness less than the range of thicknesses that the evidence of
record shows was known in the art.
With respect to claim 17, Appellant argues first that Hoinkis “teaches
away from” the subject matter of claim 17. Id. at 69–70 (emphasis
removed). As with the argument that Gandikota teaches away, we are not
persuaded by this argument. Hoinkis teaches the usefulness of depositing a
first copper layer using PVD before depositing a CVD layer, but it does not
disparage depositing the copper layer first. Hoinkis, col. 2, ll. 24–31
(teaching that the CVD “is preferably preceded by flash deposition of copper
in particular, by a sputtering or physical vapor deposition,” which “is found
to aid the nucleating of the later CVD copper film” (emphasis added)).
Moreover, claim 17 does not exclude depositing a PVD layer before the
CVD layer, as long as another seed layer is present above the CVD layer.
Appeal Br. A3.
Appellant also argues that
neither Brown et al. (disclosing two PVD seed layers), nor
AAPA (disclosing a single PVD or CVD seed layer), nor
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Shacham-Diamand (disclosing a single PVD or CVD seed
layer), nor Hoinkis (disclosing a PVD seed layer followed by a
CVD seed layer), nor any combination thereof, discloses or
suggests the deposition sequence of claim 17.
Id. at 74. This argument is not persuasive. First, to the extent that this is
intended to argue that no single reference teaches or suggests the limitations
of claim 17, we note that one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking
references individually when the rejection is based on a combination of
references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). To the extent
that this is intended to argue that the combination of the references does not
teach or suggest the limitations of claim 17, we note that “mere statements
of disagreement . . . do not amount to a developed argument.” SmithKline
Beecham, 439 F.3d at 1320. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of claim 17.

Obviousness: Claim 14

The Examiner rejected claim 14 as obvious over the combination of
Brown, Shacham-Diamand, Hoinkis, Gandikota, and applicant-admitted
prior art. Claim 14 depends from claim 13. Appeal Br. A3. Appellant
argues that, like claim 13, claim 14 requires the presence of a third seed
layer. Id. at 77–78. We agree, and we reverse the rejection of claim 14 for
the same reasons that we reverse the rejection of claim 13.
DECISION/ORDER
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–17 and 31–37 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 as lacking sufficient enablement is reversed. The Examiner’s
rejections of the following claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) also are
Appeal 2015-000667
Application 12/471,557

18
reversed: (1) claims 8 and 9 as obvious over the combination of Brown,
Shacham-Diamand, and applicant-admitted prior art; (2) claim 5 as obvious
over the combination of Brown, Shacham-Diamand, Liu, and applicant-
admitted prior art; (3) claims 11, 12, and 15 as obvious over the combination
of Brown, Shacham-Diamand, Gandikota, and applicant-admitted prior art;
(4) claims 13 and 16 as obvious over the combination of Brown, Shacham-
Diamand, Hoinkis, and applicant-admitted prior art; and (5) claim 14 as
obvious over the combination of Brown, Shacham-Diamand, Hoinkis,
Gandikota, and applicant-admitted prior art.
The Examiner’s rejections of the following claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) are affirmed: (1) claims 1–3, 6, 7, 10, and 31–37 as obvious over
the combination of Brown, Shacham-Diamand, and applicant-admitted prior
art; (2) claim 4 as obvious over the combination of Brown, Shacham-
Diamand, Liu, and applicant-admitted prior art; and (3) claim 17 as obvious
over the combination of Brown, Shacham-Diamand, Hoinkis, and applicant-
admitted prior art.
Thus, claims 8, 9, and 11–16 are not the subjects of any affirmed
rejection. Claims 1–7, 10, 17, and 31–37 remain subject to at least one
affirmed rejection.
It is ordered that the Examiner’s decision is affirmed in part.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136.
AFFIRMED-IN-PART