Ex Parte Coetzer

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 26, 2018

13940971 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 26, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/940,971 07/12/2013
28977 7590 10/26/2018
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP (PH)
1701 MARKET STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103-2921
UNITED ST A TES OF AMERICA
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Henriette Coetzer
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
FMSF-040-101 1040
EXAMINER
HEIN, DEVIN C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3686
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/26/2018 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte HENRIETTE COETZER
Appeal2017-007651
Application 13/940,971 1
Technology Center 3600
Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR. JEFFREY S. SMITH and
JOHN R. KENNY, Administrative Patent Judges.
WHITEHEAD JR., Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant is appealing the Examiner's Final rejection of claims 11-26
under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). Appeal Brief 1. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
Introduction
The invention is directed to, "using a processor, a set of inpatient
treatment records, and processing the set of inpatient treatment records to
identify index admissions, where an index admission for a patient is an
1 Appellant identifies Health Dialog Services Corporation as the real party
in interest. Appeal Brief 1.
Appeal2017-007651
Application 13/940,971
initial admission to an inpatient treatment facility and any associated
admissions within a single program of care." Appeal Brief 25.
Illustrative Claim
13. A system for evaluating health care provider
performance,
compnsmg:
a computer processor arranged to:
receive a set of inpatient treatment records;
process the set of inpatient treatment records to
identify index admissions, wherein an index admission
for a patient is an initial admission to an inpatient
treatment facility and any associated admissions within a
single program of care;
identify, based on the set of inpatient treatment
records, a set of unnecessary admissions, including for
each unnecessary admission in the set of unnecessary
admissions:
identifying a clinical history associated with the
unnecessary admission, wherein the clinical history for
the unnecessary admission includes medical records
associated with at least a predetermined period preceding
the unnecessary admission,
based on the clinical history, identify, for each
unnecessary admission, one or more interaction codes
identifying a health problem;
cross-reference the one or more interaction codes
with interaction codes in a diagnostic map, wherein the
diagnostic map cross-references one or more interaction
codes associated with at least one unnecessary admission,
and corresponding one or more health care
providers associated with the unnecessary admission;
based on the cross-referencing, determine the
corresponding one or more healthcare providers
associated with the one or more interaction codes,
wherein the corresponding one or more providers are
associated with the unnecessary admission;
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calculating an unnecessary admission evaluation
for each health care provider in the corresponding health
care providers based on the one or more interaction codes
associated with the unnecessary admission;
assigning accountability for each unnecessary
admission to a health care provider based on the one or
more associated interaction codes and the unnecessary
admission evaluation of the health care provider; and
generate a report based on the unnecessary
admission evaluation of each health care provider.
Rejections on Appeal
Claims 11-26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. The claimed
invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter because the claims as a
whole, considering all claim elements both individually and in combination,
do not amount to significantly more than an abstract idea. Final Action 2---6.
Claims 13-24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Bigby et al. ("Assessing the Preventability of Emergency
Hospital Admissions -A Method of Evaluating the Quality of Medical Care
in a Primary Care Facility," The American Journal of Medicine, Vol. 83,
1031-1036 (1987)) and Rastogi (U.S. Patent Application Publication
2009/0125348 Al; published May 14, 2009). Final Action 6-23.
Claims 11-12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Bigby, Rastogi and Examiner's Official Notice. Final
Action 23-24.
Claims 25-26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Bigby, Rastogi and Callas (U.S. Patent Application
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Publication 2011/0238441 Al; published September 29, 2011). Final
Action 24--26
ANALYSIS
Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellant and the Examiner,
we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed December 14, 2016), the Reply Brief
(filed April 21, 2017), the Answer (mailed February 24, 2017) and the Final
Action (mailed July 25, 2016) for the respective details.
35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejection
Section 101 defines patentable subject matter: "Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title." 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has "long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception" that "[l]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012)
( quotation omitted). To determine patentable subject matter, the Supreme
Court has set forth a two-part test.
"First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts" of "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas." Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Banklnt'l, 134 S.Ct. 2347,
2355 (2014). "The inquiry often is whether the claims are directed to 'a
specific means or method' for improving technology or whether they are
simply directed to an abstract end-result." RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo
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Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). A court must
be cognizant that "all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest
upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas" (Mayo,
566 U.S. at 71 ), and "describing the claims at ... a high level of abstraction
and untethered from the language of the claims all but ensures that the
exceptions to§ 101 swallow the rule." Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822
F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Instead, "the claims are considered in
their entirety to ascertain whether their character as a whole is directed to
excluded subject matter." Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.,
790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
The Supreme Court has identified as abstract ideas claims employing
mathematical relationships or formulas, which are similar to the instant
claimed invention. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that the concept
of applying a mathematical formula to hedging risk and the application of
that concept to energy markets was not patentable because of similarities to
Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); and Bilski v. Kappas, 561
U.S. 593, 611-12 (2010). Further, the Supreme Court noted that the claims,
like those in Flook, were unpatentable because "Flook established that
limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution
components did not make the concept patentable." Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit has identified abstract ideas that do
not describe an inventive concept that is more than an abstract idea, even
when embodied in specific system or structure. Specifically, the Federal
Circuit stated "not every claim that recites concrete, tangible components
escapes the reach of the abstract-idea inquiry," including a finding that
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"claims reciting an 'interface,' 'network,' and a 'database' are nevertheless
directed to an abstract idea." In re TL! Commc 'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823
F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice
Loan Serv. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324--25 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The Federal
Circuit found the "eleven steps for displaying an advertisement in exchange
for access to copyrighted media" was directed to an abstract idea, despite the
claim at issue reciting "certain additional limitations [that] add a degree of
particularity." Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 714--15 (Fed.
Cir. 2014). Further, the Federal Circuit noted "the concept embodied by the
majority of the limitations describes only the abstract idea of showing an
advertisement before delivering free content," and the addition of novel or
non-routine components did not "necessarily tum[] an abstraction into
something concrete." Ultramercial, Inc. 772 F.3d at 715.
In contrast, the Federal Circuit has found claims that "are not simply
directed to any form of storing tabular data, but instead are specifically
directed to a self-referential table for a computer database" are "directed to
an improvement of an existing technology ... achiev[ing] other benefits
over conventional databases, such as increased flexibility, faster search
times, and smaller memory requirements." Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337.
However, the heart of the claimed invention must be focused on the
underlying technology itself and how the underlying technology is altered
"in a way that leads to an improvement in the technology." Intellectual
Ventures Iv. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing
Enfzsh, 822 F.3d 1327); see also TL! Commc 'ns, 823 F.3d at 612.
If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the inquiry
ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step, where we
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"consider the elements of each claim both individually and 'as an ordered
combination' to determine whether the additional elements 'transform the
nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible application." Alice, 134 S.Ct. at
2355 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). The Supreme Court has
"described step two of this analysis as a search for an 'inventive concept'-
i.e., an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that
the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
ineligible concept itself." Id. (quotation omitted). For computer-related
technology, the Federal Circuit has held that a claim may pass the second
step if "the claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer technology in
order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer
[technology]," e.g., "a challenge particular to the Internet." DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
In Bilski, the Supreme Court rejected the machine-or-transformation
test as the exclusive test for determining patentability, but nonetheless held
the claims were ineligible because the claims were preemptory of risk
hedging in all fields. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612-13 (citing Flook, 437 U.S. 584;
Benson, 409 U.S. 63). The Federal Circuit has also identified when abstract
ideas do not amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. The
Federal Circuit held the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital
images in an organized manner was not significantly more than an abstract
idea because "the recited physical components behave exactly as expected
according to their ordinary use" and the claimed invention "fails to provide
the requisite details necessary to carry out th[ e] idea." TL! Commc 'ns, 823
F.3d at 615. Moreover, the Federal Circuit held the idea of "receiving
copyrighted media, selecting an ad, offering the media in exchange for
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watching the selected ad, displaying the ad, allowing the consumer access to
the media, and receiving payment from the sponsor of the ad" was not
significantly more than the abstract idea because "the claims simply instruct
the practitioner to implement the abstract idea with routine, conventional
activity." Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d at 715. Additionally, the Federal
Circuit noted "[ n Jone of these eleven individual steps, viewed 'both
individually and "as an ordered combination,"' transform the nature of the
claim into patent-eligible subject matter." Id. ( citations omitted).
In contrast, the Federal Circuit held claims directed to methods of
organizing human activity may be significantly more "when the claim
limitations were considered individually and as an ordered combination,
they recited an invention that is not merely the 'routine or conventional use'
of technology." Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d
1288, 1301---02 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1259;
BASCOM Global Internet Serv., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2016)). Additionally, the Federal Circuit held the ordered
combination of the claim limitations recited an inventive concept because
"the distributed, remote enhancement that produced an unconventional
result," which represented "a technical improvement over prior art
technologies and served to improve the performance of the system itself."
Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1302 (emphasis added); see also BASCOM, 827 F.3d at
1352 ("[A]n inventive concept can be found in the ordered combination of
claim limitations that transform the abstract idea of filtering content into a
particular, practical application.").
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Step One: Whether the Claims Are Directed to a Patent-Ineligible
Concept (Abstract Idea)
The Examiner finds claims 11-26 are directed to an abstract idea and
identifies the abstract idea as:
[E]valuating a clinical history of a patient to cross-reference
health care providers, interactions codes and preventable
admissions and calculating a preventable admission
evaluation based on the cross-referenced health care
providers, interactions codes and preventable admissions to
assign accountability of a preventable admission to a health
care provider. Evaluating a clinical history of a patient to cross-
reference health care providers, interactions codes and
preventable admissions is simply data recognition and storage,
such as recognizing and storing interactions codes, preventable
admissions and healthcare providers, and calculating a
preventable admissions evaluation based on the cross-referenced
health care providers, interactions codes and preventable
admissions to assign accountability of a preventable admission
to a health care provider is simply comparing new and stored
information and using rules to identify options, and comparing
data to determine a risk level, such as comparing interaction
codes to stored interaction codes to identify preventable
admissions and responsible healthcare providers and comparing
interaction codes to healthcare providers to determine a
responsibility level, which has been found by the courts to be
abstract ideas in Content Extraction, SmartGene and Perkin-
Elmer. The additional verbiage and limitations all describe the
abstract idea.
Final Action 3.
Appellant argues, the Examiner oversimplified the breadth of the
claims and "[ c ]ontrary to the Examiner's assertions, [ the limitations recited
in the claims] cannot be reduced to the allegedly abstract ideas of 'data
recognition and storage,' or 'comparing new and stored information using
rules to identify options and comparing data to determine a risk level."'
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Appeal Brief 26 (citing Final Action 3). Appellant contends the Examiner
has improperly generalized the claims to a "high level of abstraction
untethered from the language of the claim" and therefore the 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 rejection is improper. Appeal Brief 24 ( citing Memorandum dated,
May 19, 2016, regarding the recent subject matter eligibility decisions of
Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp. and TL! Communications LLC v. A. V.
Automotive, LLC, p 1 ).
The Federal Circuit has repeatedly noted that "the prima facie case is
merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of
production." Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing
In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). The court has, thus,
held that the Office carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima
facie case when its rejection satisfies the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132 by
notifying the applicant of the reasons for rejection, "together with such
information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of
continuing the prosecution of [the] application." See In re Jung, 637 F.3d
1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
All that is required of the Office is that it set forth the statutory basis
of the rejection in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet
the notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132. Id.; see also Chester v. Miller,
906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Noting that section 132 "is violated
when a rejection is so uninformative that it prevents the applicant from
recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection.").
Appellant argues "the claims do not attempt to cover all measures of
evaluating healthcare provider performance" and "contrary at least to the
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McRO decision, the Examiner has not adequately considered preemption at
Step 2A of the subject matter eligibility analysis." Appeal Brief 26-27.
The Supreme Court has described "the concern that drives this
exclusionary principle [i.e., the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent
eligible subject matter] as one of pre-emption." Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2354.
Nonetheless, characterizing preemption as a driving concern for patent
eligibility is not the same as characterizing preemption as the sole test for
patent eligibility. As our reviewing court has explained, "[t]he Supreme
Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the
judicial exceptions to patentability" and "[ fJor this reason, questions on
preemption are inherent in and resolved by the [section] 101 analysis."
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (citing Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2354). And although "preemption may
signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption
does not demonstrate patent eligibility." Id. Moreover, "[ w ]here a patent's
claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the
[Alice/Mayo] framework[], preemption concerns are fully addressed and
made moot." Id.; see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d
1359, 1362---63 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 701 (2015) ("[T]hat
the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price
optimization in the ecommerce setting do not make them any less abstract.").
Appellant contends, " [ t ]he inventors' mention of conventional
solutions confirm the above characterization of the invention for § 101
purposes as providing a specific improvement over the prior art in the field
of improving healthcare provider accountability, which had not existed
before." Appeal Brief 28. As the Federal Circuit has explained, a "claim for
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a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea." SAP Am., Inc. v. Investpic, LLC,
No. 2017-2081, 2018 WL 2207254, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 15, 2018) (quoting
Synopsis, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir.
2016)). Even assuming the technique claimed was "innovative, or even
brilliant," that would not be enough for the claimed abstract idea to be patent
eligible. See SAP America, 2018 WL 2207254 at *1.
Further, our reviewing court has repeatedly held that information
collection and analysis, including when limited to particular content, is
within the realm of abstract ideas. See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp., 830 F .3d at
1353 (Holding that "collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying
certain results of the collection and analysis" are "a familiar class of claims
'directed to' a patent-ineligible concept."); Fair Warning IP, LLC v. Iatric
Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Claims directed to
collecting information and analyzing it according to certain rules were
directed to an abstract idea.); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.,
654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Computer-implemented system for
"verifying the validity of a credit card transaction[] over the Internet" was
patent-ineligible.).
We agree with the Examiner's finding that at step one of the Alice
analysis, the claims are directed to one or more abstract ideas, we tum to the
second step of the Alice analysis, in which we must determine whether the
additional elements of the claims transform them into patent-eligible subject
matter.
Step Two: Whether Additional Elements Transform the Idea into
Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
The Examiner finds:
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When viewed as a whole, the claims do not include additional
limitations that are sufficient to amount to significantly more
than the judicial exception because the claims recite processes
that are routine and well-understood in the art of health care
provider evaluation and simply implementing the process on a
computer is not enough to qualify as "significantly more.["]
Specifically, the applicant is taking the well-understood process
of using a clinical history to determine if a healthcare provider is
accountable for a preventable admissions and implementing it on
a computer, which does not qualify as significantly more.
Final Action 4.
Appellant contends the cited prior art "do not teach or suggest the
claimed subject matter" and "[t]hus, the claims are directed to 'significantly
more' than the alleged abstract idea and satisfy the second step of the two-
step analysis." Appeal Brief 29. As we stated above, novelty is not an
indication that the claimed invention is not an abstract idea. See SAP
America, 2018 WL 2207254 at* 1. Appellant further contends, "[t]he
Examiner improperly dismissed additional claim elements as generic
computer structure and generic computer functions. See Action, pages 5---6."
Appeal Brief 30. Appellant states:
Under the McRO Memo, an improvement in computer related
technology is not limited to improvements in the operation of a
computer or a computer network per se, but may also be claimed
as a set of rules that improve computer-related technology by
allowing computer performance of a function not previously
performable by a computer. See McRO Memo at page 2.
Appeal Brief 30.
Despite characterizing the claimed invention as using computer
technology to overcome a problem specific to the operation of a computer or
a computer network per se, Appellant does not present sufficient persuasive
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evidence or argument that the claims are directed to an improvement specific
to a computer network or the Internet itself (e.g., improving the network's
operation or configuration, or retaining website visitors). Compare, e.g.,
Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354, with DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com,
L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We find Appellant's claims are
distinguished from those claims that our reviewing court has found to be
patent eligible by virtue of reciting technological improvements to a
computer system. See, e.g., DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1249, 1257
(Holding that claims reciting computer processor for serving "composite
web page" were patent eligible because "the claimed solution is necessarily
rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically
arising in the realm of computer networks."). Accordingly, we do not find
that the claims recite significantly more to transform the abstract idea into a
patent-eligible application.
We sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of claims 11-26.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) Rejection
Appellant contends the obviousness rejection of claims 13-24 is
erroneous because Rastogi fails to address the noted deficiency of Bigby.
Appeal Brief 32. Appellant contends:
Rastogi does not teach or suggest cross-referencing the one or
more interaction codes with interaction codes in a diagnostic
map, wherein the diagnostic map cross-references one or more
interaction codes associated with at least one unnecessary
admission, and corresponding one or more healthcare providers
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associated with the unnecessary admission, as required by Claim
13.
Appeal Brief 32.
Appellant argues, "[ t ]here is simply no indication in Rastogi that the
flowchart in Figure 1 includes interaction codes associated with unnecessary
admissions, and corresponding healthcare providers, much less that the
flowchart in Rastogi cross-references the interaction codes with healthcare
providers." Appeal Brief 32.
We do not find Appellant's argument persuasive because the
Examiner relied upon Rastogi's paragraph 23 in conjunction with Rastogi's
Figure 1. See Final Action 10. Rastogi discloses in paragraph 23:
[C]laims may be grouped using an APR-DRG grouper, such as
that designed by 3M® Corporation, which assigns a base class to
each medical claim based upon the DRG and primary diagnosis
codes. The grouper further may assign a severity of illness (SOI)
class 1--4 depending on the secondary diagnosis codes and other
member characteristics in the claims.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection of
claims 13-24.
Appellant argues the obviousness rejection of dependent claim 25 is
improper because the Examiner relied upon Callas to disclose "determining
whether a medical procedure was appropriate based the timing of the
medical procedure relative to a date of injury or the like, [construed as] 'if
the procedure is performed within the appropriate time window."' Appeal
Brief 33; see also Final Action 25. Appellant contends, "[h]owever, a
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timing determination of whether a procedure did take place within an
appropriate time window is different from determining when the procedure
should have taken place to prevent a preventable admission as required by
Appellant['] s claim." Appeal Brief 3 3. We find Appellant's argument
persuasive. We reverse the Examiner's obviousness rejection of claim 25.
Appellant contends "[ c ]laim 26 requires that the threshold that is
compared to the preventable admission evaluation is a 'threshold specific to
both a preventable admission and each type of healthcare provider
responsible for the preventable admission."' Appeal Brief 33. Appellant
argues, "the reasonableness threshold in Callas merely refers to a
determination of whether the requested medical service is statistically
reasonable. See Callas at [0176]-[0178]. Callas is simply silent with respect
to a threshold specific to both a preventable admission and each type of
healthcare provider responsible for the preventable admission, as required by
claim 26." Appeal Brief 33-34; see also Final Action 26. We find
Appellant's argument persuasive. We reverse the Examiner's obviousness
rejection of claim 26.
Appellant does not argue the merits of the obviousness rejection of
dependent claims 11-12 and therefore we sustain the Examiner's
obviousness rejection of the claims.
DECISION
The Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of claims 11-26 is
affirmed.
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The Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claims 13-24 is
affirmed.
The Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claims 11-12 is
affirmed.
The Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claims 25-26 is
reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l ). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(v).
AFFIRMED
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