Ex Parte ClarkeDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 29, 201911866906 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 11/866,906 10/03/2007 37945 7590 04/02/2019 DUKEW. YEE YEE AND AS SOCIA TES, P.C. P.O. BOX 802333 DALLAS, TX 75380 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Michael Paul Clarke UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. AU920070011US1 8019 EXAMINER WHEATON, BRADFORD F ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2193 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/02/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ptonotifs@yeeiplaw.com mgamez@yeeiplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MICHAEL PAUL CLARKE 1 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 Technology Center 2100 Before JOHN G. NEW, CATHERINE SHIANG, and KIMBERLY McGRAW, Administrative Patent Judges. NEW, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL 1 Appellant states the real party-in-interest is International Business [Machines] Corporation. App. Br. 2. Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 SUMMARY Appellant files this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § I34(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1, 4---6, 8, 9, 12-14, 16, 17, 20-22 and 24--27 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being obvious over the combination of Massa et al. (US 2006/0090095 Al, April 27, 2006) ("Massa") and Rathunde et al. (US 2009/0007135 Al, January 1, 2009) ("Rathunde"). 2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. NATURE OF THE CLAIMED INVENTION Appellant's invention is directed to a method for shutting down a first instance of a computer-based application and starting up a second instance of the application. Abstract. REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM Of the claims on appeal, claims 1, 6, 9, 14, 17, are 22, are independent. Claim 1 is representative of the claims on appeal, and recites: 1. A method for shutting down a first instance of an application and starting up a second instance of the application, wherein the first instance of the application has associated therewith at least one first-instance support resource, and the second instance of the application has associated therewith at least one second-instance support resource that the second 2 Appellants do not argue claims 25-27 in their Appeal Brief. We therefore summarily affirm the Examiner's rejection of these claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(iv) ("[A]ny arguments or authorities not included in the appeal brief will be refused consideration by the Board"). 2 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 instance of the application depends upon in order to run, the method comprising: responsive to an order to move the first instance of the application, starting up the at least one second-instance support resource that the second instance of the application depends upon in order to run; shutting down the first instance of the application after the at least one second-instance support resource is running; and starting up the second instance of the application responsive to initiating, but prior to completing, the shutting down of the first instance of the application, wherein the first instance of the application is shut down after the second instance of the application is running. App. Br. 23. ISSUES AND ANALYSES We adopt the Examiner's findings, reasoning, and conclusion that the claims are prima facie obvious over the combined cited prior art. We address the arguments raised by Appellant below. A. Group I: Claims 1, 5, 9, 13, 17, and 21 Appellant argues claims 1, 5, 9, 13, 17, and 21 as a single group. App. Br. 10-18. Appellant's arguments are directed to claim 1, which we select as representative. See 37 C.F.R § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). Issue 1 Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in finding the combination of Massa and Rathunde teaches or suggests the limitation of claim 1 reciting: "starting up the second instance of the application responsive to initiating, 3 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 but prior to completing, the shutting down of the first instance of the application, wherein the first instance of the application is shut down after the second instance of the application is running." App. Br. 10. Analysis The Examiner finds, in relevant part, that Massa teaches shutting down a first instance of an application and starting up a second instance of the application and, responsive to an order to move the first instance of the application, starting up the at least one second-instance support resource the second instance of the application depends upon in order to run. Final Act. 5---6 ( citing Massa ,r,r 60, 55). The Examiner finds that Massa further teaches and starting up the second instance of the application responsive to initiating, but prior to completing, the shutting down of the first instance of the application. Id. at 6. However, the Examiner finds that Massa does not expressly teach shutting down the first instance of the application after the at least one second-instance support resource is running. Id. The Examiner finds that Rathunde teaches shutting down the first instance of the application after the at least one second-instance support resource is running, and the first instance of the application is shut down after the second instance of the application is running. Final Act. 6 ( citing Rathunde ,r,r 33, 37, 38). The Examiner finds that the ARP and IP Addresses taught by Rathunde can be reasonably interpreted to be the claimed support resources of the first group of processors. Id. (and additionally citing Rathunde Fig. 4B). The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the contemporary art to have modified the teachings of Massa, with the teachings of Rathunde to include shutting down the first 4 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 instance of the application after at least one second instance support resource is running, in order to shorten the downtime during the move. Final Act. 6- 7. The Examiner finds that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the references so as to improve the readiness of the application during a move by causing it to be in to a more stable state, helping to reduce errors at start up. Id. at 7. Appellant argues that the claims require two different instances of the same application: a "first instance" of the application and a "second instance" of the application. App. Br. 10. Appellant contends that the claims further require that the first instance of the application is shut down after the second instance of the application is running, and that the second instance of the application is started up: (1) responsive to initiating; but (2) prior to completing, the shutting down of the first instance of the application. Id. Appellant asserts that this timing criteria is depicted at time T3 in Figure 5, and described in paragraph [0029] of Clarke (US 2009/0094608 Al, April 29, 2009) ("Clarke," i.e., Appellant's published application), in which the second instance of the application is started up in response to initiating the shutdown of the first instance of the application, but the shutdown of the first instance of the application has not been completed by the time the second instance of the application is started up. App. Br. 11. Appellant argues that paragraph [0055] of Massa, upon which the Examiner partially relies, teaches that if a resource depends upon other resources, the resource is brought online after the resources on which it depends are already online. App. Br. 11. Therefore, Appellant asserts, there is but a single timing-based criteria associated with bringing a "resource" 5 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 online, and that single timing-criteria is that any dependent resources must first be brought online. Id. at 12. According to Appellant, there is no timing-based criteria regarding: "but prior to completing, the shutting down of the first instance of the application" that is with respect to the starting up of a "second instance of an application," as claimed. Id. Rather, argues Appellant, only the timing of resource dependencies is described in this paragraph of Massa. Id. With respect to paragraph [0060], Appellant argues that Massa teaches that if a failover manager takes a resource offline, the group is restarted on another node in the cluster. App. Br. 12. Appellant contends that there is no mention of any particular timing criteria with respect to the order or sequencing of these take offline and restart actions. Id. Appellant asserts that, under either possible timing scenario, the claimed dual timing- based characteristics pertaining to the starting up of a second instance of an application are not described. Id. By way of example, Appellant posits assuming that the failure triggered the resources to be taken offline, followed by the group being restated on another node. Id. In this scenario, argues Appellant, there is no timing-based criteria regarding: "but prior to completing, the shutting down of the first instance of the application" with respect to the starting up of a second instance of an application, as recited in the claims. Id. Rather, Appellant asserts, a group is restarted responsive to taking a failed resource offline (i.e., a single timing-based criterion regarding a startup action). Id. Appellant further posits assuming that an alternative timing possibility occurs according to the teachings of Massa, where the resource failure triggered the group to be restarted on another node, followed by the failed 6 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 resource being taken offline. App. Br. 12. In this instance, argues Appellant, there is no timing-based criteria regarding: "but prior to completing, the shutting down of the first instance of the application," that is associated with the starting up of a second instance of an application, as recited in the claims. Id. at 13. Instead, Appellant asserts, a group is restarted responsive to failure of a resource (i.e., a single timing-based criteria regarding a startup action). Id. Consequently, Appellant argues, the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims by failing to show that Massa teaches two distinct timing-based criteria regarding the starting up of the second instance of an application, where such two distinct timing based criteria are with respect to another instance of this application. Final Act. 13. Appellant next points to the Advisory Action of December 14, 2016, in which the Examiner finds that Massa teaches the dual-application- instance synergistic interplay, in which a second instance of a particular application is started up ( 1) responsive to initiating the shutting down of the first instance of the application, but (2) prior to completing the shutting down of the first instance of the application. Final Act. 13 (citing Adv. Act. 2 (citing Massa ,r,r 60, 99, Fig. 5 steps 508 and 510)). According to Appellant, paragraph [0099] of Massa teaches actions that are performed with respect to a single node, i.e., there are no inter-node dependencies described with respect to starting up one node while shutting down another node. App. Br. 14. Instead, argues Appellant, a single node being shutdown is described without respect to the state of another node. Id. Specifically, Appellant contends, Massa describes in paragraph [0099] that the node continues to perform work until a shutdown is requested. App. 7 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 Br. 14. Appellant asserts that, if a shutdown is requested for this single node, step 508 of Figure 5 is performed to perform clean-up operations for this single node. Id. Appellant asserts that Massa teaches that he single node is then shut down after performing such single-node cleanup operations. Id. Therefore, Appellant asserts, this cited passage of Massa teaches that a single node is shutdown responsive to a shutdown request, but makes no mention of a two-part conditioning with respect to restarting the group on another node; only a single-condition causing the shutdown of a single node (i.e., shutdown has been requested). In contrast, Appellant argues, claim 1 requires a two-part conditioning with respect to starting up a second instance of an application. We are not persuaded by Appellant's arguments. Paragraph [0060] of Massa teaches: For example, if a resource ( e.g., an application) fails, the failover manager 80 may choose to restart the resource, or to take the resource offline along with any resources dependent thereon. If the failover manager 80 takes the resource offline, the group is restarted on another node in the cluster 59, known as pushing the group to another node. A cluster administrator may also manually initiate such a group transfer. Both situations are similar, except that resources are gracefully shutdown for a manually initiated fail over, while they are forcefully shut down in the failure case. ( emphasis added). The Examiner finds that Massa teaches a graceful shutdown means the node continues to perform the remaining work (i.e. the application runs) when the event to gracefully shutdown is detected. See Ans. 3 ( citing Massa 8 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 ,r 99). We agree with the Examiner that Massa thus teaches: starting a second application ( 1) responsive to initiating the shutting down of the first instance of the application (i.e., choosing to restart the application when it fails), but (2) prior to completing the shutting down of the first instance of the application (i.e., the first application is gracefully shut down, performing the remaining work before terminating). Id. In paragraph [0099] Massa teaches that: In general, the work continues until some event occurs or a time of delta elapses, where delta is the arbitration time (e.g., three seconds) described above. Preferably, the node continues to perform work and runs a background process when an event/time interval is detected. Events may include a graceful shutdown, a failure of a replica member, and a failure of a node. Step 702 tests if a shutdown has been requested, whereby if so, step 702 returns to step 508 of FIG. 5 with a TRUE shutdown status. Step 508 performs various cleanup tasks, and step 510 tests the shutdown status, ending operation of the node if TRUE. We agree with the Examiner that a person of ordinary skill in the contemporary art would understand that these tasks would take a certain amount of time to complete and that Massa also teaches initiating a second instance of the application upon the shutdown. See Massa ,r 60; Ans. 4. Consequently, we agree with the Examiner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the second instance of the application would start on initiation of the shutdown command in the first instance application, but the first instance would continue with its cleanup tasks while the second instance was commencing. Issue 2 9 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding the combined cited prior art references teach or suggest the limitation of claim 1 reciting "shutting down the first instance of the application after the at least one second instance of the application is running." App. Br. 15. Analysis Appellant again argues that the claims require a particular timing relationship is recited with respect to the two instances of the application, in which the first instance of the application is shut down after the second instance of the application is running. App. Br. 15. Appellant asserts that the Examiner ignored this limitation of the claims. Id. ( citing Final Act. 6). Appellant argues further that Massa teaches the opposite of what is claimed; teaching that a group is restarted on another node if a resource is taken offline. App. Br. 15. Appellant interprets this to mean that the Massa shutdown/offline state occurs before the new restart is performed/running. Id. In contrast, Appellant asserts, the claims require that the shutdown/offline state occurs after the second instance of the application is runmng. We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument. As we have explained supra, Massa teaches restarting the application on a new node and executing a graceful shutdown, during which "cleanup" procedures take place. See Massa ,r,r 60, 99. We agree with the Examiner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from these teachings of Massa that the first application shuts down after performing the cleanup procedures of a graceful shutdown after the second procedure has begun running on another node. 10 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 Issue 3 Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in finding that the combined cited prior art teaches or suggests the limitation of claim 1 reciting: "responsive to an order to move the first instance of the application, starting up the at least one second-instance support resource that the second instance of the application depends upon in order to run." App. Br. 15. Analysis Appellant argues that this limitation requires another specialized invocation/triggering mechanism in which the specialized invocation/triggering mechanism is with respect to an application and a dependent resource. App. Br. 15. Specifically, Appellant contends that a second-instance support resource that the second instance of the application depends upon is started up responsive to an order to move the first instance of the application, i.e., an inter-instance interaction regarding the first instance of the application and a support resource of the 'second instance' of the application. Id. Appellant disputes the Examiner's finding, which relies upon paragraphs [0055], [0059], and [0060] of Massa, as teaching the disputed limitation. App. Br. 15-16. According to Appellant, paragraph [0055] of Massa teaches dependencies among different resources, and their particular online/offline timing, but neither teaches nor suggests a second resource of a second instance/first instance of an application invocation/triggering mechanism (i.e. an inter-instance invocation/triggering mechanism), as required by claim 1. Id. at 16. 11 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 With respect to paragraph [0059] of Massa, Appellant argues that Massa describes a group that fails over in a particular listed order. App. Br. 16. Appellant asserts that there is no teaching or suggestion in Massa of any synergistic interplay between a support service associated with the second instance of an application and the first instance of the application. Id. With respect to paragraph [0069] of Massa, Appellant asserts that Massa teaches that a manager may choose to restart resources or take them offline, along with any dependent resources, but neither teaches nor suggests a second resource of a second instance/first instance of an application invocation/triggering mechanism (i.e., an inter-instance invocation/triggering mechanism), as recited in claim 1. Id. at 16-17. Instead, Appellant contends, resources are either restarted on the same node or taken offline. We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument. Massa expressly teaches that: Resources expose interfaces and properties to the cluster service 66, and may depend on other resources, with no circular dependencies allowed. If a resource does depend on other resources, the resource is brought online after the resources on which it depends are already online, and is taken offline before those resources. Massa ,r 59 ( emphasis added). We have noted supra that Massa teaches that a resource can also be an "application." See Massa ,r 60 ("For example, if a resource (e.g., an application) fails ... ,"). Combining the teaching of Massa in paragraph [0059] with those of paragraph [0060] which, as we have explained, teaches that a second instance of an application is started in response to failure of the first application, we agree with the Examiner that a person of ordinary skill would have understand from Massa that, upon 12 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 initiation of the second instance of the application upon another node (i.e., "pushing" or moving the application) in response to the failure of the first application, paragraph [0059] would also necessarily require the initiation of the second-instance support resource in response to the failure of the first instance of the application and startup of the second instance of the application. Furthermore, the Examiner also relies upon Rathunde as teaching this limitation. See Final Act. 6. We agree with the Examiner that Rathunde teaches multiple processors running instances of the same application. See Rathunde, Fig. 1. Moreover, we agree with the Examiner with respect to Rathunde teaching a "second-instance support resource." Rathunde teaches: At 350, IP filters are removed with respect to the first group. ARP [Address Resolution Protocol] is then enabled on the first group of application processors at 352, the static routes are removed at 354 for the first group of APs, and the IP addresses are published for the first group at 356. Rathunde ,r 37 (emphasis added). Appellant's Specification provides no explicit definition of the claim term "support resource"; consequently, the Examiner may adopt the broadest reasonable definition of the claim term consistent with the Specification. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We agree with the Examiner's finding that enabling a protocol to resolve and publish IP addresses reasonably corresponds to the claim term "support resource." We agree with the Examiner that Rathunde teaches the second support resource is started prior to starting the second instance of the application ( which, as explained supra, is performed at initiation of the shutdown of the first instance of the application). Rathunde teaches the ARP is enabled on 13 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 the processor and the IP addresses published prior to the second instance being brought online ("in-service"). Rathunde ,r 37; see also Ans. 5. We consequently affirm the Examiner's rejection of claim 1, as well as claims 5, 9, 13, 17, and 21 which were not argued separately. See 37 C.F.R § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). B. Group II (claims 4, 12, and 20) Appellant argues claims 4, 12, and 20 together. App. Br. 18-19. Appellant's arguments are directed to claim 4, which we select as representative. See 37 C.F.R § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). Issue Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding the combined cited prior art references teaches or suggests "wherein the step of shutting down the first instance of the application overlaps with the step of starting up the second instance of the application" as recited in claim 4. App. Br. 18. Analysis Appellant argues that Rathunde teaches application states in a first processor group are transitioned from a "ready-to-run" state to an "in-service state." App. Br. 12 (citing Rathunde ,r,r 36, 37). With respect to paragraph [0036] of Rathunde, Appellant contends that this paragraph teaches that, if no fast backout is desired, the application on the second group of processors is brought down. Id. Appellant asserts that it neither teaches nor suggests two-steps overlapping with one another, or processing associated with two instances of an application; instead, a single application is shutdown. Id. With respect to paragraph [0037], Appellant argues that Rathunde teaches that the application status in the first processor group are brought to 14 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 an in-service state, but that there is no mention of two steps overlapping with one another, or processing associated with two instances of an application; instead, a single application is brought to an in-service state. Id. The Examiner responds that Rathunde teaches the specific timing viewed of the overlap between the shutting down of one instance and the starting up of another instance of the application. Ans. 5 ( citing Rathunde ,r,r 34, 36-38; Figs. 4A-4C). The Examiner points to steps 332 and 334 of Figure 4A as showing the startup of one instance of the application by bringing the version of that application up to a point just below full service. Id. The Examiner finds that step 346 of the same process, as shown in Figure 4B, shows the start of the shutdown of the other instance of the application, in which the service is brought down. Id. Then, the Examiner finds, steps 360-380 in Figures 4B-4C show that the original instance is brought up to a fully-in-service state followed by a soak period before the second application processors are taken offline. Id. The Examiner finds that Rathunde thus teaches the overlapping between the startup of one instance of the application and the shutting down of another instance of the application. Id. We are not persuaded by Appellant's arguments. We agree with, and adopt, the Examiner's reasoning with respect to Figures 4A--4C and the accompanying text, which show startup of a second instance of the application, which is the maintained in a "ready-to-run" status (but not in- service status), while the in-service application (i.e., the first instance of the application) is being shutdown, followed by bringing the second instance of the application to in-service status. See Rathunde ,r,r 33-38, Figs. 4A---C. 15 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 We consequently affirm the Examiner's rejection of claim 4, as well as claims 12 and 20 which were not argued separately. See 37 C.F.R § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). C. Group III (claims 6, 8, 14, 16, 22, and 24) Appellant argues claims 6, 8, 14, 16, 22, and 24 together. App. Br. 19-20. Appellant's arguments are directed to claim 6, which we select as representative. See 37 C.F.R § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). Issue Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding the combined cited prior art references teach or suggest the limitation of claim 6 reciting "responsive to an order to move the first instance of the application from a first system to a second system, starting up the at least one second-instance support resource that the second instance of the application depends upon." App. Br. 19-20. Analysis Appellant argues the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 6 for similar reasons to those presentedsupra with respect to the corresponding limitation of claim 1 reciting "responsive to an order to move the first instance of the application, starting up the at least one second-instance support resource that the second instance of the application depends upon in order to run." We are not persuaded. We have explained supra why we agree with the Examiner that the cited passages of Massa and Rathunde teach the disputed elements of the limitation cited by Appellant. We incorporate that reasoning here and find Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred its rejection of 16 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 claim 6. We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claim 6, as well as claims 14, 16, and 22, which were not argued separately. See 37 C.F.R § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). Claims 8, 16, and 22 were argued separately in Group IV, addressed below. D. Group IV (claims 8, 16, and 24) Appellant argues claims 8, 16, and 24 together. App. Br. 19--20. Appellant's arguments are directed to claim 8, which we select as representative. See 37 C.F.R § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). Issue Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding the combined cited prior art references teach or suggest the limitation of claim 8 reciting: [W]herein the third instance of the application is running on the third system of the system cluster while the first instance of the application is running on the first system and continues running on the third system after shutting down the first instance of the application responsive to the third instance of the application completing a start up of the third instance of the application. App. Br. 20; see also Final Act. 11, 14 (rejecting claims 16 and 24 "under the same reasoning" applied to claim 8). 17 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 Analysis Appellant argues paragraphs [0056] and [0057] of Massa and paragraphs [0016] and [0018] of Rathunde teach the use of a time service by nodes of a cluster. App. Br. 20-21. Appellant argues that none of the cited passages teaches or suggests that a first instance of the application is shut down after a third instance of the same application has completed a startup, as recited in claim 8. Id. at 21-22. The Examiner responds that Rathunde teaches that there are a plurality m of processors, each configured to run one or more instances of the same application software, therefore, m instances of the application can include a third instance of the application. Ans. 5 ( citing Rathunde ,r 16). The Examiner finds that Rathunde teaches that there is no specific timing tied between the third instance of the application and the second instance of the application and, therefore, they are not specifically connected through this timing. Id. at 5---6. The Examiner finds that the claim language recites that "the third instance of the application is running on the third system of the system cluster while the first instance of the application is running on the first system," yet the first instance of the application is shut down responsive "to the third instance of the application completing a startup of the third instance of the application." Id. at 6. The Examiner interprets this claim language as meaning that the instances of the application as a partially started up and a partially shut down instance of the application. Id. We are not persuaded by the Examiner's reasoning. The Examiner points to no teaching of Rathunde, that teaches or suggests that the first instance of the application is shut down responsive to the third instance of the application completing a startup of the third instance of the application. 18 Appeal2017-010144 Application 11/866,906 In other words, the claim requires a causal relationship between the startup of the third instance of the application and the shutdown of the first. We consequently reverse the Examiner's rejection of claim 8, as well as claims 16 and 24, which were "rejected under the same reasoning." See Final Act. 11, 14. DECISION The Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 4---6, 9, 12-14, 17, 20-22, and 25-27 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed. The Examiner's rejection of claims 8, 16, and 24 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 19 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation