Ex Parte Chu et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 16, 2019

12058973 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 16, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
12/058,973 03/31/2008
20350 7590 04/18/2019
KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTONLLP
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street
Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
Lau Kam Chu
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
90945-745612 (011210US) 4179
EXAMINER
HOLLY, JOHN H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3696
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/18/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte LAU KAM CHU, CHEUNG PIK WA,
YUNG MIU CHU, and STUART DA VIS
Appeal2017-008039
Application 12/058,973 1
Technology Center 3600
Before JEAN R. HOMERE, JON M. JURGOV AN, and
KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judges.
SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Final Rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, and 11-25, constituting all claims
pending in the application. Claims App'x. Claims 3, 6-8, and 10 have been
cancelled. Id. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is The W estem Union
Company. App. Br. 2.
Appeal2017-008039
Application 12/058,973
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
According to Appellants, the claimed subject matter is directed to
consumer lending using a money transfer network. Spec. ,r,r 2, 7. Claims 1,
12, and 18, reproduced below, are representative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method of administering a loan with at least one
processor, wherein the at least one processor is configured to
execute a series of instructions, the series of instructions
comprising instructions for:
receiving, from a first money transfer agent location, a
loan application of a consumer;
determining to approve the loan application based at least
in part on a consumer risk score of the consumer, and without
consideration of a credit score of the consumer;
using a money transfer network to make loan proceeds
associated with the loan available to a recipient of the loan,
wherein the recipient comprises a party other than the
consumer;
causing at least a portion of the loan proceeds to be paid
to the recipient at a second money transfer location, wherein the
second money transfer agent location is different than the first
money transfer agent location;
receiving a loan repayment amount from the recipient
into the money transfer network at a third money transfer agent
location; and
determining or modifying a consumer risk score of the
recipient based at least in part on receiving the loan repayment
amount from the recipient.
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12. A method of lending money to a consumer using at least
one processor and a money transfer network, wherein the at
least one processor is configured to execute a series of
instructions, the series of instructions comprising instructions
for:
receiving a loan application from the consumer, the
information at least including identifying information that
identifies the consumer;
using the identifying information to search stored data
and extract prior usage data indicative of the consumer's prior
use of the money transfer network, wherein the prior usage data
comprises a list of receivers of past transactions;
using the prior usage data to, at least in part, approve the
loan application, wherein using the prior usage data comprises
determining the proportion of common receivers of past
transactions to uncommon receivers of past transactions;
introducing loan proceeds associated with the loan
application into the money transfer network for receipt by a
recipient; and
causing at least a portion of the loan proceeds to be paid
to the recipient.
18. A method of lending money using at least one processor,
wherein the at least one processor is configured to execute a
series of instructions, the series of instructions comprising
instructions for:
receiving a loan application from a consumer, wherein
the consumer is a prior customer of a money transfer service
provider;
using information indicative of the consumer's prior
usage of services provided by or through the money transfer
service provider to approve the loan application, wherein the
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Application 12/058,973
prior usage of services comprises a velocity over time of funds
sent through the money transfer provider by the prior customer;
and
using a money transfer network to provide loan proceeds
to the consumer or a designee of the consumer.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, and 11-25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
Claims 12-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
obvious over the combination ofNorris (US 5,870,721; issued Feb. 9, 1999)
and Fletcher (US 2009/0164369 Al; published June 25, 2009).
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 11, and 21-25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as being obvious over the combination of Norris, Fletcher, and
Cunningham (US 6,014,645; issued Jan. 11, 2000).
ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejections
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a "new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas" are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Banklnt'l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217-18 ( citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
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Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is "directed to." See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 ("On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk."); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) ("Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners' application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.").
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611 );
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594--95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)).
If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we tum to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where "we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive
concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 ( quotation marks omitted). "A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to
ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea]."' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). "[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("Memorandum"). Under that guidance, we first look
to whether the claim recites:
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( 1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
"well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
( 4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52-57.
USPTO Memorandum, Step 2A, Prong 1
Under the first step in the Alice/Mayo framework, the Examiner
determines the claims are directed to determining to approve a loan
application based at least in part on a consumer risk score of the consumer
and without consideration of a credit score of a consumer, which is a
fundamental economic practice, and, therefore, an abstract idea. Final Act.
3--4; see also Ans. 4. The Examiner further determines the claims are
similar to other claims identified as abstract by the courts that compare new
and stored information and use rules to identify options. Final Act. 4, 5.
Appellants argue "the alleged abstract idea is not even remotely
correctly identified." App. Br. 4. Appellants further argue "[h]owever, it
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matters not, because alleged fundamental practices must also be non-novel
practices (or else they would not be 'fundamental')." App. Br. 4. According
to Appellants, "novelty lies both in the alleged abstract idea of these claims,
as well as other portions thereof." App. Br. 4.
Appellants' invention is titled "Consumer Lending Using a Money
Transfer Network Systems and Methods." Appellants describe that
"[c]onsumer lending is big business." Spec. ,r 3. Appellants explain
"traditional tests of credit worthiness tend to eliminate a large group of
individuals who are otherwise credit worthy," because those "individuals do
not have a traditional banking relationship," however, those "individuals
may be identified by their use of financial products and/or services that do
not require a banking relationship, such as pre-paid cards and money transfer
services." Spec. ,r 4. Appellants' invention seeks to "target this underserved
market." Spec. ,r 4.
Independent claims 1, 12, and 18 generally recite (1) receiving a loan
application of a consumer, either from the consumer or from a money
transfer agent location; (2) determining to approve the loan application
based upon certain factors, such as a consumer risk score of the consumer or
a consumer's prior usage of the money transfer network; and (3) making the
loan proceeds available to a recipient of the loan either at the same or a
second money transfer agent location, where the recipient is either the
consumer or another party. App. Br. 15-17. Independent claim 1 further
generally recites ( 4) receiving a loan repayment amount from the recipient at
a third money transfer agent location and ( 5) determining or modifying a
consumer risk score of the recipient based at least in part on receiving the
loan repayment amount from the recipient. App. Br. 15.
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In light of Appellants' Specification, Appellants have not persuasively
rebutted the Examiner's finding that the claims are directed to approving a
loan application, which is an abstract idea - namely, a fundamental
economic practice. Appellants' claims, which recite receiving, processing,
and approving a loan application, and paying and repaying a loan, are
similar to other "fundamental economic practices" found to be abstract ideas
by the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 221
(intermediated settlement); Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611-12 (risk hedging); Credit
Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
("processing an application for financing a purchase" is a fundamental
economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce); LendingTree,
LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 F.App'x. 991, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (like the concept
of risk hedging in Bilski and intermediated settlement in Alice, "the concept
of applying for loans and receiving offers is also long prevalent in our
financial system"); Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811
F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims directed to the "anonymous
loan shopping" to be abstract). Accordingly, we conclude the claims recite a
fundamental economic practice, which is one of the certain methods of
organizing human activity identified in the Memorandum, and thus an
abstract idea constituting a judicial exception to patentability. Appellants'
novelty arguments will be addressed further below, in Step 2B of the
Analysis.
USPTO Memorandum, Step 2A, Prong 2
In determining whether the claims are "directed to" the identified
abstract idea, we next consider whether the claims recite additional elements
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that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. 2 We discern
no additional element ( or combination of elements) recited in the claims that
integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. See
Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54--55.
The Examiner determines the claims do not recite an improvement in
another technology or technical field or an improvement to the functioning
of the computer. Final Act. 4. Rather, the Examiner determines the claims
are "mere instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer using a
processor and a tangible computer readable medium storing a computer
program product configured to store instructions." Final Act. 6; see also
Ans. 2--4.
Appellants argue "the claims improve[] other technical fields beyond
the alleged abstract idea." App. Br. 5. For example, Appellants argue
"personal finance management technology is also improved by embodiments
of the claim, as they allow for repayment of loan obligations." Appellants
further argue the invention allows for "greater personal finance management
of the sender's resources." App. Br. 5. Appellants also argue the invention
"allows others than the loan applicant to receive funds from a loan" and
"allows for repayment at locations other than where [the] funds are
originally dispersed." App. Br. 7.
2 We acknowledge that some of the considerations at Step 2A, Prong Two,
properly may be evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of the Office
guidance). For purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the
Office, we evaluate them under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of the Office
guidance). See Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.25, 27-32.
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Appellants do not persuasively explain why the claims improve the
functioning of a cornputer or improve personal finance management
technology. See MPEP § 2106.05(a). Rather, the claims merely adapt the
abstract idea to an execution of steps perfonned by a processor. See Spec.
ir 4; Credit Acceptance, 859 F.3d at 1055 ("Our prior cases have made clear
that rnere autornation of manual processes using generic computers does not
constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology."); Bancorp
Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (a computer "employed only for its most basic function ...
does not impose rneaningfu1 Hrnits on the scope of those claims"). Further,
Appellants' identified improvements are improvements to the abstract idea,
not improvements to a technology or computer functionality.
Appellants argue "[ o ]ff-the-shelf generic computers are not capable of
performing such functions, much less concurrently during a[] period of
intense heavy transaction load as may be necessary in such industry." App.
Br. 5, 7. According to Appellants, "any computing device recited by the
claim is a computing device specially configured for a special purpose."
App. Br. 7; see also Reply Br. 1-2. Appellants argue "none of the portions
of the specification relate[ s] that a general purpose computer would be
capable of performing the steps of the claim 1." Reply Br. 2
Appellants' arguments are not persuasive. Initially, we note the
claims do not require a "period of intense heavy transaction load," nor do
Appellants direct our attention to any discussion of such situations in the
Specification. Moreover, Appellants do not provide persuasive argument to
rebut the Examiner's findings that the additional claim elements, including
the processor and money transfer network, provide anything other than
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generic computer functionality. See Final Act. 6, Ans. 2--4. Appellants'
Specification supports that the claims recite merely generic computer
components and functionality. E.g., Spec. ,r,r 36--43. Moreover, the claims
do not recite a particular machine or transformation. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(b }-( c ). Any "machine" is recited only at a high level of
generality. For example, the only claimed computer related component
recited in independent claim 1 is a "processor" that "is configured to execute
a series of instructions" in the preamble of the claim and a "money transfer
network." Independent claims 12 and 18 likewise recite a "processor" that is
"configured to execute a series of instructions" in the preamble of the claims
and a "money transfer network." As discussed above, Appellants'
Specification indicates that these components are merely generic. In light of
this, Appellants' arguments do not persuade us that the claims are directed to
a particular machine. We, therefore, agree with the Examiner that the
additional limitations amount to generic computer components claimed to
perform their basic functions. See Ans. 6.
For these reasons, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's
determination that the claims are directed to an abstract idea.
USPTO Memorandum, Step 2B
Turning to step 2 of the Alice/Afayo framework, we look to whether
claim 1: (a) adds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are
not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, or (b) simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. iv1emorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
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The Examiner determines the invention "requires no more than a
generic computing device (server), a client (generic computer) interface, and
a network (connected generic computers) to perform generic functions that
are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known
in the industry." Final Act 6.
Appellants argue ''[ e Jach of claims l, 12, and 18 includes specific
limitations other than what is well-understood, routine and conventional in
the field, or add unconventional steps that confine the claim to a particular
useful application." App. Br. 7; see also Reply Br. 2-3. Appellants further
argue "the Office Action does not successfully reject the claims under§ 102
or§ I 03" which "means these claims must include specific limitations other
than [what] is 'well-understood, routine and conventional in the field."'
App. Br. 7.
To the extent Appellants argue the claims necessarily contain an
"inventive concept" based on their alleged novelty or non-obviousness over
the cited references, Appellants misapprehend the controlling precedent.
Although the second step in the Alice/ Mayo framework is termed a search
for an "inventive concept," the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or
non-obviousness, but, rather, a search for "an element or combination of
elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."' Alice,
573 U.S. at 217-218 (alteration in original). A novel and nonobvious claim
directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90.
As discussed above, the claims are directed to approving a loan
application. Thus, even when viewed as a whole, nothing in the claim adds
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significantly more (i.e., an inventive concept) to the abstract idea. Similarly,
the additional elements in the claim amount to no more than mere
instructions to apply the exception using generic computer components,
which is insufficient to provide an inventive concept. Appellants do not
direct our attention to anything in the Specification that indicates the claimed
processor performs anything other than well-understood, routine, and
conventional processing functions, such as receiving, processing, and
outputting data. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom ,5A, 830 F.3d 1350,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("Nothing in the claims, understood in light of the
specification, requires anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional
computer, network, and display technology for gathering, sending, and
presenting the desired infonnation"); buySAFE', inc. v. Google, inc., 765
F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("That a computer receives and sends the
information over a network-------with no further specification-------is not even
arguably inventive"); Alice, 573 U.S. at 224----26 (receiving, storing, sending
information over networks insufficient to add an inventive concept).
According1y, Appellants have not adequately explained how the
claims are perfonned such that they are not routine, conventional functions
of a generic computer. The claims at issue do not require any
nonconventional computer components, or even a "non-conventional and
non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces," but merely call for
performance of the claimed information receiving, processing, and
displaying "on a set of generic computer components." Bascom Glob.
Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&TAfobilityLLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
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Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner's 35
U.S.C. § 101 rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, and 11-25.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections
Independent Claim 1
Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Norris,
Fletcher, and Cunningham teaches or suggests "determining or modifying a
consumer risk score of the recipient based at least in part on receiving the
loan repayment amount from the recipient," as recited in independent claim
1?
The Examiner relies on Cunningham to teach or suggest the disputed
limitation. Final Act. 14 ( citing Cunningham 5 :44--54 ). Appellants argue
Cunningham discusses grading an applicant for relevant credit offerings,
presenting the credit offerings to the applicant, and adapting potential
offerings for prospective applicants in real time, but does not teach or
suggest that a consumer risk score for the third party re-payer would be
determined or modified based on the loan repayment from the recipient.
App. Br. 9.
Cunningham is generally directed to presenting financial card offers
to potential customers. Cunningham Abstract. Cunningham uses a "grading
system" that assigns a grade/score to an applicant by using application data
(personal and financial information) as well as other information, such as
credit bureau data. Cunningham, 4:9-14, 4: 17-23. The "grade/score
assigned to the applicant by the grading system may be viewed as a financial
risk rating." Cunningham, 4:53-54. The financial risk rating is used to
determine which offers (terms) to present to the applicant. Cunningham,
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4:23-26. Cunningham also describes that the financial risk rating and
associated financial card term data may be altered "in a substantially
continuous, real time manner." Cunningham, 5:44--46. Although
Cunningham teaches or suggests altering the financial risk rating ( e.g.,
modifying a consumer risk score), we do not see, and the Examiner has not
sufficiently explained, how Cunningham teaches or suggests altering the
financial risk rating based at least in part on receiving the loan repayment
amount from the recipient, as recited in claim 1. Rather, Cunningham only
generically refers to calculating the grade/score "using the application data
and credit history data obtained directly from the credit bureau in real-time."
Cunningham, 6:6-10; see also 4: 17-23.
Accordingly, we are constrained by the record to reverse the
Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of independent claim 1, and for the
same reasons, dependent claims 2, 4, 5, 9, 11, and 21-25.
Independent Claim 12
Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Norris and
Fletcher teaches or suggests "using the prior usage data to, at least in part,
approve the loan application, wherein using the prior usage data comprises
determining the proportion of common receivers of past transactions to
uncommon receivers of past transactions," as recited in independent claim
12?
The Examiner relies on Norris to teach or suggest the disputed
limitation. Final Act. 7 (citing Norris 5:42---60, 10:4--15); see also Ans. 6
( citing Norris 9: 13-31 ). Appellants argue Norris discusses "determining
whether to approve a loan based on information received from a database,
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but does not specify what that information would consist of." App. Br. 10.
Appellants further argue "Norris only generally discloses that the
information could include a credit report," but does not teach or suggest "a
very specific proportion used to determine whether to approve a loan." App.
Br. 10.
Norris generally describes automatically processing a loan, including
completing an application, underwriting, and transferring funds. Norris
Abstract. As part of the loan approval process, Norris describes scoring the
information received from the applicant and from the credit report using a
neural network. Norris, 9: 18-23, 6:8-13. The scoring will assign points to
various factors that may be considered in loan determination. Norris, 6:21-
27. Norris describes that the neural network "is established by first
identifying criteria that might have a bearing on the ability and willingness
of the borrower to repay the loan. Then historical data are gathered to
determine the influence, or weight, to be given to each criterion." Norris,
6:28-32; see also id. at 10:4--9.
Although Norris generally teaches using historical information ( e.g.,
prior usage data) to analyze whether a loan should be approved, we do not
see, and the Examiner has not sufficiently explained, how Norris teaches that
the prior usage data comprises determining the proportion of common
receivers of past transactions to uncommon receives of past transactions, as
recited in claim 12. Norris describes different factors, such as the applicant
having a full time job, owning a home, having several bank accounts, and
the ratio of debt to liquidity, but, as Appellants correctly point out, does not
explicitly teach the proportion claimed. See Norris, 6:15-20.
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Accordingly, we are constrained by the record to reverse the
Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of independent claim 12, and for
the same reasons, dependent claims 13-1 7.
Independent Claim 18
Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Norris and
Fletcher teaches or suggests "using information indicative of the consumer's
prior usage of services provided by or through the money transfer service
provider to approve the loan application, wherein the prior usage of services
comprises a velocity over time of funds sent through the money transfer
provider by the prior customer," as recited in independent claim 18?
The Examiner relies on Fletcher to teach or suggest the disputed
limitation. Final Act. 10 ( citing Fletcher ,r 4 7); see also Ans. 7 ( citing
Fletcher ,r,r 4 7, 48). Appellants argue "nothing in Fletcher discusses loan
approval, much less using velocity of funds sent through a money transfer
provider, as recited by the claim, as grounds for determining whether to
approve a loan." App. Br. 11.
Fletcher generally describes a system for contextual spending in
person-to-person payments. Fletcher Abstract. Contextual spending refers
to "spending an amount transmitted by another party according to one or
more recommendations." Fletcher ,r 15. Fletcher describes features in
support of making contextual recommendations, such as including a user
transaction history or providing a feedback application to allow users to
evaluate services provided by the system. Fletcher ,r 4 7. Fletcher further
describes that the user profile information, including user transaction history,
may be used to provide relevant contextual recommendations. Fletcher ,r 48.
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Although Fletcher generally teaches using user transaction history ( e.g.,
prior usage data) to provide contextual recommendations, we do not see, and
the Examiner has not sufficiently explained, how Fletcher teaches using
information indicative of the consumer's prior usage of services provided by
or through the money transfer service provider to approve the loan
application, wherein the prior usage of services comprises a velocity over
time of funds sent through the money transfer provider by the prior
customer, as recited in claim 18.
Accordingly, we are constrained by the record to reverse the
Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of independent claim 18, and for
the same reasons, dependent claims 19 and 20.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of claims 1, 2, 4,
5, 9, and 11-25.
We reverse the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 1,
2, 4, 5, 9, and 11-25.
Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner's decision is affirmed. See
37 C.F.R. § 4I.50(a)(l).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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