13711583 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 21, 2018)

Ex Parte Cho et al

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 21, 2018

13711583 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 21, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 13/711,583 12/11/2012 104841 7590 12/26/2018 Inkling Systems, Inc. c/o Ascenda Law Group, PC 333 W San Carlos St. Suite 200 San Jose, CA 95110 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Peter S. Cho UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 5001-0025 3410 EXAMINER SHEFFIELD, HOPE CORNELL ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2178 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/26/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): patents@ascendalaw.com tarek.fahmi@ascendalaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte PETERS. CHO, JOYCE MYRA CROSS, ROBERT CROMWELL, JOSHUA JOHN FORMAN, THOMAS CHARLES GENONI, CHRISTOPHER WILLIAM HUNT, A VI ITSKOVICH, JESSICA SUMMER JENKINS, KERRYCK ARTHUR CLEMENS JONES, ARTHUR KOPATSY, ERIC TODD LOVETT, and OLOF ALEXANDER MATHE Appeal 2018-005251 Application 13/711,583 1 Technology Center 2100 Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, and DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges. STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1--4 and 7-21, which are all of the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 6(b ). Claims 5 and 6 have been cancelled. We AFFIRM. 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Inkling Systems, Inc. (App. Br. 1). Appeal 2018-005251 Application 13/711,583 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER According to Appellants, the claims are directed to creating cross- platform digital content using patterns stored in a pattern library (Spec. ,r 29, Abstract). Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A system comprising: one or more memories storing instructions and one or more processors in communication with the one or more memories configured, when executing the instructions, to: provide to content contributors a set of one or more content viewing and editing tools to create a target platform- independent representation of a digital content work, said content viewing and editing tools including one or more tools configured to provide simulated representations of the digital content work in appearance and function for each of a plurality of target devices or media, wherein the content viewing and editing tools are further configured to permit content creators to define a plurality of reusable patterns defining portions of the markup language representation of the digital content work, the patterns stored in a pattern library, wherein each of the plurality of reusable patterns is a configurable snippet of markup language; and produce a plurality of target platform-dependent representations of the digital content work from the target platform-independent representation of the digital content work, each target platform-dependent representation being for display on a respective one of the plurality of target devices or media, wherein the plurality of target platform-dependent modules are produced based on a corresponding plurality of profiles for each target device or medium, said profiles specifying capabilities of the respective target device or medium, and the target platform-dependent representations of the digital content work are formatted so as to be compliant with profile- specified capabilities of the respective target device or medium 2 Appeal 2018-005251 Application 13/711,583 by removing, resizing, or replacing non-compliant portions of the target platform-independent representation of the digital content work. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Huang Gardner Pena McLure Beezer Glenn Zarzar Nicholas US 2002/0147748 Al US 2002/0156813 Al US 2003/0225829 Al US 2004/0181746 Al US 6,957,233 B 1 US 2007/0135945 Al US 2009/0006454 Al US 2010/0211866 Al REJECTIONS Oct. 10, 2002 Oct. 24, 2002 Dec. 4, 2003 Sept. 16, 2004 Oct. 18, 2005 June 14, 2007 Jan. 1,2009 Aug. 19, 2010 Claims 1--4, 9, and 17-19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Gardner, Pena, and Nicholas (Final Act. 4--9). Claims 7 and 10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Gardner, Pena, Nicholas, and McLure (id. at 9-10). Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Gardner, Pena, Nicholas, and Zarzar (id. at 10-11). Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Gardner, Huang, and Nicholas (id. at 11-14). Claims 12 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Gardner, Huang, Nicholas, and Glenn (id. at 14--15). Claims 14--16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Gardner and Pena (id. at 2--4). 3 Appeal 2018-005251 Application 13/711,583 Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gardner, Pena, Nicholas, and Beezer (id. at 15). Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gardner, Huang, Nicholas, and Beezer (id. at 15-16). Our review in this appeal is limited only to the above rejections and the issues raised by Appellants. Arguments not made are waived. See MPEP Â§ 1205.02; 37 C.F.R. Â§Â§ 4I.37(c)(l)(iv) and 4I.39(a)(l). ISSUES 35 USCÂ§ 103(a) Appellants contend the Examiner has not shown the cited references teach the limitations as recited in independent claims 1, 11, and 14, and dependent claim 18 (App. Br. 17-27). ANALYSIS Issue 1 Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding Gardner teaches or suggests a "plurality of profiles for each target device or medium, said profiles specifying capabilities of the respective target device or medium," as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claim 11 (App. Br. 8-10, 21; Reply Br. 1-3). According to Appellants, the claimed "profiles" provide a specification of the capabilities of a target device, and those "profile-specified capabilities" are used to format a "target platform-dependent representation" of a "digital content work" "by removing, resizing, or replacing non- compliant portions" of a target-platform-independent representation of the digital content work 4 Appeal 2018-005251 Application 13/711,583 (App. Br. 9). Thus, Appellants contend, "[t]he claimed 'profiles' are not a mere 'set of data,' it is a specification of target-device capabilities" (id. at 10). Appellants further argue Gardner "generate[s] different outputs for different devices" but those different outputs are not "generated based on 'profiles specifying capabilities for each target device or medium"' (App. Br. 14; Reply Br. 2). That is, Appellants argue Gardner does not "provide[] a specification of the capabilities of a target device" and instead, Gardner "specifies formatting" for the output of the target device (Reply Br. 2-3). We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds, and we agree, Gardner's "transform modules" teach or suggest a "plurality of profiles for each target device or medium" (Ans. 3--4 (citing Gardner ,r,r 57-58)). The Examiner further finds, and we agree, that those transform modules "specif[y] capabilities of the respective target device" because "Gardner discloses a different output for a WAP phone and an internet enabled television set" where those different outputs are "compliant with ... profile-specified capabilities (screen size of the output device)" (Ans. 3--4 (citing Gardner ,r,r 57-58, Fig. 6)). We disagree with Appellants' argument that "Gardner's transform module specifies formatting, not capabilities" (Reply Br. 2-3 ( emphasis omitted); App. Br. 14). As the Examiner points out, Gardner discloses that "[ e Jach of the transform modules generates an output ... suitable for displaying on the associated target device ( the W AP phone, television, or browser)" (Gardner ,r 58, quoted in Ans. 3--4; see id. claim 28 ("outputs showing how said source document would be displayed on a particular one of said target device means")). Gardner details that the transform modules 5 Appeal 2018-005251 Application 13/711,583 allow "different devices to display different information," e.g., "minimal details" for "W AP phones" and "complete business details" for "Internet browsers" (id. ,r 29, Fig. 6). Because Gardner discloses that its transform modules generate output "suitable" for respective devices and further provides examples of "minimal" output suitable for W AP phones and "complete" output suitable for Internet browsers, we agree with the Examiner's finding that Gardner teaches, or at least suggests, that output is generated based on the "screen size" capability of an output device (Ans. 4). Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding Gardner teaches a "plurality of profiles for each target device or medium, said profiles specifying capabilities of the respective target device or medium," as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claim 11. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 11 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103 as being unpatentable over Gardner, Huang, and Nicholas. We likewise sustain the Examiner's rejections of claims 12, 13, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103 because Appellants offer no additional persuasive arguments for patentability (see App. Br. 22). Issue 2 Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding Pena teaches "a plurality of reusable patterns defining portions of the markup language representation of the digital content work, the patterns stored in a pattern library, wherein each of the plurality of reusable patterns is a configurable snippet of markup language," as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claim 14 (App. Br. 17-20, 23; Reply Br. 3-6, 8). Specifically, Appellants argue "[n]othing in Pena suggests that Pena's content corresponds to 'a 6 Appeal 2018-005251 Application 13/711,583 plurality of reusable' 'configurable snippets of markup language' that may be used to 'de fin[ e] portions of a markup language representation of the digital content work"' (App. Br. 18 (second alteration in original) (emphasis omitted)). Further, addressing the Examiner's finding that Pena's common user interface (UI) elements teach "patterns," Appellants argue "the Examiner asserts that Pena's UI elements are configurable because" the elements can be arranged, but the claimed "'configurability' of the patterns refers to the content of the patterns, rather than their positioning within the digital content work" (Reply Br. 5---6). Still further, Appellants argue Pena's common UI elements are not "reusable" because "Pena does not describe copying and pasting [ common UI] elements" (Reply Br. 4; App. Br. 19). We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds (Ans. 4), and we agree, Pena's "common UI elements" teach "patterns" (Pena ,r 54). The Examiner further finds (Ans. 4), and we agree, Pena discloses that those common UI elements are "defined in [a] relatively abstract format" (Pena ,r 54) such as "interface definition mark-up language" (id. ,r 56), and so are a "configurable snippet of markup language." Still further, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that those common UI elements are reusable and configurable "because [Pena's] client devices are able to select and arrange the elements as specified by the client" (see Ans. 4--5 (citing Pena ,r,r 52, 54, 56)). Appellants' first argument that Pena's content does not teach "reusable patterns" that are "configurable snippet[ s] of markup language" (App. Br. 18 ( emphasis omitted)) does not address the Examiner's finding that Pena's common UI elements teach those disputed limitations (Ans. 4--6). 7 Appeal 2018-005251 Application 13/711,583 And, contrary to Appellants' argument that "the Examiner has not explained how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand" that Pena's common UI elements teach configurable patterns defined by user input (App. Br. 19, 23), the Examiner's Answer explains that Pena's "content creators ... select and apply [ common UI] elements from a system to be configured in a document in the arrangement a client device selects" (Ans. 4 (citing Pena ,r 54, 56); Final Act. 18). That is, Pena's "common UI elements" teach "patterns" selected by a user to create content, e.g., portions a web page (Pena ,r,r 50, 53-54, Fig. 4). Further, Appellants' argument that Pena's arrangement of common UI elements does not teach the configuration of those elements because "configurability" "refers to the content of the patterns, rather than their positioning within the digital content work" (Reply Br. 5-6) is not commensurate with the scope of the claims. Appellants' Specification describes that "patterns may specify element styles ( e.g., font, layout, color, etc.) for particular elements of the work" (Spec. ,r 29 (emphasis added)). The Examiner determines that Pena's common UI elements are configurable because "client devices are able to select and arrange the elements" (Ans. 4). As such, in accordance with the Specification's description, Pena's common UI elements are "configurable" because the elements' layout, i.e., positioning, can be specified (see Pena Fig. 4). Moreover, even under Appellants' unduly narrow interpretation, Pena discloses that its common UI elements include "copy elements" such as "titles, paragraphs, etc." (id. ,r 54) which are editable text, i.e., content, to be included in the created media (id. ,r,r 191-192, Fig. 21). 8 Appeal 2018-005251 Application 13/711,583 Even further, Appellants' argument that Pena's common UI elements are not reusable because "Pena does not describe copying and pasting user elements" (Reply Br. 4; App. Br. 19) does not address the Examiner's finding (see Ans. 4--5) that Pena's system reuses common UI elements to "render[] content in a relatively abstract format into multiple platforms ... in user interfaces of client-side applications" (Pena ,r,r 52, 54). Pena's description of a common UI element at least suggests that elements are reused. Indeed, Pena further details that common UI elements are "shared by multiple platforms and hardware devices" (Pena ,r 53 ( emphasis added)). And, as the Examiner points out (see Ans. 4), a common UI element is used to generate "multiple platform formats" (Pena ,r 54; see id. ,r 57); generating multiple platform formats using a common UI element reuses that element for each generated platform format. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding Pena teaches "a plurality of reusable patterns defining portions of the markup language representation of the digital content work, the patterns stored in a pattern library, wherein each of the plurality of reusable patterns is a configurable snippet of markup language," as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claim 14. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103 as being unpatentable over Gardner, Pena, and Nicholas. We likewise sustain the Examiner's rejections of claims 2--4, 7-10, and 17-20 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103 because Appellants offer no additional persuasive arguments for patentability (see App. Br. 20-21 ). Issue 3 Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding Pena teaches "semantic metadata describing respective content included within the objects 9 Appeal 2018-005251 Application 13/711,583 in terms of its substance rather than its form or appearance," as recited in claim 14 and similarly recited in claim 18 (App. Br. 24--26; Reply Br. 9--11 ). Specifically, Appellants argue the metadata associated with Pena's "'action elements' may concern user actions" but does not "describe the respective content of the action element in terms of its substance rather than its form or appearance" (Reply Br. 11; see App. Br. 25). We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds (Ans. 7-8), and we agree, Pena's "associated metadata defining logical asset attributes" such as "action elements" (Pena ,r 66) teach "semantic metadata describing respective content included within the objects in terms of its substance rather than its form or appearance." Appellants' argument that Pena's metadata associated with action elements does not "describe the respective content of the action element in terms of its substance rather than its form or appearance" (Reply Br. 11; see App. Br. 25) is not persuasive. As the Examiner points out (Ans. 8), Pena's action elements "allow a user to, for example, navigate and view web-based content ... [and] to submit data for processing" (Pena ,r 62). We agree with the Examiner's finding that metadata describing actions such as webpage navigation and data submissions teach "metadata describing respective content included within the objects in terms of its substance rather than its form or appearance" (Ans. 8) because such actions do not have a form or appearance. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding Pena teaches "semantic metadata describing respective content included within the objects in terms of its substance rather than its form or appearance," as recited in claim 14 and similarly recited in claim 18. Therefore, we sustain 10 Appeal 2018-005251 Application 13/711,583 the rejection of claims 14 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103 as being unpatentable over Gardner and Pena. We likewise sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 15 and 16 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103 because Appellants offer no additional persuasive arguments for patentability (see App. Br. 26). DECISION The Examiner's rejection of claims 1--4, 9, and 17-19 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gardner, Pena, and Nicholas is affirmed. The Examiner's rejection of claims 7 and 10 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gardner, Pena, Nicholas, and McLure is affirmed. The Examiner's rejection of claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gardner, Pena, Nicholas, and Zarzar is affirmed. The Examiner's rejection of claim 11 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gardner, Huang, and Nicholas is affirmed. The Examiner's rejection of claims 12 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gardner, Huang, Nicholas, and Glenn is affirmed. The Examiner's rejection of claims 14--16 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gardner and Pena is affirmed. The Examiner's rejection of claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gardner, Pena, Nicholas, and Beezer is affirmed. The Examiner's rejection of claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gardner, Huang, Nicholas, and Beezer is affirmed. 11 Appeal 2018-005251 Application 13/711,583 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. Â§ 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. Â§ 41.50(Â±). AFFIRMED 12