Ex Parte Cho

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jan 12, 2009

09941265 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 12, 2009)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte HAN S. CHO
____________

Appeal 2008-1739
Application 09/941,265
Technology Center 2600
____________

Decided: January 12, 2009
____________

Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, ROBERT E. NAPPI, and JOHN A.
JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judges.

JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1-19. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We
affirm-in-part.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant invented a method for sending information stored in a
wireless communication device. In one embodiment, plural communication
addresses (e.g., telephone numbers) are distinguished by the number of
sequential key inputs of the device. For example, a first address is
associated with one input of an input key, a second address is associated
with two inputs of the same key, and a third address is associated with three
inputs of that key. The addresses are transmitted from the wireless device
after entering the inputs and maintaining the last of the sequential key inputs
for a predetermined time interval.1 Claims 1 and 9 are illustrative:
1. A method for sending information stored in a wireless
communication device, comprising:

associating information stored on the wireless communication device
with sequential inputs from an input key on the wireless communication
device, the sequential inputs including a first input and a last input;

transmitting stored information from the wireless communication
device by entering sequential inputs associated therewith and maintaining
the last input thereof for a minimum input time interval.

9. A method for transmitting an Internet address from an Internet
enabled mobile wireless communication device, comprising:

associating an Internet address stored on the mobile wireless
communication device with at least one key input on the mobile wireless
communication device;

transmitting the stored Internet address from the mobile wireless
communication device by entering the key input associated therewith and
maintaining the key input for a minimum input time interval.

1 See generally Abstract; Spec. 6:8-17.
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The Examiner relies on the following prior art references to show
unpatentability:
Joglekar US 5,535,258 Jul. 9, 1996
Tiilikainen US 5,710,810 Jan. 20, 1998
Jang US 2002/0091754 A1 Jul. 11, 2002
(filed Dec. 26, 2000)
Mager US 2003/0017839 A1 Jan. 23, 2003
(filed Jul. 17, 2001)

1. The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 5, and 12 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by Joglekar (Ans. 4-5).
2. The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 5, 9, and 12 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as anticipated by Jang (Ans. 5-6).
3. The Examiner rejected claims 3, 4, 6-8, and 13-182 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Jang and Tiilikainen (Ans. 7-9).
4. The Examiner rejected claims 10 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Jang (Ans. 8).
5. The Examiner rejected claim 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Jang, Tiilikainen, and Mager (Ans. 9).
6. The Examiner rejected claims 3, 4, 6-8, and 13-17 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Joglekar and Tiilikainen (Ans. 9-10).
7. The Examiner rejected claim 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Joglekar, Tiilikainen, and Mager (Ans. 10-11).

2 Although the Examiner rejects claim 18 over Jang and Tiilikainen in a
separate paragraph in the Answer (¶ 7; Ans. 8-9) from the paragraph
rejecting the other claims over these references (¶ 5; Ans. 7-8), we group
these claims together here for clarity and brevity.
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Rather than repeat the arguments of Appellant or the Examiner, we
refer to the Briefs and the Answer3 for their respective details. In this
decision, we have considered only those arguments actually made by
Appellant. Arguments which Appellant could have made but did not make
in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

THE ANTICIPATION REJECTION OVER JOGLEKAR
Regarding the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of representative
claim 1,4 Appellant argues that Joglekar does not disclose maintaining the
last input from sequential inputs from an input key for a minimum input time
interval as claimed. According to Appellant, Joglekar does not disclose
depressing the input key for any longer than is required to actuate the switch
and therefore does not maintain this input as the term is used in light of the
Specification (App. Br. 5-7; Reply Br. 4-5; emphasis added). Appellant
emphasizes that since the claim recites both (1) entering sequential inputs,
and (2) maintaining the last key input for a minimum input time interval, the
“maintaining” limitation must mean something more than merely entering
the inputs; otherwise, the limitation would be redundant (Reply Br. 4-5).

3 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Appeal Brief filed Apr. 4, 2006
(supplemented Sep. 5, 2007); (2) the Examiner’s Answer mailed July 7,
2006; and (3) the Reply Brief filed July 26, 2006.
4 Although Appellant nominally argues independent claims 5 and 12
separately from claim 1 (App. Br. 7-9), the arguments presented for claims 5
and 12 are substantially the same as those presented for claim 1.
Accordingly, we treat claims 1, 2, 5, and 12 as a single claim grouping, and
select claim 1 as representative of this group. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
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The Examiner responds that Appellant’s arguments are not
commensurate with the scope of the claim language and, in any event, the
term “maintaining” can be broadly interpreted as “to keep in an existing
state.” As such, the Examiner contends that Joglekar’s teaching of
depressing the key within a predetermined time period to initiate automatic
dialing fully meets the claim (Ans. 13).
The issue before us, then, is as follows:

ISSUE
Has Appellant shown that the Examiner erred in finding that Joglekar
maintains the last sequential input from an input key for a minimum input
time interval in rejecting claim 1 under § 102?

FINDINGS OF FACT
The record supports the following findings of fact (FF) by a
preponderance of the evidence:
1. Joglekar discloses a radio telephone interface for speed dialing
stored telephone numbers (Joglekar, Abstract; col. 3, ll. 10-18).
2. The interface 300 comprises a keypad 306 connected to a
processor 378 via a number of interconnect lines 348, 354, 360, 366, and
372. The keypad includes a number of keys 312-336 that, when depressed,
actuate switches. This switch actuation is indicated in the form of signals
inputted to the processor (Joglekar, col. 7, l. 66−col. 8, l. 18; Fig. 8).
3. Telephone numbers are stored in an electronic memory (i.e.,
directory 200) which can comprise a portion of the processor circuitry. The
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directory comprises multiple directory locations 200-1 through 200-N that
are individually accessed by a pointer 206 (Joglekar, col. 6, ll. 17-45; Fig. 3).
4. Sequentially depressing the “M1” key 318 enables the user to
automatically dial different stored telephone numbers depending on the
number of times the key is pressed within a predetermined time period.
Specifically, pressing key 318 once within that period initiates dialing of a
telephone number stored in a first directory location. Pressing key 318 twice
within that period initiates dialing a telephone number stored in a second
directory location. Likewise, pressing key 318 three times within the period
initiates dialing a telephone number stored in a third directory location
(Joglekar, col. 10, ll. 15-49; Fig. 5).
5. To this end, each time key 318 is pressed, the resulting switch
actuation generates a corresponding interrupt-access signal that is applied to
the processor. Based on the number of interrupt-access signals, the
processor then positions an interrupt-access pointer at the corresponding
directory location. The processor then initiates automatic dialing of the
telephone number associated with that selected directory location (Joglekar,
col. 10, ll. 15-49; Figs. 5, 8).

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Anticipation is established only when a single prior art reference
discloses, expressly or under the principles of inherency, each and every
element of a claimed invention as well as disclosing structure which is
capable of performing the recited functional limitations. RCA Corp. v. Appl.
Dig. Data Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 1440, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1984); W.L. Gore &
Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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ANALYSIS
We begin our analysis by construing the key disputed limitation of
claim 1 which calls for, in pertinent part, maintaining the last input from an
input key for a minimum input time interval. Appellant defines the term
“maintain” as “[t]o keep in an existing state; preserve or retain….” (App.
Br. 6). The Examiner does not dispute this definition (Ans. 13)—nor do we.
Under this definition, we find no error in the Examiner’s position that
Joglekar maintains the last input for a minimum input time interval as
claimed. While Appellant is correct that Joglekar does not teach depressing
the key longer than that required to actuate the switch (App. Br. 8), it is the
process that follows this actuation in Joglekar that requires maintaining the
last input for at least a minimum input time interval.
We reach this conclusion noting that when a user presses key 318 in
Joglekar, three key events occur in succession: (1) a switch is actuated; (2) a
corresponding interrupt-access signal is generated; and (3) that signal is
applied to the processor (FF 2, 5). Then, several key processing events
occur in succession: (1) the processor essentially counts the number of these
signals within a certain time period, and then (2) positions a pointer
accordingly to look up the associated telephone number stored in a directory
(FF 5).
This functionality does not occur instantaneously. That is, there is at
least a minimum time delay between (1) the time when the user depresses
the key and when the switch is actuated; (2) the time when the switch is
actuated and when the corresponding signal is generated; (3) the time when
that signal is generated and when the processor processes that signal; and (4)
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the time when such processing is initiated and when the processing is
complete (i.e., receiving and counting the signal(s), positioning the
directory’s pointer accordingly, and initiating automatic dialing of the
associated telephone number).
In view of this sequential process, Joglekar’s system would maintain
the last input (i.e., it would be kept in an existing state) to generate, transmit,
and process the signals associated with user’s depression of the key to
achieve the automatic dialing functionality described above. That the
keypad 306 is located remote from the processor 378 and interconnected
thereto via interconnect lines (FF 2) only bolsters our conclusion that the
inputs originating from the keypad would be maintained at least for a time
interval for transmission to the processor. Moreover, as we noted above, the
processor would likewise maintain these inputs at least for the time needed
to perform the requisite processing functions on those received inputs.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in
the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of representative claim 1. Therefore,
we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of that claim, and claims 2, 5, and 12
which fall with claim 1.

THE ANTICIPATION REJECTION OVER JANG
Regarding the Examiner’s anticipation rejection over Jang, Appellant
argues that the reference does not qualify as prior art in view of the
submitted declarations in the Evidence Appendix. Specifically, Appellant
contends that these declarations establish (1) conception of the invention of
the claimed subject matter before Jang’s filing date (December 26, 2000),
and (2) diligence from a time prior to Jang’s filing date to the filing date of
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the present application’s corresponding provisional application (March 30,
2001) (App. Br. 3-5; Reply Br. 1-2).
The Examiner, however, contends that that the declarations do not
establish conception of all recited limitations before Jang’s filing date,
namely the limitations pertaining to Internet-based wireless communications
(Ans. 11-12).
The issue before us, then, is as follows:

ISSUE
Has Appellant shown that the Examiner erred in relying on Jang in
rejecting claims 1, 2, 5, 9, and 12 under § 102? The issue turns on whether
Appellant has disqualified Jang as prior art by showing (1) the subject matter
of the claimed invention was conceived before Jang’s filing date, and (2)
Appellant exercised reasonable diligence from a time before Jang’s filing
date to when the invention was constructively reduced to practice.

FINDINGS OF FACT
The record supports the following additional findings of fact (FF) by a
preponderance of the evidence:
6. The present application claims benefit of provisional application
60/280,224 filed March 30, 2001.
7. Jang is a published U.S. patent application that was filed on
December 26, 2000.
8. The declaration under 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 of Han S. Cho (“the Cho
declaration”) avers that the claimed subject matter of the present application
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was conceived in the United States or other provincial region before
December 26, 2000 (Ev. App’x).
9. Attached to this declaration is a Motorola invention disclosure
document for Disclosure No. CS-11122 for an invention named “Memory
Key” (Item 1). The invention is briefly described in Item 3 which indicates
that “[b]y adding multiple, repeating, numbers as a memeory [sic] location
for phone/pager numbers, users can easily associate someone’s numbers
(office, home, cell, pager, etc.) into one set of memory location [sic] (i.e. 5,
55, 555, 5555, etc.)” (Ev. App’x; “the Cho declaration”).
10. The last page of this invention disclosure document notes that
“[i]t will be nice to associate all the telecommunication numbers of one
person to one particular character from 1 to 9….” The document further
describes an exemplary implementation of the invention that enables
assignment of (1) a cell phone number to memory location 7; (2) a home
number to memory location 77; (3) an office number to memory location
777; and (4) a pager number to memory location 7777, etc. (Id.)
11. The supplemental declaration under 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 of Roland
K. Bowler II (“the Bowler declaration”) avers that diligence has been
established in preparing the present U.S. patent application from a time prior
to December 26, 2000 to the filing date of the present application’s
corresponding provisional application 60/280,224 (March 31, 2001) (Ev.
App’x; “the Bowler declaration”).
12. The Bowler declaration notes that an invention disclosure
(Attorney Docket No. CS11122) forming the subject matter of the
referenced invention was docketed after the disclosure was reviewed by a
Motorola Patent Committee on or before Jang’s effective filing date (Id.).
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13. Mr. Bowler declares that he worked on the preparation of and/or
filing of twelve docketed patent applications between December 26, 2000
and March 30, 2001. One of these docketed patent applications includes
“Docket No. CS111222 - Cho” (Id.).
14. Mr. Bowler further declares that he sent (1) a draft patent
specification and drawings to the inventor prior to March 28, 2001, and (2) a
revised patent specification to the inventor on March 28, 2001. Exhibit A of
the Bowler declaration is an email dated March 28, 2001 from Roland
Bowler to Han Cho asking for review of an attached revised patent
specification (Id.).
15. Mr. Bower also declares that, upon final review and approval of
the specification and drawings by the inventor on March 30, 2001, the
provisional application 60/280,224 was filed that day.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
“Conception is defined as formation in the mind of the inventor, of a
definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is
hereafter to be applied in practice….” Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 869
n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Reasonable diligence can be shown by establishing that “the attorney
worked reasonably hard on the particular application in question during the
continuous critical period.” Bey v. Kollonitsch, 806 F.2d 1024, 1027 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
“The filing of a patent application is a constructive reduction to
practice of the invention disclosed therein.” Frazer v. Schlegel, 498 F.3d
1283, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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ANALYSIS
Based on the record before us, we find that Appellant has provided
sufficient evidence to antedate the Jang reference with respect to claims 1, 2,
5 and 12, but not independent claim 9. Independent claim 1 calls for, in
pertinent part, transmitting stored information from the wireless
communication device by entering the sequential inputs associated
therewith. Independent claims 5 and 12 are somewhat narrower in this
regard as they pertain to transmitting a stored communication address.
Although the invention disclosure document attached to the Cho
declaration (FF 8-10) does not expressly use this broad language, we
nevertheless find that this subject matter is at least reasonably suggested in
that document. Specifically, the invention disclosure document discusses
storing various numbers—namely a cell phone number, a home number, an
office number, and a pager number—to distinct memory locations (FF 9-10).
These stored numbers, in our view, reasonably support the broader recitation
of stored information or addresses. We therefore find that Appellant
conceived the subject matter of the invention recited in independent claims
1, 5, and 12 before the filing date of the Jang reference (December 26,
2000).
We reach the opposite conclusion, however, with respect to
independent claim 9 which calls for transmitting stored Internet addresses.
As we noted above, the invention disclosure document attached to the Cho
declaration pertains to storing phone and pager numbers (FF 9-10). But the
document is silent regarding using the device in connection with the
Internet, let alone storing Internet addresses for transmission as claimed in
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claim 9. Indeed, Appellant all but concedes this point in the Reply Brief by
admitting that “the original disclosure did not explicitly specify an Internet
address” (Reply Br. 2).
Appellant’s argument that skilled artisans would nonetheless
understand that this disclosure would include Internet addresses (Reply Br.
2) is unavailing. While we can envision phone or pager numbers as
constituting species of “communication addresses,” there is simply nothing
on this record to suggest that Internet addresses were contemplated in the
relatively brief invention disclosure document that forms the basis for
Appellant’s conception argument. Simply put, the invention described in
that document is limited to storing numbers—not Internet addresses. We
therefore do not find that Appellant conceived the invention of independent
claim 9 before the filing date of Jang (Dec. 26, 2000).
We do, however, find that Appellant constructively reduced the
invention to practice on March 30, 2001 by filing the present application’s
corresponding provisional application 60/280,224 that day. See FF 6, 15;
see also Frazer, 498 F.3d at 1288 (noting that the filing of a patent
application is a constructive reduction to practice). And we find sufficient
evidence on this record that Appellant’s attorney exercised reasonable
diligence in preparing the provisional patent application 60/280,224 from a
time before Jang’s filing date to the filing date of that provisional application
(i.e., the constructive reduction to practice). We reach this conclusion noting
the extent of Mr. Bowler’s docket at that time (FF 13) and the relatively
swift filing of the application following the inventor’s review of a draft and
revised patent specifications (FF 14-15). In our view, this evidence
establishes that the attorney worked reasonably hard on the particular
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application in question during the continuous critical period to show
reasonable diligence on the attorney’s part. See Kollonitsch, 806 F.2d at
1027.
In sum, while we find that the two declarations collectively establish
conception, reduction to practice, and reasonable diligence during the critical
period with respect to the claimed subject matter broadly, we do not find
evidence establishing conception for the narrower Internet address
limitations. Accordingly, we find that Appellant has not antedated the Jang
reference with respect to the Internet address limitations (e.g., claim 9), but
has antedated the reference with respect to the other recited limitations.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejections
of claims 1, 2, 5, and 12 based on Jang, but we will sustain the Examiner’s
anticipation rejection of claim 9 based on that reference.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS BASED ON JANG
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is incumbent upon the
Examiner to establish a factual basis to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In so
doing, the Examiner must make the factual determinations set forth in
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
Discussing the question of obviousness of claimed subject matter
involving a combination of known elements, KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, Inc., 127
S. Ct. 1727 (2007), explains that if the claimed subject matter cannot be
fairly characterized as involving the simple substitution of one known
element for another or the mere application of a known technique to a piece
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of prior art ready for the improvement, a holding of obviousness can be
based on a showing that “there was an apparent reason to combine the
known elements in the fashion claimed.” Id. at 1740-41. Such a showing
requires
some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness. . . . [H]owever, the
analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the
specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can
take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person
of ordinary skill in the art would employ.

Id. at 1741 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
If the Examiner’s burden is met, the burden then shifts to the
Appellant to overcome the prima facie case with argument and/or evidence.
Obviousness is then determined on the basis of the evidence as a whole and
the relative persuasiveness of the arguments. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d
1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

FINDINGS OF FACT
The record supports the following additional findings of fact (FF) by a
preponderance of the evidence:
16. Jang discloses a wireless Internet shortcut connection method that
converts a numerical combination of at least one number to an Internet site
Uniform Resources Locator (URL) (Jang, Abstract).
17. In one embodiment, a shortcut dialing function in Jang can be
employed in which a button (e.g., “1”) can be pressed for “a little long” to
automatically dial a preset code and numbers. The combination of the
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numbers can use any numbers such as “2002,” “2000,” “2424,” etc. (Jang,
¶¶ 0054-55).
18. In Jang, the terminal can utilize a mapping table as shown in
Figure 6 where each alphabetical character is represented with a single
number. For example, if the numbers “999” are input following the
connection code “#,” the numbers following this connection code is the URL
displayed by the mapping table (Jang, ¶¶ 0064-66; Fig. 6).
19. Tiilikainen discloses a method for quickly selecting and dialing
one of plural telephone numbers associated with the same identification
(e.g., a particular individual). Specifically, the user first searches for an
identification on a display corresponding to the stored number (e.g., a name
in a particular row of the display (24a-c)). The user also selects a
corresponding number (e.g., work, home, or mobile) associated with that
identifier (name) by selecting the corresponding column 25-27 (Tiilikainen,
Abstract; col. 1, l. 64 - col. 2, l. 11; col. 3, ll. 6-41; Fig. 3).

ANALYSIS
Claims 3, 4, 6-8, and 13-19
Since the Jang reference does not qualify as prior art with respect to
independent claims 1, 5, and 12 as noted above, we will not sustain the
Examiner’s obviousness rejections of dependent claims 3, 4, 6-8, and 13-19
based on the Jang reference for this reason alone. Accordingly, we need not
address Appellant’s arguments pertaining to the alleged deficiencies of the
cited prior art with respect to the specific limitations of claims 3, 6, 7, 13,
and 14 (App. Br. 10-14).

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Claims 10 and 11
We, however, sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims
10 and 11 based on Jang since Jang does qualify as prior art for the Internet
address limitations of those claims. To the extent that Appellant’s
arguments pertaining to Jang apply to these claims, we are not persuaded
that the Examiner erred in rejecting these claims over the reference’s
collective teachings.
We agree with the Examiner that Jang at least suggests associating a
communication address with multiple strokes of the same input key. Not
only does Jang indicate that any numbers could be used in connection with
its shortcut dialing function, the scope of the claim language does not
preclude the cited examples that actually use numbers with repeating digits,
namely “2002,” “2000,” “2424” (FF 17). These repeating digits would
involve multiple sequential strokes of the same input key—a feature that
fully meets the disputed limitation given its breadth, notwithstanding the
presence of additional strokes of different keys. In any event, Jang provides
an example where the numbers “999” are entered in connection with a
connection code (FF 18). These teachings, in our view, reasonably suggest
associating a communication address with multiple strokes of the same input
key.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in
the Examiner’s rejection of claims 10 and 11 based on Jang.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS BASED ON JOGLEKAR
Likewise, we sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejections of (1)
claims 3, 4, 6-8, and 13-17 over Joglekar and Tiilikainen, and (2) claim 19
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over Joglekar, Tiilikainen, and Mager. Notably, Appellant did not present
any arguments with respect to these rejections, let alone particularly point
out errors in the Examiner’s reasoning to persuasively rebut the Examiner's
prima facie case of obviousness based on these references.
Nevertheless, to the extent that Appellant’s arguments regarding the
alleged deficiencies of Tiilikainen in connection with the rejection based on
Jang (App. Br. 10-14) apply to this rejection, we find these arguments
unavailing. The Examiner relied on Tiilikainen merely to show that it is
known in the art to associate multiple phone numbers (i.e., addresses) with a
common identifier, namely an individual’s name. See Ans. 7, 10, 14.
Tiilikainen reasonably supports the Examiner’s position since the reference
clearly teaches that plural telephone numbers (e.g., work, home, and mobile)
can be associated with the same individual (FF 19). We find no error in the
Examiner’s combining this fundamental teaching with Joglekar to arrive at
the claimed invention. Such an improvement is tantamount to the
predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.
See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740.
Thus, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting (1)
claims 3, 4, 6-8, and 13-17 over Joglekar and Tiilikainen, and (2) claim 19
over Joglekar, Tiilikainen, and Mager. The rejections are therefore
sustained.

CONCLUSIONS
Under § 102, Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in
rejecting (1) claims 1, 2, 5, and 12 over the disclosure to Joglekar, or (2)
claim 9 over the disclosure to Jang. Appellant, however, has shown that the
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Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 2, 5, and 12 over the disclosure to Jang
under § 102.
Under § 103, Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in
rejecting (1) claims 3, 4, 6-8, and 13-17 over Joglekar and Tiilikainen; (2)
claim 19 over Joglekar, Tiilikainen, and Mager; and (3) claims 10 and 11
over Jang. Appellant, however, has shown that the Examiner erred in
rejecting (1) claims 3, 4, 6-8, and 13-18 over Jang and Tiilikainen, and (2)
claim 19 over Jang, Tiilikainen, and Mager under § 103.

ORDER
We have sustained the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-17 and
19, but we have not sustained the Examiner’s decision rejecting claim 18.
Accordingly, the Examiner’s decision rejecting claim 1-19 is affirmed-in-
part.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

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AFFIRMED-IN-PART

Eld

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