Ex Parte Chen et alDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardSep 9, 201310871120 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 9, 2013) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 10/871,120 06/18/2004 Iue-Shuenn Chen 3875.0120001 9713 26111 7590 09/09/2013 STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C. 1100 NEW YORK AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, DC 20005 EXAMINER RASHID, HARUNUR ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2493 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/09/2013 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte IUE-SHUENN CHEN and KEVIN PATARIU ___________ Appeal 2011-003243 Application 10/871,120 Technology Center 2400 ____________ Before KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, JASON V. MORGAN, and DANIEL N. FISHMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. FISHMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2011-003243 Application 10/871,120 2 This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of claims 1-34. App. Br. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse and enter new grounds for rejection pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). STATEMENT OF THE CASE THE INVENTION Appellants’ invention relates to security key transmission with strong pairing to a destination client. See generally Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative: 1. A method for security key transmission to at least one destination module, the method comprising: performing by one or more processors and/or circuits integrated within a single chip: pairing a rule with a security key and an address associated with the at least one destination module, wherein the rule corresponds to the security key; and sending the rule along with the security key and the associated address to at least one destination for use by the at least one destination module. THE REJECTIONS Claims 1-5, 7-9, 11-16, 18-20, 22-27, 29-32, and 34 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Peterka (U.S. Patent Publication No. 2002/0174366 A1; published Nov. 21, 2002). Ans. 3-6. Claims 6, 10, 17, 21, 28, and 33 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Peterka and Kamiya (U.S. Patent Publication No. 2002/0094089 A1; published July 18, 2002). Ans. 6-7. Appeal 2011-003243 Application 10/871,120 3 THE § 102 REJECTION CLAIMS 1, 12, AND 23 The Examiner rejected independent claim 1 finding that Peterka teaches the recited steps of “pairing a rule with a security key and an address” and “sending the rule along with the security key and associated address.” Ans. 3-4 (citing Peterka ¶¶ 0108, 0109, 0115, 0116, 0121, 0147, and 0148). Appellants argue, inter alia, that the Examiner has improperly picked disparate teachings of Peterka that fail to teach the limitations “arranged as in the claim.” App. Br. 6-8.1 Independent claims 12 and 23 recite similar limitations to claim 1, were rejected for the same reasons as claim 1 (Ans. 5-6), and Appellants argue that claims 12 and 23 are allowable for the same reasons as claim 1 (App. Br. 14). ISSUE Has the Examiner erred in finding that Peterka teaches all elements as arranged in claims 1, 12, and 23? ANALYSIS We are persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner has erred in finding that Peterka teaches all elements of claim 1 as arranged in the claim. We agree with Appellants that the Examiner’s various citations relate to different records and transmissions within Peterka and thus does not teach the recited steps of “pairing” and “sending” “as arranged in the claim” as 1 Because our discussion of the arranging of elements of Peterka cited by the Examiner as compared to claim 1 is dispositive of the § 102 rejection of claims 1, 12, and 23, we need not reach Appellants’ other arguments regarding these claims. App. Br. 8-13. Appeal 2011-003243 Application 10/871,120 4 required to anticipate the claim. App. Br. 7-8. Thus, we are persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner has erred in finding that Peterka teaches all elements as arranged in claim 1. On the record before us, we are constrained to reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting independent claims 1, 12, and 23 and dependent claims 2- 5, 7-9, 11, 13-16, 18-20, 22, 24-27, and 29-32 as anticipated by Peterka under § 102. THE § 103 REJECTION Claims 6, 10, 17, 21, 28, and 33 (dependent variously from independent claims 1, 12, and 23) stand rejected over Peterka (as applied to their respective base claims) in combination with Kamiya. The Examiner does not rely on Kamiya to alleviate the deficiencies discussed above with respect to the rejection of independent claims 1, 12, and 23. Thus, on the record before us, we are constrained to reverse the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 6, 10, 17, 21, 28, and 33 under § 103. NEW GROUNDS OF REJECTION UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) CLAIMS 12-22 REJECTED UNDER § 101 Claim 12 recites a “machine-readable storage.” Transitory signals are unpatentable as non-statutory subject matter under § 101. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Specification is silent with regard to defining “machine-readable storage.” Consistent with U.S. Patent & Trademark Office policy, “[t]he broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim drawn to a computer readable medium (also called machine readable medium and other such variations) typically covers forms of non-transitory tangible media and transitory propagating signals per se in view of the Appeal 2011-003243 Application 10/871,120 5 ordinary and customary meaning of computer readable media, particularly when the specification is silent.” See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media, 1351 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 212 (Feb. 23, 2010) (hereinafter, Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media); see also Ex parte Mewherter, No. 2012-007692 (PTAB May 8, 2013) (precedential), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip /boards/bpai/decisions/prec/fd2012007692.pdf. In this case, the Specification is silent as regards defining “machine-readable storage.” Accordingly, the broadest reasonable construction of “machine-readable storage” encompasses a transitory, propagating signal and therefore claims 12-22 are directed towards non-statutory subject matter. Thus, the recited “machine-readable storage” encompasses transitory propagating signals. We therefore conclude claim 12 is not directed toward statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claims 13-22 depend from claim 12 and are therefore rejected for the same reason. CLAIMS 1, 12, AND 23 REJECTED UNDER § 103 Claims 1, 12, and 23 are rejected on a new ground of rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Applicants’ Admitted Prior Art (“AAPA”, see, e.g., Spec. ¶ 0020) and Peterka as generally applied by the Examiner (see Ans. 3-4, 7-9). We start our analysis by construing key terms in the claims. During examination, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, and the language should be read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Amer. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) Appeal 2011-003243 Application 10/871,120 6 (citations omitted). To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term” other than its plain and ordinary meaning. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Claim 1 recites “pairing a rule with a security key and an address associated with the at least one destination module, wherein the rule corresponds to the security key; and sending the rule along with the security key and the associated address to at least one destination for use by the at least one destination module.” Appellants’ Specification does not clearly define “pairing,” “rule,” “address,” or “corresponding to.” We therefore construe these terms as one of ordinary skill would understand their broadest reasonable interpretation. Construction of “Pairing” The Specification describes a non-limiting, exemplary embodiment of a system for “pairing” with respect to Figure 5 showing a key (707), a security command (709 – e.g., a “rule”), and a destination address (711) being concatenated to form a key sequence (705). Spec. ¶ 63. Lacking a clear definition, we construe “pairing” to encompass “to unite in close association with another.” Random House Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary; p. 950 (1999). Construction of “Rule” The Specification states “a rule may define permissible usage by a destination module defined by the associated address and may comprise a command word, which may be implemented as a data structure.” See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 22. This non-limiting example does not provide a clear definition. Lacking a clear definition, we construe “rule” to encompass “a principle or Appeal 2011-003243 Application 10/871,120 7 regulation governing conduct, procedure, arrangement, etc.” Random House Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary; p. 1150 (1999). Construction of “Address” The Specification provides no definition of “address.” We agree with the Examiner (Ans. 8) that the claim does not recite “IP address” as urged by Appellants (App. Br. 10; Reply Br. 3). The Specification makes no reference to “IP address.” Lacking a clear definition, we construe “address” to encompass “the place or the name of the place where a person, organization, or the like is located or may be reached.” Random House Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary; p. 15 (1999). Consistent with this definition, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand “address” as recited in the claims to encompass the physical location of a receiving client/node as disclosed in Peterka. Construction of “Corresponding To” The manner in which a rule is “corresponding to” the security key is not clearly defined in the Specification. Rather, the non-limiting, exemplary embodiment of a “rule” as noted above further states that the data structure that may implement the rule “may be associated with a permissible algorithm type, a security key size, and/or a security key source.” See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 22. Lacking any clear definition, we construe that a rule is “corresponding to” the security key if the rule and key are associated (e.g., “paired”) in any manner. “Pairing” is Disclosed by the Combination of AAPA and Peterka In view of the above construction of key terms, we construe the limitation “pairing a rule with a security key and an address associated with Appeal 2011-003243 Application 10/871,120 8 the at least one destination module, wherein the rule corresponds to the security key,” as uniting in close associating a rule with a key, and an address with a destination module. Peterka discloses associating a “rule” with an “address” (“[t]he method can comprise establishing a rule defining whether the client is entitled to receive the program content; … the rule can be comprised of … a restriction based on the location of where the program content is to be delivered.” Peterka ¶ 0006). Peterka further discloses associating a “rule” with a “key” and that a “rule” “corresponds to” the “key” (“[i]f all rules are satisfied, … the program key is delivered to the client.” Peterka ¶ 0062). AAPA discloses closely associating (e.g., “uniting”) a key with an address. We therefore find that AAPA in combination with Peterka discloses “pairing a rule with a security key and an address associated with the at least one destination module, wherein the rule corresponds to the security key.” “Sending” is Disclosed by the Combination of AAPA and Peterka In view of the above construction of key terms, we construe the limitation “sending the rule along with the security key and the associated address to at least one destination for use by the at least one destination module,” as sending the paired rule/key and address/destination module to a destination. We note, as discussed in more detail infra, that this sending step is not limited to occur in a single transmission, but can include multiple transmissions. Peterka discloses a rule field in a data record 2200 of Figure 22 of Peterka that “can be encrypted prior to conveyance to the client” (Peterka ¶ 0147) and thus discloses sending a rule to the client (i.e., to a destination module). Peterka further discloses a location field (i.e., an Appeal 2011-003243 Application 10/871,120 9 address) in a data record 2300 of Figure 23 “which can be provided for an individual client” (Peterka ¶ 0148) and thus discloses sending an address to a client. Peterka further discloses sending a key to the client. Peterka ¶ 0108 (“the key can be unicast to the client”). The claim recitation of sending the rule “along with” the key and the address does not require that the three elements be transmitted in a single message or transmission. The Specification provides only a non-limiting, exemplary embodiment (Fig. 5; ¶ 63) showing the key (707), rule (709), and address (711) as concatenated into key sequence (705) transmitted over a serial bus (713; ¶ 65) to the destination module (715). Even in this non- limiting example, we note that such an exemplary serial communication necessarily sends the key, rule, and address separately (sequentially—each following the preceding field of the key sequence). Thus, we find that although the rule, address, and key of Peterka may be sent to the client in separate transmissions, they are sent “along with” one another in that all are sent to the client in some sequence over time in one or more messages or transmissions. We therefore find that the combination of AAPA and Peterka teaches “sending the rule along with the security key and the associated address to at least one destination for use by the at least one destination module.” As discussed supra, each of these features is known in the prior art and a person with ordinary skill in the art would have found their combination to be obvious. Furthermore, the combination of these elements would have yielded nothing more than predictable results. For the above reasons we reject claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over AAPA and Peterka. Independent claims 12 and 23 recite Appeal 2011-003243 Application 10/871,120 10 limitations similar to claim 1 and are therefore rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for the same reasons as claim 1. We leave it to the Examiner to determine whether this new ground of rejection should be applied to the respective dependent claims. DECISION For the reasons discussed above, the rejections of claims 1 through 34 are reversed. We enter a new ground of rejection for independent claims 12-22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We enter a new ground of rejection for independent claims 1, 12, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). This decision contains new grounds of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides that “[a] new ground of rejection . . . shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides that Appellants, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner. . . . (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). REVERSED Appeal 2011-003243 Application 10/871,120 11 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) gvw Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation