Ex Parte Chen

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 13, 2018

13686080 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/686,080 11/27/2012 Michael Chen 26141.0048U1 1742
759016000
Comcast
c/o Ballard Spahr LLP
999 Peachtree Street, Suite 1000
Atlanta, GA 30309
02/15/2018 EXAMINER
BUGG, GEORGE A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2911
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/15/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USpatentmail@ballardspahr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MICHAEL CHEN
Appeal 2017-008912
Application 13/686,080
Technology Center 2900
Before ERIC B. CHEN, JEREMY J. CURCURI, and
DAVID J. CUTITTAII, Administrative Patent Judges.
CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1—22 and 26—28. Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Claims 1—7, 9, 10, 12—17, 19, 20, 22, and 26—28 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Parker (US 2004/0135686 Al, pub. July 15,
2004). Final Act. 3—8.
Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Parker
and Abdallah (US 2008/0240105 Al, pub. Oct. 2, 2008). Final Act. 8—9.
Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Parker
and Kondo (US 2004/0155963 Al, pub. Aug. 12, 2004). Final Act. 9-10.
Claims 18 and 21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
Appeal 2017-008912
Application 13/686,080
over Parker and Bogineni (US 2010/0131280 Al, pub. May 27, 2010). Final
Act. 10.
We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention relates to “methods and systems for ambient
system control, comprising multiple detection devices with varying levels of
detection capability.” Spec., Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced
below, with the key disputed limitation emphasized:
1. A method comprising:
detecting, at a first detection device, a first signal
generated by a source;
determining that the first signal comprises a first
command and transmitting an activation signal from the first
detection device to a second detection device proximate to the
source in response to the first command, thereby activating the
second detection device proximate to the source, wherein the
second detection device has less available power than the first
detection device;
detecting, at the second detection device, a second signal
generated by the source;
determining that the second signal comprises a second
command; and
acting upon the second command.
ANALYSIS
The Obviousness Rejection of Claims 1-7,9,10,12-17,19,20,22, and
26-28 over Parker
The Examiner finds Parker teaches all limitations of claim 1. Final
Act. 3^4; see also Ans. 2—3. In particular, the Examiner finds
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Although Parker does not explicitly state the second
detection device has less available power than the first detection
device, . . . one with ordinary skill in the art would realize that
the camera 5 obviously has less available power than the motion
sensor 7 since the motion sensor is continuously activating and
the camera 5 only to start capturing image when triggered by the
motion sensor.
Therefore, one with ordinary skill in the art at the time the
invention was made [would have provided the] Parker system
with the concepts of the second detection device configured to
have less available power than the first detection device because
the power required for the motion sensor would definitely need
to be more than the camera as it would be continuously sensing
the motion.
Final Act. 4.
Appellant presents the following principal arguments:
i. “To the extent that the Office Action intends to invoke Official
Notice of the fact that the second detection device has less available power
than the first detection device, Applicant asserts that the Official Notice is
improper.” App. Br. 5.
ii.
[T]he motion sensor is active for longer periods of time than the
camera [in Parker], The only conclusion that can be drawn from
this is that the motion sensor consumes power for a longer time
than the camera. That is, the statement in the Office Action fails
to provide any information regarding the rate at which either the
camera or the motion sensor consumes power, which is needed
to determine how much power is consumed while [] the devices
are active much less the relative capacities of the power sources
used by the camera and the motion sensor.
App. Br. 6; see also Reply Br. 2.
iii. “There is no indication in Parker (or in the Office Action) what
power source is used for each of these devices. Accordingly, it is impossible
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Application 13/686,080
to draw any inference regarding the power available to either device.” App.
Br. 7 ; see also Reply Br. 2—3.
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
We do not see any error in the Examiner’s findings or in the
Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness. Specifically, Appellant’s arguments
(i), (ii), and (iii), do not show any error in the Examiner’s findings. In short,
we find Parker’s disclosures would have reasonably suggested the claimed
arrangement of available power to one of ordinary skill in the art, and are not
limited in their suggestions to only the amount of time for which power is
consumed.
We agree with and adopt as our own the Examiner’s explanation in
the Examiner’s Answer:
one with ordinary skill in the art would [have] recognize[d], in
view of the disclosure of Parker, and implemented] a smaller
available power for the second detection device (the camera,
because it only activated when a trigger signal from the motion
sensor/buzzer) than the first detection device (motion
sensor/buzzer, which is continuously power on), in order to cut
the cost of manufacturing and installation of the appropriate size
of power.
Ans. 2—3.
Further, the rationale to support a conclusion that a claim would have
been obvious may be that
a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known
options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the
anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but
of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that
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Application 13/686,080
a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious
under § 103.
KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
Only a finite number of possible arrangements exist for providing
power to the first detection device and the second detection device. In
particular, either (i) the first detection device may be arranged to have less
available power than the second detection device; or (ii) the second detection
device may be arranged to have less available power than the first detection
device; or (iii) both detection devices may be arranged to have the same
available power. We, therefore, conclude that it would have been obvious to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to have provided an arrangement for
power available to the first detection device and the second detection device
meeting the argued claim limitations. Such an arrangement would have
been merely a product of ordinary skill and common sense. This is because
when faced with the design need of making power available to the first
detection device and the second detection device, one of ordinary skill in the
art would have found it obvious to try the claimed arrangement from the
finite set of identified arrangements and because the claimed arrangement
produces a predictable solution that is within the grasp of one of ordinary
skill. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. We also
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2—7, 9, 10, 12—17, 19, 20, 22, and
26—28, which are not separately argued with particularity.
The Obviousness Rejection of Claim 8 over Parker and Abdallah
Appellant argues Abdallah fails to cure the purported deficiencies of
Parker. See App. Br. 8.
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For reasons discussed above, we find Parker is not deficient. We,
therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8.
The Obviousness Rejection of Claim 11 over Parker and Kondo
Appellant argues Kondo fails to cure the purported deficiencies of
Parker. See App. Br. 8.
For reasons discussed above, we find Parker is not deficient. We,
therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 11.
The Obviousness Rejection of Claims 18 and 21 over Parker and
Bogineni
Appellant argues Bogineni fails to cure the purported deficiencies of
Parker. See App. Br. 8.
For reasons discussed above, we find Parker is not deficient. We,
therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 18 and 21.
ORDER
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—22 and 26—28 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).
AFFIRMED
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