Ex Parte Chandra et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Aug 21, 2012

09872920 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 21, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
09/872,920 06/02/2001 Ravi Chandra 4906.P078 4641
8791 7590 08/22/2012
BLAKELY SOKOLOFF TAYLOR & ZAFMAN
1279 Oakmead Parkway
Sunnyvale, CA 94085-4040
EXAMINER
SHINGLES, KRISTIE D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2448
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/22/2012 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte RAVI CHANDRA, GERALD NEUFELD, and JENNY YUAN
____________

Appeal 2010-009577
Application 09/872,920
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, THOMAS S. HAHN, and JUSTIN T. ARBES,
Administrative Patent Judges.

JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1, 2, 4-8, 10-29, 31-35, and 37-43. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention synchronizes data associated with restarted
network processes. See generally Spec. ¶¶ 0029-30, 0050; Abstract. Claim
1 is illustrative:
1. A computer implemented method comprising:
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receiving by a second network process a first set of data from a first
network process;

receiving a notification of death of the first network process;

clearing the first set of data by the second network process if a time
period expires, the time period beginning upon receiving the notification of
death; and

synchronizing by the second network process the first set of data with
a second set of data if the time period does not expire, the second set of data
received from the first network process after the first network process
restarts.

THE REJECTIONS
1. The Examiner rejected claims 1 and 28 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as anticipated by Bishop (US 6,983,317 B1; Jan. 3, 2006; filed June
5, 2000). Ans. 4-5.1
2. The Examiner rejected claims 2, 4-8, 10, 11, 16-27, 29, 31-35, and
37-43 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Fuchs (US 5,440,726;
Aug. 8, 1995) and Bishop. Ans. 5-10.
3. The Examiner rejected claims 12-15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Kidder (US 6,694,450 B1; Feb. 17, 2004 (filed May 20,
2000)), Damani (US 5,938,775; Aug. 17, 1999), and Bishop. Ans. 10-12.

THE ANTICIPATION REJECTION
The Examiner finds that Bishop discloses every recited feature of
representative claim 1 including (1) receiving notification that a first

1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Appeal Brief filed February 1,
2010; (2) the Examiner’s Answer mailed March 25, 2010; and (3) the Reply
Brief filed May 24, 2010.
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network process has died, namely when a “heartbeat period” expires; (2)
clearing a first set of data if an eviction time period expires, where the
eviction time period is said to begin upon receiving the death notification;
and (3) synchronizing first and second data sets if the time period does not
expire, where the second data set is received from the first network process
after that process restarts. Ans. 4-5, 12-13.
Appellants argue that Bishop’s heartbeat indicator is not a death
notification, but rather indicates just the opposite: that the engine is alive.
App. Br. 8-9; Reply Br. 2-3. As such, Bishop’s eviction time period is said
to not begin upon receiving a death notification as claimed, but rather begins
at the engine’s last heartbeat. Id. Appellants add that Bishop does not
synchronize data after the first process restarts if the time period does not
expire as claimed, since any synchronization in Bishop occurs after the
eviction period expires. App. Br. 9-10; Reply Br. 3-4.

ISSUE
Under § 102, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 by finding
that Bishop (1) clears a first set of data if a time period expires, where the
time period begins upon receiving notification that a first network process
has died, and (2) synchronizes first and second data sets after the first
process restarts if the time period does not expire?

ANALYSIS
This dispute turns on when Bishop’s notification that a first network
process has died is received, for a time period must begin at this moment as
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claimed. According to the Examiner, this moment is when Bishop’s
“heartbeat period”2 expires. Ans. 12.
We see no error in this finding, for Bishop’s “Listener” process
detects whether an engine heartbeat is received within a two-minute timeout
period, and if not, notifies associated components that the engine has failed.
Bishop, col. 101, l. 45 – col. 102, l. 11; col. 103, ll. 30-35; col. 104, ll. 1-5.
But if a heartbeat is detected within a 15-minute eviction timeout period, the
engine is considered to have recovered from a partial engine failure;
otherwise, the engine completely fails and is removed from a master list.
Bishop, col. 103, l. 24 – col. 104, l. 14.
Notably, there are two key heartbeat detection time periods in
Bishop’s engine failure determination: (1) a two-minute timeout period, and
(2) a 15-minute eviction timeout period as shown below:

Timeout period (2 min.)

Eviction Timeout period (15 min.)

Timeline Showing Bishop’s Timeout and Eviction Timeout Periods

2 A “heartbeat” in Bishop’s parlance is a message sent to available engines at
five-second intervals. Bishop, col. 101, ll. 53-55; col. 102, ll. 7-8.
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The Examiner finds that when the “heartbeat period” expires, a
process death notification is received. Ans. 12. Although Bishop does not
explicitly refer to a “heartbeat period,” this finding nonetheless reasonably
comports with Bishop’s two-minute timeout period which deems an engine
“failed” if no heartbeat is detected within this period as noted above—a
failure determination and associated notification that fully meets the recited
death notification. Accord Ans. 13 (referring to Bishop’s “heartbeat timeout
period”). Although an engine can recover from this “death” if its heartbeat
returns within the eviction timeout period, this resurrection does not
preclude the fact that the engine is effectively pronounced dead when it fails.
See Bishop, col. 103, ll. 30-35; col. 104, ll. 1-5. Accord Spec. ¶¶ 0029-30
(noting that if a heartbeat message is not received, the process is considered
dead).
And even assuming, without deciding, that the 15-minute eviction
timeout period starts concurrently with the two-minute timeout period as
shown above, nothing in the claim precludes a 13-minute eviction timeout
period that begins when the two-minute period expires. Nor does the claim
preclude the resulting clearing of engine data when the eviction time period
expires as noted above and as the Examiner indicates. Ans. 12.
We also see no error in the Examiner’s position that Bishop’s
recovering a failed engine and the associated data merging and updates fully
meets the recited synchronization. Ans. 5, 13. As noted above, if a
heartbeat is not detected within the two-minute timeout period, but is
detected within the 15-minute eviction timeout period (i.e., within the 13-
minute eviction period noted above), the engine recovers from a partial
engine failure. Bishop, col. 103, ll. 24-51; col. 105, ll. 2-7. In this scenario,
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data synchronization associated with engine process restart therefore occurs
(1) if the eviction time period does not expire, and (2) after restart as
claimed. Appellants’ contention that any synchronization in Bishop occurs
after the eviction period expires (App. Br. 9-10; Reply Br. 3-4) is unavailing
in light of the engine’s recovery from a partial engine failure before eviction
time period expiration as noted above.
We are therefore not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
representative claim 1, and claim 28 not separately argued with particularity.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS
We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 2, 4-
8, 10-27, 29, 31-35, and 37-43. Ans. 5-12. Despite nominally arguing these
claims separately, Appellants reiterate similar arguments made in connection
with claim 1 and allege that the additional cited references fail to cure those
purported deficiencies. App. Br. 10-12; Reply Br. 4-6. We are not
persuaded by these arguments, however, for the reasons previously
discussed.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting (1) claims 1 and 28 under § 102,
and (2) claims 2, 4-8, 10-27, 29, 31-35, and 37-43 under § 103.

ORDER
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 4-8, 10-29, 31-35, and
37-43 is affirmed.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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