Ex Parte Chakra et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 29, 2017

13892934 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 29, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/892,934 05/13/2013 A1 Chakra RSW920130053US1 9104
75949 7590
IBM CORPORATION
C/O: Fabian Vancott
215 South State Street
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
EXAMINER
BLACKWELL, JAMES H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2177
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/03/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patents @ fabianvancott.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte AL CHAKRA, JOHN A. FELLER, TRUDY L. HEWITT,
and FRANCESCO C. SCHEMBARI
Appeal 2017-004838
Application 13/892,934
Technology Center 2100
Before DAVID M. KOHUT, KAMRAN JIVANI, and SCOTT E. BAIN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
KOHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek our review, under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1—20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Appeal 2017-004838
Application 13/892,934
INVENTION
“The present invention relates to presenting a link label for multiple
hyperlinks, and more specifically, to presenting a link label for multiple
hyperlinks in electronic messages.” Spec. 11.
Independent claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below.
1. A system for presenting a link label for multiple
hyperlinks, comprising:
a presenting engine to present a layered data element in an
electronic message, the layered data element comprising a link
label that represents multiple hyperlinks;
a designating engine to designate an active hyperlink from said
multiple hyperlinks based on specific criteria associated with a
recipient of said electronic message; and
a directing engine to direct said recipient of said electronic
message to an online location of said active hyperlink in
response to user input selecting said link label.
REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1—5, 7—12, and 16—20, under
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), as anticipated by Feig (US 6,182,140 Bl; Jan. 30,
2001). Ans. 3—19 (Feb. 24, 2016).1
1 Appellants argue that this rejection constitutes a new ground of rejection
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.39(a)(2). See Reply Br. 5. However, this issue is a
petitionable matter, as opposed to an appealable matter, and therefore is not
before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.113. We will address Appellants’ arguments
with respect to the Examiner’s anticipation rejection as presented in the
Examiner’s Answer.
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The Examiner rejects claims 6 and 15, under 35 U.S.C. § 103, as
obvious over Feig and Bates (US 2003/0188263 Al; Oct. 2, 2003).
Ans. 19-21.
The Examiner rejects claim 13, under 35 U.S.C. § 103, as obvious
over Feig and Oldham (US 8,150,979 Bl; Apr. 3, 2012). Ans. 21—22.
The Examiner rejects claim 14, under 35 U.S.C. § 103, as obvious
over Feig and Bharat (US 2012/0095837 Al; Apr. 19, 2012). Ans. 22—23.
The Examiner has withdrawn the Final Action’s rejections of claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) and claims 10-16 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Ans. 23.
ANALYSIS
A. Does Feig disclose the independent claims’ relating of
“criteria” to a “recipient”?
The first issue before us is whether Feig discloses the independent
claims’ relating of “criteria” to a “recipient of said electronic message” that
includes the link label representing multiple hyperlinks. See infra
(contentions). Independent claim 1 recites the criteria as part of the
following feature: “a designating engine to designate an active hyperlink
from said multiple hyperlinks based on specific criteria associated with a
recipient of said electronic message.” The remaining independent
claims recite similar designating “based on specific criteria associated with a
recipient of said electronic message” (claim 10) and “based on criteria about
a recipient of said electronic message” (claim 17). Though we address the
present issue by reference to the findings and arguments for claim 1, our
analysis applies to all independent claims.
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Application 13/892,934
As to claim 1 ’s “specific criteria,” the Examiner finds:
Feig describes three specific INSTRUCTION programs that
. . . determine (i.e. designate) an active hyperlink from amongst
those defined in the mURL data structure. Each of the three
INSTRUCTION programs [determine which of the defined URL
servers] is accessible. The second and third . . . also determine
the bandwidth . . . between the user’s client machine and [each
defined URL server],
Ans. 4 (citations omitted).
Appellants respond: “Claim 1 is directed to a recipient’s experience in
receiving an electronic message with a layered data element presented
therein, and having the recipient’s system activate one of a plurality of
hyperlinks within the layered data element [] ‘based on specific criteria
associated with a recipient of said electronic message. ’” Reply
Br. 7. Addressing Feig (id. at 6—8), Appellants further respond that Feig
does not evaluate URLs via criteria of the URLs’ recipient, contending:
[T]he Feig reference describes a sender sending a download
request to any of a number of servers or data sources. However,
the servers are chosen based upon a sender’s criteria (i.e., an
allowable level of bandwidth, server accessibility, default
language, character set, desired default version of the hypertext
document, user skill level or other interest, etc.). The servers
(i.e., recipients) do not participate in setting criteria or accessing
data based on their respective criteria. ... In other words, the
local settings asserted by the Action as describing the claimed
“criteria associated with a recipient” are not criteria of a recipient
but of a sender.
Id. at 6—7); see also App. Br. 14—15. Appellants present the same arguments
for claims 10 and 17. Reply Br. 12, 14.
We are unpersuaded the Examiner erred, because Appellants’
arguments are incommensurate with the claims. The independent claims do
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not base the designating on criteria of the recipient. The claims rather base
the designating on criteria “associated with a recipient” (claims 1 and 10)
and “about a recipient” (claim 17). These claimed criteria merely concern—
and thus need not be “of’ (as argued)—the recipient of the hyperlinks. As
found by the Examiner, Feig’s INSTRUCTION programs use criteria
concerning the mURL recipient, namely, designating an active URL based
on the mURL servers and respective bandwidths available to the user-client
receiving and displaying the mURL. Ans. 4—5. Thus, we agree with the
Examiner’s finding that Feig’s INSTRUCTION programs designate an
active hyperlink of the mURL based on criteria “associated with” (claims 1
and 10) and “about” (claim 17) a “recipient of said electronic message”
(claims 1,10, and 17) including the mURL.
B. Does Feig teach claim 10’s
criteria?
“minimal” and “additional”
The second issue before us is whether Feig discloses independent
claim 10’s “minimal” and “additional” criteria. Claim 10 adds these criteria
to the above-addressed criteria for designating an active hyperlink. Claim
10 particularly recites:
wherein designating the active hyperlink from said multiple
hyperlinks [based on specific criteria associated with a recipient
of said electronic message] . . . comprises: determining whether
more than one of the hyperlinks satisfies minimal criteria; and in
response to a determination that more than one of the hyperlinks
satisfies the minimal criteria, applying a number of additional
criteria to the more than one hyperlink to determine which of the
more than one hyperlinks is more relevant to the recipient
relative to one another.
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As to these claimed criteria, the Examiner finds:
Feig describes three INSTRUCTION programs for determining
which hyperlink in the mURL data structure is chosen to be used
or active. In each is defined a minimal criteria, that is, each at
least checks as a first step, whether a site referenced by a
hyperlink in the mURL data structure is available
(reachable). . . . [I]n the second and third INSTRUCTION
programs, an additional criteria is applied to those hyperlinks in
the mURL data structure that are found to be available
(reachable), both having to do with a bandwidth determination
for each of the hyperlinks between the client and the particular
server.
Ans. 12 (emphasis omitted).
Appellants respond that Feig’s INSTRUCTION programs do not use
the above-noted minimal and additional criteria to designate the most
relevant URL as an active URL, stating:
[T]he Answer points out that two or more sites may quality as a
downloading sites; what the Action relies on as the claimed
“active hyperlink.” However, the system of Feig merely chooses
a website, and never actually designates such a website as an
“active hyperlink.” This is clear since more than one site in Feig
may be chosen as a qualifying site, resulting in no single “active
hyperlink. ’ ’
Reply Br. 13; see also App. Br. 20-22.
We are unpersuaded because the arguments are incommensurate with
the claim’s scope. Claim 10 indeed recites the minimal and additional
criteria as part of designating an active hyperlink (based on specific criteria).
However, designating an active hyperlink does not require denoting the
designated, active hyperlink to the recipient. Rather, the hyperlink need
only be selected in the manner claimed (designate) and opened (active), thus
directing the recipient to respective online content. See Spec. 154 (“In this
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example, the presenting system designated a single active hyperlink. As a
result, the presenting system took the recipient directly to the online content
associated with the active hyperlink”); see also id. 144 (an “active hyperlink
. . . causes the recipient to be directed to the contents of the online resources
pointed to”); “designate.” Dictionary.com. Dictionary.com Unabridged.
Random House, Inc. (accessed: Aug. 11, 2017) (“to nominate or select for a
duty”).
As found by the Examiner, Feig’s INSTRUCTION programs select a
URL (designate) and open the selected URL (active) to direct the mURL
recipient to respective online content. Ans. 10-11; see also Feig col. 4,11.
8—24. The INSTRUCTION programs do so by identifying each of a
mURL’s accessible sites (minimal criteria) and then opening a URL of
highest bandwidth (additional criteria). Feig col. 4,11. 8—24. Thus, we agree
with the Examiner’s finding that Feig designates an active hyperlink by
applying “minimal” and “additional” criteria as recited in claim 10.
C. Does Feig teach claim 17’s scoring of hyperlinks?
The third issue before us is whether Feig teaches independent
claim 17’s scoring of hyperlinks. See infra (contentions). Claim 17 recites
this feature as follows: “the hyperlinks are scored based on matching the
criteria, and wherein the hyperlink with the highest score is designated as the
active hyperlink.”
As to the claimed “score,” the Examiner finds:
If a hyperlink passes a criteria (e.g. is the resource referenced by
the hyperlink accessible or reachable), it is implicitly assigned a
score (e.g. pass/fail, 0 or 1, etc.). For those hyperlinks passing
the first criteria,. . . scoring is by bandwidth where the hyperlink
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with the highest bandwidth implicitly scores highest and is
selected as the active hyperlink[.]
Ans. 17—18.
We find no error in the Examiner’s determination that Feig’s
compared bandwidths constitute compared bandwidth “scores.” We do so
because bandwidth is a measured value. Further, Feig’s disclosed tie in
bandwidths (Feig, col. 4,11. 22—24) implicitly discloses a comparison of
rounded values (as bandwidths are otherwise too exacting to produce a
tie). Thus, Feig’s compared bandwidths are ranked, i.e., scored, based upon
their point-values, e.g., by comparing MB (megabytes per second) values
that increment one MB “point” for every million bytes per second increase
in performance.
Appellants present several arguments, each of which is conclusory or
unresponsive to the finding of bandwidth scores. Reply Br. 14—
15. Appellants contend: “Feig does not describe scoring” {id. at 14);
“bandwidth is not a criteria . . . but [rather] merely a parameter” (id. at 15);
and “Feig . . . arbitrarily choos[es] a first in a listed order of URFs ... if
there happens to be a tie . . . [and thus] describes arbitrary selection of a
URF” (id. ). The first and second contentions merely assert that a bandwidth
value is not a criteria score. The third contention merely asserts a bandwidth
tie would not occur if Feig selected URFs based on bandwidth scores. For
the reasons discussed above, we disagree with these contentions.
D. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants’ arguments do not establish a
reversible error.
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Appellants do not present separate arguments for patentability of the
dependent claims. Appellants contend claims 2—9 and 11—16 are allowable
in view of their dependencies from claims 1 and 10 (addressed above).
Reply Br. 11 (claims 2—5 and 7—9), 13 (claims 11, 12, and 16), 15 (claims 6
and 15), 16 (claims 13 and 14). Appellants do not address claims 18—20.
We accordingly sustain all rejections.
DECISION
We affirm the rejections of claims 1—20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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