Ex Parte Chahrouri et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jun 2, 2009

10104564 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 2, 2009)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte GEBRAN G. CHAHROURI, KEVIN T. COLLINS, LABHESH
PATEL, and CHRIS S. L. YEO
____________

Appeal 2009-1684
Application 10/104,564
Technology Center 2600
____________

Decided;1 June 2, 2009
____________

Before KENNETH W. HAIRSTON, JOHN A. JEFFERY, and KARL D.
EASTHOM, Administrative Patent Judges.

EASTHOM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil
action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, begins to run from the decided date
shown on this page of the decision. The time period does not run from the
Mail Date (paper delivery) or Notification Date (electronic delivery).
Appeal 2009-1684
Application 10/104,564

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1-33 (App. Br. 5).2 We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Appellants disclose an automatic call distribution (ACD) system that
employs customized logic related to agent behavior. ACDs typically match
incoming requests for service, for example telephone calls or e-mails, with a
resource for handling that service, for example, a human agent. (Abstract;
Spec. 1:2-5; 2:2-6). Exemplary claim 1 follows:
1. A method for routing calls of an automatic call
distributor system, comprising:
receiving a first workflow associated with a first agent of a plurality of
agents, the first workflow comprising logic customized for the first agent
that comprises a desired behavior for the first agent;
receiving a plurality of requests for connection with one of the
plurality of agents, wherein each request is received from a respective user;
monitoring system information;
executing the first workflow comprising logic customized for the first
agent after the first agent becomes available for connection with one of the
respective users;
selecting a first request of the plurality of requests, wherein the first
request is selected based on the desired behavior of the first agent and the
monitored system information;
connecting the first request to the first agent;
after the first agent has handled the first request, reexecuting the first
workflow comprising logic customized for the first agent; and
repeatedly selecting additional requests of the plurality of requests for
connection with the first agent and connecting the additional requests to the
first agent, wherein the workflow comprising logic customized for the first

2 Appellants’ Brief (filed May 16, 2007) (“App. Br.”) and Reply Brief (filed
Nov. 21, 2007) and the Examiner’s Answer (mailed Sept. 25, 2007) (“Ans.”)
detail the parties’ positions.
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agent is reexecuted after each handling of an additional request by the first
agent.

The Examiner relies on the following prior art references:

Ho US 4,747,130 May 24, 1988
Tonisson US 5,903,641 May 11, 1999
Cave US 6,845,154 B1 Jan. 18, 2005
(filed Jan. 23, 2001)
The Examiner rejected: claims 1, 3-5, 8, 10-12, 15, 17-19, 22, 24-26,
and 29-33 as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) based on Tonisson;
claims 2, 7, 9, 14, 16, 21, 23, and 28 as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
based on Tonisson and Ho; and claims 6, 13, 20, and 27 as obvious under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Tonisson and Cave.
ISSUES
Appellants dispute the Examiner’s finding that Tonisson anticipates
claims 1, 3-5, 8, 10-12, 15, 17-19, 22, 24-26, and 29-33. The issue presented
by Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 15-19) with respect to the anticipatory
rejection of claims 1, 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 15, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 29-33 based on
Tonisson is:3
Did Appellants demonstrate that the Examiner erred in finding that
Tonisson discloses logic customized for a first agent and reexecuting logic
after each handling of a request as required by claim 1?

3 Appellants do not argue these claims separately and rely on arguments
which focus on claim 1 (see id.). Accordingly, claim 1 is selected to
represent this group. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

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With respect to the anticipatory rejection of dependent claims 3, 10,
17 and 24 based on Tonisson, Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 19) present
the following issue: 4
Did Appellants demonstrate that the Examiner erred in finding that
Tonisson discloses receiving a workflow after the first agent becomes
available?
With respect to the obviousness rejection of dependent claims 7, 14,
21 and 28 based on Tonisson and Ho, Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 21)
present the following issue: 5
Did Appellants demonstrate that the Examiner erred in finding that
Tonisson discloses a second workflow associated with a second agent?

FINDINGS OF FACT (FF)
Appellants’ Disclosure
1. Appellants describe connecting agents to calls “based upon desired
behavior for a particular agent or group of agents. The desired behavior can
be entered into the communication system by a system manager through
workflows containing customized logic . . . .” (Spec. 8:21-23).
2. A manager controls “agent behavior” by inputting such
“workflows containing customized logic” to arrive at the “desired behavior”
as follows (see also infra FF 3):

4 Appellants focus on claim 3 and do not present separate patentability
arguments for claims 10, 17, and 24 (App. Br. 20, 21). Accordingly, claim 3
is selected to represent this group. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

5 Appellants focus on claim 7 and do not present separate patentability
arguments for claims 14, 21, and 28 (App. Br. 21). Accordingly, claim 7 is
selected to represent this group. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

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The logic may be specific to a particular agent or group of
agents. The logic may be written in a workflow and entered
into memory 50. The logic is then be [sic] executed by ACD
34a after a particular agent or group of agents becomes
available to handle a call. Executing customized logic specific
to a particular agent at the time the agent becomes available to
handle a call provides a manager of ACD 34a greater flexibility
and control over agent behavior.

(Spec. 14:17-25).
3. Appellants describe a particular example involving customized logic,
workflow and desired agent behavior:
For example, assume that agents 48a and 48b normally
take calls from both queues 54a and 54b. . . . A system manager
may desire for agent 48a to always handle calls from queue 54a,
if any exist, and only handle calls from queue 54b if queue 54a
is empty. A system manager of ACD 34a may input into ACD
34a a workflow containing relating [sic] to the desired behavior
for agent 48a. When agent 48a becomes available processor 46
executes the workflow previously entered relating to agent 48a.
Agent 48a may become available after concluding a previous
call, after taking a break or after other occurrences. . . . After
executing the workflow . . ., ACD 34a routes a particular call to
agent 48a based upon the workflow and the conditions. In this
example, distributor 52 would connect agent 48a to a call from
queue 54a . . . . This connection is in accordance with the desire
of the system manager who input the desired behavior of agent
48a into ACD 34a through the workflow.

Assume further that the desired behavior for agent 48b
involves simply handling the call that has waited the longest on
either of queues 54a and 54b. A system manager of ACD 34a
may input into ACD 34a a workflow relating to the desired
behavior for agent 48b. When agent 48b becomes available,
observer 49 may also check conditions of ACD 34a . . . .
Processor 46 executes the workflow previously entered relating
to agent 48b. After executing the workflow . . . distributor 52
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connects the particular call residing in queue 54a or 54b which
had been waiting the longest amount of time to agent 48b.

(Spec. 14:26-16:3).
4. “[T]he workflow may comprise desired behavior for a group of
agents” (Spec. 18:29-30).
5. To support “reexecuting the first workflow comprising logic
customized for the first agent”, Appellants rely (App. Br. 9:14-15), inter
alia, on their Specification at page 17, lines 9-11, which states: “The
workflow would be executed each time the agent becomes available for a
call, as described above.”
Tonisson
6. Tonisson’s ACD system automatically assigns calls to “skills in a
call center wherein individual calls requiring different skills are handled by a
plurality of agents who are individually assigned to different ones of the
skills . . . .” (Col. 2, ll. 11-19) (emphasis supplied).
7. Tonisson describes typical prior art ACD systems as follows:
“When the ACD system detects that an agent has become available to handle
a call, the ACD system delivers to the agent the highest-priority oldest-
waiting call that matches the agent’s highest skill.” (Col. 1, ll. 25-28).
Tonisson’s system, like the typical prior art systems, also connects calls
from call queues to available agents based on matching skills to calls as
agents become available (col. 5, ll. 29-36). Tonisson describes problems
with prior art systems as based on the requirement that a supervisor must
manually adjust agent assignments as call volumes change (col. 1, ll. 41-58).
8. Tonisson’s system overcomes the prior art ACD systems by
“automatically adjust[ing] agents’ call-handling assignments – for example,
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by changing the skills to which an agent is assigned (logged into) or by
changing the relative priorities (levels of expertise) of the agent’s skills – in
order to optimize a predefined objective or objectives” (col. 1, l. 62 to col. 2,
l. 8).
9. In Tonisson’s ACD 110, each call queue 120 (121-129) and agent
queue 130 (131-139) corresponds to a different agent skill (col. 3, ll. 60-63;
Fig. 1). Calls are typically assigned to “only one call queue which
corresponds to the skill that the call needs the most. Likewise each agent’s
skills are typically prioritized according to his or her level of expertise in
that skill” (col. 4, ll. 1-4). Individual agents are enqueued in queues 130 in
their order of expertise (or in multiple queues in a similar fashion) (col. 4, ll.
4-9). “Individual calls requiring different skills are handled by agents 106-
108 who are individually assigned to different ones of the skills” (col. 4, ll.
21-23).
10. After an agent logs into the system, agent vector 150 retrieves the
agents’ skills and levels of expertise from data base 101 and logs the agent
into each of the agent’s skill queues 130 at the corresponding level of
expertise. The vector, inter alia, allocates the percentage of time each agent
spends handling calls from each skill queue. Periodically, as call volumes
change, or otherwise, the agent vector 150 optimizes the call center by
adjusting the agent’s call handling priorities. The vector retrieves
predetermined values of optimization parameters from the CMS 110 (call
management system which gathers records and statistics (col. 3, ll. 44-47)).
The vector optimizes for each skill of each logged-in agent and
automatically assigns calls accordingly. (Fig. 4; col. 4, ll. 36-52; col. 9, l. 62
to col. 10, l. 67).
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PRINCIPLES OF LAW
“[T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on review of the prior art or
on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability.” In
re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Under § 102, anticipation is established when a single prior art
reference discloses expressly or under the principles of inherency each and
every limitation of the claimed invention. Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO, Inc.,
190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1478-79
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
Under § 103,

“there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness” . .
. . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings
directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim,
for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps
that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.

KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re
Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). “On appeal to the Board, an
applicant can overcome a rejection by showing insufficient evidence of
prima facie obviousness . . . .” Kahn, 441 F.3d at 985-86 (citation omitted).
“[W]hen . . . the prior art . . . is altered by the mere substitution of one
element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than
yield a predictable result.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 416 (citation omitted). “‘Our
suggestion test is in actuality quite flexible and not only permits, but
requires, consideration of common knowledge and common sense.’” Id. at
421 (citation omitted).
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“It is the applicants’ burden to precisely define the invention,
not the PTO’s.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(“The problem in this case is that the appellants failed to make their
intended meaning explicitly clear.”).

ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 15, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, and 29-33
Customized Logic
Appellants argue, with respect to claim 1, that Tonisson’s assignment
based on “‘an optimization function . . . [that] determine[s] optimum
assignments of the plurality of call center agents’” (App. Br. 16 (quoting
Tonisson col. 2, ll. 31-35)) does not constitute customized logic for
individual agents because “the Examiner has simply attempted to equate an
agent’s skill with customized logic” (id.). Appellants also assert that “one
optimization function that assigns several agents” does not constitute “logic
customized for individual agents” (id.).
Appellants’ arguments lack merit. The Examiner relied on more than
an agent’s skills as constituting customized logic. For example, the
Examiner described Tonisson’s ACD system 101 as assigning agents into
specific skill queues associated with different agent skills and automatically
assigning calls to the agents (Ans. 4, 10) as constituting customized logic.
Appellants’ “customized logic” involves merely assigning calls to agents
based on skill levels or desired agent behavior (see FF 1-3). The skill level
may not even be considered: “the desired behavior for agent 48b involves
simply handling the call that has waited the longest” (FF 3).
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Tonisson’s ACD system individually assigns each agent to a specific
set of skill queues 130 and also allocates calls to each agent based on the
agent’s specific skills and relative time spent at each assigned queue (FF 6-
10). Such individual assignment and allocation based on individual skill
constitutes logic customized for each individual agent, as the Examiner
found, contrary to Appellants’ arguments.
Thus, even if Tonisson’s overall logic function optimizes the system
as Appellants argue, Tonisson’s system individually considers the skill
levels of each agent and thereby provides individual assignment based logic
as described above (FF 6-10). For example, “each agent’s skills are
typically prioritized according to his or her level of expertise in that skill”
(FF 9). Any readjustment of work assignments by the optimizing agent
vector occurs after the individual consideration and assignment of each
agent – thereby meeting the argued claim limitation both prior to and after
such optimization. The optimization simply includes consideration of each
skill of each logged-in agent and automatically assigns calls accordingly.
(FF 10).
Reexecuting Logic
Appellants’ assertion that Tonisson does not disclose reexecuting “the
workflow comprising logic customized for the first agent . . . after each
handling of an additional request” as set forth in claim 1 is based on the
assertion, implied or otherwise, that “reexecuting” requires a readjustment or
recalculation of the workflow logic (see App. Br. 17-19). Appellants set
forth no basis for this assertion. Claim 1 requires no such readjustment or
recalculation. Therefore, Appellants’ arguments are not commensurate in
scope with claim 1.
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Further, Appellants’ disclosure indicates that reexecution merely
requires performing the same defined workflow duties on the next call or
calls as on the previous call, as the agent becomes available (see FF 3, 5).
Tonisson’s agents similarly perform the same workflow tasks for a set of
calls (until the tasks are possibly changed via optimization as described
supra, FF 10) after they are available – i.e., after completing an earlier call
task from a call queue (FF 7).
Accordingly, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and
claims 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 15, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, and 29-33 which were not
separately argued.
Claims 3, 10, 17 and 24
Appellants contend that “[b]ecause Tonisson discloses that the agents
are logged into their skills before they are available, Tonisson does not
disclose receiving the first workflow after the first agent becomes available
for connection with one of the respective users” (App. Br. 20).
This argument assumes that claim 3 precludes receiving a “first
workflow” more than once. To the contrary, the claim does not preclude
receiving another first workflow assignment after the first agent becomes
available. In other words, the “first workflow” corresponds to the “first
agent,” and does not preclude other first workflows for the first agent.
Appellants acknowledge that Tonisson discloses “a periodic recalculation”
(id.). Such a new recalculation of skills or priorities constitutes receiving
(by a component in the system) a new first workflow (see FF 8, 10). Under
an alternative claim interpretation, as described supra, Tonisson’s agents
each receive the same first workflow on each reexecution thereof – i.e., after
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completing a previous call at which time the agent becomes “available for
connection” for the next call.
Appellants also argue:
FIGURE 2 depicts an agent first logging in (200) then the
agent’s skills are retrieved (202) and then the agent is logged
into the agent’s skills (204). . . . The Examiner has focused on
the agent being merely logged into the system, but the user is
not available to handle a call until the agent vector logs the
agent into one or more skills. As can be seen in FIGURE 2, the
agent’s skills are retrieved before the agent is logged into his
skills.
(Reply Br. 6) (emphasis added).
Appellants’ argument implies that “available for connection” means
“available to handle a call.” This argument is not commensurate with the
scope of claim 3. Additionally, Appellants do not disclose that an agent can
“handle” a call without having a workflow in place nor what an agent would
“handle” without a workflow. While Appellants disclose that an agent can
become “available” “after conducting a previous call, after taking a break or
after other occurrences” (FF 3), Appellants do not define “available for
connection.” “It is the applicants’ burden to precisely define their invention,
not the PTO’s.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The
problem in this case is that the appellants failed to make their intended
meaning explicitly clear.”).
Therefore, in addition to the interpretations of claim 3 as determined
above, becoming “available for connection” alternatively does not preclude
merely arriving at the call center, or, as the Examiner determined, logging
onto the system (and then receiving the first workflow). Accordingly, we
will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3, 10, 17, and 24.

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Claims 7, 14, 21 and 28
Appellants argue (Reply Br. 7) that “an agent’s skills or parameters
are not a workflow” and therefore Tonisson does not disclose a second
workflow associated with a second agent. The argument lacks merit.
Tonisson’s ACD assigns workflows for each agent as explained above with
respect to claim 1. Workflows, as Appellants employ the term (FF 1-3),
simply correspond to automated work assignments, abundantly disclosed in
Tonisson whereby multiple agents are each uniquely automatically assigned
to specific call tasks in the ACD based on his or her expertise (FF 5-10).
Accordingly, we will also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims
7, 14, 21, and 28.
Claims 2, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 16, 20, 21, 23, 27, and 28
Appellants argue (App. Br. 20-21) that claims 2, 7, 9, 14, 16, 21, 23,
and 28, rejected based on Tonisson and Ho, and claims 6, 13, 20, and 27,
rejected based on Tonisson and Cave, are unobvious “for at least the reasons
discussed . . . with respect to claims 1, 8, 15 and 22” (id. at 21).6 Because
Appellants’ arguments with respect to claims 1, 8, 15 and 22 do not
demonstrate error, we will also sustain the rejections of claims 2, 6, 7, 9, 13,
14, 16, 20, 21, 23, 27, and 28.
Final Finding and Determination
Comparing Tonisson’s and Appellants’ disclosures reveals similar
ACD systems, with Tonisson adding system optimization to the “logic”
(compare FF 1-5 with FF 6-10). As such, Appellants’ use of different

6 As discussed supra, Appellants presented a separate argument for claims 7,
14, 21 and 28 as a group.
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terminology to describe the similar components of Appellants’ ACD system
fails to patentably distinguish the claims over Tonisson’s ACD system.
CONCLUSION
Appellants did not demonstrate that the Examiner erred in finding that
Tonisson discloses 1) logic customized for a first agent and reexecuting
logic after each handling of a request as required by claim 1; 2) receiving a
workflow after the first agent becomes available as required by claim 3; and
3) a second workflow associated with a second agent as required by claim 7.

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-33.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

gvw

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