Ex Parte Case

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 28, 2018

12166157 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 28, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/166,157 07/01/2008
26379 7590 07/02/2018
DLA PIPER LLP (US )
2000 UNIVERSITY A VENUE
EAST PALO ALTO, CA 94303-2248
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Janet E. Case
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
365041-991101 3161
EXAMINER
PALA VECINO, KATHLEEN GAGE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3625
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/02/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PatentDocketing US-PaloAlto@dlapiper.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JANET E. CASE
Appeal2017-004451
Application 12/166,157
Technology Center 3600
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, HUNG H. BUI, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.
MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL 1
1 Appellant indicates the Real Party in Interest is Proxio. App. Br. 1.
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Application 12/166,157
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1-32. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We AFFIRM.
Representative Claim
Representative claim 1 under appeal reads as follows ( emphases,
formatting, and bracketed material added).
1. A private market system, comprising:
[A.] one or more buying parties, wherein each buying party
interacts with the system using a processing unit based device;
[B.] one or more selling parties, wherein each selling party
interacts with the system using a processing unit based device;
[C.] a computer that executes a private market unit;
[D.] a network capable of connecting the one or more buying
parties and the one or more selling parties to the private market unit;
and
[E.] the private market unit further comprising
[i.] an offer repository storing one or more offers of
products or services with privacy levels attached to
each offer from the one or more selling parties, the
privacy levels including
[a.] a public privacy level,
[b.] a network privacy level and
[ c.] a private privacy level,
[ii.] a request repository storing one or more requests for
products or services from the one or more buying
parties, an anonymity repository storing a set of
anonymity parameters for each of the one or more
buying parties, the one or more selling parties and
one of the product and the service that is part of a
transaction,
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[iii.] a matching engine that matches a particular offer for
one of the product and service in the offer
repository with one or more requests for one of the
product and service in the request repository based
on the set of anonymity parameters for each of the
one or more buying parties, the one or more selling
parties and one of the product and the service that
is part of the transaction which maintains the
anonymity of the buying parties to generate a
matching request and the selling party and
[iv.] a notification engine that notifies a buying party
associated with the matching request of the match
based on the privacy levels of the offers and the
parameters stored in the anonymity repository for
the selling party associated with the particular
offer and the relationship between the buying party
and the selling party and initiates the transaction
based on the anonymity parameters.
Examiner's Rejections
A. Section 101
The Examiner rejected claims 1-32 "under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the
claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter" (Final Act. 4)
i.e., for being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
We select claim 1 as representative. Appellant does not argue
separate patentability for claims 2-32. Except for our ultimate decision, we
do not address this rejection of claims 2-32 further herein.
B. Section 103
1.
The Examiner rejected claims 1-14, 18-28, and 32 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Kuehr-McLaren et
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al. (US 2005/0102195 Al; pub. May 12, 2005) and Millard et al. (US
2002/0007335 Al; pub. Jan. 17, 2002).
Appellant argues separate patentability for claim 1. Appellant does
not argue separate patentability for claims 2-14, 18-28, and 32. To the
extent that Appellant discusses claim 18, Appellant merely repeats the
arguments directed to claim 1. Such a repeated argument is not an argument
for "separate patentability." Except for our ultimate decision, we do not
address this rejection of claims 2-14, 18-28, and 32 further herein.
2.
The Examiner rejected claims 15-17 and 29-31 under 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Kuehr-McLaren and Millard in various
combinations with other references. 2
Separate patentability is not argued for claims 15-17 and 29-31.
Rather, Appellant argues against these claims solely by reference to the
arguments presented for their parent independent claims. Thus, the
rejections of these claims tum on our decision as to claim 1. Except for our
ultimate decision, we do not address these rejections further herein.
Issues on Appeal
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 for being directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 for being obvious?
2 We treat headings D. and E. at page 16 of the Appeal Brief and page 3 of
the Reply Brief as though they correctly reference the rejections under
35 U.S.C. § 103.
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ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellant's
arguments (Appeal Brief and Reply Brief) that the Examiner has erred. We
disagree with Appellant's conclusions.
A. Section 101
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for "any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof." The Supreme Court has "long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bankint'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quotingAss'nfor
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
The Supreme Court in Alice reiterated the two-step framework previously
set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 82-83 (2012), "for distinguishing patents that claim laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first
step in that analysis is to "determine whether the claims at issue are directed
to one of those patent-ineligible concepts," such as an abstract idea. For
example, a fundamental economic practice is an abstract idea:
[In Bilski v. Kappas], the Court grounded its conclusion that all
of the claims at issue were abstract ideas in the understanding
that risk hedging was a "'fundamental economic practice."' 561
U.S., at 611.
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357.
The Court acknowledged in Mayo that "all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena,
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or abstract ideas." Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. We, therefore, look to whether the
claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery. See
Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016). If
the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise,
the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are
considered "individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine
whether the additional elements 'transform the nature of the claim' into a
patent-eligible application." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 ( quoting Mayo, 566
U.S. at 79, 78).
In other words, the second step is to "search for an 'inventive
concept'-i.e., an element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ ineligible concept] itself."' Id. ( alteration in original) ( quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73). The prohibition against patenting an abstract
idea "'cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula
to a particular technological environment' or adding 'insignificant
postsolution activity."' Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 610-11 (2010)
( citation omitted).
B. Examiner's §101 Rejection -Alice/Mayo - Steps 1 and 2
Applying step 1 of the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner determines:
The claims are directed to business interactions which is
considered to be an abstract idea inasmuch as such activity is
considered to be a fundamental economic practice by organizing,
storing, and transmitting information ( offers and privacy levels
for business interactions). Organizing, storing, and transmitting
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information has been deemed by the Federal Circuit to be an
abstract idea (see Cyberfone [v]. CNN et al (Fed[.] Cir[.] 2014)[.]
Final Act. 2.
Applying step 2 of the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner determines:
[W]hen considering the elements and combinations of
elements, the claims as a whole do not amount to significantly
more than the abstract ides itself. This is because the claim does
not amount to an improvement to another technology or technical
field; and do not amount to an improvement to the functioning of
a computer itself.
Furthermore, the claim merely amounts to the application
or instructions to apply the abstract idea (i.e. business
interactions) on a computer, with the claims requiring nothing
more than a generic computer to perform generic computer
functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional
activities previously known to the industry.
10/28/2014 Non-Final Act. 4.
C. Appellant's§ 101 Arguments
1. Abstract Idea - "tie up"
Appellant raises the following arguments in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as directed to patent ineligible subject
matter.
Pursuant to Step 2A [ of the 2014 Interim Eligibility
Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014)], the examiner
asserts that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of business
interactions. OA at 4. Pursuant to Step 2A, the examiner must
then determine if the abstract idea is set forth in the claims and
would "tie up" the abstract idea. In the present case, the abstract
idea is not set forth in the claims and the claims would not tie up
the abstract idea since these claims do not embody the alleged
abstract idea (the fundamental economic practice of business
interactions) since the claims recite other elements and thus the
abstract idea is not set forth in the claims. Specifically, the claims
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recite other features of the claimed apparatus and method that do
not claim the abstract idea and thus the claims are not directed to
the abstract idea. Furthermore, the claims clearly do not "tie up"
the idea of business interactions. Thus, pursuant to Step 2A of
the Interim Guidelines, claims 1-32 are not directed to an abstract
idea and the rejection should be withdrawn.
App. Br. 10-11 (emphasis added).
Essentially Appellant asserts that procedurally the Examiner is
required to perform a "tie up" analysis as part of Step 1 of the Alice/Mayo
framework (Step 2A of the 2014 Interim Eligibility Guidelines); and the
Examiner fails to do so. We are unpersuaded by Appellant's assertion. To
the extent that any "tie up" analysis requirement exists, it is as part of the
"significantly more" analysis of Step 2 of the Alice/Mayo framework (Step
2B of the 2014 Interim Eligibility Guidelines). See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 86-87
( the Court uses the phrase "tie up" three times in its discussion of the
controlling precedents which reinforce its conclusion that to be patent
eligible a claim directed to an abstract idea must add something of
significance to that abstract idea).
To the extent that Appellant asserts the Examiner has erred in
showing claim 1 does not recite significantly more, we address such
assertions below based on the particularized arguments Appellant presents to
support the assertions.
2. Abstract Idea- Cyberfone
Appellant also raises the following arguments in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as directed to patent ineligible subject
matter.
[T]he examiner has relied on the Cyberfone CAFC case to
support his cursory[] conclusion that the claims are directed to
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an abstract idea. However, the Cyberfone case is inapplicable
since it was decided before the Alice case, the USPTO
Guidelines, subsequent CAFC cases and the USPTO memos
cited above and thus the Court could not have used the proper
test to assess whether the claims are in fact directed to an
abstract idea. For example, the Cyberfone test does not follow
the test set forth in the Alice case nor the further refinements to
the patent eligibility test set forth in the Enfish and TLC cases.
Thus, the Cyberfone case cannot be used as a basis for a case in
which the court found a claim to be an abstract idea. As a result,
the examiner has not identified a court case in which the court
found claims, using the proper test, like the pending claims
directed to an abstract idea. Thus, the alleged abstract idea is not
similar to the court examples (that have applied the proper test)
and thus is not an abstract idea under Step 2A of the USPTO
Guidelines.
App. Br. 11 ( emphasis added).
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument. Contrary to
Appellant's assertion that the USPTO's 2014 Interim Eligibility Guidelines
could not have used Cyberfone to assess whether a claim is directed to an
abstract idea, the USPTO' s Guidelines explicitly reference Cyberfone as an
example of a claim to an abstract idea. 79 Fed. Reg. at 7 4622, 7 463 0-31.
3. Abstract Idea-Not directed thereto
Appellant also raises the following arguments in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as directed to patent ineligible subject
matter.
[U]nder Step 2A and the Enfzsh and TLC cases, the examiner has
overly broadly[] define[ d] the abstract idea without taking into
account all of the claim language as is required under the current
case law. For example, the examiner's allegation that the claims
are directed to a fundamental economic practice by organizing,
storing and transmitting information ignores the various claim
elements of the claims that, when properly analyzed under the
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case law, show that the claims are not directed to any abstract
idea. Specifically, the claims recite [ Appellant fully quotes claim
1 above portions E. i-iv] which were not properly considered by
the cursory analysis performed by the examiner in the office
action. Thus, pursuant to Step 2A, the claims are not in fact
directed to an abstract idea and the rejection should be withdrawn
for at least this additional reason.
App. Br. 11-12.
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument. We agree with the
Examiner's determination that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea in the
form of sales process functions in a private market (see all of the functions
recited in above portions E. i-iv of claim 1 ). Contrary to Appellant's
argument, these claimed functions are business functions, not technological
functions. Also contrary to Appellant's argument, claim 1 is directed to a
"fundamental economic practice." Such activities are squarely within the
realm of abstract ideas. Sales process functions in a private market are a
fundamental business practice long prevalent in our system of commerce,
like the risk hedging in Bilski, the intermediated settlement in Alice,
verifying credit card transactions in CyberSource (see CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011)), collecting and
analyzing information to detect and notify of misuses in Fair Warning (see
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 (Fed. Cir.
2016)), and guaranteeing transactions (see buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,
765 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Sales process functions in a private
market are also a building block of a market economy. Thus, sales process
functions in a private market, like risk hedging and intermediated settlement,
are an "abstract idea" beyond the scope of§ 101. See Alice 134 S. Ct. at
2356.
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4. Significantly More
Appellant also raises the following arguments in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as directed to patent ineligible subject
matter.
The claims also are directed to substantially more than the
abstract idea since the claims are directed to improvement in a
technical field (pursuant to the Enfzsh case) and directed to a
solution that did not exist prior to the Internet and thus was not
well known prior to the Internet pursuant to the DDR Holdings
case.
Pursuant to the Enfish case, the claims are directed to
improvement in a technical field ( a sales marketplace) in which
the claims recite the various elements set forth in the independent
claims that provide an improvement in technology (the privacy
levels and the matching engine) that did not exist in the prior art
as explained below in response to the prior art rejections. Thus,
the claims are directed to substantially more than the abstract
idea for at least this reason.
The claims are directed to a technical problem ( an real
estate sales ... system) and a solution (the privacy levels and the
matching engine) that did not exist before the Internet.
Therefore, the claim elements are not well known pursuant to
DDR Holdings and are not directed to simply a computer
implementation of a notoriously well known idea like
hedging ....
. . . Similar to the Bascom case, the present claims are
directed broadly to a markplace that may be an abstract idea like
the content filtering in Bascom. However, like Bascom, the
present claims are a particular arrangement of elements ( see
summary of claims above) that are a technical improvement
(including the privacy level and how the matching engine
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operates with respect to those privacy levels) over the prior art
ways of a private market as described in the background of the
present patent application.
App. Br. 13-14 (emphasis added).
[P]ursuant to the McRO[, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.,
837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016)] case, the instant claims are
directed to patent eligible subject matter. Like the McRO claims,
the present claims are directed to improving an existing
technological process (a computer based private market system)
like the lip synchronization and facial expression control of
animated characters in McRo [sic]. Furthermore, the claims
specifically recite [ Appellant fully quotes claim 1 above portions
E. iii-iv] which are like the set of rules in the McRO [sic] claims
so that the present claims do not preempt any idea ( for the same
reasons as the McRO case) and are limited to the specific
processes for the computer private market set forth in the claims
(like the specific processes for automatically animating
characters using particular information and techniques and does
not preempt all techniques of McRO [sic]) and thus are patent
eligible for the same reasons set forth in McRo [sic].
Furthermore, like McRO [sic], it is the processes above and not
the use of a computer that improved the existing technological
process of a computer private market.
App. Br. 12-13.
We see no reason on the record to question the Appellant's assertion
that the claimed invention improves "buying" and "selling" ( claim 1) by
improving the business transaction (i.e., transaction steps) of sales process
functions in a private market. However, the fact that a claimed concept is
"[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant" is not enough to "satisfy
the§ 101 inquiry." Myriad, 569 U.S. at 591. Nor is it enough for subject-
matter eligibility that claimed techniques be novel and nonobvious in light of
prior art, passing muster under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. See Mayo, 566
U.S. at 89-90; Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138,
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1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract
idea. A claim directed to a unique and advantageous marketing and sales
arrangement is nonetheless directed to a marketing and sales arrangement
and constitutes an abstract idea. 3 "[U]nder the Mayol Alice framework, a
claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature ( or natural phenomenon
or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the
inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility." Genetic Techs. Ltd. v.
Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 188-89 (1981). The search for a§ 101 inventive concept is
distinct from demonstrating§ 102 novelty."); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (same for
obviousness) (Symantec). We conclude that the improvement of claim 1 is
an improved sequence of sales process functions in a private market
(fundamental economic practice), that is, an improved abstract idea. The
claims here are ineligible because their innovation is an innovation in
ineligible subject matter.
Further, in contrast to cases such as BASCOM, we conclude claim 1
contains no technical solution. Bascom Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Unlike the claims at issue in
3 See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In
this case, the patentee argued that its financial arrangement ( a method of
using advertising as an exchange or currency) was distinguishable from the
"routine," "long prevalent," or "conventional" abstract idea in Alice
because it was "directed to a specific method of advertising and content
distribution that was previously unknown." Id. at 714. The court rejected
the patentee's position that "abstract ideas remain patent-eligible under
§ 101 as long as they are new ideas, not previously well known, and not
routine activity." Id.
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BASCOM, claim 1 does not introduce a technical advance or improvement.
It contains nothing that amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
abstract idea itself. Id. See Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839
F.3d 1138, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2016). To the extent claim 1 adds anything to the
abstract idea, it is a statement to use a computer to perform the business
functions of "storing" the business data, "matching" transactions, and
providing "notifications" to the transaction's parties. "[I]f a patent's
recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to 'implemen[t]' an
abstract idea 'on ... a computer,' that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (alteration in original) ( quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 84). Appellant's argument that claim 1 is directed to an
improvement in a technical field is simply an attempt to reach into the
ineligible concept (sales process functions in a private market) to show an
improvement to the well-understood, routine, and conventional activity of
storing, matching, and providing notification. The timing, execution, and
confidentiality (privacy) of sales process functions in a private market is a
buying and sales problem, not a technological problem.
Claim 1 does not "focus on a specific means or method that improves
the relevant technology," but is "directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke[s] generic processes and machinery."
McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314. This is not enough to transform an abstract idea
into patent-eligible subject matter. See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360
( explaining that claims that "amount to 'nothing significantly more' than an
instruction to apply the abstract idea ... using some unspecified, generic
computer" "is not 'enough' to transform an abstract idea into a patent-
eligible invention" (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77, 79)); Intellectual
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Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2017) ("[T]he claim language here provides only a result-oriented
solution, with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it.").
5. Additional 101 Procedural Argument
Appellant further raises the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as directed to patent ineligible subject
matter.
[T]he examiner did not address the McRo [sic] case which was
cited in the appeal brief and relied on in the arguments made by
Applicant. Thus, it appears that the examiner has no rebuttal
argument for the McRo [sic] case.
Reply Br. 1 ( emphasis added).
Appellant's argument overlooks the Examiner's conclusion, that "the
claims do not speak to a particular technical improvement such as those in
Bascom or other decisions rendered by the courts" (Ans. 6 ( emphasis
added)), is inclusive of Appellant's McRO argument. We agree with the
Examiner's discussion and conclusion.
D. Appellant's§ 103 Arguments
Appellant raises the following arguments in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Kuehr fails to disclose the claimed different privacy levels
(public privacy level, a network privacy level and a private
privacy level) that are used by a claimed notification engine to
notify a buyer) and that are used to initiate the transaction based
on the claimed anonymity parameters.
Furthermore, while Millard generally discloses privacy levels,
Millard still fails to disclose the two claim elements set forth
above.
App. Br. 15 ( emphasis omitted).
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In particular, Appellant argues the Kuehr-McLaren reference fails to
disclose or suggest the limitation of different privacy levels. However,
Examiner did not cite Kuehr-McLaren for this limitation. Rather, the
Examiner cited Millard. Final Act. 7-8. Then, Appellant argues4 the
Millard reference fails to disclose or suggest the limitations of an "offer
repository" and a "notification engine." However, Examiner did not cite
Millard for these limitations. Rather, the Examiner cited Kuehr-McLaren.
Final Act. 6-7.
We conclude that Appellant's argument does not address the actual
reasoning of the Examiner's rejection. Instead, Appellant attacks each of the
Kuehr-McLaren and Millard references singly for lacking teachings that the
Examiner relied on the combination of references to show. It is well
established that one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references
individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references.
See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d
1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986). This form of argument is inherently unpersuasive to
show Examiner error. Our reviewing court requires that references must be
read, not in isolation, but for what they fairly teach in combination with the
prior art as a whole. Merck, 800 F .2d at 1097.
CONCLUSION
(1) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1-32 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 for being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
4 We are reading the argued "two claim elements" (App. Br. 15) as the
"offer repository" and "notification engine" of the portion of claim 1
which Appellant quotes at page 14 of the Appeal Brief.
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(2) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1-32 as being
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
DECISION
The Examiner's rejections of claims 1-32 are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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