Ex Parte Carter et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardOct 25, 201711279393 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/279,393 04/11/2006 Susan A. Carter C1401.70022US00 8057 23628 7590 10/27/2017 WOLF GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C. 600 ATLANTIC AVENUE BOSTON, MA 02210-2206 EXAMINER MURATA, AUSTIN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1712 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/27/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Patents_eOfficeAction@WolfGreenfield.com W GS_eOffice Action @ W olfGreenfield .com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SUSAN A. CARTER and JOHN G. VICTOR Appeal 2017-001434 Application 11/279,3931 Technology Center 1700 Before MICHAEL P. COLAIANNI, JEFFREY R. SNAY, and BRIAN D. RANGE, Administrative Patent Judges. RANGE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL SUMMARY Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 9—14, 16, 18—31, 34, and 38. We have jurisdiction. 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Sumitomo Chemical Company Limited. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2017-001434 Application 11/279,393 STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 Appellants describe the invention as relating to a method of making an electroluminescent device, such as a light-emitting polymer (LEP) device. Appeal Br. 3. Claim 1, reproduced below, is the only independent claim on appeal and is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method of making an electroluminescent device comprising: forming a substantially transparent anode layer; forming over the anode layer an organic light-emitting material layer that contains a conjugated polymer; and screen-printing over the organic light-emitting material layer a substantially non-transparent cathode, the cathode comprising: a plurality of conductive particles; and an electron transporting polymer material having a lowest unoccupied molecular orbital (LUMO) energy that is between a LUMO energy of the light-emitting material layer and a work function of the cathode. Appeal Br. 10 (Claims App’x). REFERENCES The Examiner relies upon the prior art below in rejecting the claims on appeal: Tang et al. US 4,769,292 Sept. 6, 1988 (hereinafter “Tang”) Cowman et al. US 5,235,310 Aug. 10, 1993 (hereinafter “Cowman”) 2 In this opinion, we refer to the Final Office Action dated September 18, 2015 (“Final Act.”), the Appeal Brief filed March 15, 2016 (“Appeal Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer dated August 26, 2016 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief filed October 25, 2016 (“Reply Br.”). 2 Appeal 2017-001434 Application 11/279,393 Odashima et al. (hereinafter “Odashima”) US 5,470,607 Nov. 28, 1995 Kuwajima et al. (hereinafter “Kuwajima”) US 5,951,918 Sept. 14, 1999 Janusauskas US 5,976,613 Nov. 2, 1999 Bailey US 6,430,810 B1 Aug. 13, 2002 Stupp et al. (hereinafter “Stupp”) US 2003/0087533 Al May 8, 2003 Shiang et al. (hereinafter “Shiang”) US 2004/0027062 Al Feb. 12, 2004 Liu et al. (hereinafter “Liu”) US 2009/0208776 Al Aug. 20, 2009 Bhupendra K. Sharma and Neeraj Khare, Effect of UV exposure on rectifying behavior of polyaniline/ZnO heterojunction, 28 Semicond. Sci. and Tech. 125022 (2013) (hereinafter “Sharma”). REJECTIONS The Examiner maintains the following rejections on appeal: Rejection 1. Claims 1, 9-12, 16, 18, 21—24, 30, 31, 34, and 38 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Shiang, Tang, Bailey, and Janusauskas with evidence provided by Sharma and Liu. Final Act. 3^4. Rejection 2. Claims 13, 14, 28, 29, and 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Shiang, Tang, Bailey, and Janusauskas further in view of Stupp. Id. at 7. Rejection 3. Claim 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Shiang, Tang, Bailey, and Janusauskas further in view of Cowman. Id. Rejection 4. Claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Shiang, Tang, Bailey, and Janusauskas further in view of Cowman and Kuwajima. Id. at 8. 3 Appeal 2017-001434 Application 11/279,393 Rejection 5. Claims 26 and 27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Shiang, Tang, Bailey, and Janusauskas further in view of Odashima. Id. at 9. As a sixth rejection, we note that the September 18, 2015, Final Office Action does not explicitly address claim 25, but the associated Office Action Summary indicates that claim 25 stands rejected. Final Act. 1. Based on the record before us, including the Examiner’s discussion of priority relative to claim 25 (Final Act. 2—3), we understand the Examiner’s rejection of claim 25, as set forth in the August 28, 2015, Office Action at pages 7—8, to be pending and before us, and the Examiner’s omission of that rejection from the Final Office Action to be harmless error. Appellants do not address the Examiner’s separate rejection of claim 25 in briefing. Accordingly, that rejection is sustained. ANALYSIS We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by the Appellants and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Cf. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“It has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections”)). After considering the evidence presented in this Appeal and each of Appellants’ arguments, we are not persuaded that Appellants identify reversible error. Thus, we affirm the Examiner’s rejections for the reasons expressed in the Final Office Action and the Answer. We add the following primarily for emphasis. Appellants argue all rejections together, and argue all claims as a group. See Appeal Br. 3^4. Therefore, consistent with the provisions of 37 4 Appeal 2017-001434 Application 11/279,393 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2013), we limit our discussion to claim 1, and all other claims on appeal stand or fall together with claim 1. The Examiner finds that Shiang teaches a method of forming an organic light emitting diode (OLED) having the general structure of claim 1. Final Act. 4. The Examiner finds that Tang teaches including high work function material such as silver in an OLED cathode and that it would have been obvious to combine such material with Shiang to reduce sheet resistance. Id. The Examiner finds that Bailey teaches having an electrode layer comprising “one or more materials selected from a list of materials” including, for example, silver and doped polyaniline. Id. at 4—5. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to use the materials of Bailey as the cathode material of Shiang as a simple substitution of known materials to yield a predictable result. Id. at 5. The Examiner finds that Sharma teaches that the p-doped polyaniline will have a lowest unoccupied molecular orbital (LUMO) value between that of light emitting materials such as polyfluorene and that of silver. Id. The Examiner further finds that Janusauskas teaches “that when forming a rear electrode of similar metal and organic (binder), screen printing is a known technique.” Id. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to screen print the metal and polymer material as a simple substitution of known methods. Id. Appellants argue that the combined references do not teach “a cathode comprising a plurality of conductive particles and a polymer material.” Appeal Br. 5—6; Reply Br. 2—3. As the Examiner finds, however, both 5 Appeal 2017-001434 Application 11/279,393 Bailey and Janusauskas teach electrodes having both metal and polymer. Final Act. 4—5; Bailey 6:32-42; Janusauskas 4:25—29. The Examiner further finds that “the JANUSAUSKAS reference teaches how a combination of metal and polymer can be screen printed to form an electrode by using inks including metal particles.” Ans. 2. The preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s position regarding Janusauskas. Janusauskas suggests printing with “blends of carbon silver or nickel silver in a binder.'” Janusauskas 4:25—29 (emphases added). Janusauskas’s teaching of blending metal within the binder suggests metals in particle form. Appellants provide no argument to the contrary. Reply Br. 3 (merely stating that Janusauskas “provides no such disclosure” with respect to conductive particles). Moreover, Appellants identify no basis for construing “particle” in claim 1 so narrowly that it would exclude metal blended in a binder at a size suitable for screen printing, and, based on the Specification, we discern no basis for such a narrow construction. See Spec. 110 (stating parties “are usually flat flakes or spheres” (emphasis added)), 112 (indicating particles may precipitate “in a porous gel network”). Appellants also argue that Sharma does not support that the materials described by Bailey would have the LUMO value recited by claim 1. Appeal Br. 6—8. Claim 1 ’s LUMO energy recitation defines a characteristic of the polymer material of the electroluminescent device which is formed by claim 1 ’s method. Our reviewing court has held that where “the claimed and prior art products are identical or substantially identical, or are produced by identical or substantially identical processes, the PTO can require an applicant to prove that the prior art products do not necessarily or inherently possess the characteristics of his claimed product.” In re Best, 562 F.2d 6 Appeal 2017-001434 Application 11/279,393 1252, 1256 (CCPA 1977); see also In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[W]hen the PTO shows sound basis for believing that the products of the applicant and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.”). Here, the Examiner’s obviousness combination utilizes the doped polyaniline suggested by Bailey, a cathode utilizing silver, and known light emitting materials such as polyfluorene. Final Act. 5. Claim 1 does not specify particular materials for the recited “electron transporting material,” “conductive polymer,” or “light-emitting material” having “polymer.” The materials cited by the Examiner are thus within claim 1 ’s scope. Moreover, the Specification suggests use of silver and polyaniline. Spec. Tflf 10-11, 27. The Examiner thus presents a sound basis for believing that the products of the Appellants and the prior art are the same, and the burden shifts to Appellants to establish that the prior art products do not have the recited LUMO energy characteristic. Appellants do not meet this burden. Rather, Appellants present no evidence or rationale as to why the prior art combination proposed by the Examiner would not have the recited LUMO energy characteristic. Meanwhile, the Examiner presents at least some evidence that the prior art combination would have this characteristic. Final Act. 5; Ans. 2—3. Appellants present argument disputing the Examiner’s evidence as to LUMO energy characteristics (Appeal Br. 6—8; Reply Br. 3—5), but this argument does not substitute for presenting an affirmative rationale as to why the characteristics of the prior art and embodiments within the scope of claim 1 would be different. In re Best, 562 F.2d at 1256. 7 Appeal 2017-001434 Application 11/279,393 Appellants also argue that the Examiner does not explain why the proposed combination of Shiang, Tang, and Bailey could reasonably have been expected to successfully result in a material suitable for screen printing. Appeal Br. 8—9; Reply Br. 5—6. The Examiner, however, finds that Janusauskas teaches screen printing is a known technique for forming an electrode of “similar metal and organic (binder)” as that of the Shiang/Tang/Bailey combination. Final Act. 5. Appellants do not persuasively dispute this finding of fact. Janusauskas’s teaching that its screen printing can work with similar materials provides evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in employing this technique, and Appellants present no evidence to the contrary. Ans. 3. Thus, a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s position that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in screen-printing to form the cathode of the Shiang/Tang/Bailey combination. Because Appellants have not identified Examiner error, we sustain the rejections. DECISION For the above reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 9-14, 16, 18-31,34, and 38. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation