Ex Parte Calin

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 19, 2013

10778189 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 19, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
10/778,189 02/17/2004 INV001Doru Calin 129250-001085/US 6996
32498 7590 03/20/2013
CAPITOL PATENT & TRADEMARK LAW FIRM, PLLC
P.O. BOX 1995
VIENNA, VA 22183
EXAMINER
RECEK, JASON D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2442
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/20/2013 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte DORU CALIN
________________

Appeal 2010-009695
Application 10/778,189
Technology Center 2400
________________

Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, JASON V. MORGAN, and
JOHN G. NEW, Administrative Patent Judges.

NEW, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2010-009695
Application 10/778,189

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SUMMARY
Appellant files this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1, 3-11, 13-19 and 21-23 as
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the
combination of Takahashi et al. (US 2003/0097446 A1, May 22, 2003)
(“Takahashi”) and Hogan et al. (US 2002/0111180 A1, August 15, 2002)
(“Hogan”).1
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

NATURE OF THE CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s invention is directed to communication between devices
participating in a teleconference or the like which is maintained without the
need for each device to separately obtain new domain access rights as one or
more of the devices comes in contact with a new domain. Abstract.

GROUPING OF CLAIMS
Because Appellant makes no separate arguments for the individual
claims, we select claim 1 as representative. App. Br. 4. Claim 1 recites:
1. A method for providing access rights to a domain
comprising the steps of:

obtaining, at a first node prior to the first node
accessing the domain, access rights from the domain; and

1 Claim 2, 12, and 20 are canceled. App. Br. 8-9.
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Application 10/778,189

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broadcasting, by the first node, the obtained access
rights to at least one other interconnected node prior to the other
node accessing the domain.

App. Br. 22.

ISSUE AND ANALYSIS
Issue
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred by finding that Hogan
teaches or suggests the limitation of claim 1 reciting “obtaining, at a first
node prior to the first node accessing a domain, access rights from the
domain.” App. Br. 4. We therefore address the issue of whether the
Examiner so erred.

Analysis
Appellant argues that Hogan does not teach that access rights are
obtained by a node (referred to as an “access controller” of “user equipment
unit” in Hogan). App. Br. 4. Appellant argues that Hogan instead teaches
an access controller which receives an “access group eligibility message.”
Id. According to Appellant, this access group eligibility message does not
contain access rights; rather, information in this message must be compared
to stored “access group classification” information to determine if a
particular user equipment unit can access a “cell.” Id. Furthermore,
Appellant contends, even if the stored access group classification
information can be considered access rights, such rights are not obtained
from the cell that is sought to be accessed, but is obtained instead from a
“core network,” not the cell. Id.
Appellant also contends that the “access group eligibility message”
taught or suggested by Hogan does not correspond to the access rights
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Application 10/778,189

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recited in claim 1. App. Br. 4. Appellant argues that the message taught by
Hogan does not, by itself, contain access rights because Hogan’s messages
must be compared to stored “access group classification” information and
therefore the messages themselves are not access rights and do not
necessarily lead to access. App. Br. 4-5. Appellant contends that the
limitation of claim 1 reciting “obtaining, at a first node prior to the first node
accessing the domain, access rights from the domain” is not disclosed in
Hogan, no matter how many additional, determining steps Hogan may
disclose. App. Br. 5.
The Examiner responds that Appellant’s argument depends upon the
definition of “obtain,” which the Examiner interprets to mean “to succeed in
gaining possession of as the result of planning or endeavor; acquire.” Ans.7
(quoting The American Heritage College Dictionary, 4th Edition). The
Examiner finds that Hogan teaches or suggests that a node receives an
access eligibility message, and further teaches or suggests using the access
eligibility message to determine whether a node has access rights. Ans. 7
(citing Hogan, ¶¶ [0027]-[0029]; ¶¶ [0068]-[0069]; Fig, 3B). Therefore,
finds the Examiner, although Hogan performs a determination step,
Hogan teaches or suggests obtaining access rights because it gains
possession of or acquires access rights based on the access eligibility
message which is received from an interconnected node. Ans. 7.
The Examiner also finds that Appellant’s specification provides no
definition of the term “access rights”; but rather provides an example
suggesting that “access rights” are any authentication, authorization or
accounting rights. Ans. 7 (citing Spec., ¶ [0005]). The Examiner finds that,
since the eligibility message disclosed by Hogan leads to access, the
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message is therefore a type of authentication or authorization. Therefore,
Hogan teaches “access rights” as recited by the claims. App. Br. 7 (citing
Hogan, ¶¶ [0027]-[0029]).
We are persuaded by the Examiner’s reasoning and adopt it as our
own. As an initial matter we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument
that, even if the stored access group classification information can be
considered access rights, such rights are not obtained from the cell that is
sought to be accessed, but is obtained instead from a “core network,” not the
cell, because such language is not recited in claim 1. Rather, claim 1 recites
that the access rights are obtained from “the domain,” rather than from the
cell to which access is sought. The Federal Circuit has frequently
emphasized that “[p]articular embodiments appearing in a specification will
not be read into the claims when the claim language is broader than such
embodiments.” Electro Med. Sys. S.A. v. Cooper Life Sci., 34 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed.Cir.1994); see also Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 F.3d 1342,
1347 (Fed.Cir.1998).
Moreover we are persuaded by the Examiner’s finding that Hogan
teaches a process by which access rights are obtained from the domain, viz.,
that Hogan teaches or suggests obtaining access rights because it gains
possession of or acquires access rights based on the access eligibility
message which is received from an interconnected node. Ans. 7. We find
that the Examiner’s definition of “obtaining” is a reasonable one. Ans. 7; In
re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (USPTO may give claim
language its “broadest reasonable interpretation” during prosecution). We
find that Hogan teaches that: “[t]he access group eligibility message enables
the user equipment unit to ascertain, on a basis of access group to which the
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user equipment unit belongs, whether the user equipment unit is eligible to
operate in a cell for which the access group eligibility message is
transmitted.” Hogan, ¶ [0027]; Ans. 7. Moreover, we find that Hogan
explicitly teaches that this determination thus allows the user equipment unit
to make a decision whether or not it has access rights in a particular cell,
and thereby addresses access rights in complex network configurations such
as a shared network situation. Hogan, ¶ [0029]; Ans. 7 (emphases added).
We therefore conclude that the Examiner did not err in finding that Hogan
teaches or suggests the limitation of claim 1 reciting “obtaining, at a first
node prior to the first node accessing a domain, access rights from the
domain.”

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3-11, 13-19 and 21-23 as
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) is affirmed.

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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