Ex Parte CACERES

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 21, 2018

12341579 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 21, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/341,579 12/22/2008
63675 7590 09/25/2018
PATTERSON & SHERIDAN, LLP/IBM SVL
24 Greenway Plaza
SUITE 1600
HOUSTON, TX 77046-2472
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
BARRY M. CACERES
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
SVL920080043US 1 1181
EXAMINER
BAHL, SANGEETA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3629
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/25/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
P AIR_eofficeaction@pattersonsheridan.com
PSDocketing@pattersonsheridan.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte BARRY M. CACERES
Appeal2017---000443
Application 12/341,579
Technology Center 3600
Before ANTON W. PETTING, BRUCE T. WIEDER, and
BRADLEY B. BAY AT, Administrative Patent Judges.
PETTING, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
Barry M. Caceres (Appellant) seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of
a final rejection of claims 1-24, the only claims pending in the application
on appeal. We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellant's Appeal Brief ("App.
Br.," filed July 24, 2015) and Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed October 19,
2016), and the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed July 29, 2016), and Final
Action ("Final Act.," mailed February 20, 2015).
Appeal2017---000443
Application 12/341,579
The Appellant invented to a way of processing identity records in an
entity resolution system, and more particularly, determining whether an
entity is relevant due to multiple distinct values for an attribute type of the
entity in an entity resolution system. Specification para. 1.
An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of
exemplary claim 1, which is reproduced below (bracketed matter and some
paragraphing added).
1. A computer-implemented method for selecting an entity for
analysis using multiple value detection rules, the method
compnsmg:
[ 1] selecting an entity in an entity resolution system comprising
a plurality of entities,
wherein each entity is associated with a plurality of
identity records stored by the entity resolution system,
wherein each identity record includes one or more
attribute types and associated attribute values,
and
wherein the plurality of identity records associated with
each respective entity is used to represent a distinct
individual;
[2] evaluating, by operation of one or more computer
processors, the selected entity
using one or more multiple value detection rules,
wherein the evaluation using each of the one or more
multiple value detection rules comprises:
identifying an attribute type associated with a
respective multiple value detection rule,
identifying a set of attribute values stored in the
identity records of the selected entity that
correspond to the identified attribute type,
and
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determining, from the identified set of attribute
values, a number of distinct values of the attribute
type for the selected entity;
[3] determining that the number of distinct values of the
attribute type associated with at least a first one of the multiple
value detection rules exceeds a threshold specified by the first
multiple value detection rule ;
and
[ 4] generating an alert providing an indication of the selected
entity, the first multiple value detection rule, and the distinct
values of the attribute type associated with first multiple value
detection rule.
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art:
Janigian US 5,303,149
Agarwal US 2002/0184181 Al
Bhatia US 2008/0243967 Al
Apr. 12, 1994
Dec. 5, 2002
Oct. 2, 2008
Claims 1-24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as lacking a
supporting written description within the original disclosure.
Claims 1-24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-
statutory subject matter.
Claims 1--4, 8-12, 16-20, and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as unpatentable over Bhatia.
Claims 5, 13, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable over Bhatia and Agarwal.
Claims 6, 7, 14, 15, 22, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a)
as unpatentable over Bhatia and Janigian.
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Application 12/341,579
ISSUES
The issues of eligible subject matter tum primarily on whether the
claims recite more than abstract conceptual advice of what a computer is to
provide without implementation details.
The issues of obviousness tum primarily on whether the prior art
describes the claims at the level of detail recited.
The written description rejection is uncontested.
FACTS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES
The following enumerated Findings of Fact (FF) are believed to be
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
Facts Related to the Prior Art - Bhatia
01. Bhatia is directed to providing duplicate record processing based on
customizable rules. Bhatia para. 4.
02. Detected duplicate records are merged, deleted, deactivated, or moved
based on one or more sets of customizable rules for each record type.
According to some embodiments, hierarchical relationships between
structured records may be adjusted based on record attributes. Bhatia
para. 5.
03. The duplicate record processing system enables a user to set attribute
level preferences for retaining relevant information from several
duplicate records into one. The user may select different criteria on
individual attributes to suggest which value should be carried forward in
final record. For example, a value for an attribute may be taken from a
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Application 12/341,579
duplicate record, which was modified for the selected attribute most
recently meaning the most recent value for the attribute is to be taken
from the records. Additionally, the user might want to keep some
defaults for selected attributes or may want to specify the preferences for
attribute values. Bhatia para. 29.
04. A user may be notified about the automatic duplicate processing of
records owned by them such that the user can access the new record and
modify if necessary. The user may also be enabled to amend the new
record to fill the information from its potential duplicates reported using
a context sensitive task pane within the record form. Bhatia para. 30.
05. The duplicate detection engine is a component of duplicate processing
service for detecting duplicate records among the received ( or stored)
records. Therefore, the duplicate detection engine may receive records to
be checked for duplication directly from record intake layer or from
records data store. Duplicate detection engine provides information
associated with duplicate records to duplicate processing engine. Bhatia
para. 34.
06. Bhatia begins with optional record creation. The record may be
received from another application/user, created as part of an application,
or retrieved from a data store. Bhatia para. 56.
07. A duplicate detection engine detects duplicate records and provides
them to the duplicate processing engine/application. Bhatia para. 57.
08. Customizable rules are applied by the duplicate processing
engine/application to eliminate, merge, or move duplicate records.
Bhatia para. 58.
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Application 12/341,579
ANALYSIS
Claims 1-24 rejected under 35 USC§ l 12(a) as lacking a supporting
written description within the original disclosure
The written description rejection is uncontested.
Claims 1-24 rejected under 35 USC§ 101 as directed to non-statutory
subject matter
Method claim 1 recites selecting and evaluating data representing
some entity, determining that a count of the number of distinct values
exceeds a threshold, and generating data representing an alert along with
data representing a rule and attribute types. Thus, claim 1 recites receiving,
analyzing, modifying, and transmitting data. None of the limitations recite
implementation details for any of these steps, but instead recite functional
results to be achieved by any and all possible means. Data reception,
analysis, modification, and transmission are all generic, conventional data
processing operations to the point they are themselves concepts awaiting
implementation details. The sequence of data reception-analysis-
modification-transmission is equally generic and conventional. The ordering
of the steps is therefore ordinary and conventional. The remaining claims
merely describe process parameters, with no implementation details.
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, []
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. [] If so, we then ask, "[ w ]hat
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Application 12/341,579
else is there in the claims before us? [] To answer that question,
[] consider the elements of each claim both individually and "as
an ordered combination" to determine whether the additional
elements "transform the nature of the claim" into a patent-
eligible application. [The Court] described step two of this
analysis as a search for an "'inventive concept"'-i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is "sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."
Alice Corp., Pty. Ltd. v CLS Bank Intl, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citing
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012)).
To perform this test, we must first determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. The Examiner determines
the claims to be directed to data processing which is a fundamental practice
in business documentation and business management. Final Act. 3--4.
Although the Court in Alice made a determination as to what the
claims were directed to, we find that this case's claims themselves and the
Specification provide enough information to inform one as to what they are
directed to.
The preamble to claim 1 recites that it is a method for selecting an
entity for analysis using multiple value detection rules. The steps in claim 1
result in data indicating some entity along with a rule and attribute types
absent any technological mechanism other than a conventional computer for
doing so. The Specification at paragraph 1 recites that the invention relates
to processing identity records in an entity resolution system, and more
particularly, to determining whether an entity is relevant due to multiple
distinct values for an attribute type of the entity in an entity resolution
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system. Thus, all this evidence shows that claim 1 is directed to analyzing
data to determine when criteria are met, i.e. data processing. This is
consistent with the Examiner's determination.
It follows from prior Supreme Court cases, and Bilski (Bilski v
Kappas, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)) in particular, that the claims at issue here are
directed to an abstract idea. Like the risk hedging in Bilski, the concept of
data processing is a fundamental business practice long prevalent in our
system of commerce. The use of data processing is also a building block of
ingenuity in information gathering. Thus, data processing, like hedging, is
an "abstract idea" beyond the scope of §101. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134
S. Ct. at 2356.
As in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., we need not labor to delimit the precise
contours of the "abstract ideas" category in this case. It is enough to
recognize that there is no meaningful distinction in the level of abstraction
between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of data
processing at issue here. Both are squarely within the realm of "abstract
ideas" as the Court has used that term. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct.
at 2357.
Further, claims involving data collection, analysis, and display are
directed to an abstract idea. Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that "collecting information, analyzing it, and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis" are "a familiar class
of claims 'directed to' a patent ineligible concept"); see also In re TL!
Commc 'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 (Fed. Cir.
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Application 12/341,579
2016). Claim 1, unlike the claims found non-abstract in prior cases, uses
generic computer technology to perform data reception, analysis,
modification, and transmission and does not recite an improvement to a
particular computer technology. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314--15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims
not abstract because they "focused on a specific asserted improvement in
computer animation"). As such, claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of
receiving, analyzing, modifying, and transmitting data.
The remaining claims merely describe process parameters. We
conclude that the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.
The introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the
analysis at Mayo step two.
[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea "while adding the words 'apply it"' is
not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea "'to a particular technological environment."'
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words "apply it with a
computer" simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent's recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to "implemen[ t ]" an abstract idea
"on ... a computer," that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption
concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the
ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of "additional
featur[ e ]" that provides any "practical assurance that the
process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [ abstract idea] itself."
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (citations omitted).
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"[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than
simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea [] on a generic
computer." Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2359. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer for receiving, analyzing, modifying, and transmitting data amounts
to electronic data query and retrieval----one of the most basic functions of a
computer. The step of generating data representing an alert is not contingent
upon any analysis result, including the result in step [4], but is always
performed according to the way claim 1 is drafted, and so is straight data
generation. All of these computer functions are well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry. See Elec. Power
Grp. v. Alstom S.A., supra. Also see In re Katz Interactive Call Processing
Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 201 l)("Absent a possible
narrower construction of the terms "processing," "receiving," and "storing,"
. . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer
without special programming"). In short, each step does no more than
require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. As to the
data operated upon, "even if a process of collecting and analyzing
information is 'limited to particular content' or a particular 'source,' that
limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract."
SAP America Inc. v. InvestPic LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant's method add nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis-
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modification-transmission is equally generic and conventional or otherwise
held to be abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange,
display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction),
Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification,
generation, display, and transmission), Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast
Cable Communications, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring). The ordering
of the steps is therefore ordinary and conventional.
Viewed as a whole, Appellant's method claims simply recite the
concept of data processing as performed by a generic computer. To be sure,
the claims recite doing so by advising one to select and evaluate data by
identifying attribute type and values and determining a number of distinct
values, determining the number exceeds a threshold, and generating data
representing an alert. But this is no more than abstract conceptual advice on
the parameters for such data processing and the generic computer processes
necessary to process those parameters, and do not recite any particular
implementation.
The method claims do not, for example, purport to improve the
functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they effect an improvement in
any other technology or technical field. The 18 pages of the written
description portion of the Specification spell out different generic
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equipment2 and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the
particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the
concept of data processing under different scenarios. They do not describe
any particular improvement in the manner a computer functions. Instead,
the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more than an instruction
to apply the abstract idea of data processing using some unspecified, generic
computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract
idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at
2360.
As to the structural claims, they
are no different from the method claims in substance. The
method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic
computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic
computer components configured to implement the same idea.
This Court has long "warn[ ed] ... against" interpreting § 101 "in
ways that make patent eligibility 'depend simply on the
draftsman's art.'
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2360.
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that "claims 1, 9, and
17 recite an approach for evaluating whether a collection of records in an
entity resolution system -- all presumed to store information about the same
individual -- should be the subject of analysis by using a multiple value
detection rule." App. Br. 9. An approach is abstract conceptual advice.
2 The Specification describes using a general purpose computer. Spec. para.
23.
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Absent concrete technological implementation details, the claims do no
more than recite functionality to be achieved absent how to do so.
At that level of generality, the claims do no more than
describe a desired function or outcome, without providing any
limiting detail that confines the claim to a particular solution
to an identified problem. The purely functional nature of the
claim confirms that it is directed to an abstract idea, not to a
concrete embodiment of that idea.
Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1269
(2016).
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that "the limitations
recited by claim 1 recite a novel approach for efficiently selecting entities to
subject to analysis, based on multiple value detection rules." App. Br. 10.
"A claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea. The search for a
§ 101 inventive concept is thus distinct from demonstrating § 102 novelty."
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corporation, 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the claims would
not preempt the idea. App. Br. 10-11. "Where a patent's claims are deemed
only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo [/Alice]
framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed
and made moot." Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d
1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that "the rejection
concludes that claim 1 is merely directed to an 'abstract idea of data
processing' which is a fundamental practice in business documentation,
without providing any objective evidence of practices in 'business
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documentation' (whatever that may be) fundamental or otherwise." App.
Br. 11. As we discussed supra, Electric Power provides such objective
evidence.
Appellant further argues that the asserted claims are akin to the
claims found patent-eligible in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.
773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). App. Br. 11-12. In DDR Holdings, the
court evaluated the eligibility of claims "address[ing] the problem of
retaining website visitors that, if adhering to the routine, conventional
functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol, would be instantly
transported away from a host's website after 'clicking' on an
advertisement and activating a hyperlink." Id. at 1257. There, the court
found that the claims were patent eligible because they transformed the
manner in which a hyperlink typically functions to resolve a problem
that had no "pre-Internet analog." Id. at 1258. The court cautioned,
however, "that not all claims purporting to address Internet-centric
challenges are eligible for patent." Id. For example, in DDR Holdings the
court distinguished the patent-eligible claims at issue from claims found
patent-ineligible in Ultramercial. See id. at 1258-59 (citing Ultramercial,
772 F.3d at 715-16). As noted there, the Ultramercial claims were
"directed to a specific method of advertising and content distribution that
was previously unknown and never employed on the Internet before." Id.
at 1258 (quoting Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715-16). Nevertheless, those
claims were patent ineligible because they "merely recite[ d] the abstract
idea of 'offering media content in exchange for viewing an advertisement,'
along with 'routine additional steps such as updating an activity log,
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requiring a request from the consumer to view the ad, restrictions on public
access, and use of the Internet."' Id.
Appellant's asserted claims are analogous to claims found ineligible
in Ultramercial and distinct from claims found eligible in DDR Holdings.
The ineligible claims in Ultramercial recited "providing [a] media product
for sale at an Internet website;" "restricting general public access to said
media product;" "receiving from the consumer a request to view [a]
sponsor message;" and "if the sponsor message is an interactive message,
presenting at least one query to the consumer and allowing said consumer
access to said media product after receiving a response to said at least one
query." 772 F.3d at 712. Similarly, Appellant's asserted claims recite
receiving, analyzing, modifying, and transmitting data. This is precisely the
type of Internet activity found ineligible in Ultramercial.
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the claims are
analogous to those in Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). Reply Br. 2-3. The claims differ from those found patent
eligible in Enfzsh, where the claims were "specifically directed to a self-
referential table for a computer database." 822 F.3d at 1337. The claims
thus were "directed to a specific improvement to the way computers
operate" rather than an abstract idea implemented on a computer. Id.
at 1336. Here, by contrast, the claims are not directed to an
improvement in the way computers operate. Though the claims purport
to accelerate the process of making determinations and sending alert data,
our reviewing court has held that speed and accuracy increases stemming
from the ordinary capabilities of a general purpose computer "do[] not
materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject
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matter." Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (US.),
687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Instead, the claims are more
analogous to those in FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1094, wherein claims
reciting "a few possible rules to analyze audit log data" were found
directed to an abstract idea because they asked "the same questions
(though perhaps phrased with different words) that humans in analogous
situations detecting fraud have asked for decades." 839 F.3d at 1094,
1095.
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the claims contain
an inventive concept that is also found in the specific ordered combination
of the limitations, similar to the Federal Circuit's findings in BASCOM
(Bascom Global Internet v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2016)). Reply Br. 3. Initially, we remind Appellant that Bascom did not
find claims eligible on the substance, but rather that the Appellees did not
provide sufficient evidence to support a 12(b )( 6) motion to dismiss in which
facts are presumed in the non-movant's favor.
The key fact in Bascom was the presence of a structural change in
"installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end-
users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user. This
design gives the filtering tool both the benefits of a filter on a local computer
and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server." Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1350.
The instant claims have no analogous structural benefit.
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Claims 1-4, 8-12, 16-20, and 24 rejected under 35 US.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Bhatia
As to the limitation of "determining, from the identified set of
attribute values, a number of distinct values of the attribute type for the
selected entity," we are persuaded by Appellant's argument that
when the "duplicate record processing system" of Bhatia
identifies a duplicate record, the user may specify which record
to keep. Again, while the values in the duplicate record (such as
records A, A', and A") may be different, nothing in this passage
( or in Bhatia) actually describes them as being so and the
examples in Bhatia seem to presume the records are identical
copies of the same records.
Reply Br. 5. At bottom, the claims are too specific to say they are described
by the more general Bhatia.
Claims 5, 13, and 21 rejected under 35 US.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Bhatia and Agarwal
These claims depend from claims 1, 9, and 1 7.
Claims 6, 7, 14, 15, 22, and 23 rejected under 35 US.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Bhatia and Janigian
These claims depend from claims 1, 9, and 1 7.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The rejection of claims 1-24 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as lacking a
supporting written description within the original disclosure is uncontested
and summarily sustained.
The rejection of claims 1-24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
non-statutory subject matter is proper.
The rejection of claims 1--4, 8-12, 16-20, and 24 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Bhatia is improper.
The rejection of claims 5, 13, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Bhatia and Agarwal is improper.
The rejection of claims 6, 7, 14, 15, 22, and 23 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Bhatia and Janigian is improper.
DECISION
The decision to reject claims 1-24 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv) (2011).
AFFIRMED
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