Ex Parte Bushell et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 19, 2016

13487604 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 19, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
13/487,604 06/04/2012 Mark Anthony Bushell
91753 7590 10/21/2016
General Electric Company
Global Patent Operation-Aviation
901 Main Avenue
3rd Floor
Norwalk, CT 06851
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
257572171966-0100 8607
EXAMINER
PARKER, JEFFREY ALAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2625
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/21/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
gpo.mail@ge.com
lori.E.rooney@ge.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MARK ANTHONY BUSHELL and BRETT ALLEN EDDY
Appeal2015-007096
Application 13/487,604
Technology Center 2600
Before ERIC S. FRAHM, KAMRAN JIV ANI, and SCOTT B. HOW ARD,
Administrative Patent Judges.
HOW ARD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Non-Final
Rejection of claims 1-14, which constitute all of the claims pending in this
application. Although the action appealed from is a Non-Final Action,
because the application has been twice rejected we have jurisdiction
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 6 and 134. Ex parte Lemoine, 46 USPQ2d 1420,
1423 (BPAI 1994) (precedential).
We affirm.
1 Appellants identify GE Aviation Systems LLC as the real party in interest.
Br. 2. We take Official Notice that GE Aviation Systems LLC is an indirect
subsidiary of General Electric.
Appeal2015-007096
Application 13/487,604
THE INVENTION
The disclosed and claimed invention is directed to an apparatus for an
aircraft cockpit display panel having a first portion and a second portion and
first and second independent video channels. Spec. i-f 3.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. An aircraft cockpit display comprising:
a display panel having a liquid crystal matrix with pixels
arranged in rows and columns;
a backlight for illuminating the liquid crystal matrix;
first and second independent video channels, with each
video channel having a row driver operably coupled to the row
in the liquid crystal matrix, the first video channel having a first
column driver operably coupled to and driving the columns of a
first portion of the liquid crystal matrix, the second video channel
having a second column driver operably coupled to and driving
the columns of a second portion of the liquid crystal matrix, with
the first portion not identical to the second portion; and
a switch for selecting between the first and second
independent video channels to display a video signal on the
display panel;
wherein the selected independent video channel operably
drives the rows of both the first and second portions in the liquid
crystal matrix upon a failure of the non-selected independent
video channel.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence in rejecting the
claims on appeal is:
De Lauzun et al.
LeF ort et al.
Tanada et al.
US 2005/0284984 Al Dec. 29, 2005
US 2010/0289963 Al Nov. 18, 2010
US 2012/0062612 Al Mar. 15, 2012
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REJECTIONS
Claims 1-8 and 11-14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over De Lauzun and LeFort. Non-Final Act 3-7.
Claims 9 and 10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over De Lauzun, LeFort, and Tanada. Non-Final Act. 7-9.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejection in light of Appellants'
arguments that the Examiner erred. In reaching this decision, we have
considered all evidence presented and all arguments made by Appellants.
We disagree with Appellants' arguments with respect to claims 1-14, and
we incorporate herein and adopt as our own: ( 1) the findings and reasons set
forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final
Act. 3-9), and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner's
Answer in response to Appellants' arguments (Ans. 9-24). We incorporate
such findings, reasons, and rebuttals herein by reference unless otherwise
noted. However, we highlight and address specific findings and arguments
for emphasis as follows.
Claims 1-9 and 11-14
Appellants argue the Examiner's characterization of LeFort is
incorrect. Br. 13-15. Appellants argue LeFort teaches multiple displays and
not a single display panel having a first portion and a second portion. Br.
14. Similarly, Appellants argue that LeFort teaches that "upon failure of a
GGU, a graphics channel of another display drives the rows and columns of
a different display having the failed GGU." Br. 14 (emphasis omitted).
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According to Appellants, that is different than the requirement of the
wherein limitation of claim 1. Id. Third, Appellants argue LeFort does not
teach a single independent video channel that drives a first portion and a
second portion of a display as required by claim 1. Br. 14--15.
The Examiner finds De Lauzun teaches a video display panel having a
first portion and a second portion, each of which is driven by an independent
video channel. Non-Final Act. 3--4; Ans. 14. The Examiner further finds
LeFort teaches, in a related system using multiple screens, in the event of a
failure of a data source, using a different data source so that the video driver
is not wasted. Non-Final Act. 4; Ans. 15-16. The Examiner finds that the
person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the redundancy
features taught by LeFort for the display taught in De Lauzun and that the
combination of teachings would result in the claimed invention. Non-Final
Act. 4--5; Ans. 14--16.
Nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking the references
individually when the rejection is predicated upon a combination of prior art
disclosures. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The
test for obviousness is not whether the claimed invention is expressly
suggested in any one or all of the references, but whether the claimed subject
matter would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light
of the combined teachings of those references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,
425 (CCP A 1981 ). Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellants'
arguments-arguments that focus on the LeFort reference individually and
ignores the Examiner's combination of teachings-that the Examiner erred.
Appellants also argue the Examiner's reason for combining the
references was conclusory and "are not supportable in fact." Br. 15-16
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Application 13/487,604
(emphasis omitted). Appellants further argue "[t]he references themselves
provide no express or inherent factual basis that would lead to the
combination." Br. 16. Appellants also argue the references teach away from
being combined. Id. Because of the alleged lack of a factual basis,
Appellants argue the Examiner engaged in improper hindsight. Br. 16-17.
The Examiner finds a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
combined De Lauzun and LeF ort "for the purpose of enhancing the
redundant system of De Lauzun by providing a known method to operate the
associated screen of a failed driver with a different operational driver."
Non-Final Act. 4--5. The Examiner further finds both De Lauzun and LeFort
teach redundancy in the event of a failed display or components of a display
systems and finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
combined the references to provide complimentary redundancy. Ans. 15-
16.
Rejections based on obviousness must be supported by "some
articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness." In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
cited with approval in KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418
(2007). Although Appellants contend that the Examiner has failed to
provide articulated reasoning as to the proposed modification at issue,
Appellants do not persuasively address the reasoning provided by the
Examiner (Non-Final Act. 4--5; Ans. 15-16).
Additionally, Appellants appear to rely on an incorrect statement of
law. In KSR, the Supreme Court rejected the rigid application of the
teaching, suggestion, or motivation (TSM) test in favor of a more expansive
and flexible approach to the determination of obviousness. KSR Int 'l Co. v.
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Application 13/487,604
Teleflex inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007). lnKSR, the Court stated, "the
analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject
matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences
and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ."
Id. at 418. Thus, to the extent Appellants' argument is premised on strictly
applying the TSM test, it is not persuasive of Examiner error.
We also find Appellants have not established that the prior art teaches
away from the claimed invention because Appellants have not demonstrated
that "a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be
discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led
in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant." In re
Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed Cir. 1994). "'A reference may be said to
teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference,
would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or
would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the
applicant."' Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1332
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam Applications S.A.,
469 F.3d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
The section of the references cited by Appellants, which discusses
preferred embodiments, "does not teach away ... [as] it merely expresses a
general preference for an alternative invention but does not 'criticize,
discredit, or otherwise discourage' investigation into the invention claimed."
DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2009); see also In re Fulton, 391 F.3dl 195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments that the
Examiner erred in finding a reason to combine the references.
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Appellants also argue that even if the references could be combined,
the resulting combination of the two references would not result in the
claimed invention. Br. 17-18. Instead, Appellants contend:
the combination teaches either that a second graphics generation
unit from a second display may drive the entire portion of the
first display (e.g. the columns and rows of the right-hand and left-
hand zones; that is, operate as all column and row drivers 661,
662, 621, 622) or that a second graphics generation unit from a
second display may operate in place of just the row and column
drivers for one of the right or left-hand zones (e.g. 621and662).
Br. 17.
"The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary
reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary
reference." Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Instead, the relevant issue is "what the
combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of
ordinary skill in the art." Id. "Combining the teachings of references does
not involve an ability to combine their specific structures." In re Nievelt,
482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973). Appellants' arguments directed to the
bodily incorporation of the two references does not persuade as that the
Examiner erred.
According! y, we sustain the Examiners' rejection of claim 1, along
with the rejection of claim 14, which is argued on the same grounds, and
claims 2-7 and 11-13, which are not argued separately. See Br. 19.
Claims 9 and 10
Appellants argue that, as used in Tanada, the gate driver drives the
display and the buffer circuit operates in a tri-stated condition. Br. 20.
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Appellants further argue that the claims require the driver to be in a tri-stated
condition and that is not taught by Tanada. Id.
The Examiner finds Tanada teaches a "row driver may be set to a tri-
stated condition." Non-Final Act. 8 (citing Tanada i-fi-154, 56). The
Examiner further finds:
[Tanada] teaches is the implementation details of a row/gate
driver, the row/gate driver made up substantially of a shift
register 401 and a buffer circuit 402, whereby the buffer circuit
contains a tri-state buffer controlled by the W/E signal. When
the W IE signal is high the tri-state buff er is set as an inverter and
when the W/E signal is low the tri-state buffer is set to a floating
state. When the row is active, it is in one of these configurations
and when it is deactivated it is in the other configuration.
Therefore it can be said that when either selected or deselected,
the row/gate driver is set to a tri-stated "condition," because the
tri-state buffer is always active in either state.
Ans. 20.
Tanada teaches that the buffer circuit is a part of the gate-driver-
which Appellants concede is a row driver as recited in the claims-and the
buffer circuit has a tri-stated condition. Tanada i154. Additionally,
Appellants do not address the reasoning relied on by the Examiner (Ans. 20-
22) and, thus, does not adequately address the rejection on appeal.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments that the
Examiner erred.
Appellants further argue the Examiner did not provide a reason to
combine the tri-state condition taught by Tanada with LeFort. Br. 20-21.
Thus, according to Appellants, the Examiner engaged in impermissible
hindsight. Br. 21-22.
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The Examiner finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
have incorporated the teachings of Tanada with the display of De Lauzun.
Non-Final Act. 8. Specifically, the Examiner finds the person of ordinary
skill in the art would have "combine[ d] the driver tri-state buffer of Tanada
with the drivers of the switchable input system of De Lauzun in view of
LeFort for the purpose of allowing the selection operations to not interrupt
each other." Id. The Examiner further finds that the person of ordinary skill
in the art would have turned to Tanada to provide implementation details not
provided by De Lauzun. Ans. 22.
Appellants do not address the reasoning relied on by the Examiner-
specificall y the reason to combine Tanada with De Lauzun-and, thus, does
not adequately address the rejection on appeal. "If an appellant fails to
present arguments on a particular issue----or, more broadly, on a particular
rejection-the Board will not, as a general matter, unilaterally review those
uncontested aspects of the rejection." Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072,
1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
We find the Examiner's findings on the reason to combine the
references to be supported by "some articulated reasoning with some
rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness."
Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the
Examiner erred.
Finally, Appellants argue Tanada does not cure any of the alleged
shortcoming regarding claim 1. Br. 22. Because we determine that the
rejection of claim 1 is not erroneous for the reasons discussed above, we are
not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the Examiner erred.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 9 and 10.
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DECISION
For the above reasons, we affirm the Examiner's decisions rejecting
claims 1-14.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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