Ex Parte Broude et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jan 30, 2012

12589296 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 30, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/589,296 10/20/2009 Craig Broude 07/149CIP 1887
7590 01/30/2012
LEON D. ROSEN
FREILICH, HORNBAKER & ROSEN
Suite 1220
10960 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90024
EXAMINER
LEE, JOHN R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2878
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/30/2012 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte CRAIG BROUDE and LEON D. ROSEN
____________

Appeal 2011-012792
Application 12/589,296
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before SCOTT R. BOALICK, CARLA M. KRIVAK, and
ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, Administrative Patent Judges.

KRIVAK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1, 2, and 5-7. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.

Appeal 2011-012792
Application 12/589,296

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ claimed invention is an apparatus that is activated to
block glare to a vehicle’s driver from a region viewable through a
windshield (Spec. 2:12-15).
Independent claim 1 is reproduced below.
1. Apparatus for use in a vehicle to protect a driver whose eyes
are at a predetermined eye position, from bright lights
originating from point-like sources, including a windshield
with a part (40) that the driver most commonly looks
through to view an area of the environment that is generally
forward of the vehicle, said windshield having multiple
windshield pixels whose transparency and opacity can be
varied, comprising:

a sensor (44) located beside said windshield part (40)
and having a sensor area containing multiple sensor pixels
(54), a lens (56) that forms an image of said environment
area onto said sensor area, and a circuit (70) coupled to said
multiple sensor pixels and to said windshield pixels that
controls the transparency of each of said windshield pixels
in accordance with the amount, or intensity, of light falling
on a directly corresponding one of said sensor pixels,
without opto-electronically determining the position of the
driver’s eyes;

said circuit constructed to reduce the transparency of a
glare-blocked zone of said windshield pixels that comprises
at least one windshield pixel, where the directly
corresponding sensor pixel is receiving a highest intensity of
light of all sensor pixels, to block glaring light that would
otherwise reach the driver’s eyes at said predetermined eye
position by passing through said glare-blocked zone.

Appeal 2011-012792
Application 12/589,296

3
REFERENCES
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, and 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
based upon the teachings of Isaac (US 7,134,707 B2), Barnes (US
5,841,507), and Chen (US 5,298,732).

The Examiner rejected claims 6 and 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based
upon the teachings of Isaac and Hollemans (US 2007/0252821 A1).

ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 2, and 5
The Examiner finds Isaac teaches all of Appellants’ claimed
limitations except for a sensor having a lens (Ans. 4). The Examiner relies
on Barnes for teaching a sensor array and Chen for teaching a sensor having
a lens (Ans. 5). The Examiner then states Appellants’ arguments in the
Appeal Brief are “directed to individual references and do not address
whether or not it would be obvious to include those features of Barnes and
Chen” into Isaac as found by the Examiner (Ans. 10). The Examiner further
states Chen was cited for teaching a lens used with a sensor and does not
make “use of any other specifics for Chen” (Ans. 10-11).
Appellants contend “Chen’s lens does not form an image on a sensor
surface that has sensor pixels directly corresponding to windshield pixels,”
as claimed (emphasis added) (App. Br. 5-6). We agree. The Examiner has
not addressed how Isaac, Barnes, and Chen, alone or combined, teach or
suggest a sensor and a circuit coupled to multiple sensor pixels and
windshield pixels that control the transparency of each windshield pixel in
accordance with light “falling on a directly corresponding one of said sensor
pixels” (claim 1). Thus, the rejection of claims 1, 2, and 5 is not sustained.
Appeal 2011-012792
Application 12/589,296

4
Claims 6 and 7
The Examiner finds Isaac teaches all the elements recited in claim 6
except for a sensor integrated with a windshield capable of sensing multiple
windshield areas manually touched by a driver, relying on Hollemans for
this feature (Ans. 8).
Appellants argue Isaac’s touch pad is on the dashboard, not the
windshield, as claimed (App. Br. 7). Appellants further assert Hollemans
discloses detecting two points on a screen (two finger touch) and the
windshield is not darkened by the touch (App. Br. 8). Appellants further
urge the combination of Isaac and Hollemans does not suggest moving
Isaac’s touch screen to the windshield (Reply Br. 4).
However, Hollemans discloses a touchscreen which, among other
things, can be used in a windshield (¶¶ [0007], [0038]; Ans. 8). Isaac was
cited to disclose darkening the windshield when an area on a touchpad in the
dashboard is touched. We agree with the Examiner that moving Isaac’s
touch pad to the windshield as taught by Hollemans would have been an
obvious design choice (Ans. 8). Thus, the rejection of claim 6 is sustained.
The Examiner finds Isaac does not teach maintaining a window that
was touched at a reduced transparency for a predetermined time period
without the driver needing to set the time period each time a windshield area
is touched, as claimed in claim 7 (Ans. 9). The Examiner asserts it is well
known to provide a timer component in a user interface system and that it is
“notoriously old in the automobile arts that vehicles are turned off during
periods of non-use” (Ans. 9). Therefore, the Examiner finds, it would be
recognized that the apparatus of Isaac in view of Hollemans would turn off
once the vehicle is turned off (Ans. 9).
Appeal 2011-012792
Application 12/589,296

5
Appellants counter neither Isaac nor Hollemans suggests darkening a
windshield for a predetermined time period (Reply Br. 4). We agree.
Turning off a vehicle does not correspond to a “predetermined time period”
as the Examiner asserts (Ans. 10). Further, the Examiner has not pointed to
any portion of Isaac or Hollemans to support the proposition that the
transparency of the windshield is reduced for a predetermined time period
other than to say it is well known in the art without providing any references
for support (Ans. 9). Thus, the rejection of claim 7 is not sustained.

DECISION
The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 2, 5, and 7 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 and thus the Examiner’s decision rejecting these claims is reversed.
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
and thus the Examiner’s decision rejecting this claim is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv)(2010).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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