Ex Parte Brosnan et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 24, 201613291239 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 24, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 13/291,239 11/08/2011 Susan W. Brosnan 73445 7590 06/24/2016 Lieberman & Brandsdorfer, LLC 802 Still Creek Lane Gaithersburg, MD 20878 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. RPS9201l0073US 1 3216 EXAMINER CHAPPELL, DANIEL C ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2135 MAILDATE DELIVERY MODE 06/24/2016 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SUSAN W. BROSNAN, PATRICIA S. HOGAN, JOHN DAVID JR. LANDERS, JR., and DAVID J. STEINER Appeal2014-007535 Application 13/291,239 Technology Center 2100 Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, NABEEL U. KHAN, and MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges. STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal2014-007535 Application 13/291,239 STATE~vfENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims 1-18. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We affirm. THE INVENTION The claims are directed to simulating a functionality of non-volatile random access memory (NVRAM) using cache memory of a disk controller. Spec., i-f 1. Claim 1, reproduced below with a disputed limitation emphasized in italics, is representative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method comprising: a disk controller in communication with storage media, the disk controller including cache memory; an operating system in communication with the cache memory; setting aside a logical block address of the disk controller cache memory; the operating system in communication with the disk controller rnaintaining the set aside logical block address as permanently dirty, including maintaining a bit designating the set aside logical block address as permanently dirty; and the operating system supporting read and write operations, including reading data from the disk controller cache memory to support the read operation and storing write data in the disk controller cache memory to support the write operation. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Schneider et al. Yang et al. us 5,408,644 US 2005/0243609 Al 2 Apr. 18, 1995 Nov. 3, 2005 Appeal2014-007535 Application 13/291,239 REJECTION The Examiner rejected claims 1-18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yang and Schneider. Final Act. 2-28. APPELLANTS' CONTENTIONS 1. The term permanently dirty as used in claim 1 is properly interpreted as being persistent across changes in system state, a feature not taught or suggested by the applied Schneider reference, which flushes data rather than maintaining the set aside logical block address as permanent data. App. Br. 10-14. 2. Schneider's teaching of "increas[ing] system performance by including a memory that allows for data to be written; thus reducing the writing of partial stripes of data" is a result of using an intermediary posting memory device, not Schneider's flushing process using a permanent dirty flag and, therefore, does not provide appropriate motivation for incorporating these relied-upon latter features into Yang in rejecting claim 1. App. Br. 14--15. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner's rejection in light of Appellants' arguments the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants' conclusions. We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 2-28) and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner's Answer in response to Appellants' Appeal Brief (Ans. 2-14) and concur with the 3 Appeal2014-007535 Application 13/291,239 conclusions reached by the Examiner. \Ve highlight the following for emphasis. Appellants argue the term permanently dirty requires persistence across changes in system state such that the claimed set aside logical address designation is maintained through system shutdown or reboot. App. Br. 12- 13. In support of the proffered interpretation, Appellants rely on the Specification for disclosing that blocks designated permanently dirty are not subject to periodic flushing to persistent storage and because "[ d]uring initialization, the operating system checks the disk cache controller for a logical block address marked as permanently dirty (102)." App. Br. 12, citing Spec. i-f 20. Appellants further argue, in contrast to the definition of permanent offered by the Examiner of "lasting for a relatively long time," the cited Webster's New World College Dictionary includes an alternate definition of "lasting or intended to last indefinitely without change." App. Br. 12-13. According to Appellants, "the Examiner's definition of 'permanent' is clearly inconsistent with Appellants' specification when ... an alternate definition provided by the Examiner's source supports Appellants' use of the term." App. Br. 13. The Examiner responds by finding the Specification does not provide a clear definition of the term permanent, the plain meaning of the term as evidenced by a dictionary definition includes the proffered broader interpretation of lasting for a relatively long time rather than indefinitely, and Appellants' reliance on the operation of a preferred embodiment in limiting the claim interpretation is improper and would result in the inappropriate importation of limitations from the Specification into the claims. Ans. 3. 4 Appeal2014-007535 Application 13/291,239 \Ve find Appellants' argument unpersuasive of Examiner error. The Examiner's interpretation of the term permanently dirty as requiring designation for a relatively long time but not necessarily indefinitely or through system shutdown and/or reboot is supported by the evidence of record (e.g., the proffered dictionary definition) and is consistent with the Specification. It is well settled that, during examination, the PTO must interpret terms in a claim using "the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant's specification." In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). However, "[a]bsent claim language carrying a narrow meaning, the PTO should only limit the claim based on the specification or prosecution history when those sources expressly disclaim the broader definition." In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Thus, "while it is true that claims are to be interpreted in light of the specification and with a view to ascertaining the invention, it does not follow that limitations from the specification may be read into the claims." Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988). As the court explained in In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989), the rationale for this approach to claim interpretation is that "during patent prosecution when claims can be amended, ambiguities should be recognized, scope and breadth of language explored, and clarification imposed." By asking us to adopt the narrower of two interpretations of the claim term at issue, without any amendment of the claim reflecting the narrower claim scope advanced, Appellants are asking us to interpret claim 1 in a 5 Appeal2014-007535 Application 13/291,239 manner contrary to that directed by our reviewing court. Accordingly, we decline to read limitations present in a disclosed exemplary embodiment of the invention into the claims. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner in finding the term permanently dirty does not require persistence across changes in system state and that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the disputed limitation of claim 1 does not require the claimed set aside logical address designation be maintained through system shutdown and/or reboot. We also agree with the Examiner's finding that Yang's area dedicated to storing data that has not yet been written to disk (i.e., a permanent dirty area) in combination with the disclosed operation of Schneider's cache and permanent dirty flag teaches or suggests the disputed limitation of the operating system in communication with the disk controller maintaining the set aside logical block address as permanently dirty, including maintaining a bit designating the set aside logical block address as permanently dirty. See Final Act. 4---6. In connection with contention 2, Appellants argue the Examiner's reasoning for modifying Yang to incorporate Schneider's permanent dirty flag is premised on reasoning unrelated to the flag itself and, therefore, is insufficient to support a conclusion of obviousness. App. Br. 14--15. The Examiner responds by finding: The permanent dirty flag of Schneider controls flushing of part of the posting memory of Schneider. This is asynchronous I/O processing. Yang is also concerned with asynchronous I/O processing (see, e.g., paragraph 0091 of Yang). Contrary to Appellants' argument that the teachings of Schneider are not related to those of Yang, both Schneider and Yang are concerned with asynchronous I/O processing. Schneider therefore would have commended itself to the inventor's attention and therefore is indeed a logical choice for 6 Appeal2014-007535 Application 13/291,239 combination with Yang to solve the problem addressed by the claimed invention. Ans. 5. In the absence of persuasive rebuttal in reply, we find the Examiner has articulated reasoning with rational underpinnings sufficient to justify the legal conclusion of obviousness. See KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). In contrast, Appellants fail to provide persuasive evidence or explanation showing that the Examiner's asserted combination is anything other than the combination of familiar elements yielding no more than predictable results. See KSR at 416-1 7. Such a combination is itself a sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support a finding of obviousness. Accordingly, Appellants' contention 2 is unpersuasive of Examiner error. For the reasons discussed supra, Appellants' arguments addressing the rejection of independent claims 1, 7, and 13, and dependent claims 3-5, 9- 11, and 15-17, which are not separately argued, (App. Br. 10-15) are unpersuasive of Examiner error. Because Appellants' contentions of error in connection with the rejections of dependent claims 2, 8, and 14 (App. Br. 15-18) and dependent claims 6, 12, and 18 (App. Br. 18-21) are based on arguments similar to those presented in connection with independent claims 1, 7, and 13, such arguments are likewise unpersuasive for similar reasons. Therefore we sustain the rejections of claims 1-18 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) over Yang and Schneider DECISION The Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-18 is affirmed. 7 Appeal2014-007535 Application 13/291,239 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation