Ex Parte Borges et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 28, 2017

13536801 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 28, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
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Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/536,801 06/28/2012 Daniel R. Borges 5607.1380000
(P12920US1)
2868
63975 7590 10/02/2017
NTFRNF KFNNT FR FtOT DNTFTN Rr FOY PT T f EXAMINER
1100 NEW YORK AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
ASEFA, DEBEBE A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2476
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/02/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DANIEL R. BORGES, BIRJU N. SHAH,
CHRISTOPHER B. ZIMMERMANN, and
CHRISTIAAN A. HARTMAN
Appeal 2015-005619
Application 13/536,801
Technology Center 2400
Before JAMES R. HUGHES, NATHAN A. ENGELS, and
CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final decision rejecting claims 1—25, which constitute all the
claims pending in this application. Final Act. 1; Br. 3.1 We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 We refer to Appellants’ Specification (“Spec.”), filed June 28, 2012 and
Appeal Brief (“Br.”) filed Dec. 23, 2014. We also refer to the Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.”) mailed Mar. 10, 2015, and Final Office Action (Final
Rejection) (“Final Act.”) mailed July 23, 2014.
Appeal 2015-005619
Application 13/536,801
Appellants ’ Invention
The invention concerns communication systems, computer-readable
storage media, and methods for communication between devices in a
wireless local area network, including a first device obtaining connection
information associated with the second device, using the connection
information to move the first device from a first basic service set (BSS)
(configuration or topology) associated with the first device to a second BSS
associated with the second computing device, establishing a direct link
between the first and second devices, then conditionally terminating the
direct link and moving the first device from the second BSS back to the first
BSS when the first BSS is associated with a more robust connection than the
second BSS. Spec. Tflf 1, 5—11; Abstract.
Representative Claim
Independent claim 1, reproduced below with key disputed limitations
emphasized, further illustrates the invention:
1. A computer-implemented method for facilitating
communication between a first computing device and a second
computing device connected to the first computing device
through an extended service set (ESS) of a wireless local area
network (WLAN), comprising:
obtaining, on the first computing device, connection
information associated with the second computing device;
using the connection information to move the first
computing device from a first basic service set (BSS) associated
with the first computing device to a second BSS associated with
the second computing device;
after the first computing device is connected to the second
BSS, establishing a direct link between the first computing
device and the second computing device, wherein the direct link
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Application 13/536,801
facilitates subsequent communication between the first and
second computing device; and
conditionally terminating the direct link and, when the
first BSS is associated with a more robust connection than the
second BSS, moving the first computing device from the second
BSS back to the first BSS.
Rejections on Appeal
1. The Examiner rejects claims 1—7, 9-16, and 18—24 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lambert et al. (US
2010/0054154 Al, published Mar. 4, 2010) (“Lambert”), McCann et al. (US
2013/0301607 Al, published Nov. 14, 2013 (filed May 11, 2012))
(“McCann”), and Kneckt et al. (US 2013/0231151 Al, published Sept. 5,
2013 (filed Mar. 1, 2012)) (“Kneckt”).
2. The Examiner rejects claims 8, 17, and 25 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lambert, McCann, Kneckt, and
Agrawal et al. (US 6,879,812 B2, issued Apr. 12, 2005) (“Agrawal”).2
ISSUE
Based upon our review of the record, Appellants’ contentions, and the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions, the issues before us follow:
2 The Examiner does not list Kneckt in the statement of rejection. See Final
Act. 24. Claims 8, 17, and 23, however, depend on independent claims 1,
10, and 18, respectively. The rejection of the independent claims includes
Kneckt. We find the Examiner’s omission of Kneckt to be harmless error,
and amend this typographical error to clarify the ground of rejection and for
clarity and consistency of the record.
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Application 13/536,801
Did the Examiner err in finding that Lambert, McCann, and Kneckt
collectively would have taught or suggested “conditionally terminating the
direct link and, when the first BSS is associated with a more robust
connection than the second BSS, moving the first computing device from the
second BSS back to the first BSS,” within the meaning of Appellants’ claim
1 and the commensurate limitations of claims 10 and 18?
ANALYSIS
Appellants argue independent claims 1,10, and 18 together as a group
and do not separately argue the rejection of dependent claims 8, 17, and 25,
or the rejection of dependent claims 2—7, 9, 11—16, and 19-24. See Br. 3, 7—
8, 11. Accordingly, we select independent claim 1 as representative of
Appellants’ arguments and grouping with respect to claims 1—25. 37 C.L.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the final Office Action from which this appeal is taken (final
Act. 2—5), and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s
Answer (Ans. 3—5) in response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief. We concur
with the findings and conclusions reached by the Examiner, and we provide
the following for emphasis.
Appellants contend that Lambert, McCann, and Kneckt do not teach
the disputed features of representative claim 1. See Br. 8—11. Specifically,
Appellants contend Kneckt does not describe the disputed feature of
“conditionally terminating the direct link and, when the first BSS is
associated with a more robust connection than the second BSS, moving the
first computing device from the second BSS back to the first BSS.” Br. 10—
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11 (emphasis omitted) (quoting claim 1). See Br. 8—11. Appellants further
contend that
the cited sections of Kneckt are limited to describing — aside
from the general descriptions of Wi-Fi Direct and operations for
joining an ad hoc wireless network — request frames that
specify a condition that responding devices must meet if they
are to send a corresponding response. Kneckt does not
describe or suggest, in whole or in part, conditionally
terminating a direct link and/or moving a device back to a
given basic service set (BSS) from a different BSS based on the
robustness of a connection with the given BSS and/or the
different BSS.
Br. 10.
We agree with the Examiner and find a preponderance of the evidence
demonstrates that the combination of Lambert, McCann, and Kneckt would
have taught or at least suggested the disputed features of Appellants’ claim
1. The Examiner relies on Lambert and McCann to teach the undisputed
features of connecting a first and second device via a first BSS. See Final
Act. 3^4. The first and second device must be connected in order to
“[obtain]” the “connection information associated with the second
computing device” (claim 1) and “move the first computing device from a
first basic service set (BSS) associated with the first computing device to a
second BSS associated with the second computing device” (claim 1) — the
Examiner also relies on Lambert and McCann to teach these undisputed
features. See Final Act. 3^4.
The Examiner relies on Kneckt in combination with Lambert and
McCann to teach the disputed features of conditionally terminating the direct
link and moving the first computing device from the second BSS back to the
first BSS. See Final Act. 4—5; Ans. 3—5. The Examiner explains that Kneckt
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describes establishing direct links between peer devices and one device (as a
group owner) terminating the group (the direct connections between the
device (first device) and other peer devices) (Kneckt 1121). See Final Act.
4—5; Ans. 4—5. The Examiner further explains the termination may be based
on certain conditions, such as when particular BSS characteristics (delay,
capacity, load) fall below (or exceed) a threshold (Kneckt 145) — i.e., a
conditionally terminating a direct link. See Final Act. 4—5; Ans. 4—5. The
Examiner also explains that Kneckt describes establishing network links
(through an access point (AP)) and direct links, and a device may join or
rejoin a particular link (make a particular connection) (see Kneckt || 114,
150-152). See Final Act. 4—5; Ans. 4—5. Therefore, we agree with the
Examiner that Kneckt describes that establishing and terminating BSS
network and direct links is known.
Kneckt also describes determining link quality (see Kneckt || ISO-
152). See Final Act. 4—5; Ans. 4—5. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner
that, in view of the undisputed teachings of Lambert and McCann
establishing a first BSS connection, Kneckt would have at least suggested
(conditionally terminating and) rejoining the first BSS connection (that is,
moving the first computing device from the second BSS back to the first
BSS), when the quality of the first BSS is better than the second (direct)
BSS (that is, the first BSS is associated with a more robust connection than
the second BSS).
Further, Appellants failed to file a Reply Brief addressing the
Examiner’s clarified findings and additional discussion of the disputed
limitations, or otherwise rebutting the findings and responsive arguments
made by the Examiner in the Answer.
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Appellants also argue the references individually, confine their
arguments in their Appeal Brief to the Kneckt reference, and do not address
the combination of Lambert, McCann, and Kneckt or the knowledge of one
of ordinary skill in the art. Kneckt must be read, not in isolation, but for
what Kneckt fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as a whole. See
In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (one cannot
show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where the
rejections are based on combinations of references).
Appellants’ arguments do not take into account what the combination
of Lambert, McCann, and Kneckt would have suggested to one of ordinary
skill in the art —
The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a
secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference .... Rather, the test is what
the combined teachings of the references would have suggested
to those of ordinary skill in the art.
In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (citations omitted).
We find that it would have been well within the skill of a person of
ordinary skill in the art to combine such known techniques to establish a first
BSS connection as taught by Lambert and McCann, establish a second direct
BSS connection as taught by Kneckt, conditionally terminate the second
BSS as taught by Kneckt and rejoin the first BSS connection when the
quality of the first BSS is better than the second direct BSS as taught by
Kneckt in combination with Lambert and McCann. See KSR Int 7 Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[I]f a technique has been used to
improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize
that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is
obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill” (citations
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omitted)). Appellants have not provided persuasive evidence or reasoning
establishing that combining the respective familiar elements of the cited
references in the manner proffered by the Examiner would have been
“uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” at the
time of Appellants’ invention. Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.,
485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
Thus, Appellants do not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of representative independent claim 1. Accordingly,
we affirm the Examiner’s rejections of representative claim 1, independent
claims 10 and 18, and dependent claims 2—9, 11—17, and 19-25, not argued
separately with particularity (supra).
CONCLUSION
Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
1-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 1—25 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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