Ex Parte Bolz et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 6, 2017

12855602 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 6, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/855,602 08/12/2010 Jeffrey A. Bolz NVDA/SC-09-0264-US0-US1 1255
102324 7590 04/10/2017
Artegis Law Group, LLP/NVIDIA
7710 Cherry Park Drive Suite T #104
Houston, TX 77095
EXAMINER
TRAN, KIM THANH THI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2612
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/10/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
kcruz @ artegislaw.com
ALGdocketing @ artegislaw.com
mmccauley @ artegislaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JEFFREY A. BOLZ and PATRICK R. BROWN
Appeal 2015-000571
Application 12/855,6021
Technology Center 2600
Before BRUCE R. WINSOR, SHARON FENICK, and
MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges.
FENICK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final
Rejection of claims 1-22. (Appeal Br. 5). We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b)(1).
We affirm.
1 Appellants identify NVIDIA Corporation as the real party in interest.
(Appeal Br. 3.)
Appeal 2015-000571
Application 12/855,602
Invention
Appellants’ invention relates to accessing texture objects stored within
a texture memory via image units to which the texture objects are attached.
Texture objects in texture memory comprise one or more images
corresponding, e.g., to distinct levels of detail (LODs) of the texture. To
access a texture object, one or more images corresponding to a particular
LOD is bound to an image unit, via which the texture object (and the LOD)
can then be accessed. (Spec. ]} 32, Abstract.)
Exemplary Claims
Claims 1 and 3, reproduced below, are exemplary:
1. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium
including instructions that, when executed by a processor,
perform the steps of:
receiving a texture bind request from an application
program, wherein the texture bind request includes an object
identifier that identifies a first texture object stored in the texture
memory and an image identifier that identifies a first image unit,
wherein the first image unit includes one or more references to
one or more corresponding images, and each corresponding
image is associated with a different level of detail of the first
texture object;
binding the first texture object to the first image unit based
on the texture bind request;
receiving, within a shader engine, a first shading program
command from the application program for performing a first
memory access operation on the first texture object, wherein the
memory access operation is a store operation or an atomic
operation to an arbitrary location in the image; and
performing, within the shader engine, the first memory
access operation on the first texture object via the first image
unit.
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Application 12/855,602
3. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of
claim 1, wherein the texture bind request specifies one or more
types of memory access operations that can be performed on the
first texture object via the first image unit.
Rejection2
The Examiner rejects claims 1-22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Grossman et al. (US 2010/0091028 Al; pub. Apr. 15,
2010; “Grossman”) andKoguchi (US 2005/0259104 Al; pub. Nov. 24,
2005). (Final Action 3-11.)
Issues
I. Did the Examiner err in finding that Grossman, in combination
with Koguchi, teaches or suggests “performing a first memory access
operation on the first texture object,” as recited in claim 1?
II. Did the Examiner err in finding that Koguchi, in combination
with Grossman, teaches or suggests a texture bind request which “specifies
one or more types of memory access operations that can be performed on the
first texture object via the first image unit,” as recited in claim 3?
ANALYSIS
(I) Obviousness Rejection - Claim 1
The Examiner finds that claim l’s limitation of receiving, within a
shader engine, a first shading program command from the application
program for performing a first memory access operation on the first texture
object is taught or suggested by Grossman, in combination with Koguchi.
(Final Action 3-5.) Specifically, the Examiner maps Grossman’s data store
2 Examiner has withdrawn the rejection (Final Action 2) under 35 U.S.C.
§101. (Answer 2.)
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Application 12/855,602
102 to the recited texture memory that contains a texture object. (Id. at 3-4;
Advisory Action 2.)
Appellants contend that the data store 102 of Grossman “merely stores
parameters of objects, such as geometric descriptions.” (Appeal Br. 11;
Reply Br. 5-6.) Appellants argue “[tjhere is no discussion or disclosure in
Grossman about any operations that are performed on texture objects.”
(Appeal Br. 12.)
The cited portion of Grossman refers to Figure 1 as a block diagram
of a graphics processing system implementing “a texture level tracking and
clamping process.” (Grossman 20, cited by Final Action 4.) Grossman
teaches that “data store 102 stores one or more parameters of objects related
to texture processing for a graphics rendering system” and continues to
explain that “[tjhese can include texture objects as well as geometric
descriptions, and the like.” (Id.) Appellants’ argument is premised on an
assumption that Grossman thereby teaches that texture objects themselves
are not stored in the data store 102, but rather that only other information
(parameters) of texture objects are stored there. (Appeal Br. 11; Reply Br.
6.)
Regardless of any ambiguity as to whether the referent of “[tjhese”
(which include texture objects) is the “parameters of objects relating to
texture processing” or the objects, in light of the entirety of Grossman, we
agree with the Examiner’s finding (Final Action 4) that texture objects are
stored in the data store. While Grossman teaches that “[gjraphics Tenderer
110 receives descriptions of textured objects from the data store 102,” this is
the beginning, and not the end, of the process of texture level tracking and
clamping taught in Grossman. (Grossman ]} 20.) Grossman teaches that the
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Appeal 2015-000571
Application 12/855,602
texture processor 104 “includes a number of processing components (or
modules) that process textures used by a graphics Tenderer 110.” (Id.) The
disclosure of Grossman with respect to Figure 1 and the texture processor
104 of Figure 1 teaches or at least suggests that texture objects (and not just
meta-data pertaining to such objects) are stored in data store 102 and
accessed by graphics Tenderer 110 via texture processor 104 (which ensures
the correct level of detail), specifically upon the transmission of information
to data store 102 from LOD and address calculator 109 which allows the
correct level of detail and location (address) to be accessed for a texture
object. (Id. 20-22.)
Therefore, we do not agree with Appellants that “there is no
discussion or disclosure in Grossman” (Appeal Br. 12) about operations that
are performed on texture objects, as memory access operations are taught or
suggested by Grossman. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments of
error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 and sustain its obviousness
rejection. We also sustain the obviousness rejection of independent claims
13 and 22, not argued separately (Appeal Br. 12), and of dependent claims 2,
4—12, 14, and 16-21, also not argued separately (id.).
(II) Obviousness Rejection - Claim 3
Claim 3 depends from claim 1 and recites a texture bind request which
specifies one or more types of memory access operations that can be
performed on the first texture object via the first image unit. Appellants
argue that while Koguchi teaches a shader capable of accessing only a
specific area in memory, “[tjhis restriction ... is not equivalent” to the
claimed texture bind request. (Appeal Br. 12-13; Reply Br. 7.) Appellants
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Application 12/855,602
further argue that the cited teachings of Koguchi are “silent with respect to
specifying a type of memory access operation.” (Reply Br. 7.)
However, the Examiner finds that the teachings of Koguchi, with
respect to shaders performing rendering and capable of only accessing a
specific area in memory, along with the teachings of Grossman with respect
to restricting access to texture based on LOD, teaches or suggests a shader
which can only access texture data from specific areas in memory. (Final
Action 4—6; Answer 4—5.) Appellants argue the individual teaching of
Koguchi instead of the combination applied by the Examiner; such
arguments are unavailing. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 422-23 (CCPA
1981).
We agree with the Examiner’s finding that the combination of the
teachings of Grossman with respect to binding the first texture object to the
first image (Final Act. 4) with the teachings of Koguchi with respect to the
use of a shader restricted to accessing (reading) only certain areas in
memory (id. at 5-6) renders obvious the claimed limitation.
Thus we are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments of error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 3, or of claim 15, not separately argued
(Appeal Br. 13).
DECISION
The Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of 1-22 is affirmed.
Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv), no time period for taking any
subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended.
AFFIRMED
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