Ex Parte Blaesing et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 19, 2018

14260703 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 19, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/260,703 04/24/2014
22045 7590 06/21/2018
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C.
1000 TOWN CENTER
TWENTY-SECOND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075
UNITED ST A TES OF AMERICA
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Frank Blaesing
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
KOA0352PUSA (R 1904) 1669
EXAMINER
BROOME, SHARRIEF I
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2872
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/21/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
kdilucia@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte FRANK BLAESING, ALF BURAU, ANDREAS PIRCHNER,
THOMAS WEBER, GREGOR BOEHNE, FRANK HAGEN,
and CLAUDIA WEBER
Appeal2017-007332
Application 14/260,703
Technology Center 2800
Before KAREN M. HASTINGS, JAMES C. HOUSEL, and
DONNA M. PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOUSEL, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL 1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner's decision finally rejecting claims 1-3, 5, 7-10, 12-16, 20, and 22.
We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.
1 Our decision refers to the Specification (Spec.) filed April 24, 2014, the
Examiner's Final Office Action (Final) dated November 3, 2016,
Appellants' Appeal Brief (Appeal Br.) filed November 30, 2016, the
Examiner's Answer (Ans.) dated April 4, 2017, and Appellants' Reply Brief
(Reply Br.) filed April 13, 2017.
2 Appellant is the Applicant, Leopold Kostal GmbH & Co. KG, which is
identified as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal2017-007332
Application 14/260,703
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The invention relates to a camera arrangement having a prism coupled
to a vehicle windshield between the windshield and a camera within the
vehicle interior (Spec. ,r 2). Appellant discloses that both the curvature of
the windshield pane in most types of vehicles and the slanted entrance of
light when viewing through a normally slanted pane leads to a defocusing
effect of the pane when no prism is coupled to the pane (id. ,r 5). However,
Appellants further disclose that, when a prism is fitted with a coupling agent
to the inside of a curved pane, the windshield and the coupling medium act
together as a lens such that the defocusing effect fails (id. ,r 6). In addition,
Appellants disclose that modifying the focus of the camera's objective lens
cannot usually compensate for the differing effective radii of curvature in the
horizontal and vertical directions, and slope, of windshield panes (id. ,r 7).
Therefore, Appellants' solution to address the defocusing problem discussed
above it to provide that at least one of the light entry surface of the prism
facing the windshield and the light exit surface of the prism facing the
camera is non-flat (id. ,r 14).
Claim 1, reproduced below from the Claims Appendix to the Appeal
Brief, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal. The limitations at issue
are italicized.
1. A camera arrangement for a vehicle, the arrangement
compnsmg:
a camera arranged behind a windshield of a vehicle; and
a prism positioned between the windshield and the
camera and coupled to the windshield by a coupling medium,
the prism having a light entry surf ace facing the windshield in
which light rays originating from an exterior side of the
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Application 14/260,703
windshield enter through the windshield and into the prism and
a light exit surface facing an optical imaging component of the
camera in which the light rays exit from the prism toward the
optical imaging component of the camera;
wherein the light exit surface is a non-flat, concave
surface by which the prism at least partially compensates for
refraction resulting from curvature of the windshield.
Independent claim 16 similarly recites a camera arrangement for a
vehicle as set forth in claim 1 where the light entry surface is further limited
to be a non-planar, curved surface.
REJECTIONS
The Examiner maintains, and Appellants request our review of, the
following grounds of rejection under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a):
1. Claims 1, 3, 5, 7-9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, and 22 as unpatentable
over Schanz3 in view of Watanabe; 4
2. Claim 2 as unpatentable over Schanz and Watanabe, further in
view of Suzuki; 5 and
3. Claims 10 and 14 as unpatentable over Schanz and Watanabe,
further in view of Rana. 6
3 Schanz, DE 10342837 Al, published April 28, 2005. The Examiner relies,
without objection, on an English-language machine translation of this
reference.
4 Watanabe et al., US 2008/0192358 Al, published August 14, 2008
("Watanabe").
5 Suzuki et al., US 4,787,711, issued November 29, 1988 ("Suzuki").
6 Rana, US 6,046,867, issued April 4, 2000.
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Application 14/260,703
ANALYSIS
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether Appellant has identified
reversible error in the Examiner's conclusion that it would have been
obvious to have modified Schanz' prism to include a non-flat, concave light
exit surface facing the camera in view of Watanabe. We answer this
question in the affirmative and, therefore, will not sustain the Examiner's
obviousness rejections.
The Examiner finds that Schanz discloses a camera arrangement
substantially as recited in claims 1 and 16, except for a prism with a light
exit surface that is non-flat and concave (Final 2--4). The Examiner finds
Watanabe discloses prism 13 whose light exit surface is non-flat and
concave (id. at 4). The Examiner finds that Watanabe's light exit surface is
top surface 13c because, as shown in Figure 3, light is shown exiting from
that side of prism 13 (id.; Ans. 3).
Appellant argues, inter alia, that the Examiner's rejection lacks
rational underpinning to modify Schanz as proposed in view of Watanabe
because Watanabe is directed to a heads-up display device for a vehicle
wherein the device includes display source 11, 12 and a prism for refracting
display light from display source 11, 12 toward a projection position on
windshield 3 to be observed by a driver within the vehicle (Appeal Br. 10).
Watanabe's prism is designed to prevent ghost images appearing on the
windshield due to external light F by reflecting light F toward panel 23
rather than toward windshield 3 (id.). In contrast to Watanabe, Appellant
asserts claim 1 and Schanz both require a prism placed between a windshield
and a camera inside the vehicle for directing external light to a camera (id.).
Appellant further contends that Schanz and Watanabe have disparate goals,
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Application 14/260,703
with Schanz passing external light through the prism to a camera and
Watanabe preventing external light from being reflected by the prism
towards the windshield (id. at 11 ). As such, Appellant contends that it
would not have been obvious to modify Schanz' optical system to provide
Schanz' prism with a non-flat, concave light exit surface facing the camera
in view of Watanabe's teaching because Watanabe teaches doing so would
reflect external light away from the camera rather than toward the camera
(id. at 10).
Appellant's argument is persuasive of reversible error. As Appellant
asserts, Watanabe's prism directs display light from display source 11, 12 to
a projection point on the windshield to be observed by the vehicle driver. In
order to prevent ghost images, Watanabe's prism is designed to reflect
external light away from the windshield project point. In contrast, claim 1
and Schanz both provide a prism between a windshield and a camera to
direct external light to the camera. The problem Watanabe solves,
preventing ghost images from external light, is simply not applicable to the
arrangement of claim 1 and Schanz. Moreover, although the Examiner
correctly finds that Watanabe's prism surface 13c is a light exit surface, the
Examiner errs in equating this light exit surface with the light exit surface of
claim 1 which recites that this light exit surface faces the camera.
Watanabe's surface 13c not only does not face a camera, it actually faces
towards the windshield and away from the display source.
The Examiner has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case
of obviousness based on an inherent or explicit disclosure of the claimed
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445
(Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on review of the
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prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case of
unpatentability"); In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re
Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1051 (CCPA 1976). To establish a prima facie
case of obviousness, the Examiner must show that each and every limitation
of the claim is described or suggested by the prior art or would have been
obvious based on the knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the art. In re
Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In addition, meeting that
burden requires establishing that the applied prior art would have provided
one of ordinary skill in the art with an apparent reason to modify the prior art
to arrive at the claimed invention. See KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398,418 (2007).
Here, the Examiner has not carried the burden of establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the factual basis for the conclusion that the
claimed invention would have been obvious over the combination of Schanz
and Watanabe as proposed. The Examiner does not rely on either Suzuki or
Rana to remedy the deficiencies discussed above with regard to the proposed
combination of Schanz and Watanabe. Accordingly, we reverse the
rejections.
DECISION
Upon consideration of the record, and for the reasons given above and
in the Appeal and Reply Briefs, the decision of the Examiner rejecting
claims 1-3, 5, 7-10, 12-16, 20, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Schanz in view of Watanabe, alone or further in view of
Suzuki or Rana, is reversed.
REVERSED
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