Ex Parte Billard et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 5, 2017

13509288 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 5, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/509,288 05/11/2012 Justin Billard 60469-478PUS1; 11515-US 7184
64779 7590 09/07/2017
CARLSON GASKEY & OLDS
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEPARTMENT
400 W MAPLE STE 350
BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009
EXAMINER
RIEGELMAN, MICHAEL A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3654
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/07/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
frederic .tenney@otis.com
ptodocket @ cgolaw. com
cgolaw@yahoo.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JUSTIN BILLARD, JAMES M. DRAPER,
and ANTHONY COONEY
Appeal 2017-001379
Application 13/509,2881
Technology Center 3600
Before JAMES R. HUGHES, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and
CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—6 and 8—20, which constitute all the pending
rejected2 claims. Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.
1 The real party in interest is identified as Otis Elevator Company, a
business unit of United Technologies Corporation. App. Br. 1.
2 Claim 7 is subject to objection. Final Act. 9.
Appeal 2017-001379
Application 13/509,288
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention relates to elevator braking in which braking
force is applied to a braking surface. Abstract; Spec. 1—4, 13—16. Claim
1 is exemplary of the matter on appeal (disputed limitation emphasized):
1. An elevator braking device comprising:
a brake housing;
at least one roller supported by the brake housing, the roller being
selectively moveable between a first position in which the roller does
not engage a guide rail and a second position in which the roller
engages and rolls along the guide rail;
at least one biasing member supported by the brake housing,
associated with the at least one roller and biasing the roller toward the
guide rail in the second position; and
at least one braking surface supported by the brake housing
and engaging a periphery of the roller that faces the guide rail such
that friction between the periphery of the roller and the braking
surface provides a stopping force for stopping vertical movement of
an associated elevator car or counterweight.
App. Br. 8 (Claims Appendix).
REJECTIONS
Claims 1—6, 8—10, 14—18, and 20 stand rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Koppensteiner (US 4,538,706;
iss. Sept. 3, 1985). Final Act. 2—7.
Claims 11—13 and 19 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Koppensteiner in view of Gray et al. (US
4,176,826; iss. Dec. 4, 1979) (“Gray”). Final Act. 7—9.
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Application 13/509,288
ANALYSIS
Appellants argue the Examiner mischaracterizes the teaching of
Koppensteiner and errs in finding Koppensteiner anticipates claims 1—6, 8—
10, 14—18, and 20. App. Br. 2—5; Reply Br. 1—2. According to Appellants
Appellant’s claimed invention provides a stopping force
for an elevator system in a unique manner that is not in any way
contemplated or suggested by the references relied upon by the
Examiner. Contrary to conventional wisdom, which includes
applying a frictional braking force directly to a guiderail,
Appellant’s claims include using a braking force on a periphery
of a roller that is allowed to roll along the guiderail without
applying the frictional force directly to the rail. As explained in
[paragraph 13] of Appellant’s specification, energy is dissipated
through friction that is internal to the braking device, which
provides a more robust braking arrangement because variations
in the co-efficient of friction along a guiderail, for example, does
not have an effect on the co-efficient of friction used to stop
elevator system components from moving. The main reference
[Koppensteiner] relied upon by the Examiner on appeal utilizes
a brake lining that is forced against the side of a guiderail and
utilizes frictional engagement between that brake lining and the
guiderail as a stopping force, [t]here is no frictional engagement
between the periphery of a roller and a braking surface internal
to a brake in that reference [].
App. Br. 2-3.
In particular, Appellants argue the Examiner errs in finding
Koppensteiner teaches that “friction between the periphery of the roller (8)
and the braking surface [] provides a stopping force ... for stopping vertical
movement of an associated elevator car or counterweight” and in finding
that the ‘“outer surface of 12’” provides at least one braking surface. Id. at 3
(citing Final Act. 4).
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Application 13/509,288
In particular, Appellants argue Koppensteiner teaches the roller 8 is a
“free” safety roller that does not engage a braking surface. Id. at 3^4 (citing
Koppensteiner Fig. 2). Appellants argue Koppensteiner does not teach that
the spring 12 is a braking surface nor does it mention the spring 12 causing
friction for preventing the elevator car from moving. Id. Appellants
contend it is the Koppensteiner brake lining 5 that engages the guide rail
surface and applies a braking force directly to the guide rail. Id. at 4.
According to Appellants, “[t]he spring 12 does not engage the roller 8 in a
way that results in friction between them with such friction being a braking
force” and “[t]he braking force in the Koppensteiner reference results from
the friction between the guiderail and the brake lining 5, which is not the
same thing as friction between the roller 8 and the spring 12.” Id.
In the Answer, the Examiner finds:
Firstly, component 12 reads on the “a [braking] surface”
as disclosed in claim 1. Specifically, component 12 exerts a
stopping force on 8 directed horizontally towards 7, as shown in
figure 1. The evidence of this stopping is most clearly shown in
figure 1, by the deflection of component 12 in the hatched lines.
Secondly, roller 8 is always frictionally engaged with and
[braking] surface 12. Specifically, as shown in figures 1 and 2,
the outer surface of 8 is in direct contact with 12. Feature 9 is
not in direct contact with 12 due to cutout 15, however, as is
clearly apparent in figures 1 and 2, and is required by the
claims, the region of 8 above and below 9 (as best seen in
figure 2) is always in frictional contact with 12. In other words,
the roller 8 engages the braking surface.
Additionally, in the specification of Koppensteiner, the
described [] roller 8 is “all the time rotating” (from column 3,
lines 1-3) is used as evidence that the roller does not engage the
braking surface. This evidence is being misinterpreted by
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Application 13/509,288
Appellant and provides further evidence that the roller does
engage the braking surface. Koppensteiner [c]ites that roller is
all the time rotating as it travels from the position shown in
figure 1, to the position shown in the hatched lines in figure 1.
In order to induce this rotation a frictional point of contact must
be present between components 8 and 12.
Ans. 3^4.
In Reply, Appellants argue:
The Koppensteiner reference never describes the spring
12 as a braking surface and never describes any sort of stopping
force generated between the roller 8 and the spring 12.
The Examiner alleges that friction between the roller 8
and the spring 12 is necessary to induce rotation of the roller 8
but that is not what the Koppensteiner reference teaches.
Instead, the collar 9 rolls along the guiderail surface 7 to cause
rolling movement of the roller 8. While there will be some
friction between the spring 12 and the roller 8 when the roller 8
is in the upper position of Figure 1, that friction is not enough
to be or to generate a stopping force for stopping movement of
the elevator car.
The Examiner’s position appears to be that any friction
between a roller and any other surface in a brake housing is
sufficient to anticipate Appellant’s claims. If so, the Examiner
is not accounting for all limitations within Appellant’s claims.
Claim 1, for example, specifies that there is a braking surface
supported by the brake housing. Friction between the periphery
of the roller and the braking surface provides a stopping force
for stopping vertical movement of an associated elevator car or
counterweight. There is no such teaching in the Koppensteiner
reference. Therefore, there is no prima facie case of
anticipation.
Reply Br. 2.
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Application 13/509,288
We are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments because the Examiner
provides insufficient evidence to meet the requirement for anticipation.
There is insufficient evidence that Koppensteiner teaches the claim 1
limitation at least one braking surface supported by the brake housing and
engaging a periphery of the roller that faces the guide rail such that friction
between the periphery of the roller and the braking surface provides a
stopping force for stopping vertical movement of an associated elevator car
or counterweight. In particular, Koppensteiner does not disclose the claimed
“stopping force” as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.
A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the
claims is found, either expressly or inherently described in a single prior art
reference, and arranged as required by the claim. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v.
Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
In view of the above, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 1—6, 8—
10, 14—18, and 20 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
Regarding the § 103 rejection of dependent claims 11—13 and 19 over
Koppensteiner and Gray, Appellants argue, because Koppensteiner does not
teach the claim 1 disputed limitation, discussed supra, regarding the § 102
rejection of independent claim 1, the combination with Gray is insufficient..
We are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments and do not sustain the
rejection of claims 1—6, 8—10, 14—18, and 20 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a). The Examiner provides no evidence that Gray teaches the disputed
limitation. Because our decision with regard to the disputed limitation is
dispositive of the rejection of these claims, we do not address additional
arguments raised by Appellants.
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Application 13/509,288
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—6 and 8—20.
REVERSED
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