Ex Parte Betz et alDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesSep 17, 201011737457 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 17, 2010) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P 0 Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313- 1450 www uspto go" 21 130 7590 09/21/2010 BENESCH, FRIEDLANDER, COPLAN & ARONOFF LLP ATTN: IP DEPARTMENT DOCKET CLERK 200 PUBLIC SQUARE SUITE 2300 CLEVELAND, OH 441 14-2378 APPLICATION NO. I EXAMINER I NGUYEN, TRAN N 111737,457 0411 912007 Andrew L. Betz I11 29763.5 5646 FILING DATE I ARTUNIT I PAPERNUMBER I FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Please find below andlor attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. NOTIFICATION DATE The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. DELIVERY MODE Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): CONFIRMATION NO. 09/21/2010 ELECTRONIC patent @ beneschlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES Exparte ANDREW L. BETZ, I11 and DRAGOS MIRZA Appeal 2009-005935 Application 111737,457 Technology Center 3600 Before HUBERT C. LORIN, FRANCISCO C. PRATS, and BIBHU R. MOHANTY, Administrative Patent Judges. LORIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL' 1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. 5 1.304, or for filing a request for rehearing, as recited in 37 C.F.R. 5 41.52, begins to run from the "MAIL DATE" (paper delivery mode) or the "NOTIFICATION DATE" (electronic delivery mode) shown on the PTOL-90A cover letter attached to this decision. Appeal 2009-005935 Application 111737,457 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Andrew L. Betz, 111, et al. (Appellants) seek our review under 35 U.S.C. 5 134 (2002) of the final rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, and 6-29. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. 5 6(b) (2002). Claims 3 and 5 have been cancelled. SUMMARY OF DECISION We REVERSE2 and enter a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. 5 41.50(b). THE INVENTION This invention is a system and method "for calculating an insurance credit score for an insurance coverage." Specification [OOOl]. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A method of furnishing a quote for an automobile insurance product for a user comprising : receiving a request from a user for a quote for an automobile insurance product, wherein the request includes a user identifier and an identification of a coverage option selected from the group consisting of bodily injury, property damage, personal injury protection, comprehensive, collision, uninsured motorist, 2 Our decision will make reference to the Appellants' Appeal Brief ("App. Br.," filed Jul. 14, 2008) and Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed Oct. 20, 2008), and the Examiner's Answer ("Answer," mailed Aug. 20, 2008). Appeal 2009-005935 Application 111737,457 liability, physical damage, and combined coverage; retrieving user credit information based on the user identifier, the user credit information having a plurality of attributes, each attribute having a value, wherein each coverage option is associated with a subset of attributes; selecting from the user credit information the values of the subset of attributes associated with the identified coverage option; generating weight factors associated with the selected values; inputting the selected values and the weight factors into an insurance credit score algorithm to calculate a user insurance credit score for the selected coverage option; inputting the calculated user insurance credit score into an insurance quote algorithm to calculate a quote for the automobile insurance product; and providing the quote for the automobile insurance product to the user. THE REJECTIONS The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of unpatentability : Greco US 5,809,478 Sep. 15, 1998 The Appellants' admitted prior art on pages 2-3 of the Specification. [Hereinafter, AAPA.] Michael J. Miller and Richard Smith. The Relationship of Credit- Based Insurance Scores to Private Passenger Automobile Insurance Loss Propensity, (Jun. 2003). [Hereinafter, Miller.] Appeal 2009-005935 Application 111737,457 The following rejections3 are before us for review: 1. Claims 1, 2,4, 6-12, and 29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 5 112, second paragraph for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicants regard as the invention. 2. Claims 1, 2,4, 6-12, and 29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 5 103(a) as being unpatentable over Greco, AAPA, and Miller. 3. Claims 13-20 and 25-28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 5 103(a) as being unpatentable over Greco and Miller. 4. Claims 21-24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 5 103(a) as being unpatentable over Greco, Miller, and AAPA. ISSUES The first issue is whether claims 1, 2, 4, 6-12, and 29 are indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicants regards as the invention under 35 U.S.C. 5 112, second paragraph. Specifically, the major issue is whether the use of the term "combined coverage" renders claim 1 indefinite. The second issue is whether claims 1, 2,4, 6-12, and 29 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 5 103(a) over Greco, AAPA, Official Notice and Miller. Specifically, the issue is whether the combination of Greco, 3 The Appellants also traverse the objection to claim 1 for lack on antecedent basis and the object to claim 4 for failing to further limit the subject matter of the independent claims. App. Br. 8-10 and Reply Br. 3-4. However, these objections are petitionable matters and not appealable matters and, therefore, we will not address them. See In re Hengehold, 440 F.2d 1395, 1403-1404 (CCPA 1971). Appeal 2009-005935 Application 111737,457 AAPA, and Miller teaches that each coverage option is associated with a subset of attributes of the user's credit information. The third issue is whether claims 13-1 8 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 5 103(a) over Greco and Miller. Specifically, the issue is whether the combination of Greco and Miller teaches a step of identifying at least one pre-selected attribute associated with the selected automobile line coverage option." The fourth issue is whether claims 19, 20, and 25-28 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 5 103(a) over Greco and Miller. Specifically, the issue is whether the combination of Greco and Miller teaches data selection logic configured to select some, but not all, of the data from the user credit information according to the automobile insurance line coverage selection. The rejection of claims 21-24 under 35 U.S.C. 5 103(a) as being unpatentable over Greco, Miller and AAPA also turns on this issue. FINDINGS OF FACT We find that the following enumerated findings of fact (FF) are supported by at least a preponderance of the evidence. Ethicon, Znc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the general evidentiary standard for proceedings before the Office). 1. Paragraph [0002] of the Specification states: In the automobile insurance industry, several different types of coverage are available, including bodily injury coverage, property damage coverage, personal injury protection coverage, comprehensive coverage, collision coverage, uninsured motorist coverage. These coverage types are sometimes referred to as line coverage. Appeal 2009-005935 Application 111737,457 Additionally, some firms offer broader insurance coverage, such as liability coverage, sometimes referred to a BIPD coverage, which, broadly speaking, may be a hybrid of bodily injury coverage, property damage coverage, and personal injury coverage. Firms also offer physical damage coverage, sometimes referred to as PhysDam coverage, which broadly speaking, may be a hybrid of collision coverage and comprehensive coverage. Further, firms also offer combined coverage, which includes all of the above described line coverages. 2. Paragraph [0022] of the Specification states "[i[f the credit report includes adequate information, the insurance provider filters the credit information to retrieve values related to pre-selected variables (step 240). The pre-selected variables are independent of the coverage the user selects. In other words, the same variables are used for each insurance coverage selection." 3. Page 15 of Miller states "[flor instance, the credit attributes and the weighting of those attributes to develop an insurance score for private passenger automobile insurance may be different than a score used for commercial automobile insurance, or for homeowners insurance" ANALYSIS The rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 6-1 2, and 29 under 35 U.S. C. § 112, second paragraph for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicants regards as the invention. Appeal 2009-005935 Application 111737,457 Claims 1, 2, 6-12, and 29 Claim 1 recites "wherein the request includes . . . and an identification of a coverage option selected from the group consisting of bodily injury, property damage, personal injury protection, comprehensive, collision, uninsured motorist, liability, physical damage, and combined coverage." The Examiner found that inclusion of "combined coverage" above rendered claim 1 indefinite because the Examiner was unable to determine whether "combined coverage" refers to a combination of previously recited elements or any combination of elements whether previously recited or not. Answer 4. See also Answer 37-39. The Appellants argue that the use of "combined coverage" does not render claim 1 indefinite (Answer 10- 1 1 and Reply Br. 4-5) and that: To persons of ordinary skill in the automobile insurance art, the term "combined coverage" is understood to include all of the above listed line coverage options (b, bodily injury coverage, property damage coverage, personal injury protection coverage, comprehensive coverage, collision coverage, and uninsured motorist coverage). Indeed, this plain meaning of the term is reflected in the "Background" section of the application, which states, "firms also offer combined coverage, which includes all of the above described line coverages." (See [0002]). App. Br. 10. The 'distinctly claiming' requirement means that the claims must have a clear and definite meaning when construed in the light of the complete patent document. Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452, (Fed. Cir. Appeal 2009-005935 Application 111737,457 1985). Section 112 thus ensures definiteness of claim language. See In re Zletz, [893 F 2d. 319,] (Fed. Cir. 1989). The test for definiteness is whether one skilled in the art would understand the bounds of the claim when read in light of the specification. Orthokinetics, 806 F.2d [1565,] 1576. If the claims read in light of the specification reasonably apprise those skilled in the art of the scope of the invention, Section 112 demands no more. Hybritech, 802 F.2d [1367,] 1385. The degree of precision necessary for adequate claims is a function of the nature of the subject matter. Id. Miles Labs. Znc. v. Shandon Znc., 997 F.2d 870, 874-5 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The question is: do the claims read in light of the specification reasonably apprise those skilled in the art of the scope of the invention? Answering that question "requires a construction of the claims according to the familiar canons of claim construction. Only after a thorough attempt to understand the meaning of a claim has failed to resolve material ambiguities can one conclude that the claim is invalid for indefiniteness." All Dental Prodx LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods. Znc., 309 F.3d 774,780 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This is so because [tlhe requirement to "distinctly" claim means that the claim must have a meaning discernible to one of ordinary skill in the art when construed according to correct principles. Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Rosemount, Znc. v. Beckman Instruments, Znc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Only when a claim remains insolubly ambiguous without a discernible meaning after all reasonable attempts at construction must a court declare it indefinite. Exxon Research & Eng 'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. Appeal 2009-005935 Application 111737,457 Metabolite Labs. Znc. v. Laboratory Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We agree with the Appellants. The Examiner has not established that claim 1 is insolubly ambiguous and that the claim, read in light of the Specification (see FF I), does not reasonably apprise those skilled in the art of the scope of the invention. Accordingly, we find that the Appellants have overcome the rejection of claim 1, 2, 4, 6-12, and 29 under 35 U.S.C. 5 112, second paragraph for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicants regard as the invention. Claim 4 Claim 4 recites "wherein the coverage option is a line coverage option." The Examiner found that "it is not clear if Appellant intends to recite additional line coverage options, i.e. in effect changing 'the group consisting' to the 'the group comprising."' Answer 4-5. (Emphasis original). The Appellants respond: "Claim 1 is written to include the group consisting of line coverage options liability, physical damage, and combined coverage. Claim 4, by contrast, is limited to line coverage options, and therefore excludes liability, physical damage, and combined coverage - it calls out a narrower subset of claim 1, without specifically reciting additional limitations." App. Br. 10- 1 1. (Emphasis original). Again, we agree with the Appellants. The Examiner has not established that claim 4 is insolubly ambiguous and that the claim, read in light of the Specification (see FF I), does not reasonably apprise those Appeal 2009-005935 Application 111737,457 skilled in the art of the scope of the invention. Accordingly, we find that the Appellants have overcome the rejection of claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. 5 112, second paragraph for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicants regard as the invention. The rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 6-12, and 29 under 35 U.S. C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Greco, AAPA, and Miller. Claim 1 recites a step of "receiving user credit information based on the user identifier, the user credit information having a plurality of attributes, each attribute having a value, wherein each coverage option is associated with a subset of attributes" and recites that "the coverage option was selected from the group consisting of bodily injury, property damage, personal injury protection, comprehensive, collision, uninsured motorist, liability, physical damage, and combined coverage." (Emphasis added.) In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner relies upon AAPA and Miller to teach that the recited coverage options (i.e. bodily injury, property damage, etc.) are known. Answer 7-8. The Examiner also relies upon paragraph [0022] of AAPA and page 15 of Miller to teach associating each insurance coverage option with a subset of attributes. See Answer 9-10. The Examiner then combines these teachings to conclude that one of ordinary skill in the art would have associated each of the recited coverage options with a subset of attributes as recited in claim 1. Answer 10. To traverse the rejection of claim 1, the Appellants argue that the Examiner has misinterpreted the scope of the teachings of AAPA and Miller and that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been led to associate each of the specifically recited coverage options with a subset of attributes. Appeal 2009-005935 Application 111737,457 App. Br. 11-13. The Appellants assert that paragraph [0022] of AAPA teaches that the attributes are independent of the selected coverage options, which is the opposite of the recited limitation. App. Br. 11-12. Further, the Appellants argue Miller's page 15 teaches selecting credit attributes and weighting the attributes to create an insurance score based on a general class of insurance, such as private passenger automobile insurance, commercial automobile insurance or homeowners insurance and not based on the specifically recited coverage options. App. Br. 12. We agree with the Appellants. While we agree with the Examiner that AAPA and Miller both describe that the recited coverage options are known (see Answer 6 4 , the Examiner has not adequately explained why either paragraph [0022] of AAPA or page 15 of Miller (see FF 2-3) clearly teaches associating each of the specifically recited coverage options with a subset of attributes. Further, neither AAPA nor Miller provide any general teaching of associating line coverage options (i.e. bodily injury, property damage, etc.) or anything other than a general class of insurance (i.e. liability, physical damage, or combined coverage) with a subset of attributes. See FF 2-3. Without such evidence, we find that the Examiner has failed to establish a prima facie showing of obviousness. The conclusion that the claimed subject matter is prima facie obvious must be supported by evidence, as shown by some objective teaching in the prior art or by knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art that would have led that individual to combine the relevant teachings of the references to arrive at the claimed invention. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Appeal 2009-005935 Application 111737,457 Accordingly, we find that the Appellants have overcome the rejection of claim 1, and claims 2,4, 6-12, and 29, dependent thereon, under 35 U.S.C. 5 103(a) over Greco, AAPA, and Miller. The rejection of claims 13-20 and 25-28 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Greco and Miller. Claims 13-18 Claim 13 recites a method which includes the steps of "identifying at least one pre-selected attribute associated with the selected automobile line coverage option." Similar to their argument traversing the rejection of claim 1 above, the Appellants argue that neither reference discloses this limitation. App. Br. 15 and Reply Br. 9. Further, the Appellants argue that the Examiner's has unreasonably broadly construed "line coverage" given the context of the claim language and paragraph [0002] of the Specification. Reply Br. 5. The Appellants provide a definition of "line" as "the amount of insurance written for a particular risk." Id. The Examiner has construed "line coverage" to be "protection under a specific class of insurance policies" and has asserted that this encompasses "any coverage for auto insurance" and also "any coverage for any class of insurance." Answer 36. The Examiner seems to argue that "line coverage" includes any coverage for general classes of insurance such as life insurance, property insurance, or workers compensation insurance. See Id. The Examiner seems to have used their broad construction of "line coverage" to conclude that page 15 of Miller, which describes associating a general class of insurance to a subset of attributes (see FF 3), teaches the step at issue. Appeal 2009-005935 Application 111737,457 "Analysis begins with a key legal question -- what is the invention claimed? Courts are required to view the claimed invention as a whole. 35 U.S.C. 5 103(a). Claim interpretation, in light of the specification, claim language, other claims, and prosecution history, is a matter of law and will normally control the remainder of the decisional process." Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Claim construction involves the search for the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 13 12- 13. This meaning may be informed by the surrounding claim language, the specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence. Id. at 13 14- 19. Though not preferred over intrinsic evidence, id. at 13 17, extrinsic evidence in the form of expert testimony can be useful to a court for a variety of purposes, such as to provide background on the technology ..., to explain how an invention works, to ensure that the court's understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is consistent with that of a person of ordinary skill in the art, or to establish that a particular term in the patent or prior art has a particular meaning in the pertinent field. Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Environmental Intern., L. C., 460 F.3d 1349, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2006). We agree with the Appellants. The Examiner has unreasonably broadly construed the term "line coverage" to encompass general classes of insurance, such as life insurance or property insurance. We note that claim 13 recites "automobile line coverage options. " Since the line coverage options are already described as being part of a general class of insurance - automobile- it would be unreasonable to conclude that line coverage options Appeal 2009-005935 Application 111737,457 could include other general classes of insurance, such as home owner's insurance. Further, the Examiner's construction is inconsistent with paragraph [0002] of the Specification, which state that in the automobile insurance industry coverage options, such as bodily injury, are referred to as line coverage. FF 1. Given our finding that the Examiner's construction of "line coverage" erroneously interprets claim 13 as encompassing general classes of insurance, we do not agree with the Examiner that page 15 of Miller, which teaches associating attributes with general classes of insurance (FF 3), teaches identifying at least one pre-selected attribute associated with the selected automobile line coverage option. Accordingly, we find that the Appellants have overcome the rejection of claim 13, and claims 14-18, dependent thereon, under 35 U.S.C. 5 103(a) over Greco and Miller. Claims 19, 20, and 25-28 Claim 19 recites an article which includes "data selection logic configured to select some, but not all, of the data from the user credit information according to the automobile insurance line coverage selection." The Appellants argue that neither reference discloses selecting data from the user credit information according to the automobile insurance line coverage selection for reasons similar to those used to traverse the rejection of claim 1. App. Br. 16 and Reply Br. 9. For the same reason as discussed above with regards to claim 13, we find that the Examiner has failed to establish a prima facie showing of obviousness. Accordingly, we find that the Appellants have overcome the rejection of claim 13, and claims 14-18, dependent thereon, under 35 U.S.C. 5 103(a) over Greco and Miller. Appeal 2009-005935 Application 111737,457 The rejection of claims 21 -24 under 35 U.S. C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Greco, Miller, and AAPA. This rejection is directed to claims dependent on claim 19, whose rejection we have reversed above. For the same reasons, we will not sustain the rejection of claims 21-24 over the cited prior art. Cf. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (" [Dlependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious."). NEW GROUND OF REJECTION Pursuant to 37 CFR 41.50(b) we enter a new ground of rejection on claims 19-28. We reject claims 19-28 under 35 U.S.C. 5 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. Taking claim 19 as representative, claim 19 recites "[a] computer- readable medium" comprising three data logic elements. We note that the Specification is silent as the meaning of "a computer-readable medium." Giving claim 19 the broadest reasonable construction, we find that claim 19 encompasses forms of the data logic being disposed on transitory propagating signals per se. A signal does not fit within at least one of the four statutory subject matter categories under 35 U.S.C. 5 101. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Accordingly, we reject claims 19-28 under 35 U.S.C. 5 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. 4 See Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media, 135 1 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 212 (Feb. 23, 2010). Appeal 2009-005935 Application 111737,457 DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1, 2,4, and 6-29 is reversed. This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. 5 41.50(b) (effective September 13, 2004, 69 Fed. Reg. 49960 (August 12, 2004), 1286 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 21 (September 7, 2004)). 37 C.F.R. 5 41.50(b) provides "[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review." 37 C.F.R. 5 41.50(b) also provides that the Appellants, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner . . . . (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under 5 41.52 by the Board upon the same record . . . . REVERSED; 37 C.F.R. 41.50(b) mev BENESCH, FRIEDLANDER, COPLAN & ARONOFF LLP ATTN: IP DEPARTMENT DOCKET CLERK 200 PUBLIC SQUARE, SUITE 2300 CLEVELAND OH 441 14-2378 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation