Ex Parte Best et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 12, 2018

12647770 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 12, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/647,770 12/28/2009
68585 7590 07/16/2018
PA TENTS ON DEMAND, P.A. - IBM CAM
4581 WESTON ROAD
SUITE 345
WESTON, FL 33331
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Steven F. Best
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
CAM920090042US 1 2596
EXAMINER
ANDERSON,FOLASHADE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3623
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/16/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing 1@patentsondemand.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEVEN F. BEST and JANICE M. GIROUARD
Appeal2017-003578
Application 12/647,770 1
Technology Center 3600
Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.
CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1-20, which are all of the claims pending in the application. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
1 Appellants identify International Business Machines Corporation as the
real party in interest. See Br. 3.
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Application 12/647,770
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
According to Appellants, the claims are directed to the generation of a
free time report for a resource. Abstract. 2 Claim 1, reproduced below, is
representative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method for the reporting of free time for resources of a
task management system comprising:
receiving, by a receiving unit, of at least one identifier of
a resource registered with a task management system and a time
period by a free time reporter from a graphical user interface
( GUI) of the task management system, wherein the time period
is defined by a start date and at least one of an end date and a
total quantity of time;
processing information associated with allocation of the
resources to existing task activities during the time period;
determining, based on processing, a plurality of time
allocation data for a quantity of time the resource is allocated to
existing task activities during the time period;
generating, by a generation unit, a free time report based
upon the queried data; and
presenting, by a presentation unit, the free time report
within the GUI of the task management system, wherein the
receiving, querying, generating, and presenting result from at
least one processor executing programming instructions that are
stored on one or more transitory medium.
2 This Decision refers to: (1) Appellants' Specification filed December 28,
2009 ("Spec."); (2) the Final Office Action ("Final Act.") mailed July 2,
2015; (3) the Appeal Brief ("Br.') filed May 2, 2016; and (4) the Examiner's
Answer ("Ans.") mailed September 15, 2016.
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REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS
Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2-3.
Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
unpatentable over Doss (US 2008/0228547 Al; published Sept. 18, 2008)
and Horvitz (US 2005/0165631 Al; published July 28, 2005). Final Act. 4--
7.
Our review in this appeal is limited only to the above rejections and
the issues raised by Appellants. Arguments not made are waived. See
MPEP § 1205.02; 37 C.F.R. §§ 4I.37(c)(l)(iv) and 4I.39(a)(l).
ANALYSIS
We disagree with Appellants' contentions and adopt as our own:
( 1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from
which this appeal is taken; and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in
the Answer in response to the Appeal Brief. With respect to the claims
argued by Appellants, we highlight and address specific findings and
arguments for emphasis as follows.
35 USC § 101: Claims 1-20
The Examiner concluded claims 1-20 are directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter. Final Act. 3. We agree with the Examiner.
In Alice, the Supreme Court set forth an analytical "framework for
distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those
concepts." Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Banklnt'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014)
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(citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
75-79 (2012)). The first step in the analysis is to "determine whether the
claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts." Id.
If so, the second step is to consider the elements of the claims "individually
and 'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the additional
elements 'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible
application." Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). In other words, the
second step is to "search for an 'inventive concept' - i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73).
As an initial matter, we observe that independent claims 1, 9, and 14
respectively recite a method, a system, and a non-transitory computer
readable medium. As such, the claims are directed to statutory classes of
invention within 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Turning to the first step of the Alice analysis, we agree with the
Examiner that the present claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept,
namely, "generating and presenting a free time report of a task management
system," which the Examiner analogizes to "an abstract process[] of
collecting and analyzing information." Final Act. 3; Ans. 11. Our
reviewing court has reiterated that "claims focused on 'collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis' are directed to an abstract idea" (SAP Am., Inc. v. Investpic, LLC,
890 F.3d 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Electric Power Group, LLC
v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016))). Here, the claims are
directed to the collection, analysis, and display of information. Specifically,
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the claims' method collects information, reciting "receiving ... at least one
identifier ... and a time period." The claims' method further analyzes that
data, reciting "processing information ... determining, based on processing,
a plurality of time allocation data" and "generating ... a free time report."
Finally, the claims' method display the results of the collection and analysis,
reciting "presenting ... the free time report within the GUI of the task
management system." The claims are focused, therefore, on the
combination of those abstract-idea processes to provide a method of
analyzing task and time data. As such, the claims are directed to an abstract
idea. Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354.
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, we further agree with
the Examiner that the claims fail to transform the abstract idea into a patent-
eligible invention. Final Act. 11. Appellants argue that the claims recite
"material limitation[ s] that [are] beyond the routine and conventional
technology." Br. 10. However, the "claims at issue do not require any
nonconventional computer" components or functions and instead, "merely
call for performance of the claimed information collection [ and] analysis ...
'on a set of generic computer components."' Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1355
(quoting Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d
1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The claim limitations, at best, define the
abstract processes of collecting, analyzing, and displaying information by
specifying what information is collected, what information is considered
when analysis is performed, and what information is displayed. But those
limitations do not use the recited computing components in a non-routine or
unconventional manner; i.e., the receiver collects data, the processor
analyzes information, and the unit for presenting displays processed
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information. Indeed, Appellants' Specification teaches that "a general
purpose computer" may "implement[] the functions/ acts" of the claimed
invention. Spec. ,r 15.
Further, Appellants' argument that the "the use of a computing system
is essential in order to centralize the resource allocation and allow for the
evaluation as to whether new tasks can be supported" (Br. 10-11) merely
describes that the abstract information collection and analysis is performed
by a computer. But, "such invocations of computers and networks that are
not even arguably inventive are 'insufficient to pass the test of an inventive
concept in the application' of an abstract idea." Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at
1355 (quoting buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1353, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2014)). Accordingly, the "invention" remains in the realm of
abstract ideas and is, therefore, patent-ineligible. SAP, 890 F.3d at 1023.
Additionally, Appellants argue that dependent claims 3 and 4 recite
"additional limitations that, when combined with their respective base claim,
further move the claimed invention beyond being merely an abstract idea."
Br. 11. However, rather than transforming the claims into a patent-eligible
invention, the limitations in those claims merely further limit the abstract
idea processes recited in independent claim 1, i.e., analyzing and displaying
information. Dependent claim 3 recites "adjusting ... the total quantity of
time defined by the time period" and only serves to define what information
is being analyzed. Dependent claim 4 recites "the quantity of free time is
expressed" as a percentage or a total, which only describes how information
should be analyzed for display.
Appellants have not proffered sufficient evidence or argument to
persuade us that any of the limitations in the remaining dependent claims
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provide a meaningful limitation that transforms the claims into a patent-
eligible application. See Br. 10-11. Accordingly, Appellants have not
persuaded us claims 1-20 are directed to patent-eligible subject matter.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
35 USC § 103: Claims 1-3. 5-7. and 9-20
"free time report"
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding Doss teaches "a free
time report," as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claims 9 and 14.
Br. 11-12. Specifically, Appellants argue the claims "determine the 'free
time' within the task time frame of the various resources needed to complete
the task. The free time is not specified blocks of time, per se, but the time
available to a given resource that can be used for task activities," whereas
Doss "provide[ s] an indication of free blocks of time for a user, rather than
indicating the free time available for a task within a given time period."
Br. 12.
Appellants' arguments are not commensurate with the scope of the
claims. Appellants' Specification explicitly defines the term "free time" -
"the term 'free time' is defined as time that a resource 145 is not assigned to
existing task activities 123 within the task management system 130." Spec.
,r 19. We agree with the Examiner that Doss' s meeting scheduler teaches
reported "free time" within that definition. Final Act. 4; Ans. 16-17. In
particular, Doss teaches "a search for finding available free time" (Doss
,r 71) that outputs the free time a user is not assigned to a task (Doss Fig.
12). For example, Figure 12 of Doss shows that "John can attend [a]
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meeting," because "John ... has free time on this day between 1 p.m. and 5
p.m., after having a busy period between 10:30 a.m. and 12:30 p.m." Doss
,r,r 144--145. As such, Doss teaches "free time" because Doss describes the
time that John, i.e., a resource, does not have a busy period, i.e., is not
assigned to existing task activities. Furthermore, even under Appellants'
proffered definition that "free time" is "the time available to a given
resource that can be used for task activities," Doss outputs the time that John
has available for attending a meeting task, as described supra.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding
Doss teaches "a free time report," as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited
in claims 9 and 14.
"allocation of the resources to existing task activities"
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding Horvitz teaches
"processing information associated with allocation of the resources to
existing task activities during the time period" and "determining, based on
processing, a plurality of time allocation data for a quantity of time the
resource is allocated to existing task activities during the time period," as
recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claims 9 and 14. Br. 12.
Specifically, Appellants argue "Horvitz is focused on time management of
an individual, whereas the Appellant[s'] claimed invention is focused on
managing a task that involves use of resources." Br. 12. Appellants further
argue "in Horvitz the user is inputting time to be dedicated to a task ...
whereas the claimed limitation seeks to determine time available of a
resource by looking at time already allocated to existing tasks." Br. 12.
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We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds (Final Act. 4--5; Ans. 19--
20), and we agree, Horvitz's "graphical display 700 of a current day's time
allocation," in which "various projects are laid out over time [so] that a user
can grasp the activities planned for a given day at 71 O" (Horvitz ,r 51, Fig.
7), teaches "processing information associated with allocation of the
resources to existing task activities during the time period" and
"determining, based on processing, a plurality of time allocation data for a
quantity of time the resource is allocated to existing task activities during the
time period."
Appellants' argument that the "claimed invention is focused on
managing a task that involves use of resources" (Br. 12) is not
commensurate with the scope of the claims. The claims do not recite
limitations requiring the management of a task. Rather the claims generate
and present a free time report by "processing information associated with the
allocation of the resources to existing task activities" and "determining ...
time allocation data for a quantity of time the resource is allocated to
existing task activities." That is, the claims review already assigned tasks to
determine what free time a resource has by determining a quantity of time
the resource is allocated to existing task activities, but the claims do not
require the management of any new task or the already assigned tasks.
Horvitz processes and determines allocated resource time for existing tasks
activities as required by the claims. In particular, Horvitz "depict[ s]
segments of time that are allocated" to a project over a time period for a user
"when automatic scheduling is selected." Horvitz ,r,r 49, 51, Figs. 4, 7.
Horvitz's time allocation report includes the amount of time allocated for a
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user's task "activities planned for a given day," e.g., "ICMI reviews,"
"Finance Hm," and "Cons Spec." Horvitz ,r 51, Fig. 7.
Further, to the extent Appellants argue that an individual person is not
a "resource" (Br. 12), Appellants' Specification describes that "a resource
145" is an individual, "[f]or example, an administrative assistant 145."
Spec. ,r 21, Fig. 3 ("Resources" include "Jane Doe" and "Ralph Smith"). As
such, the user in Horvitz, for whom time allocations are determined,
(Horvitz ,r,r 49, 51) teaches a "resource."
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding that
Horvitz teaches "processing information associated with allocation of the
resources to existing task activities during the time period" and
"determining, based on processing, a plurality of time allocation data for a
quantity of time the resource is allocated to existing task activities during the
time period," as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claims 9 and 14.
Improper Combination
Appellants contend the Examiner improperly combined Doss and
Horvitz. Br. 13. Specifically, Appellants argue
neither of these references are drawn to the problem of task
management within an organization where the task can require
the use of multiple resources, nor are they sufficiently related to
each other in a way that would draw them to the attention of one
of ordinary skill seeking to design a task management system as
claimed by Appellant[ s].
Br. 13.
We are not persuaded. We agree with the Examiner's finding that
Doss and Horvitz are analogous art because, like Appellants' claimed
invention, "Doss and Horvitz each are concerned with scheduling
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resources." Ans. 21. Indeed, Doss is directed to "improving free-time
searches and scheduling" including "programmatically scheduling a
meeting" (Doss ,r 25) and Horvitz is directed to "automated time
management and dynamic scheduling within selected periods of time"
(Horvitz ,r 24 ). As such, both Doss and Horvitz are in the same field of
endeavor as the claimed invention and are properly combinable as analogous
art. Moreover, the Examiner has provided a reason to combine the teachings
of Doss and Horvitz, namely, to provide "a more efficient method in
performing intelligent free-time searches," and Appellants fail to show why
this reasoning is deficient. Final Act. 5; see In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988
(Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[R]ejections on obviousness grounds [require] some
articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness") ( cited with approval in KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398,418 (2007).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in concluding
claims 1, 9, and 14 would have been obvious over the combination of Doss
and Horvitz. We, therefore, sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of
independent claims 1, 9, and 14, as well as the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection
of dependent claims 2, 3, 5-7, 10-13, and 15-20, which are not argued
separately. See Br. 11-14.
35 USC § 103: Claim 4
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding Doss teaches "the
quantity of free time is expressed as at least one of a percentage of the total
quantity of time defined by the time period and a total quantity of hours," as
recited in claim 4. Br. 13. Specifically, Appellants argue "Doss is silent
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with regard to expressing the quantity of free time as at least one of a
percentage of the total quantity of time defined by the time period and a total
quantity of hours." Br. 13.
We are not persuaded. As an initial matter, the claim recites two
alternative limitations for expressing the quantity of free time. Specifically,
the claim recites "free time is expressed as at least one of a percentage of the
total quantity of time defined by the time period and a total quantity of
hours" ( emphasis added). During examination, "claim language should be
read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary
skill in the art." In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831,833 (Fed.Cir.1990). With respect
to free time, Appellants' Specification discloses that "[ t ]he data can be
presented within the free time report 128 in a variety of ways, such as a
percentage or a quantity of hours." Spec. ,r 28. Accordingly, we determine
the Examiner's disjunctive interpretation of the alternative limitations in
claim 4 to be reasonable and consistent with Appellants' Specification. See
Ans. 22.
In view of the Examiner's interpretation of the claim, we agree with
the Examiner's finding that Figure 12 of Doss, showing the quantity of free
time via a "graphical depiction of free time [for] each resource (John, Sally,
Paul, Mary)," teaches the second alternatively recited limitation, i.e., "free
time is expressed as ... a total quantity of hours." Ans. 22. In particular,
Figure 12 includes open blocks which "Denote[] Free Time" amounts
between the hours of 8:00 and 18:00 and further includes "Recommended
meeting times" showing free time hours. Accordingly, whether or not Doss
is "silent" regarding expressing free time as a percentage (Br. 13), i.e., the
first alternatively recited limitation, we are not persuaded of Examiner error
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because we agree with the Examiner that Doss teaches the second
alternatively recited limitation.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in concluding
claim 4 would have been obvious over the combination of Doss and Horvitz.
We, therefore, sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 4.
35 US.C. § 103: Claim 8
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding Doss teaches "the
presentation of the free time report utilizes a free time report window that is
an independent element of the GUI of the task management system," as
recited in claim 8. Br. 14. Specifically, Appellants argue "Doss does not
appear to disclose presenting a free-time report window let alone discuss
presenting a separate free time report window that is an independent element
of the GUI of the task management system." Br. 14.
We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds (Ans. 23), and we agree,
Doss' s "sample GUI showing results of a search where multiple potential
meeting times and locations were found" (Doss ,r 39, Fig. 12) teaches "a free
time report window that is an independent element of the GUI." In
particular, Figure 12 of Doss shows an "element 1230" of "Recommended
meeting times and Locations" providing free time for scheduling a task, and
Figure 12 further shows a "lower portion" schedule denoting free time and
busy time. Doss ,r 144.
Appellants' argument that Doss does not discuss "a separate free time
report window that is an independent element of the GUI of the task
management system" (Br. 14) is not commensurate with the scope of the
claim because the claim does not recite a separate window. Furthermore, the
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claim does not define an "independent element of the GUI." Nor does
Appellants' Specification define, let alone use, the term "independent
element" when describing its GUI. As such, both element 1230 and the
lower portion of Doss, showing free time search results in their own
respective windows, teach "an independent element of the GUI of the task
management system."
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in concluding
claim 8 would have been obvious over the combination of Doss and Horvitz.
We, therefore, sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 8.
DECISION
For the reasons above, we affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting
claims 1-2 0.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(±).
AFFIRMED
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