Ex Parte Bender

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 25, 2013

11508567 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 25, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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Ex parte MICHAEL BENDER
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Appeal 2010-009359
Application 11/508,567
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before DENISE M. POTHIER, BARBARA A. BENOIT, and
DAVID C. McKONE, Administrative Patent Judges.

BENOIT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the rejection of
claims 1, 3-5, 7-9, 11, 13-15, and 17-20, which constitute all the claims
pending in the application. Claims 2, 6, 10, 12, and 16 have been canceled.
App. Br. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention relates to controlling user access to a relational
database by separating data access “entitlements” from a table or view being
controlled into separate tables (called an “entitlement table”). See generally
Abstract; Spec. ¶¶ 0001-02. The entitlement tables may have a priority
which defines one entitlement table as having a higher priority than another
entitlement table. See generally Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative and reads
as follows, with key disputed limitations emphasized:
1. A method for controlling access to a relational
database, the method comprising:
[(a)] defining and creating first and second entitlement
tables;
[(b)] establishing a priority hierarchy between the first
and second entitlement tables such that the first entitlement
table is dominant to, and therefore overrides, the second
entitlement table;
[(c)] receiving a request, from a user, for access to
requested data in the relational database, wherein the user is
identified by a user identifier that is set by a relational database
program;
[(d)] determining if the user is authorized to access the
requested data by comparing the user identifier with an entry in
the first or second entitlement table that is associated with the
requested data in the relational database, wherein the first or
second entitlement table defines which data classifications are
authorized to be accessed by the user; and
[(e)] wherein at least one of the first and second
entitlement tables includes [(i)] only rules for inclusion that
permit a user with a specific user identifier to access the
requested data, or [(ii)] includes only rules for exclusion that
prohibit a user from accessing the requested data.

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The Rejections
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3-5, 7-9, 11, 13-15, 17, and 18 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Fan (US 2006/0136479 A1;
published June 22, 2006) and Aldred (US 6,438,549 B1; issued Aug. 20,
2002). Ans. 3-9.
The Examiner rejected claims 19 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Fan, Aldred, and Gentles (US 2004/0266533 A1;
published Dec. 30, 2004). Ans. 9-10.

THE OBJECTION
The Examiner objected to claims 1, 9, and 11 because of informalities.
Ans. 3. Appellant does not contend that we should address the objection
(see generally App. Br. 6-10), which ordinarily is a petitionable matter, not
an appealable one. MPEP §§ 706.01, 1201 (8th ed., Aug. 2012); cf. Ex
Parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1077-78 (BPAI 2010) (precedential)
(determining an objection to the drawings was outside of the Board's
jurisdiction.). Accordingly, the objection is not before us on review.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER FAN AND ALDRED
The Examiner finds that Fan and Aldred collectively teach or suggest
every element recited in claim 1. Ans. 3-7. The Examiner relies on
Aldred’s teaching for the recited entitlement tables and concludes it would
have been obvious to combine the teachings of the references “to separate
two sets of related, but distinct sparse data.” Ans. 4; see also Ans. 4-7.
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred by finding the references
collectively teach or suggest limitation (e) because the Examiner
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misconstrued limitation (e) to require two entitlement tables where one table
includes only rules for inclusion and another table only includes rules for
exclusion. App. Br. 7. Rather, as Appellant interprets limitation (e), claim 1
requires two entitlement tables where each one can only include rules of
exclusion or rules of inclusion, but not both types of rules in the same
entitlement table. Id. Appellant goes on to assert that the Examiner erred
because Aldred only discloses an access control list (ACL) that includes
rules for inclusion. App. Br. 7-8. Appellant impliedly argues that the
Examiner erred because Aldred does not also disclose an ACL table that
includes rules for exclusion and so does not teach or suggest the two
entitlement tables that Appellant asserts are required by claim 1. See App.
Br. 7. (stating “each one of the entitlement tables” and “the ACL table taught
in Aldred is limited only to listing those individuals who have permission to
perform a particular action(s)”).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because they are not
consistent with the language of claim 1. By reciting “wherein at least one of
the . . . entitlement tables includes [(i)] only rules for inclusion . . . or [(ii)]
includes only rules for exclusion,” claim 1 only requires one entitlement
table, of the first and second entitlement tables, that includes only rules for
inclusion or alternatively only rules for exclusion. Appellant admits that
Aldred teaches one entitlement table that includes rules for inclusion (App.
Br. 7-8), which is all limitation (e) requires. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding Aldred teaches or suggests
limitation (e).
The Examiner relies on In re Dulberg, 289 F.2d 522, 523 (CCPA
1961), for support for the conclusion that it would have been obvious for an
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ordinarily skilled artisan to separate Aldred’s tables into separate tables
(“i.e., one having definitions as to what tasks a user is able to perform . . .
and the other having definitions as to what tasks a user is not able to
perform”). Appellant argues that this reliance is misplaced because the facts
of the Dulberg case are too dissimilar to be used to support an obviousness
rejection of claim 1. App. Br. 8-9; Ans. 7.
We also find this argument unpersuasive because, as explained above,
limitation (e) of claim 1 does not require multiple tables having either rules
for inclusion or rules for exclusion. Rather, claim 1 requires only one table
(i.e., recites “at least one of the . . . tables”) to have either of these properties.
Moreover, the Examiner’s proposed combination of Fan and Aldred
predictably uses prior art elements according to their established functions—
an obvious improvement, and we find the Examiner’s reason (Ans. 4) to
combine the teachings of the cited references supported by articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to justify the Examiner’s
obviousness conclusion that Fan and Aldred collectively would have taught
or suggested claim 1. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418
(2007).
On this record, we are not persuaded of error in the rejection of
independent claim 1 and claims 3-5, 7-9, 11, 13-15, 17, and 18 not
separately argued with particularity (App. Br. 9-10).

THE REMAINING OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION
Claims 19 and 20 depend from independent claim 11. Appellant
asserts that the rejection of claims 19 and 20 should be reversed because
claim 11 is allowable. App. Br. 10. For the reasons discussed previously
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with respect to claim 1, we disagree that claim 11, which recites
commensurate limitations as claim 1, is allowable.
Accordingly, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the rejection
of claims 19 and 20.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 3-5, 7-9, 11, 13-15,
and 17-20 under § 103.

ORDER
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3-5, 7-9, 11, 13-15, and
17-20 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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