Ex Parte BEHM et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 20, 201313457885 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 20, 2013) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte GARY W. BEHM, MALEK BEN SALEM, and YUE LI ____________________ Appeal 2013-007490 Application 13/457,885 Technology Center 2800 ____________________ Before RICHARD TORCZON, JOHN G. NEW, and HUNG H. BUI, Administrative Patent Judges. BUI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants 1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-11. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 2 1 Real Party in Interest is International Business Machines Corporation. 2 Our decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed February 19, 2013 (“App. Br.”); Examiner’s Answer mailed March 19, 2013 (“Ans.”); Reply Appeal 2013-007490 Application 13/457,885 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants’ Invention Appellants’ invention relates to a method using real-time Advanced Process Control (APC) information for an enhanced Lot Sampling Engine (ELSE) in semiconductor fabrication. See Appellants’ Spec., ¶ [0001], and Abstract. Claims on Appeal Claim 1 is the only independent claim on appeal. Claim 1 is illustrative of Appellants’ invention, and is reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized: 1. A computer program product comprising a computer readable storage memory having readable program code tangibly embodied in the storage memory, the computer program product includes at least one component operable to: pass a lot through a production process; calculate an advanced process control recipe parameter adjustment (RPA) distribution value using an advanced process controller (APC); calculate an APC calculated process capability (Cpk) value using the APC; communicate the RPA and the Cpk value to a lot sampling engine (LSE); utilize the LSE to correlate the RPA and the Cpk value in conjunction with a historical Cpk value calculated by the LSE to determine if sampling of the lot is indicated; and perform a measurement process of the lot, if sampling is indicated. Brief filed May 20, 2013 (“Reply Br.”); and the original Specification filed April 27, 2012 (“Spec.”). Appeal 2013-007490 Application 13/457,885 3 Examiner’s Rejection Claims 1-11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. Ans. 3-5. Issue on Appeal Based on Appellants’ arguments, the dispositive issue on appeal is whether the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-11 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. In particular, the issue turns on whether the Examiner erred in concluding that claims 1-11 encompass transitory media such as “signals, carrier waves, etc.” Ans. 3-5. ANALYSIS The Examiner finds Appellants’ claims 1-11 are drawn to a “computer readable storage medium.” According to the Examiner, The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim drawn to a computer readable medium covers forms of non-transitory tangible media and transitory propagating signals per se in view of the ordinary and customary meaning of computer readable media, particularly when the specification is silent (see MPEP 2111.01). Because the broadest reasonable interpretation covers a signal per se, a rejection under 35 USC 101 is appropriate as covering non-statutory subject matter. See 351 OG 212, Feb 23 2010. Final Rej. 2. Appellants contend that Appellants’ Specification, in particular paragraph [0048], only provides examples of tangible physical storage devices, such as read-only memory (ROM) or random access memory Appeal 2013-007490 Application 13/457,885 4 (RAM), and does not contemplate signals or other transitory waves. According to Appellants, the broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim term “computer readable storage medium” in view of Appellants’ Specification would only include storage media that are tangible, such as read-only-memory (ROM) or random-access-memory (RAM), and does not include signals per se. App. Br. 3-5. In particular, paragraph [0048] of Appellants’ Specification describes: [0048] FIG. 7 shows an exemplary flow 700 describing how the real-time APC information is collected, calculated and passed to the ELSE for an optimized lot sampling plan in accordance with the present invention. FIG. 7 may equally represent a high-level block diagram of components of the invention implementing the steps thereof. The steps of FIG. 7 may be implemented on computer program code in combination with the appropriate hardware. This computer program code may be stored on storage media such as a diskette, hard disk, CD-ROM, DVD-ROM or tape, as well as a memory storage device or collection of memory storage devices such as read-only memory (ROM) or random access memory (RAM). Additionally, the computer program code can be transferred to a workstation over the Internet or some other type of network. Furthermore, a computer program product may include a computer usable medium having readable program code tangibly embodied in the medium. Appellants’ Spec., ¶ [0048] (emphasis added). Appellants also assert that the Board has previously interpreted “computer readable storage medium” to only cover statutory subject matter. App. Br. 5-6 (citing Ex Parte Dureau, No. 2009-007211 (BPAI Aug. 23, 2010) (nonprecedential); Ex Parte Bash, No. 2009-007202 (BPAI Dec. 20, 2010) (nonprecedential); Ex Parte Kelly, App. No. 2009-013458 (BPAI, June 15, 2011), and Ex Parte Hu, App. No. 2010-000151 (BPAI, Feb. 9, Appeal 2013-007490 Application 13/457,885 5 2012)). Appellants thus contend that the “computer readable storage medium” of Appellants’ claim 1 should be interpreted as being directed to statutory subject matter. Id. at 7. In response, the Examiner finds that because Appellants’ Specification fails to expressly limit the term “computer readable storage medium” to exclude signals, carrier waves, etc., the term encompasses transitory propagating signals. Ans. 4. The Examiner bases this finding in part: (1) because Appellants’ Specification does not contain any specific definition precluding the use of signals or other transitory waves as being the memory; (id. at 4) (2) because paragraph [0048] of Appellants’ Specification describes that “the computer program code can be transferred to a workstation over the Internet or some other type of network” which is a form of signal transmission, via the Internet; (id. at 5) and (3) because the guidance provided in U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer-Readable Media, 1351 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 212 (Feb. 23, 2010) (hereinafter Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer- Readable Media). (Id. at 4.) There, the Office states that “[t]he broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim drawn to a computer readable medium (also called machine readable medium and other such variations) typically covers forms of non-transitory tangible media and transitory propagating signals per se in view of the ordinary and customary meaning of computer readable media, particularly when the specification is silent.” Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer-Readable Media 212. We agree with the conclusion reached by the Examiner. Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s and the Office’s position, as set forth in Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer-Readable Media, that the broadest Appeal 2013-007490 Application 13/457,885 6 reasonable interpretation of “computer readable medium” typically encompasses non-statutory subject matter. Instead, Appellants argue that the word “memory” necessarily excludes transitory media from the scope of the term. We do not find this argument to be persuasive. In particular, we do not find any limitation on the form of the “computer-readable storage medium” in Appellants’ Specification. In fact, as the Examiner points out, Appellants’ Specification further describes that “the computer program code [tangibly embodied in the computer readable storage medium] can be transferred to a workstation over the Internet or some other type of network” which is a form of signal transmission, via the Internet. Spec. ¶ [0048]; see Ans. 5. The case law and the guidelines both indicate that, while a tangible medium might provide a safe harbor, a tangible signal does not. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (transitory embodiments are not directed to statutory subject matter). The present claims do not opt for requiring tangible media, but rather call for "computer program code [that is] tangibly embodied" in some medium. We have no evidence of an art established meaning for tangibly embodied computer program code that would exclude the sort of "tangible signal" that was unpatentable in Nuijten. Even if Appellants’ Specification is silent as to the meaning of “computer readable storage medium,” we can still turn to other guidance including extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning of “computer readable storage medium.” “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, Appeal 2013-007490 Application 13/457,885 7 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Sunrace Roots Enter. Co., Ltd. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“In the absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to the claim terms, the words are presumed to take on the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to them by those of ordinary skill in the art.”). 3 First, we turn to guidance provided in 1351 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 212 (Feb. 23, 2010); Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media. (“The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim drawn to a computer readable medium (also called machine readable medium and other such variations) typically covers forms of non-transitory tangible media and 3 Based on these cases there are several factors to consider when determining whether a “computer readable storage medium” type claim avoids encompassing a non-statutory signal: (1) Extrinsic evidence relevant to the meaning as would be understood by one skilled in the art at the time of the effective filing date of the patent application. As opposed to the voluminous extrinsic evidence dated 2002 and thereafter which is discussed in this Decision, before 2002 there is little evidence that the ordinary and customary meaning of such “storage medium” terms encompassed a signal. (2) Whether there is express intent in applicant’s specification to limit the term, i.e., applicant’s specification is not silent as to the meaning of such terms. (3) Whether the claim expressly limits the medium to “non-transitory” embodiments. (4) Whether the claim implicitly limits the medium to “non-transitory” embodiments. The most common form of this is the use of “means plus function” elements in the claim (i.e., a true Beauregard type claim). Such means plus function elements are limited by statute to the corresponding structure in the specification and equivalents thereof. Such a structure requirement may limit the claim to non-transitory embodiments. Appeal 2013-007490 Application 13/457,885 8 transitory propagating signals per se in view of the ordinary and customary meaning of computer readable media, particularly when the specification is silent.”). Second, we also look at extrinsic evidence in the form of published applications assigned to the same assignee as the appeal before us (i.e., International Business Machines Corp.), which use the identical term “machine-readable storage medium.” See In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1358 [49 USPQ2d 1464] (Fed. Cir. 1999) (where the Federal Circuit sua sponte introduced other patents (from other applicants) to interpret the contested phrase). Such extrinsic evidence includes, for example (emphasis added): US 20030097554 A1; Filing Date: 20011121 Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation. Paragraph [0022] Whether contained in the computer system or elsewhere, the instructions may be stored on a variety of machine readable storage media, such as a DASD storage (e.g. a conventional “hard drive” or a RAID array), magnetic tape, electronic read-only memory, an optical storage device (e.g., CD ROM, WORM, DVD, digital optical tape), paper “punch” cards, or other suitable computer readable media including transmission media such as digital, analog, and wireless communication links. US 20030208338 A1; Filing Date: 20020503 Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation. Paragraph [0017] [Same sentence as above in US 20030097554 A1]. Appeal 2013-007490 Application 13/457,885 9 US 20040044735 A1; Filing Date: 20020830 Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation. Paragraph [0028] [Same sentence as above in US 20030097554 A1]. Third, we also look at extrinsic evidence in the form of published applications assigned to other assignees (including but not limited to industry leaders such as Hewlett-Packard Company (related to this appeal’s assignee), Sun, Cisco, Oracle, and Siemens) (emphasis added): “Whether contained in the computer system or elsewhere, the instructions may be stored on a variety of machine readable storage media, such as a DASD storage (for example, a conventional ‘hard drive’ or a RAID array), magnetic tape, electronic read-only memory, an optical storage device (for example, CD ROM, WORM, DVD, digital optical tape), paper ‘punch’ cards, or other suitable computer readable media including transmission media such as digital, analog, and wireless communication links.” US 20050021386 A1 at [0027], filed July 23, 2003, assigned to Hewlett-Packard Company (emphasis added). “Additionally, a data signal embodied in a carrier wave (e.g., in a network including the Internet) may be the computer readable storage medium.” US 20040244009 A1 at [0055], filed June 28, 2001, assigned to Sun Microsystems, Inc. (emphasis added). “Another example of a computer-readable storage medium is a signal that carries software across a network.” US 20080077710 A1 at [0166], filed May 1, 2003, assigned to Cisco Technologies, Inc. (emphasis added). “Additionally, a data signal embodied in a carrier wave (e.g., in a network including the Internet) can be the computer readable storage medium.” US 20040255307 A1 at [0032], Appeal 2013-007490 Application 13/457,885 10 filed May 27, 2003, assigned to Oracle International Corp. (emphasis added). “Additionally, a data signal embodied in a carrier wave (e.g., in a network including the Internet) can be the computer readable storage medium.” US 20020143962 A1 at [0021], filed March 14, 2001, assigned to Siemens Information and Communication Networks, Inc. (emphasis added). “Additionally, a data signal embodied in a carrier wave (e.g., in a network including the Internet) can be the computer readable storage medium.” US 20110171948 A1 at [0033], filed March 21, 2003, assigned to Portal Software, Inc. (emphasis added). “Further, computer readable storage medium may also encompass data signals embodied in a carrier wave such as the data signals embodied in a carrier wave carried in a network.” US 20100115149 A1 at [0060], filed December 2, 2002, assigned to Plantronics, Inc. (emphasis added). “Additionally, a data signal embodied in a carrier wave (e.g., in a network including the Internet) may be the computer readable storage medium.” US 20060242241 A1 at [0199], filed January 29, 2002, assigned to Neoteris, Inc. (emphasis added). “Additionally, a data signal embodied in a carrier wave (e.g., in a network including the Internet) may be the computer readable storage medium.” US 20050037367 A9 at [0029], filed August 25, 2003, assigned to Affymetrix, Inc. (emphasis added). “The data structures and code described in this description can be stored on a computer readable storage medium, which may be any device or medium that can store code and/or data for use by a computer system. This includes, but is not limited to, magnetic and optical storage devices such as disk drives, magnetic tapes, CD (compact discs) and DVD Appeal 2013-007490 Application 13/457,885 11 (digital video disks), and computer instruction signals embodied in a transmission medium.” US 20050007567 A1 at [0093], filed July 10, 2003, assigned to Fortis Systems, Inc. (emphasis added). “Further, computer readable storage medium may also encompass data signals embodied in a carrier wave such as the data signals embodied in a carrier wave carried in a network.” US 20020180725 A1 at [0082], filed April 23, 2002, assigned to Quantum3D, Inc. (emphasis added). “The term ‘computer-readable storage medium’ refers to any medium that participates in providing the symbolic representations of operations to a processor for execution. Such media may take many forms, including, without limitation, volatile memory, nonvolatile memory, flash memory, electronic transmission media, and the like.” US 20040236726 A1 at [0027], filed May 19, 2003, assigned to Teracruz, Inc. (emphasis added). “Additionally, a data signal embodied in a carrier wave (e.g., in a network, e.g., internet, intranet, and the like) may be the computer readable storage medium.” US 20030175815 A1 at [0102], filed March 26, 2003, assigned to Caliper Technologies Corp. (emphasis added). Based on the significant amount of available guidance and evidence discussed supra, we conclude that those of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim term “computer readable storage medium” to include signals per se. Further, where, as here, the broadest reasonable interpretations of all the claims each covers a signal per se, the claims must be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as covering non-statutory subject matter. See In re Nuijten, at 1356-57; Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer- Readable Media, supra; U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Interim Appeal 2013-007490 Application 13/457,885 12 Examination Instructions for Evaluating Subject Matter Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, page 2 (Aug. 24, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/2009-08- 25_interim_101_instructions.pdf; U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Evaluating Subject Matter Eligibility Under 35 USC § 101, pages 11-14 (August 2012 Update), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/101_training_aug2012.pdf. Therefore, we reject claims 1-11 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for being directed to non-statutory subject matter. Separately, we also agree with the Examiner that the Dureau, Bash, Kelly, and Hu decisions do not control nor compel a different result. As correctly noted by the Examiner, none of these opinions has been designated as precedential, and therefore none of the opinions was intended to be binding on the Examiner and, by extension, this panel. Ans. 5; BPAI, Std. Op. P. 2 (rev. 7) (2008), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/procedures/sop2.pdf. In contrast, our decision on appeal in Ex Parte Mewherter, No. 2012- 007692 (PTAB May 8, 2013) is precedential as to the treatment of the rejection under 35 U.S.C. §101. In the Mewherter decision, we also held that, even if Appellants’ Specification is silent as to the meaning of “computer readable storage medium,” the ordinary and customary meaning of that term would include signals per se. Nevertheless, like Mewherter, we also note that Appellants are not precluded from amending these claims to overcome this rejection. Guidance on this point is provided in U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media, 1351 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 212 Appeal 2013-007490 Application 13/457,885 13 (Feb. 23, 2010) (“A claim drawn to such a computer readable medium that covers both transitory and non-transitory embodiments may be amended to narrow the claim to cover only statutory embodiments to avoid a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 by adding the limitation ‘non-transitory’ to the claim.”). See also U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Evaluating Subject Matter Eligibility Under 35 USC § 101, pages 11-14 (August 2012 Update), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/101_training_aug2012.pdf (noting that while the recitation “non-transitory” is a viable option for overcoming the presumption that those media encompass signals or carrier waves, merely indicating that such media are “physical” or tangible” will not overcome such presumption). CONCLUSION On the record before us, we conclude that the Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1-11 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. DECISION As such, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-11. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED bar Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation