Ex Parte Beever et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 15, 2017

13329629 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 15, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/329,629 12/19/2011 Paul Beever 67582-079FUSl;JLR10-014US 6966
26096 7590 06/19/2017
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C.
400 WEST MAPLE ROAD
SUITE 350
BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009
EXAMINER
BOWES, STEPHEN M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3657
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/19/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ptodocket @ cgolaw. com
cgolaw@yahoo.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte PAUL BEEVER and TIMOTHY REYNOLDS
Appeal 2016-002154
Application 13/329,629
Technology Center 3600
Before JASON V. MORGAN, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and
AMBER L. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judges.
HAGY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—9, 12, 13, 16, 19—21, and 23—25, which are all of
the pending claims.2 We have jurisdiction over these claims under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 Appellants identify the real party-in-interest as Jaguar Land Rover Limited.
(App. Br. 1.)
2 Claims 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, and 22 have been canceled in Amendments
dated April 15, 2014 and June 11, 2014.
Appeal 2016-002154
Application 13/329,629
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
According to Appellants, “[t]he present invention relates to brake
control systems for motor vehicles and methods of braking motor vehicles.
In particular, though not exclusively, it relates to such brake control systems
and methods of braking, in which safety is enhanced after the vehicle is
brought to a stationary state, i.e. standstill.” (Spec. 12.)
Exemplary Claim
Claims 1 and 12 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below with the
disputed limitation italicized, is exemplary of the claimed subject matter:
1. A brake control system for a motor vehicle having
wheels, hydraulic service brakes for supplying a service braking
effort to a plurality of the wheels, at least one sensor for detecting
standstill of the vehicle, and a parking brake engageable to
supply a park braking effort only to a subset of the plurality of
wheels, the system comprising:
at least one brake actuator for hydraulically actuating the
service brakes to supply the service braking effort comprising at
least a driver input braking effort to the plurality of wheels based
upon a driver input; and
a brake controller for controlling the at least one brake
actuator to apply an automatic service braking effort, wherein the
brake controller is arranged, when standstill of the vehicle is
detected following a driver input brake effort slowing the vehicle
to a stop and before the parking brake is engaged, to cause the
service braking effort to transition from the driver input braking
effort applied to the plurality of the wheels to the automatic
service braking effort such that the brake actuator supplies the
automatic service braking effort only to said subset of the
plurality of wheels,
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and wherein the brake controller is further configured,
after a predetermined time period has elapsed after the transition
to supply the automatic service braking effort only to the subset
of the plurality of wheels, to engage the parking brake to apply a
park braking effort only to said subset of the plurality of wheels,
and to release the automatic service braking effort, wherein the
brake controller is arranged to ensure that, during standstill of
the vehicle, the automatic service braking effort does not exceed
the subsequently applied park braking effort.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Bach US 2006/0186731 A1 Aug. 24, 2006
Gronau et al. (“Gronau”) US 2007/0164605 A1 July 19, 2007
Herges US 7,628,459 B2 Dec. 8,2009
REJECTIONS
Claims 1—6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 19-21, and 23—25 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bach and Herges. (Final Act.
2-7.)
Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Bach, Herges, and Gronau. (Final Act. 7—8.)
ISSUES
(1) Whether the Examiner erred in finding the combination of Bach
and Herges teaches or suggests “wherein the brake controller is arranged to
ensure that, during standstill of the vehicle, the automatic service braking
effort does not exceed the subsequently applied park braking effort,” as
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recited in independent claim 1 and commensurately recited in independent
claim 12.
(2) Whether the Examiner erred in combining the teachings of the
Bach and Herges references.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants’
conclusions and we adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth
by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 2—
9) and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in
response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief. (Ans. 2—6.) We concur with the
conclusions reached by the Examiner, and we highlight the following for
emphasis.3
The Examiner finds Bach teaches or suggests the limitations of claim
1, except the Examiner finds Bach “does not disclose wherein the brake
controller is arranged to ensure that, during standstill of the vehicle, the
automatic service braking effort does not exceed the subsequently applied
park braking effort,” for which the Examiner relies on Herges. (Final Act. 3
(citing Herges 4:33—36 and Fig. 2).)
Appellants argue the Examiner’s findings regarding the teachings of
Herges are in error because “the brake application discussed in [the
paragraph cited by the Examiner] occurs before the vehicle comes to rest
3 Only those arguments made by Appellants have been considered in this
decision. Arguments Appellants did not make have not been considered and
are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2014).
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which is not the same thing as during standstill.'1'’ (App. Br. 4.) In other
words, Appellants argue Herges does not teach or suggest an “automatic
service braking effort” during standstill. We disagree. For example, in
claim 6, Herges recites “wherein the service brake is applied for braking
after the time at which the vehicle becomes stationary . . . .” (Herges col. 8,
claim 6 (emphasis added).) This claim is supported by the Herges
disclosure. (E.g., Herges 1:24—28; 2:9—16; 2:39-43; Fig. 2.)
Appellants next argue the Examiner’s findings regarding Herges are
erroneous because:
[e]ven if Figure 2 of the Herges reference could reasonably be
interpreted to establish that a service braking effort during
standstill is below a park braking effort, there still is no teaching
of ensuring that a service braking effort will not exceed a
subsequent park braking effort during other braking events.
Figure 2 apparently is one possible outcome but not a guarantee.
In other words, the proposed combination does not teach the
feature of Appellant’s claims which includes ensuring that the
automatic service braking effort during standstill of the vehicle
does not exceed the subsequently applied park braking effort.
(App. Br. 5.) We disagree. The Examiner finds, and we agree, “Herges
teaches providing a parking brake force that is at least as strong as the
service brake force and also reducing the service brake force based on the
parking brake force.” (Ans. 4 (citing Herges 6:22—31).) Herges also recites,
in claim 6, “a service braking force being at most as great as the maximum
parking braking force producible by the parking brake.” (Herges 8:30-35
(emphasis added).) Thus, as the Examiner finds, and we agree, Herges
consistently teaches “a service-to-parking brake transition in which the
maximum parking brake force is greater than the maximum service brake
force.” (Ans. 4 (citing Herges Figures 1, 2 and 6:22—31).) We, therefore,
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agree Herges teaches limiting the service braking force so that it does not
exceed the parking brake force, which is within the scope of the disputed
limitation of claim 1, affording that limitation a broad but reasonable
construction.
Appellants next argue the Examiner erred in combining Bach and
Herges because Bach “explicitly teaches and requires that a service braking
effort exceeds a park braking effort.” (App. Br. 6.) Appellants further argue
that modifying Bach with Herges, as proposed by the Examiner, “would
defeat the stated object of the Bach reference” because it
would ensure that the service braking effort will not exceed the
park braking effort instead of intentionally having the service
brake force exceed the parking brake force as expressly desired
in the Bach reference. In other words, the Examiner proposes to
modify the Bach reference in a manner that would make it
perform in the opposite way compared to how it was intended to
perform.
(Id. at 7.)
Although we agree Bach teaches simulating a parking brake force by
applying a greater service brake force than a previously determined parking
brake force (Bach f 27), we disagree that modifying the teachings of Bach
with Herges would defeat the stated purpose of Bach, Bach’s stated
purpose, as noted by Appellants, is “provide a method of stabilising a
vehicle which has been braked to a standstill, and a corresponding braking
system, which on transition from service brake mode to parking brake mode
hold the vehicle reliably at a standstill.” (App. Br. 6 (quoting Bach 5).)
Bach further discloses:
In the case of the invention, therefore, the braking force
which is built up in the service brake to brake the vehicle is not
used to determine the parking brake force. Instead, according to
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the invention the amount of a parking brake force which keeps
the vehicle at a standstill is determined. After the amount of this
parking brake force is determined, the service brake force which
simulates the parking brake is built up in the service brake. This
can require that the amount of the braking force which is built up
by means of the service brake to bring the vehicle to a standstill,
i.e. to brake the vehicle completely, is increased, maintained or
reduced, depending on the magnitude of the previously
determined parking brake force. As soon as the service brake
force which simulates the parking brake is built up, the parking
brake can actually be actuated, by being put into a state in which
the previously determined parking brake force is set up. Then,
after complete actuation of the parking brake, the service brake
can be deactivated. The vehicle is then in a state which is secured
by the parking brake, and the parking brake secures the vehicle
reliably against unintentional rolling away or skidding away.
(Bach | 8.) Thus, Bach teaches transitioning from a service brake mode to a
parking brake mode, at standstill, with the service brakes simulating a
parking brake mode prior to the transition. Bach also teaches the desirability
of “ensuring a reliable transition into parking brake mode without incurring
the risk that the braking forces which are present in the parking brake mode
do not give sufficient hold.” (Id. 134.)
Like Bach, Herges also teaches “automatic changeover from the
service brake to the parking brake.” (Herges 2:34—36.) Also like Bach,
Herges seeks to avoid the situation in which the parking brake is not
sufficient to keep a vehicle from rolling after the service brakes are released.
Herges teaches this purpose may be accomplished “wherein the service
brake is applied for braking after a time at which the vehicle becomes
stationary, a service braking force being at most as great as the maximum
parking braking force producible by the parking brake.” (Id. at 8:30-34
(emphasis added).) Herges explains that “it is therefore possible for the
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driver to tell whether the maximum parking braking force which can be
produced by the parking brake is sufficient to prevent the vehicle from
rolling.” {Id. at 4:36—39.) Thus, as the Examiner finds, and we agree,
modifying Bach with Herges does not defeat the stated purpose of Bach, but
instead achieves that very purpose—reliably and automatically transitioning
from a service brake mode to a parking brake mode. (See Ans. 5.)
We are also not persuaded by Appellants’ additional arguments—that
the Examiner has failed to provide a “sufficiently articulated rationale” for
combining Bach with Herges, and that combining these references would
“change the principle of operation in the Bach reference” and amounts to
“improper hindsight construction.” (App. Br. 7—9.) As noted, although
Herges accomplishes the same purpose of Bach (automatic and reliable
transition from service brake to parking brake) with a different relative
magnitude of service brakes and parking brakes, it does so to achieve an
additional purpose of giving the driver feedback, prior to deactivating the
service brakes, of whether the parking brake force will be sufficient to
prevent the vehicle from rolling, by applying the service brakes with no
greater force than the parking brakes will be able to provide. (Herges 4:36—
39, 8:30-34.) The Examiner finds, and we agree, this teaching in Herges
provides reasoning for combining the teachings of these references. (See
Ans. 5, 6 (citing, e.g., Herges 4:36—39).) We, therefore, disagree the
Examiner has engaged in improper hindsight reconstruction or has erred in
combining the teachings of the cited references; rather, the Examiner has
articulated “reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded of error in the
Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of independent claim 1, and we,
therefore, sustain that rejection. Separate patentability is not argued for
independent claim 12 or for dependent claims 2—9, 13, 19—21, or 23—25.
(App. Br. 3.) Although claim 7 is rejected over a different combination of
references (adding Gronau), Appellants have not particularly pointed out
errors in the Examiner’s reasoning regarding the additional teachings of the
further cited art, but merely assert patentability based upon that claim’s
dependency from independent claim 1. (App. Br. 9.) Therefore, for the
reasons stated above for independent claim 1, we also sustain the rejection of
claims 2—9, 12, 13, 16, 19—21, and 23—25.
DECISION
For the above reasons, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—9, 12, 13,
16, 19-21, and 23—25 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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