Ex Parte Bausen et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 5, 2017

12788919 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 5, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/788,919 05/27/2010 Dirk BAUSEN AIRBUS 3.0-560 7619
530 7590 09/07/2017
LERNER, DAVID, LITTENBERG,
KRUMHOLZ & MENTLIK
600 SOUTH AVENUE WEST
WESTFIELD, NJ 07090
EXAMINER
THOMAS, BINU
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1717
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/07/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
eOfficeAction @ ldlkm. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DIRK BAUSEN, DANIEL LAHIDJANIAN,
BIRGIT KUHLENSCHMIDT, KARL HAUSMANN, and
ROLF BENSE
Appeal 2016-001960
Application 12/788,919
Technology Center 1700
Before LINDA M. GAUDETTE, BRIAN D. RANGE, and LILAN REN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
REN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a rejection of claims
1—5.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 The real party in interest is identified in the Appeal Brief as Airbus
Operations GmbH. Appeal Brief filed June 17, 2015 (“App. Br.”), 1.
2 Final Office Action mailed December 18, 2014 (“Final Act.).
Appeal 2016-001960
Application 12/788,919
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to “a processing device for coating a tail
assembly of an aircraft, the surface of which was already primed in
preparation” as well as “a method for operating such a processing device.”
Spec. 12.3
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A processing device arrangement for coating a
surface of a rudder unit of an aircraft having an areal [sic.] extent
of several meters, the device arrangement comprising:
a plurality of spatially delimited work stations disposed in
succession so that the rudder unit can be moved to each work
station in succession, wherein the plurality of work stations
includes:
a pretreating station configured to activate the surface by
means of plasma so as to form an activated surface;
a painting station disposed downstream of the pretreating
station and configured to paint the activated surface with at least
one layer of paint having a first color so as to form a painted
surface and configured to dry the painted surface after the
painting; and
a decorating station disposed downstream of the painting
station and configured to apply a pattern having a second color
different from the first color, wherein the pattern includes at least
one of a letter and a picture motif,
wherein each of the plurality of work stations includes:
a work platform disposed on a first side and a second side
of the rudder unit configured to enable a manual processing of
the surface, wherein a height of the work platform is
electromotively or hydraulically adjustable such that the entire
rudder unit is reachable, and
3 Application No. 12/788,919 filed May 27, 2010 (“Spec.”).
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Application 12/788,919
a gantry robot disposed on each side of the rudder unit
configured to automatically process the surface of the rudder
unit.
App. Br. 14.
REFERENCES
The prior art references relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the
claims on appeal are:
Owen
Williams
Dattilo
Baird
Straccia
Herre
US 2,761,373
US 4,850,382
US 6,641,666 B2
US 2006/0044376
US 2008/0138532
US 2008/0047486
Sept. 4, 1956
July 25, 1989
Nov. 4, 2003
A1 Mar. 2, 2006
A1 June 12, 2008
A1 Feb. 28, 2008
REJECTIONS
Claims 1 and 3—5 have been rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Dattilo, Straccia, Baird, Herre, and Owen. Final Act. 3.4
Claim 2 has been rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Dattilo, Straccia, Baird, Herre, Owen, and Williams. Final Act. 8.
OPINION
Appellants raise arguments with regard to the claim limitations of “a
painting station . . . configured to paint. . . and configured to dry” and “a
work platform . . . configured to enable a manual processing of the surface,
wherein a height of the work platform is electromotively or hydraulically
4 In this decision, we also refer to the Examiner’s Answer mailed October 7,
2015 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief filed December 7, 2015 (“Reply.”).
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Application 12/788,919
adjustable such that the entire rudder unit is reachable.” App. Br. 6—12.5
We address each argument in turn below.
Appellants acknowledge that Dattilo discloses a coating system
having “a basecoat zone 20” which includes “a first basecoat station 22” and
“a first flash chamber 40.” App. Br. 6 (citing Dattilo at 4:61—5:6 and 8:42—
49); Reply Br. 2—3; see also Dattilo Fig. 1. Appellants, however, argue that
the basecoat zone 20 in Dattilo does not teach or suggest the “painting
station . . . configured to paint. . . and configured to dry” as recited in claim
1. App. Br. 6. Appellants assert that the Examiner erred by “conflat[ing] a
zone and a painting station” and engaging in impermissible hindsight for
combining “first basecoat station 22” and “first flash chamber 40” which are
separate and distinct structures disclosed in the prior art. App. Br. 6;
Reply 3.
Claim 1 recites “a painting station” configured to “paint [an] activated
surface” and “dry the painted surface after the painting.” The Examiner
reasons that claim 1 “does not define the structural components used to paint
the surface and dry the painted surface.” Ans. 9. The Examiner accordingly
finds that the recited “painting station” is taught or suggested by Dattilo’s
coating system in which painting and drying occurs in respective locations
within the system. Id. Appellants do not respond to, much less dispute, this
finding by the Examiner. Compare Reply 2—3 with Ans. 9. Appellants’
attorney arguments lack evidentiary support and do not explain with
sufficient specificity why the Examiner erred in applying the prior art
5 Appellants do no separately raise arguments for dependent claims 2—5 and
state that they stand or fall with claim 1 based on their dependence from
claim 1. App. Br. 12.
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Application 12/788,919
teachings to the recited limitations. Therefore, Appellants do not identify
reversible error6 in this aspect of the obviousness analysis. In re Pearson,
494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (“Attorney’s argument in a brief cannot
take the place of evidence.”); In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to
identify the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections . . . .”).
Appellants next argue that the Examiner reversibly erred in finding
that Herre’s coating zone having a walk-in control area 15 which includes
floor 37 for operating personnel 16 teaches or suggests “a work platform . . .
configured to enable a manual processing of [a] surface” as recited in claim
1. App. Br. 7. Appellants do not dispute that floor 37 in Herre is configured
to allow the operator to visually monitor the coating process or the
Examiner’s finding that the operator “could also be manually confirming the
positioning of the vehicle within the coating zone and could also be
manually confirming the robots (11) are moving about in the desired
manner.” Compare Ans. 11, with Reply 4. Appellants do not respond to the
Examiner’s reasoning that all claim 1 requires is a platform that makes the
manual processing possible without specifying the type of manual
processing. Compare Ans. 11, with Reply 4.
Appellants only argue that the Examiner’s construction of the claim
term “manual processing” is inconsistent with the specification. Reply 4.
Appellants argue that the specification gives examples of the recited
6 Appellants disagree with the Examiner’s construction of the term “zone”
but do not offer their own construction and do not explain why “a painting
station” as recited in claim 1 precludes the system in Dattilo which includes
both “first base coat station 22” and “flash chamber 40.” Reply 3; see also
App. Br. 6—7.
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“manual processing of [a] surface” such as “manual cleaning tasks, masking
tasks and the like” without explaining why these examples exclude the
visual monitoring from manual processing as the broadest reasonable
interpretation. Id. (citing Spec. 112.) Appellants’ dictionary definition also
does not provide that the recited “manual processing of [a] surface” excludes
visual monitoring. Id. All claim 1 requires is “a work platform disposed on
a first side and a second side of the rudder unit configured to enable a
manual processing of the surface.” Even if we were to agree with
Appellants that Examiner’s interpretation of the claim term “manual
processing” excludes visual monitoring, Appellants have not persuasively
shown that the “work platform” at issue is patentably distinguished from
floor 37 in Herre based on the recited work platform being “configured to
enable” any manual processing. See In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“It is well settled that the recitation of a new intended use
for an old product does not make a claim to that old product patentable.”).
We have also considered Appellants’ argument that the operator in
Herre is unable to manually process the surface of vehicle body 2 from the
walk-in control areas 15 and 15' in the Herre configuration because
sidewalls 6 and 6' are disposed between the vehicle and the control areas.
Id. at 8, 9. Appellants do not respond to, much less identify reversible error
in, the Examiner’s finding that sidewalls 6 and 6' may be transparent
allowing visual monitoring by the operator. Compare Ans. 11 (citing Herre
134), with Reply 4. With regard to Appellants’ argument that Examiner is
relying on different embodiments in Herre for the teaching, “[cjombining
two embodiments disclosed adjacent to each other in a prior art patent does
not require a leap of inventiveness.” Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc v. Cordis
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Application 12/788,919
Corp., 554 F.3d 982, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2009). We are therefore not persuaded
that the Examiner reversibly erred in this aspect of the obviousness analysis.
Appellants lastly argue that a skilled artisan would not have combined
Owen with the other references to teach “a height of the work platform [that]
is electromotively or hydraulically adjustable such that the entire rudder unit
is reachable” as recited in claim 1. Appellants argue that a skilled artisan
would be deterred from applying the manual process in Owen with the
robotic operations in Dattilo, Straccia, and Herre because “the moving parts
of the robots/gantry robots can pose a risk to an operator present within the
painting station.” App. Br. 11. Appellants, however, do not support this
assertion with factual evidence. Id. Appellants’ argument that Owen is
published more than fifty years earlier than Herre does not show that the
Examiner erred in combining the references. In re Wright, 569 F.2d 1124,
1127 (CCPA 1977) (“The mere age of the references is not persuasive of the
unobviousness of the combination of their teachings, absent evidence that,
notwithstanding knowledge of the references, the art tried and failed to solve
the problem.”). Appellants do not respond to, much less identify reversible
error, in the Examiner’s rationale that a skilled artisan would have combined
the references “because Owen teaches the raisable platform save the
operator time in the ascending and descending of the operator.” Compare
Final Act. 6 (citing Owen 1:65—70), with App. Br. 11—12, Reply 4—5. No
reversible error has been identified here.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—5 is affirmed.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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