Ex Parte Bantz et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 29, 2017

13004462 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/004,462 01/11/2011 DAVID F. BANTZ YOR920100491US1
(163-367)
1561
49267 7590 03/31/2017
TTTTTTNTTAN fr RTTFTTO P C EXAMINER
401 Broadhollow Road, Suite 402
Melville, NY 11747
POINT, RUFUS C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/31/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DAVID F. BANTZ, THOMAS E. CHEF ALAS, LESLIE S. LIU,
STEVEN J. MASTRIANNI, JAMES R. MOULIC, and DENNIS G. SHEA
Appeal 2016-006431
Application 13/004,462
Technology Center 2600
Before THU A. DANG, CATHERINE SHIANG, and
NORMAN H. BEAMER, Administrative Patent Judges.
DANG, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 16—23 and 26—37, which constitute all the claims
pending in this application. Claims 1—15, 24, and 25 have been previously
canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
A. INVENTION
According to Appellants, the invention “relates to mobile devices and
communication methods, and more particularly to mobile computing devices
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Application 13/004,462
configured to work with dynamic networks to warn of events of interest”
(Spec. 12).
B. REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM
Claim 16 is reproduced below:
16. A warning notification method for a vehicle, comprising:
storing one or more condition criteria in a memory device;
monitoring a status of the one or more condition criteria,
which include internal and external environmental conditions,
wherein the external environmental conditions include vehicle,
driver, and road independent conditions;
designating policy mandates which define one or more
user-customizable warning scenarios, wherein the warning
scenarios include a combination of the internal and external
environmental conditions;
generating a warning signal responsive to at least one of a
local or remote triggering event related to the status and the
policy mandates; and
using a mobile computing device, communicating
between the monitoring device and an external network to
receive the warning signal and output a warning message on the
external network to one or more designated entities.
C. REFERENCES AND REJECTION
Claims 16, 17, 19, 21—23, 26—29, 31, and 33—37 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lutter et al. (US
2002/0198660 Al, pub. Dec. 26, 2002), Saito et al. (US 2002/0044049 Al,
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pub. Apr. 18, 2002), and Follmer et al. (US 2008/0258890 Al; pub. Oct. 23,
2008).
Claims 18 and 30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lutter, Saito, Follmer, and Gaddy et al. (US
2007/0063824 Al, pub. Mar. 22, 2007).
Claims 20 and 32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lutter, Saito, Follmer, and Sumiya et al. (US
2003/0128123 Al, pub. July 10, 2003).
II. ISSUE
The principal issue before us is whether the Examiner erred in finding
that Lutter in further view of Saito and Follmer teaches or suggests
“monitoring” a status of “one or more condition criteria” which include
“external environmental conditions” that “include vehicle, driver, and road
independent conditions’ '' (claim 16).
III. ANALYSIS
In reaching this Decision, we consider all evidence presented and all
arguments actually made by Appellants. We do not consider arguments that
Appellants could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs, and we
deem any such arguments waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Appellants contend “Lutter does not, and cannot teach or suggest
external environment conditions which include vehicle, road, and driver
independent conditions.” App. Br. 13. In particular, although Appellants
concede “conditions sensed in Lutter are related to vehicle, driver, or road
conditions,” Appellants contend “there is no discussion of monitoring
vehicle, driver, and road independent conditions anywhere in Lutter.” Id. at
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14. Appellants contend “an example of the ‘road-independent conditions’
(e.g., warning based on smoke detection alarm beep), is discussed in at least
paragraphs ... of the present Specification.” Id.
Based on the record before us, we are unpersuaded by Appellants’
contentions regarding the Examiner’s rejections of claim 16. Instead, we
agree with the Examiner’s findings, and agree with the Examiner’s
conclusion that claim 16 would have been obvious over Lutter (in view of
Saito and Follmer).
As an initial matter of claim construction, we give claim 16 its
broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In
re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). However, “limitations are
not to be read into the claims from the specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988
F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
Although Appellants point to the Specification for examples (App. Br.
14), we note that the Specification provides no clear definition for the term
“vehicle, driver, and road independent conditions” (claim 16). That is,
Appellants merely point to “(paragraphs [0029]—[0036], Fig. 1, block 104,
and FIG. 3, blocks 304, 306, 308)” for support for such monitoring of
“vehicle, driver, and road independent conditions” (App. Br. 6), wherein
these portions of the Specification merely sets forth examples of “sensors
104” and the sensing steps thereof. However, we note that the Specification
sets forth that sensors 104 may be, for example, “sensors to determine
information obtained from the vehicle, such as hard braking, radar detection,
collision sensors, accelerometers,” or “sensors to determine if an emergency
exists or that there is an impending emergency situation,” or “sensors that
monitor a condition of a human within the vehicle.” Spec. |24. That is, this
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paragraph describes that the sensor may determine information “obtained
from the vehicle” (“vehicle” condition that is not independent from the
vehicle), or monitor a condition “of a human within the vehicle” (“driver”
condition that is not independent from the vehicle), or monitor information
indicating “an impending emergency situation,” but nothing in the cited
paragraphs clearly define as to what is a “road independent” condition. Id.
In fact, the Specification (and claims) as originally filed does not even refer
to “road independent.”
Further, we note that, given the broadest reasonable interpretation, a
“road independent” condition may encompass any monitored condition not
dependent on the road, including vehicle and driver dependent conditions.
That is, monitoring the vehicle or the driver is independent from monitoring
the road. As set forth in the exemplary examples of the Specification, a
condition obtained from the vehicle or a condition of a human within the
vehicle, such as monitoring a pacemaker for a driver (Spec. 129) or
monitoring the distance of cars following a particular car (Spec. 132), are
independent of the road condition.
Furthermore, we note that claim 16 recites “one or more condition
criteria” which include “external environmental conditions” that “include
vehicle, driver, and road independent conditions” (claim 16). That is,
similar to the examples set forth in the Specification (Spec. H 24, 29, 32)
and thus consistent with the Specification, claim 16 merely requires
monitoring one of a vehicle condition, or a driver condition or a road-
independent condition. Id.
Nevertheless, given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent
with the Specification (Spec. 124), we agree with the Examiner’s reliance on
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Lutter for teaching and suggesting “vehicle, driver, and road independent
conditions,” as recited in claim 16. We agree with the Examiner’s finding
Lutter teaches and suggests “vehicle (. . . speed, acceleration, direction
location indicating imminent danger),” and “driver airbag
deployment [)]” conditions. Ans. 3. That is, similar to the exemplary
embodiments set forth in Appellants’ Specification (Spec. Tflf 24, 29, 32),
Lutter teaches and suggests vehicle (speed acceleration) and driver
conditions (such as airbag deployment) that are “road independent”
conditions.
further, we also agree with the Examiner that “weather” such as “icy”
condition is “neither dependent on the road [n]or driver.” Ans. 3. Although
Appellants contend “weather can cause different road conditions,” and that
“the road is clearly subject to the weather condition,” such contentions are
not commensurate with the language of the claims. App. Br. 15. That is,
although Appellants are contending that road conditions are subject to the
weather condition, monitoring the road-independent conditions does not
preclude monitoring weather conditions. In other words, the road condition
may be subject to (dependent on) the weather, but weather is not dependent
on the road condition (and thus, is road-independent).
Based on the record before us, we are unpersuaded the Examiner erred
in finding the Lutter in combination with Saito and Follmer teaches or at
least suggests the contested limitation.
The test for obviousness is what the combination of references cited
by the Examiner teaches or suggests to one of ordinary skill in the art. See
In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Thus, although
Appellants contend Saito “is silent on monitoring remote triggering events
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unrelated to road, vehicle and driver conditions” (App. Br. 15), Appellants
are arguing against the teachings of Saito individually, when the Examiner is
relying on the combination of Lutter, Saito and Follmer for such teaching
and suggestion.
Further, we note that such contention is not commensurate in scope
with the language of claim 16, since the claim does not require any event
“unrelated” to “vehicle and driver” conditions (claim 16). As discussed
above, given the broadest, reasonable interpretation consistent with the
Specification, claim 16 requires monitoring “one of’ vehicle condition,
driver condition, and road-independent condition. Further, we note such
contention is inconsistent with the Specification, which (similar to Saito)
describes monitoring of both the vehicle and driver, and thus, does monitor
(i.e., is related to) “driver” as well as “vehicle” conditions (Spec. 24, 29,
32). In fact, the Specification (and claims) as originally filed does not even
refer to “unrelated to . . . driver” conditions (id.).
Similarly, given the broadest, reasonable interpretation of the claims
consistent with the Specification, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ non-
commensurate contention that “Follmer does not teach driver independent
conditions” (App. Br. 16). As discussed above, the examples set forth in
Appellants’ own Specification, similar to Follmer, are also “driver” (as well
as vehicle) dependent conditions. (Spec. 24, 29, 32).
On this record, we are unpersuaded of Examiner error in the rejection
of claim 16, and claims 17, 19, 21—23, 26—29, 31, and 33—37 not separately
argued and falling therewith (App. Br. 17) over Futter, Saito and Follmer.
As for claims 18 and 30, Appellants contend “a receiver which
receives messages is clearly not equivalent to a sensor which measures
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conditions” (App. Br. 21). However, we are unpersuaded that the Examiner
erred in finding “Gaddy teaches a device (receiver) which detects a physical
property, i.e. sound . . . from a stationary environment remote from a vehicle
and provides the detected sound to the user . . (Ans. 4). We adopt the
Examiner’s findings, which we incorporate herein by reference, and affirm
the rejection of claims 18 and 30 over the teachings and suggestions of the
combination Lutter, Saito and Follmer, in further view of Gaddy.
As for claims 20 and 32, Appellants contend “there is no user
selection of designated entities in Sumiya” (App. Br. 26). However, we are
unpersuaded that the Examiner erred in finding Sumiya teaches and suggests
this contested limitation because “the users are selected in advance in a
training made and stored in the memory” (Ans. 4). We adopt the
Examiner’s findings, which we incorporate herein by reference, and affirm
the rejection of claims 20 and 32 over the teachings and suggestions of the
combination of Lutter, Saito and Follmer, in further view of Sumiya.
V. CONCLUSION AND DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 16—23 and 26—37 under
35U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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